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Abstract
It has been assumed that the 1994 Rwandan genocide and massacres during which more than
a million of human beings were killed resulted from the "Hutu Power" ideology of the
Habyarimana regime (1973-1994). The perspective of this thesis rests on new lines of
reasoning looking at the root causes of that ideology from two angles. Firstly, from 1880's
Rwanda was subjected to external influences which constructed a meta-narrative founded on
the Hamite myth defending the "Batutsi supremacy". Secondly, the local elite, comprising the
traditional Batutsi nobility, then the educated and the post-independence Bahutu ethno-
politicians assimilated these constructs.
In fact, the group of people, the Banyarwanda, which the explorers, then the missionaries
encountered, were distributed in three social categories: the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa.
These people had been living relatively peacefully together sharing many common factors
including: cultural unity, language, religion, major social organisations like the clan and
family habits such as intermarriages. Some lineages were, however, attempting to create their
own identity. Out of that encounter between the West and Rwandan society, the image of
Rwanda which was constantly projected was of a land dominated by a "race" of "Hamites of
Caucasian origin who arrived in Rwanda from Ethiopia or Egypt". The 'Batutsi' were chosen
by the new rulers, colonialists and the missionaries to promote "Western civilisation founded
on Christianity". The other groups, the Bahutu and Batwa constituted the mass of "roturiers"
relegated to a status of a second category citizens. Discriminatory policies were set up in
cultural, subcultural and political practices to reinforce the so-called differences in schools,
evangelism, public sphere. An ethnic ideology, this thesis argues, emerged out of that meta-
narrative.
The emancipation in the colonies which occurred in the 1940s/50s brought the victims of that
discrimination to stand against the Hamite supremacy. The conservative ruling class,
entrenched in their feelings of supremacy, clashed with those petitioning for more justice and
equity. Surprisingly, the former defenders of the Hamite theory, the colonial rulers and the
Catholic Church converted to the Bahutu cause. These combined actions generated the 1959
social revolution which initiated the Bahutu rule, at the same time, left society fractured. A
new ideology claiming the "rule of the indigenous majority" versus the "Hamites, foreign
conquerors" was born. Subsequently, the shadow of the Hamite myth blocked any chance of
healing the wounds.There was a need to bring about reconciliation. But in both cases, before
and after the independence, the intervention of the Churches like the mediation in the 1990's
crises, seems to have been an attempt to safeguard the triumph of the "Christian Kingdom in
the heart of Africa". The Church hierarchy had pursued a model of Church-State
relationships legitimising a world-view ideology of the MRND system.
To restore a social harmony, a change of attitude is needed from all those who played a key
role in the Rwandan conflict. And to become a true serving community, faithful to the
Gospel, the Churches, this thesis suggests, must confess guilt and repent. Then, if they adopt
a Listening Ecclesiology, they can be a true moral and mediating force between the various
strata of society.
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Abbreviations and some relevant Rwandan terms
Abanyarwanda: population of Rwanda include the three groups:
(A) Bahutu ( pi), (u) Muhutu (sing)
(A) Batutsi (pi), (u) Mututsi (sing)
(A) Batwa (pi), (u) Mutwa(sing)
Karinga: emblem-drum of the reigning dynasty, the Bahindiro lineage, a faction of the Banyiginya clan
AACC: All Africa Conference of Churches
ABRECSA: Alliance of Reformed Churches in South Africa
ADL: Association pour la Defense Des Droits de l'homme et des Libertes Publiques
AEBR: Association des Eglises Baptistes au Rwanda
AEE: African Evangelistical Enterprise
AMECEA: African and Mauritius Episcopal Conferences of East Africa.
ANC:African National Congress
APROSOMA: Association pour la Promotion Sociale des Masses
ARBEF: Association Rwandaise pour le bien-etre Familial
ARDES: Association Ruandaise pour le Developpement Social
ARTC: Association Ruandaise de Travailleurs Chretiens
ASSUMA: Association des Superieurs Majeurs
AVP: Association pour les Volontaires de la Paix
BCMS: Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society, formed by dissidents from CMS
BEM: Bapteme Eucharistie et Ministere
BUFMAR: Bureau pour les formation Medical Agrees au Rwanda
CBK: Communaute Baptiste du Kivu ex-Zaire)
CEC: Comite de Contact des leaders des Eglises
CDR: Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique
CERAI: Centre d'Enseignement Rural et Artisanal Integre
CICCU: Cambridge Inter-Collegiate Christian Union
CIDPDD: Centre International pour le Developpement et le Progres des Droits
CLADHO: Concertation des ligues et Associations des Droits de l'homme
CMML: Christian Mission in Many Lands (Inkuru Nziza mission in Kigali)
CMS: Church Missionary Society
CND: Conseil National de Developpement ( former Rwanda parliament)
CPR-SECOM: CPR, Service de Communication
CPR: Conseil Protestant du Rwanda
CRAP:Commission de relance des activites pastorales
CSM: Christian Student Movement
CSCNWW: Centre for the Studies of Christianity in the Non-Western World
EKD: Evangelical Kirk in Deutschland
EPR: Eglise Presbyterienne au Rwanda
FOR: Forum des Organisations pour la Reconciliation
FIDH international Federation of Human Rights
UIDH inter-African Union of Human Rights and peoples.
CIDPDD/IDHRDD) : Centre International of Human Rights and of Persons et Democratic
Development
JOC: Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne
LDGL: Ligue des Droits de l'Homme dans les Grands Lacs
LIPREDHOR: Ligue pour la Promotion des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda
LWF: Lutheran World Federation
MDR-PARMEHUTU: Mouvement Democratique Republicain PARMEHUTU
MINUAR (UNAMIR): United Nations Military Action for Rwanda
MIR: Mouvement International pour la Reconciliation
MRND: Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement
NPI: New Park Initiative
NRA: National Resistance Army
OCAM: Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauritienne
v
ONAPO: Office National de la Population
ORINFOR: Office Rwandais d'Information
PACLA: Panafrican Christian Leadership Assembly
PARMEHUTU: Parti du Mouvement de PEmancipation Hutu
PDC: Parti Democrate Chretien
PL.: Parti Liberal
PSD: Parti Social Democrate
RADER: Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais
RPF: Rwanda Patriotic Front
RTLM: Radio Television des Milles Collines
SAT: Service d'Animation Theologique ( du diocese de Butare)
SBMPC: Societe Beige des Missions Protestantes au Congo
SDN: Society des Nations
UEBR: Union des Eglises Baptistes au Rwanda
UNAR:Union Nationale Rwandaise
ANCHOR: United Nation High Commission for Refugees
UPRONA: Union pour le Progres National ( Burundi)
VEM(UEM): United Evangelical Mission
WACC: World Association for Christian Communication
WCC: World Council of Churches
WRA: World Reformed Alliance
Chronology of Key events in Rwanda:
1853 Enthroning of King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri
1861 John Henning Speke collects the information on Rwanda
1884-1885 Berlin Conference on Congo
1892 Oscar Baumann, the first European to cross Rwanda
1897 Enthroning of King Yuhi V Musinga. Captain Ramsay presents to the Royal court at Rwanda a
letter of protection and the German empire flag.
1900 Foundation of the first White Fathers Missionary stations in Save and Zaza.
Dr Richard Kandt is the first European to be received by King Yuhi V Musinga.
1903 Baptism of the first Catholic Catechumens
1907 Foundation of the first Protestant Missions in Zinga and Kirinda by Dr Johanssen.
Dr Richard Kandt became the first Governor of Rwanda.
Father Classe became Vicar Apostolic of Catholic Missions in Rwanda. Kabgayi, created in
1905 became the headquarters of the Catholic Church.
1910 Fixation of the borders between the German, British and Belgian colonies.
Father P. Loupias of Rwaza mission in the north was assassinated by Rukara
1911 Baptism of the first Protestant catechumens in Kirinda
1912 The Ndungutse and Chief Basebya revolt in the north. Ft Gudowius, Governor
a.i. and Chief Rwubusisi conducted punitive expedition to impose the Musinga's and the
colonial rule
1914 First tax imposed on each male adult.
Beginning of the First World War.
1916 Invasion of the Belgian troops.
The German missionaries left Rwanda.
1919 The Versailles' Treaty. The Dutch Ost Africa is ceased to Britain and Belgium.
Rwanda and Burundi became Belgian colonies.
1921 The SBMPC took over the Bethel Missions
1922 Installation of the first Mission station of CMS in Gahini
Father Classe ordained bishop continues to head the Catholic Church till his death in 1945 in
Bujumbura
1924-1933 Belgian colonial reforms. Suppression of autonomous Bahutu monarchies.
Grouping of the population with identity cards ascribing the population to ethnic origin (Hutu,
Tutsi or Twa).
Mgr Classe opposed the nomination of Bahutu to positions of chiefs.
1930 Revocation ofMusinga followed in 1931 by the enthroning of his son
Rudahigwa. Impetus of Tornado, the Catholic mass conversions.
1936 Beginning of Protestant Revival in Gahini, a CMS- Ruanda-Mission station
1946 Consecration of Rwanda and its people to Christ the King and the Virgin Mary by
King Mutara III Rudahigwa
1952 Father A.Bigirumwami is ordained first African bishop of the Belgian colonies
1956 Father Andre Perraudin is ordained by A. Bigirumwami bishop of Kabgayi
1957 Publication of the petition of 9 Bahutu leaders.
1958 Rejection of the petition of the Bahutu leaders by 14 ' senior Councillors of the
king of Rwanda
1959 Pastoral letter of Bishop Perraudin, Primate of the Catholic Church.
Death of King Mutara Rudahigwa in Bujumbura. Enthroning of KigeliV Ndahindurwa.
1959-1962 Uprisings and then social revolution of the Bahutu. Many Rwandans mostly,
Batutsi died, others went to exile
1961 Abolition ofMonarchy and its symbols, particularly, Karinga
1962 Rwanda became independent under the rule of the Parmehutu party of Gregoire
Kayibanda
1963/64 Attacks of the 'Inyenzi'(The Batutsi rebels exiled in neighbouring countries). Genocide
massacres of Batutsi' in Gikongoro region.
1973: Violence in schools. Fed by Major-General Habyarimana, the army overthrew Kayibanda.
1974-1981:(!) Kayibanda and his collaborators were assassinated under arrest in the
Ruhengeri prison
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1975: Creation by Habyarimana of the MRND, sole political organisation in the land
Two years later, Bishop Vincent Nsengiyumva became member of its leading
organ, the Central Committee and Chairman of its Social Affairs Commission
1990: - Visit of the Pope in Rwanda ( 6-9 September)
- 1 October attack of the Rwanda Patriotic Front from Uganda in the north.
- 4 October arrest of 10,000 Batutsi and Bahutu opponents to the regime
- 1991-1993 massacres of Batutsi and Bahutu opposed to the regime in various
regions, Kibirira, Bigogwe, Murambi, Bugesera.
- June 1991 promulgation of a new Constitution accepting multiparty politics.
- First meeting for 30 years of the Rwandan Church leaders, the refugees and
the Rwandan government under the hospices of the AACC.
- Creation of new political parties. The opposition pressured for political changes
- April 1992, Church leaders facilitated the forming of a coalition Government of 5 political
parties. The MRND keeps 50 % of the posts and the key departments (Defence, Interior and Security.
The Cabinet is led by a Prime Minister from Opposition which also keeps the Foreign Affairs.
- Beginning of Peace talks with the RPF in Arusha/ Tanzania without Churches.
1993 Signature of the Peace Agreement:
- There must be a fundamental share of power in the Cabinet, the Parliament and the Administration
and army: the two armies ( governmental and RPF) must integrate on an almost equal basis.
- Most of Powers are in the hands of the government led by a Prime Minister from the major Opposition
party, the MDR.
- A contingent of 2500 UN peace troops might supervise the implementation of the accord for a 22
months transitional period out of which democratic elections should be organised. The troops were only
available end of December. The Bengalis were the majority, but Belgium provides the most significant
contingent 600 men) equipped.
- January to March 1994 all the attempts to install the Transitional institutions including the RPF failed.
-April 6, 22.30 Habyarimana, together with the President of Burundi, Cyprian Ntaryamira, died in a
plane shot down near the President's residence in Kanombe.
-7 April to July 1994 genocide massacres of the Batutsi and the Bahutu favourable to the Peace
Agreement or opposed to the massacres; the Moderate Prime Minister, Mrs Agathe Uwiringiyimana
and many members of her Cabinet were killed.
On 8 April, former Speaker of the Parliament, Dr. T.Sindikubwabo sworn in as President, Jean
Kambanda as Prime Minister of the interim government. They gave a go-ahead to the Presidential
Guard, the Militia Interahamwe and of the MRND, abahuzamugambi of the CDR and the bureaucrats of
the regime to perpetrate the genocide within two weeks.
-The More than a million died.
- May 1994 Catholic and Protestant Church leaders met in Kabgayi and published a message in which
they failed to name and condemn the perpetrators of the genocide massacres
- July 1994 RPF took Kigali. The interim government, exiled in south moved to Zaire and forced almost
2 millions of people to exile.
- October 1996 war of Zaire. Some refugees were repatriated; many others started a long odyssey in the
deep Equatorial Forests in the west where thousands died.
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And the Genocide Happened.
For present and future generations of Rwandans, 1994 will remain the point of reference for
the most horrific trauma experienced by the whole nation - the genocide in which more than
one million human beings were killed. For three years I have been reflecting on the factors
and circumstances which led to it. I have wanted to begin this story with a personal
testimony of what I experienced as the state organisation of the genocide from the early days
of horrific events.
On the evening of the 6 April 1994 the plane carrying the president of Rwanda, Major-
General Juvenal Habyarimana together with his colleague from Burundi, Cyprian
Ntaryamira, was shot down. The two Presidents together with their delegations, died when
the plane crashed in Habyarimana's residence in Kanombe, Kigali. A few hours after the
announcement of the murder on RTLM Radio, the city was plunged again into a similar
nightmare to the night of the 4th October 19901 . At 6 a.m. various sources of information
confirmed the relentless slaughter of opposition leaders, the Batutsi and human rights
activists2,
th
On 7 April at 7.30 a.m. Israel Havugimana, the Secretary of the African Evangelistic
Enterprise (AEE) who was a friend from secondary school days and a long-time partner in
the Christian peace initiatives) called me from his residence, three miles away. He told me:
"People in military uniform came to my house. They told us to lie down in the sitting room,
beat us, broke everything, took money and some commodities and then left". But less than an
hour later when I called Israel there was no reply. Two hours after, Olivier Iyakaremye, a
member of the Bible Society of Rwanda Board phoned from Gikondo to say: "Israel is dead".
His neighbours from "Medecins sans Frontieres", a French Medical Aid Organisation, heard
several shootings in his house; when the shooting stopped, there was no sign of life. Later,
the same neighbours rescued 4 years old Danny, from among the dead bodies. She was the
youngest of Havugimana's daughters.
1 At that time the Rwandan army simulated an RPF attack in the capital causing bomb explosions and shooting
the whole night. They then justified the arrest, torture and imprisonment of utsi, any opposition and other
undesirable elements of the regime. At 5.30 a.m. Radio Rwanda started broadcasting the communiques of the
minister of Defence, inviting the population to remain calm and not to move from their houses. Then it began to
broadcast classical music.
2
April, 7th at 6.30 am two close friends Dominique Nkiramacumu and Israel Havugimana, colleagues in
different Christian and Human rights organisations, who lived between the Parliament building (position of RPF
troops) and the headquarters of the UN troops phoned to announce the deterioration of the situation in their area.
There had been bombings in Hotel Chez Lando, where the owner, Landoald Ndasingwa, who was also the
Minister of Social Affairs, had his residence. Ndasingwa was killed together with his Canadian wife, and their two
children and other relatives. Among other personalities killed in hours of early the 7^ of April 1994 were, the
President of the Constitutional Court, Joseph Kavaruganda, the Minister of Agriculture and President of the Social
Democratic Party, Frederic Nzamurambaho; the Minister of Information, Faustin Rucogoza; the Director of the
Cabinet of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dr Deo Habimana and a close aide to the President of the MDR; these
were all killed while the latter had gone in hiding.
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I phoned D. Sezibera, the Secretary of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister who was also a
close friend and member of my Church. I asked him if the Prime Minister was going to
broadcast an appeal for calm to avoid the revenge of the President's death by the extremists.
Sezibera responded in an unrecognisable voice: "the Prime Minister, Mrs. Uwiringiyimana,
was trying to get to Radio-Rwanda when she was attacked by the Presidential Guard. There
was eventually a counter-attack from the soldiers of the MINUAR force that protected her",
Sezibera reported3. Neither she nor her nominated successor, Faustin Twagiramungu were
now contactable, he told me. But suddenly I could hear the voice of Sezibera's wife,
Xaverine, "turashize we, nimudutabare! Bari mu kurasa kwa Baboab. Ngaba baraje" (we are
going to be killed. They are bombing Baobah's Hotel next to us! They are coming here)4 .
On that day, the 7 April, the situation deteriorated rapidly. Information was coming by
telephones and faxes about the assassination of several politicians including the Prime
Minister, Mrs Agathe Uwiringiyimana and her husband. Their guard, 10 UN Belgian soldiers
were disarmed while trying to protect the Prime Minister. Transferred into the Kigali
barracks, they were tortured, killed and mutilated by the Presidential Guard. In the Jesuit
centre of Remera-Kigali, 11 priests and nuns were killed by the Presidential guard, 500 yards
from the headquarters of the UN military peace troops. Several young ladies were killed in
the residential house of JOC 5for functionaries, next door to the headquarters of the White
Fathers. Charles Shamukiga a successful businessman, founder of a human rights
organisation, called the Association for Volunteers of Peace (AVP) and Consul of
Luxembourg in Rwanda was also reported to have been killed.
The killings occurred not only in Kigali but also in Gisenyi and Cyangugu. At Rambura
parish ( the native village of President Habyarimana in Gisenyi, in the catholic diocese of
Nyundo, three priests were killed6. In the capital city the massacres and looting happened
quickly in Kiyovu, Gikondo, Remera and Kacyiru7. In Cyangugu, several people including a
district medical doctor, Ignace Nagapfizi, a magistrate, Joseph Kayihura, a businessman,
Karangwa were killed, while refugees flooded into the Churches. In Kibungo there were
several thousand refugees in the Churches, in the parishes of Rwamagana, Zaza, Kibungo
while barricades were established on the roads and borders preventing freedom of movement.
On 8 April 1994, 25 teachers at the Junior seminary in Nyundo and four clergymen: Father
Augustin Ntagara, Adrien Nzanana, Deo Twagirayezu, and a Josephite brother were killed.
3 The story proved to be half-true. There was no response from the UNAMIR (United Nations Military Peace
Keeping Force for Rwanda) which was disarmed, brought to the Kigali-centre military camp, tortured and killed.
4 Their neighbours, the Hotel Baobab belongs to a former army officer, Stany Sibomana, a member as well as
Sezibera of the MDR opposition party. Sezibera jumped the wall of his residence. For two months he lived under¬
ground in the home of a Muslim family. His family was saved by an RPF soldier disguised as a member of the
Interahamwe militia.
5 Jeunesse Ouvriere Catholic (Catholic Youth Workers'organisation).
6 Those killed in Muramba parish were: Father Spiridion Kageyo, Antoine Niyitegeka, Antoine Habiyakare.
Among the victims in Gisenyi were, 2 teachers in the Nyundo secondary school: Mr Semucyo and Mrs Kanzayire.
7 White Fathers, Rwanda., Fax no 2 April. 7 1994, 13.45 p.m. and fax no 3, 16.35 p.m.Archives ofWhite Fathers,
Brussels.
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The Roman Catholic bishop of Nyundo, Wenceslas Karibushi was wounded but miraculously
a Rwandan officer rescued him from being buried alive by the militia. Some Diplomats tried
to meet with the MRND leaders in the Capital but only the ambassadors of USA and France
attended due to lack of security8. A meeting of some army officers asked the 'government' to
proceed with the installation of the institutions of the Arusha Accord; the Government,
Parliament and an integrated Army and Civil Administration. From the 8 April onwards, it
was no longer possible to exchange information as the only means were the telephones which
had been cut off in different sectors of the city including ours at Kacyiru. From then on, only
the two media, Radio RTLM and Radio Rwanda, now under the control of the extremists
were openly calling on the population to identify the inyenzi (cockroaches) who were hiding
among them and to hand them over to soldiers9.
In Kibungo, the Roman Catholic diocese headquarters was affected from the 9 April. Father
A.Ruterandongozi was one of the first to be killed. From then on several regions of the
prefecture e.g. Sake, Zaza, Gasatsa, Gahini, Rwamagana were badly affected. In Kigufi
monastery (Nyundo diocese in Gisenyi), the massacres began with the killing of 7 people
including three Priests and a Brother. In Nyamirambo, after the massacres of the 8th April in
the parish, the soldiers returned and killed indiscriminately a considerable number of people
in the Josephites' centre and in College St Andre. Several people were killed in the
Dominican Congregation headquarters. "Witnesses speak of a river of blood," wrote Guy
th
Theunis of the White Fathers. Equally, on the 8 in Gikondo Catholic parish, 61 people were
killed and 13 seriously injured. Father S. Felipok of the Pallotti Congregation spent more
than a hour bargaining in vain with the Gendarmes10. The latter retreated leaving the militia
'working', i.e. killing their targets.
On the 9th April 1994, Theodore Sindikubwabo, former Speaker of the monolithic MRND
Parliament was sworn in as the new President of the Republic. He took up his presidency in
the Hotel des Diplomates, Kigali. There, he presided over a swearing in ceremony of a new
cabinet made up exclusively of the extremist wings from various parties headed by the
MRND11. In his swearing in speech the newly appointed Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda,
gave "two weeks for the pacification" to be completed which was rightly interpreted by the
observers as the time necessary to complete the systematic killing of the Batutsi and the
s
According to a report shared in secret with me in Kigali by a high ranking Ecclesiastic-diplomat in early January
1994, the diplomats were also divided among the 'pro-Habyarimana', 'pro-RPF' or the 'pro-opposition'. Thus, the
ambassador of Belgium was called squarely "Inkotanyi" (RPF), the ambassador of France was publicly "CDR"
(Pro-regime hard-liners), the ambassador of USA was said to have come to espouse the CDR position.
9 White Fathers, Rwanda region. Fax no 4 and no 5, April 8 1994, 11.40 p.m.
Rwandan Security Forces comprised three categories: The Army and the Gendarmerie with two separate chiefs
of staff, under the Ministry of Defence, and the Police related the Ministry of Home Affairs (called the Ministry of
Interior).
11
Opposition members of Mrs Agathe Uwiringiyimana's Cabinet were killed or went into hiding whilst the
MRND Ministers were protected by the army and then re-appointed in the interim cabinet.
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'ibyitso'. Units of gendarmes and militia were convoyed by bus around the regions that were
showing resistance to the killings 12.
At this early stage France and Belgium sent military planes to evacuate their nationals and
other western expatriates. Belgium pulled out its troops from the UN peace force, leaving
their Rwandan colleagues or employees behind them'3. In its session of 21 April, the UN
Security Council decided to pull out its troops. The withdrawal of the international
community forces was interpreted by the slaughterers as a clear signal to go ahead with their
genocide plans.
"Are these people members of our group"?
After 48 hours of uncertainty hiding under the storehouse of Bible Society House and having
failed to escape on foot from the compound, we were joined by a neighbouring family who
were escaping from the militia attacks. We decided to pray and to wait for death or for a
miracle. On the 9th April we were miraculously evacuated by a gendarme who forced us to
evacuate his family including his wife of Bagogwe background to his home-village in our
native region. With the Kimonyos's the convoy of 14 people of mixed 'ethnic' identities
moved from the city, spending hours at the barricades negotiating the prices of individuals,
trying to deny people's identities.
After crossing the obstacle of the Nyabarongo bridge, at Ruriba, south west of Kigali, we
tried to join an international convoy of Americans, Canadians, German, Italians and other
citizens of Western countries evacuated by road via Bujumbura. We then hoped to integrate
into the convoy and to pass through the Rwanda borders and to enter Bujumbura in Burundi.
The convoy stopped in Rugobagoba, 35 km from Kigali. It soon became clear that we were
persona non grata. Questions such as "Are these people ours? And Can we let them go
please" sounded like a blow of a hammer on my head. They were not spoken by an
Interahamwe, but from one of the leaders of the convoy! We were then sent off, forced to
leave the convoy, and to fend for ourselves.
12 See our description of the killings in Kibuye and Cyangugu , Butare and the visit in these regions of the interim
government.
13 On 8 April 1994, 3000 Tutsi refugees and 250 psychiatric patients from Ndera, near Kigali who spontaneously
run toward the Belgian troops asking for protection were rebutted by gun shootings and left behind. An hour later,
they were all exterminated. Surprisingly, a senior army officer of the Belgian UN troops, Major Lemaire, spoke of
a 'successful expedition'!
At the College of Technology in Kicukiro, five thousand people including the then minister for Foreign Affairs,
Boniface Ngurinzira, architect of the Arusha Accord who negotiated the deployment of the UN troops were left by
Belgians troops and hacked to death by the hands of killers. A survivor of the carnage, Bs.3. interviewed in
Nairobi June 1994. See also Florida Ngurinzira (widow of the late Boniface Ngurinzira interviewed in Brussels,
July 1995; and also her intervention before the Commission of the Belgian Parliament on the tragic events of
Rwanda. In Mahoux and Verhofstadt in Decembre 1997.
In Rugunga, nationals of European countries including France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland were gathered by
French troops in the Ecole Francaise awaiting for their evacuation. 13 Rwandan employees of the embassies
implored French troops unsuccessfully to be evacuated. "Then a courageous young Belgian from a volunteer
organisation refused to evacuate without his Rwandan colleagues. It is then that the unfortunates had their lives
saved". Witness. Me. 12.
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Fortunately, the road from Gitarama to Nyanza (where our friends the Kimonyo's had a
residence) and the Nyanza-Birambo line in the direction of our native region, were still safe.
But the sting of the question "are these people members of our group", still resounded in my
ears as I remembered that the same question was asked by the killers, to select from among
the Banyarwanda those who would die and those who would live,
th
From the 10 of April to the second half of April 1994 when I went into hiding trying to plan
an escape into exile I experienced horrific tragic events and moments of uncertainty from my
mother's home, in the west of the Rwanda. The following stories are samples of personal
experiences and notes taken from Monday the 11th of April 1994. Here I want to show how
"the genocide machinery" functioned as a perfect organisation of the authorities who were
seeking to create what Rakiya Omar and Alex de Waal have rightly called, a "solidarity in the
crime". In fact, as indicated in this modest account, the spectre of the genocide at the local
level has been successfully spread by the authorities who thereafter washed their hands of
having organised or of having orchestrated the massacres.
The Death of the Symbols
When we were exiled in the Biguhu region I hoped to pursue my commitment as a human
rights activist in preventing the spread of violence. In the first instance, some of the local
authorities like the councillor to whom I spoke gave the impression of being committed to the
same principles. At one point I even believed I had persuaded him to resist the call for mass
murder spread by the perpetrators of the massacres either on radio or by rumours. But then, it
soon became clear that these authorities were executing orders from their superiors. Hence
reliable accounts related in person to the present author and subsequently substantiated by the
occurrence of tragic events revealed that during a so-called 'security meeting' on the Mwendo
Commune, on 12 April 1994, the local authorities had received clear orders from the
Burgomaster and the Prefecture authorities to eliminate the 'Ibyitso' (traitors) and 'Inyenzi
(cockroaches)'.
The first victim in the Mwendo commune was Athanase Rwamuhizi, the Presbyterian
minister of Kugituntu parish and President of the Itabire district. Following the massacres
that started in the neighbouring commune of Muko in the Gikongoro Prefecture, he gave
asylum to the refugees in parish. Then to prepare for the threat of attack, Rwamuhizi
successfully organised a watch guard. He was visited by the President of the Church, on
Sunday 10 April 1994 but rejected the offer of joining some of his colleagues in Kirinda, the
major Church centre, 40 km away14. Rwamuhizi probably hoped to be able to use his
influence and protect the refugees mostly from the neighbouring Gikongoro prefecture. On
14 In fact, the massacres started when the Presbyterian ministers were pursuing an annual theological conference.
Those who were ministering in parishes nearby, like Rwamuhizi were able to return to their parishes.
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the 12 of April, killers from the neighbouring Muko commune of Gikongoro Prefecture
attacked, killed Rwamuhizi and all 200 refugees15.
Rwamuhizi was a humble man who lived among the people. He was a man of original ideas,
who made a significant contribution to improving the living conditions of the population in
the very poor, remote and deprived region of Itabire. He initiated self-reliance projects, built
a very big, spacious Church and schools, storage silos, a traditional medicine centre; he
initiated a clean water project and was still extending his activities. His innovations earned
him not only respect but also suspicion.16
After the death of Rwamuhizi the tragedy continued among those of Tutsi background
including Church workers, teachers and agronomists. Among the victims were the family of
Revd Mugemera and his predecessor in the parish of Biguhu, Revd Oscar Rwasibo. They
were killed respectively in Kirinda and at Kuruganda. Meanwhile, those among the local
population who were threatened continued to seek refuge in the Commune's headquarters or
with families of friends17.
On Wednesday, 13 April, a prominent teacher and my head-teacher in Primary School,
Michael Nyiridandi and his family joined us. Nyiridandi who had been awarded the gold
medal of service by the government was a truly charismatic leader in the field of education,
highly competent and full of integrity. We succeeded, despite severe pressure, in hiding them
under the roof of my mother's house. I then planned to drive the whole night up to Nyanza
and then to the Burundian borders to enable them to escape. But as the French proverb says
"L'homme propose et Dieu dispose". My best plans were thwarted by the killers who were
roaring like a raging lion18.
The next day, it was another school teacher, Ezekiel Munyarigoga a born-again evangelist,
and his wife Deborah who were killed in the Biguhu Church on Thursday, 14 April 1994
where they had been hiding for a week. In a particular incident of high risk, six of us
challenged the killers and hollowed out a grave between the residence of the minister and the
youth centre where we buried Ezekiel and Deborah with prayer and praise for his life. We
asked God that this prayer accompany all the victims of this most heinous carnage. A funeral,
15 This account was first reported to me by Ut.20., a retired school teacher.
16 The next day I spent most of the time on the phone at the Church Health Centre requesting assistance and a car
from the Church leadership from Kirinda to collect the body. Finally when the car came later in the afternoon with
Revd Gakindi and M.F. Ntawirukanayo in it, the group of elders and staff of the Biguhu Centre withdrew one by
one. Half way to Kugituntu parish, we met the Burgomaster with the body of Rwamuhizi. Rwamuhizi who was
expecting a visit of a UN staff agency was suspected of working with the RPF according to a staff member of a
local health institution.(Tj.l8).
17
Among the Church workers were the families of the Biguhu parish minister and Geras Mutimura. Revd
Mugemera survived the massacres of Friday, the 15 April 1994 in his native parish, Kirinda but his wife and their
seven children were killed.
18 In the afternoon my mother's residence was attacked by a mob of more than 50 people. They checked every
centimetre of the house and were about to leave when our neighbouring villager who had two sons among the
killers insisted that the refugees had not left the house. They eventually returned, found the family, took them to
the nearby river, Mbirurume where they killed them cynically and cold- bloodedly. Witnesses Ns.l3.,& Tm.19.
the most sacred event in the life of individuals in Rwanda culture has been refused to the
victims.
After burying the Munyarigogas it was reported that the Burgomaster was at the nearby trade
centre of Gahunduguru. I resolved, as we had previously done as human rights activists to
confront the Burgomaster on the issue of stopping the violence. I then suggested to him that
the killers who were known to the villagers be put under arrest in order to appease the rest.
"If these people did not die who else would die instead"? replied the Burgomaster repeating
one of his police guard's sentence. He then left in the commune car.
Due to the despair provoked in me by the threats and the escalation of these events, I decided
to join David Simurabiye, the Pentecostal minister of the nearby Musongati parish for mutual
comfort. When I met with him it was raining. He seemed unusually concerned. We sat in the
parish office where I shared with him my loneliness and isolation due to the threats from the
mobs. He told me of the refugees who were hiding in the bushes and would come in the
evening for restoration and rest. We prayed, comforted one another and separated. The day
after, it was reported to me that the killers surrounded the immense Pentecostal Church under
construction and killed 21 persons including mothers and babies.
Simulating attacks to Ensure Solidarity in Crime
According to witnesses more than 2000 people were massacred near the parish of Biguhu, in
the Mwendo Commune, on Saturday, 16 April 1994. The massacres occurred shortly after the
Burgomaster visited the nearby trade centre at Gahunduguru. There, he announced his
intention of 'releasing the traitors ('ibyitso') and invited youngsters to 'welcome' them. A car
with health clinic centre staff was sent into the surrounding areas to round up a supply of
youngsters from villages allegedly to defend the Gahunduguru centre against the 'imminence'
of attack. According to eye witnesses, groups of armed delinquents attacked defenceless
persons. Those killed included old people, women, children, mothers with babies who had all
been starving for more than a week. The 'welcoming' group finished them off in less than
two hours. One man said: "I left with the car to call for supplies in the nearby villages at
approximately 3 p.m. When I came back around 4 p.m., there was not one single person left
alive". When I asked him how he, a worker in a Church institution, could have been involved
in such a plan and why, he tried to modify his statement and said: "We were told that we
were going to be attacked, that is why I accepted to go and locate supplies".
This imprudent disclosure led me to suspect that indeed the genocide had a network of
relays on local levels. Eye witnesses in Gahunduguru said that the Burgomaster had followed
the unsuspecting refugees on their route to the carnage so as to ensure that they were all
killed. When he arrived at the place of the carnage, he asked the killers to remove the bodies
to allow him to drive through the corpses. He went 1 km to the trade centre where he drank a
beer, and drove back through the bodies again to return to the commune's headquarters
leaving the corpses strewn on the road.
xix
The next morning the former Burgomaster, then head of the MRND in the Birambo sous-
prefecture, presided at the digging of common graves and the disposal of the bodies. On that
Sunday, 17 April 1994, I again joined Pastor Simurabiye in the Musongati Pentecost Church
and cried out in revolt and revulsion against the killers before a diminished congregation of
15 to 20 people. But then in my despair I questioned what can a committed community of
rural boys and girls do other than say prayers? At that moment, we were as dead bodies
sitting there, trapped in a hopeless situation. According to witnesses, the simulacra of the
attacks of the commune and the trade centres were organised to involve more people in the
killings and to ensure solidarity in crime. There was nothing I could do I told myself, but tell
the Burgomaster the truth. The last time I met Mr. Muragizi, the burgomaster, 18th of April, I
asked him if he thought that in "killing innocent defenceless people you could win the war; or
resuscitate your shobuja (patron)"19.
The obvious role of the local authorities in encouraging the massacres were confirmed to us
during an attempt to go into exile on April 25th near the Bwakira commune. There we were
rescued from a mob, not by policemen nor any other commune functionaries who gazed
indifferently at the scene of our plight, but by a widow. A Church member like us at Kigali
parish, she came running up from a long distance crying loudly: "Uwo ni Gatwa wacu,
ntimumwice" (this is our Gatwa don't kill him). Having split into partisans and opponents to
decide our fate, they did not kill us but took our car leaving us abandoned at the side of the
road. Eventually we negotiated the cost of our freedom not knowing what was going to
happen to the car or to us next.
Genocide Massacres in Kaduha, Kibuye and Kirinda
Witnesses in the Gahunduguru centre saw two army jeeps on Tuesday 19 April 1994,
conveying armed gendarmes towards the Kaduha Centre in Gikongoro, 30 miles away. It is
believed that these people carried out the bombings of more than 14000 people which took
place on the 20 and 21 April in the surrounding areas including the Mwendo commune.
Witnesses who arrived from Kigali, via the Nyange centre in the middle of April told us how
the Roman Catholic Church had been razed to the ground with 3000 to 4,000 people inside
by a caterpillar engine hired by a local trader and the authorities of the Kivumu commune.
Similar killings happened in the Gatwaro stadium in Kibuye prefecture where, according to
witnesses almost 15000 people were killed under the order of the Prefet, Dr Kayishema. In
the Kizenga hills at the Rwamatamu commune, about 10,000 refugees resisted for two days,
having taken shelter with their cattle. The resistance was broken by supplies of Interahamwe
convoyed in three lorries from the Bugarama and Cyangugu regions as witnessed20.
19
Using the word Shobuja, I was refering to the death of President Habyarimana, whom the killers pretended to
avenge. I then anticipated the worst and began to arrange my escape from the commune for my exile. I later learnt
from credible sources that he regretted that 'such an accomplice' had escaped to safety.
20
Witness, Ks.9, April 1994.
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In Kirinda, the killings were conducted by the Sous-Prefet, the Burgomaster, the President of
the Tribunal and the local gendarmes. On 14 April 1994 these authorities simulated an attack
against the Bwakira Commune. They mobilised youngsters, piled them into a lorry belonging
to the roads department and took them in convoy allegedly to defend the commune. Halfway
they turned around and started the attack against the refugees in Kirinda at the Hospital and
School of Nursing located at Shyembe centre. Many Church workers including medical and
paramedical, teachers and ministers' families were all exterminated. These authorities rented
lorries from the centre to load the corpses to bring them to the river Nyabarongo nearby. The
authorities however did not leave Shyembe until 2. a.m. after finishing their 'job'. Two days
later the Sous-Prefet, Anaclet Rudakubana, was promoted by the interim government as
Prefet of Kibungo, a position he was never to occupy21.
The following days, the Burgomaster of Bwakira would sent militia to the Gitarama
prefecture to the Masango and Murama Communes and up to the Adventist mission of Gitwe
to hunt the Batutsi. The victims were brought hands tied behind them, seated on an
embankment of the Nyabarongo bridge, then asked in which order they wanted to be
hacked22.
Call for the Final Solution
Massacres in Butare: Breakdown of True Solidarity
In Butare, the massacres started after the visit of the interim President, Theodore
Sindikubwabo. A native of the region, he made a visit and gave two public speech as on 19
April and again on 25 April. He blamed the authorities for not being 'concerned'. He publicly
said : "abana b'abatutsi bagiye kwiga imbunda none baraturasa. None abantu bamwe
baravuga ngo ntibindeba"23. Until then the authorities in Butare, the Prefet and the Military
Commander, had co-operated with the population to prevent the occurrence of the massacres.
But then, the Prefet was dismissed and killed together with his entire family whilst the
military commander was displaced. From that time onwards the massacres were
systematically conducted by the Presidential Guards and the militia who were taken there in
convoy by buses and military lorries from Kigali24.
Massacres in Cyangugu:
Illusion of an International Solidarity
In Cyangugu, local clergy met in the Gihundwe Mission told how the massacres started in the
th
Kibogora Methodist centre. The massacres began on Sunday, the 10 of April in the
Kibogora region which contains a Methodist parish, a large hospital and schools for nurses
and teachers. A meeting for 'security' was called by the Burgomaster. The meeting turned out
21 The appointment of the former Sous-Prefet of Birambo, A. Rudakubana as Prefet of Kibungo was announced
by the Radio Rwanda station. Ironically, the day he moved to take over the office, the RPF took control of the
area. (Tm.19).
22 Ns.13, witness in April 1994
23 Our translation: "the children of the Batutsi have been training in fire arms and are shooting at us. Now, some
people are saying: I am not concerned".
24
Degni-Segui, R., Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission. Report to the Economic and Social
Council. Document E/CN.4/1995/70 of 11 November 1994, p,4.
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to be a mass murder strategy. The Interahamwe blocked the roads, trapping and killing
hundreds of people on their way back from the Church. The militiamen entered the hospital
and took sick people from wards. Some tried to escape but were assassinated by the killers in
the compound surrounding the hospital.25
In their own compound, in Gihundwe, three refugees were shot dead in front of the
Moderator of the Church by gendarmes who were threatening to expel almost 2000 refugees
from the first Swedish missionary station founded in 194126. Eventually the Church leaders
obtained permission for the refugees to be transferred to the Kamarampaka stadium where it
was assumed they would receive better protection.
The killers were so determined to exterminate their targets that they would execute them at
sacred sites by bombing or razing buildings to the ground, or pulling them from under the
protection of key personalities and communities. When the Catholic bishop of Cyangugu
tried to rescue three clergymen from Nyamasheke Parish and Secondary school, the refugees
were pulled out of his car at Kagano Commune and hacked to death in front of the bishop27.
At the prefecture 'security meeting', the clergy present later reported that the Sous-Prefet of
the area asked for a digger to dig the mass graves. As there was no engineer available, the
Commune paid 200,000 Fr. to the criminals to bury thousands of the victims28.
In Cyangugu, the genocide will also be remembered for two other reasons. First, because the
international community failed to rescue the victims. Following the onset of the massacres,
refugees gathered at the Kamarampaka29 stadium from the Gihundwe Pentecostal parish, the
Catholic diocese headquarters and elsewhere allegedly for 'sure protection'. Instead of
protection, the militia would come to select victims to be slaughtered. For instance, on 29
April, 80 people were killed near the Kamembe market in a place renamed Kinihira0 whilst
several others were killed in a ravine called Mukadasomwa.
A tragic incident among many others happened the day after P. Gaillard31 head of the Red
Cross in Rwanda, had created the illusion of an international solidarity. P.Gaillard announced
on RFI that an agreement with the prefecture authorities for the transfer of the refugees to the
Congolese (ex-Zaire) city of Bukavu, two miles away was imminent. The negotiations failed.
25
Kg.9 & Nj.14., Cyangugu, April 28 1994.
26
Kg.9 & Nj.14. Cyangugu, April 28, 1994.
27
Mgr T. Ntihinyurwa has, since the end of the war been appointed Archbishop of Kigali, Primate of the Catholic
Church in Rwanda.
28
Kg. 9 & Nj.14. Cyangugu, April 28,1994
29 The referendum of September 1961 together with the legislative elections which ended the monarchical regime
have been since known as Kamarampaka (which means the end of dispute). The stadium was famous not only for
its historical name, but for the pressure to contribute fiancially and manually put on the population by the then
Prefet, the zealous A. Kagimbngabo. This man was also known for his mobilisation tactics during the 1959
revolution (Np.15). This memorial stadium is one of a dozen built with the population's labour and financial
contributions during the era of glorified achievements of the MRND. It was located in a remote hill in the
Cyangugu prefecture's headquarters, opposite the Congolese city of Bukavu.
30 The place of slaughter near the public market of Kamembe was renamed Kinihira to cynically indicate that the
victims were being sent 'home' to Kinihira, the RPF strongholds in the north of the country, in Byumba Prefecture.
31 The only leader of a Humanitarian Organisation who had decided to remain in Rwanda and to pursue his
activities during the tragic events.
xxii
According to various sources confirmed by the UN Special Reporter32, the Prefet was under
pressure by from his superiors who urged him to apply the 'final solution'. Thus the refugees
remained in the stadium subject to death33.
Second, the massacres were a demonstration of the absence of courage and of a clear
strategy among the Christian leaders to stand for human rights and to save lives. According
to credible sources, the Muslims, in Cyangugu protected their residential area called "la Cite"
and mobilised members of their community whatever political parties they belonged to for
their mutual protection. At the same time, Christian leaders requested the authorities of the
interim government to take the refugees onto the Kamarampaka stadium rather than resisting
with them, eventually up to martyrdom.
Due to the insistence of the Red Cross, about one thousand survivors were transferred to the
Nyarushishi tea plantation. Credible sources from among people native to or familiar with
Cyangugu estimated that there were no more than 4000 Batutsi survivors of the whole
Cyangugu prefecture at the time. If only pressure on the interim government had
accompanied the efforts of the Red Cross, the 5000 refugees could have been transferred to
Bukavu, two miles away. Surprisingly, when the French "Turquoise operation" arrived, it
took only a few days to rescue thousands of the genocide bureaucrats, militia and army from
hundreds of miles away. In the row over justification of their controversial mission, the
French advanced a fanciful figure of 10,000 Batutsi allegedly rescued in the Nyarushishi
(Braeckman, Verschave). Although we thank God for even a single life saved (and many
people thanked France for that), the figures have been obviously put forward to exorcise
France's bad conscience from its previous role in recruiting, training, equipping and rescuing
the genocidal regime as shown in chapter Six.
A Cry for Help to the World-wide Church
On the 13 April 1994, the present author had a two hour communication with the United
Evangelical Mission in Wuppertal (VEM)34, describing the occurrence of the massacres as a
carefully long-time organised plan from the MRND/CDR regime to exterminate the Batutsi
and the political opposition. Although it pursued the line of the previous letter of information
on the political crisis he regularly produced from 1991 to inform the ecumenical bodies and
friends abroad, that communication had a special character due to the tragedy and the
circumstances of the call. Sent by telephone from a remote village, the intention was to alert
32 Degni-Segui., op.cit., p. 4.
33 The announcement of the deal was made on Radio France International, on 28 April 1994. But nothing came out
of these negotiations. When on 30 April the refugees were told to return to their homes some sources say the
refugees then tried to cross the border to Zaire prompting the militia posted around the stadium and the roads to
shoot indiscriminately leaving several hundred dead. Others were taken back to the stadium. Out of the 5123,
almost 1000 survivors were transferred to the Nyarushishi tea plantation. Senior district functionaries including a
Magistrate at the Appeal Court met in Cyangugu and a local Telecommunications engineer estimated the
Cyangugu victims between 40,000 to 50,000. Witness., Hg.9. and B.a.l, April 1994).
34 The message was recorded by Peter Sandner in French, translated into German and English and sent to
ecumenical partners and Church members with some delay.
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the ecumenical family to the gravity of the tragedy with the hope of raising a campaign of
solidarity with the victims. It also deepened his isolation as he was labelled as 'icyitso'
(accomplice).
The message started by describing the events as "Horror, carnage, political and ethnic
cleansing which had no equivalent despite the tragic history of Rwanda
The superlatives, I said, would not present the situation in Rwanda as it was happening. The systematic
killings are being conducted by the military unit of the Presidential Guard, the Interahamwe and
Impuzamugambi militia against the Batutsi and among leaders and adherents of the moderate opposition
imprisoned in their houses. The holocaust has been a carefully prepared response by the hard-line regime
of the dictatorship to the crisis resulting from its incapacity to integrate the problems of democracy and
to resolve the October 1990 war. The Church has tried to mediate between the different forces but
without a clear position against the political blockage, it was criticised by the opposition for not being
neutral35.
The author also referred to the interconnection between the situation in Zaire, Burundi and
Rwanda where the democratic process had been sabotaged by violence perpetrated by violent
groups organised by the regimes. When he escaped from Rwanda with his family at the
beginning of May 1994, the VEM was supportive and accepted to finance this research and
my wife's Master in Health Management in the hope that we will be able to contribute to the
healing of Rwandan society.
Church Leaders: Genocide or "Inter-ethnic killings"?
It must be acknowledged however that such a perception of the causes and the interpretation
of the events as described above was not shared by some Christian leaders. In fact, during the
first days of the massacres, a curfew was imposed on the whole country and sources of
information were dominated by the hard-liners. However, in late April and May, Catholic and
Protestant Church leaders met and published messages in which they failed to identify the
criminals and to advocate in favour of the victims. Like the sensationalist media, some
Church leaders have described the tragedy as the Bahutu revenging their "beloved" dead
President, or killing first to prevent being killed. This judgement proceeded from their
imprisonment in an ivory tower of "ethnic identity" that prevented them from discerning the
instrumentalisation of difference, the manipulation of fears and frustrations by the state
bureaucracy.
On the 21 April 1994 a communique from the Province of the Episcopal Church (Anglican)
said that the bishops shared in the "suffering with those who lost their relatives, in particular
the two Presidential families, Rwandan and Burundian, and the Prime Minister". "Sadly
affected by the blood that flows continuously following the 'inter-ethnic-violence'" the
bishops appealed to the RPF and the 'government' to cease violence, to agree with one
another and to pardon mutually. They asked the United Nations and Church Organisations
including the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches and
Canterbury to mediate between the two parties.
35 The report was sent to Wuppertal/ Germany from my remote native rural area of Biguhu, 150 miles from Kigali;
it was recorded by Peter Sandner in French on April, 13 1994. In fact, from early 1990 the United Evangelical
Mission in Wuppertal has been preoccupied with the deterioration of the political situation in Francophone Africa.
Details of its initiative are recounted in chapter VI of this work.
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On 5th May 1994, a month after the beginning of the massacres, the General Secretary of the
Protestant Council in Rwanda, read on the interim government owned 'Radio Rwanda, a
message on the behalf of the chairman of the Council. According to it, the massacres resulted
from the death of the President. He then appealed to the RPF to renounce fighting and to
negotiate with the Rwandan government. To the latter, he asked to guarantee security to each
national. He publicly supported the Rwandan army and invited Christians to back the
government.
The message of the Catholic bishops on the 13 May 1994 equally sent condolences to the
victims and called on the RPF and the government to set up the institutions of transition. On
13 May 1994 the 'Committee of Contacts' of both Catholics and Protestants spoke to "those
threatened by the negative consequences of the war and the massacres". They naturally
condemned the profanities and the destruction of the holy instruments- instruments of liturgy-
and places. They demanded the RPF and the government to cease the war and to stop the
massacres; they offered their mediation but failed to condemn the genocide.
The Anglican archbishop of Rwanda, in a message to the UN General Secretary, condemned
energetically the October 1990 war as unjustifiable. He lamented the infringement of the
principle that prevents refugees attacking their country of origin and the host countries to
give them a "base for subversive activities". If the UN had committed itself to democracy in
South Africa, the controversial prelate suggested that UN must do the same in Rwanda where
the attackers (the RPF) threaten to reinstate a monarchical regime rejected by the majority in
1960. The UN should stop the "war, in particular, the aggressor" and safeguard the rights of
the majority and possibly of a 'certain group'36, he wrote. Several other messages from
individual bishops and Church leaders came with the same tone. They refused to see the
genocide enterprise behind the actions of the interim government; and never identified the
demon to condemn so that the world-wide Christian family could know through a credible
source what was happening37.
36 The message was undated, but possibly written during the Archbishop's trip to Europe, North America. The trip
was open on June 2 in a Press Conference in Nairobi to lobby for the interim government. During the Press
Conference, the bishop refused to condemn the perpetrators of the massacres, the interim Government, its army
and militia Interahamwe while sending the responsibility of the war to the RPF. Then most of the journalists
attending walked out of the hall.
The bishop's message subsequent to this event was signed on each of its 14 paragraphs, referring to the April 1994
Anglican bishops declaration on the massacres. Apparently unsatisfied with the 'moderation' of the latter message,
the bishop decided to issue his unfailing support to the regime and to speak out in favour of the 'rights of the
majority'.
37The message from the head of a major Protestant Church called the events the "finale of Rwanda and argued
implicitly that the FPR and the opposition were responsible for the assassination of the Hutu opposition leaders
during the period prior to the tragedy". As such the RPF and the opposition were held responsible of the blockage
in the implementation of the Accord. The massacres were justified as the anger of the population and the
presidential guard in revenge for the death of the president and to stop the RPF plan "to exterminate all the Bahutu
leaders in the four days following the death of the president" (Tm. 19).
Another bishop published a similar message, saying that, instead of 600 soldiers, the RPF had 5000 hidden in the
Batutsi families in Kigali awaiting for the " 'J' day to take the arms from various caches around the country. The
Bahutu community attacked the Batutsi after the death of the president to kill them, thus to annihilate the RPF and
the Batutsi minority plan"(Kn.l0)
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Many among the clergy and other neutral observers who experienced the massacres
recognised that there was no such a reality as 'inter-ethnic killings'. There was rather, on the
one side, a strict state organisation, mobilising the population and supplying in arms and
army and gendarmerie men, and on the other hand, the victims led like sheep to the slaughter.
Speaking of the same massacres, Father Maindron of the Crete - Zaire-Nil parish wrote in his
diary 15,16 et 17 April 1994:
Ce n'est pas une guerre civile, car la plupart de ces gens sont sans defense. On les tue comme des
agneaux a l'abattoir... on veut eliminer tout ce qui est Tutsi. On est alle jusqu'a extraire l'embryon d'une
femme Hutue ( sic), mariee a un Tutsi, pour l'eliminer. Quel acharnement diabolique.38
The reporter of the UN Commission on human rights reported the tragedy in similar terms:
The massacres are systematic in nature- whole families are exterminated- grand parents, parents and
children. No one escapes, not even new-born babies. But what is even more symptomatic is that the
victims are pursued to their very last refuge and killed there. This is true of ecclesiastical buildings,
particularly Churches, which once served as a refuge for the Tutsi, but have now become the scene of
their holocaust. The same applies to hiding places in the roofs or other corners of houses and in the
woods and forests, to which the attackers set fire to make sure that they leave no survivors behind them.
The same applies also to the frontiers, which are blocked to prevent the Tutsi from escaping to
neighbouring countries39
African Rights which interviewed and recorded several witnesses of what it called the
"genocide and mass murder recounted by the survivors of the most horrific episode of
modern history" arrived at a similar observation. Death squad groups and militia, the
bureaucrats on different levels from the interim government by Prefets, Deputy-Prefects,
Burgomasters and councillors have themselves conducted killings. African Rights then
describes the motivation of these killers as follows:
They lamented the unfinished revolution of 1959-62: mass graves, rotting corpses, latrines, windows...
bear testimony to the killers' determination to kill- and to kill the belief of the Rwandese people that the
Church can protect innocent. They killed Church people, priests, nuns, medical staff, expecting women,
children, elderly; they raped and killed women, all with inhuman cruelty. They deliberately secularised
the Church, attacking the moral and spiritual fabric of the community. The aim was to annihilate.40
The aim of the extremists was not only to physically exterminate every Rwandan from
Batutsi background, but to create a nation of people complicit in the genocide killing, where
everyone was tainted with the blood of those who had died, a permanent social and
psychological no-man's land between Bahutu and Batutsi41. Among those who experienced
these threats and couldn't offer protection to victims was Father Maindron. Powerless in the
face of the suffering of the victims, he recounts how often he retreated in prayer.
II (Maindron) se sent plus utile en priant qu'en assistant, impuissant, a la scene. Une decision prise
d'instinct: ne pas y aller, ne pas voir mais prier. II commence son chapelet et entend les coups de
gourdins sur les tetes, puis les cris de douleur et une femme qui supplie: 'pitie, pitie'... Les adultes crient,
les enfants meurent en silence. Le pretre se met a genoux dans son bureau, les bras en croix. II pense a la
passion, a Maire lors de la mise en croix de Jesus.42
To sum up, the genocide as we experienced it in the few examples reported here was
organised by the political and military machinery of the state. Despite the courage of
individuals which has not been researched, the moral and spiritual power of the Church has
38 Poincare.N., Gabriel Maindron. Un Pretre dans la Tragedie. Paris: les editions de l'atelier/ Editions ouvrieres,
1995,p.99.
39
Degni-Segui, R., Report E/CN.4/1995/7 of 28 June 1994 to the Economic and Social Council. New York, p.8.
4(1 African Rights, 1994 p. 485.
41 Ibid. p. 568.
42
Poincare, N., op.cit. p.88.
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been damaged due to the absence of courage of the Church leaders to stand for the truth, and
eventually to share in suffering with the victims. Why did many Christian communities lack
examples and guidance on how to interpret the events with discernment so as to fight the
evil?
The Church hierarchies' messages left the audience with a number of unanswered questions.
As a team of Catholic and Protestant leaders why couldn't they join forces, to exert moral
and psychological pressure on the interim government which was conducting the massacres.
Why did they remain reluctant to name and condemn the killers? How much did their
interpretation of the events rely on the prism of their ethnic belonging? Whether a firm
condemnation of the killers would have made of the Church leaders martyrs is not absolutely
evident; that it would have increased the credibility of the Church is unquestionable.
These questions and accounts of a personal experience raise a number of issues some of
which will be dealt with in the thesis. Firstly, the suffering inflicted by human beings to their
fellows indicates that people blinded by ideologies can be cynical beyond human
imagination. Secondly, ideological manipulation which exacerbated people's resentment has
a historical roots in the politics of modern Rwanda. Thirdly, the blindness affected both the
elite and the masses. The former would defend the groups' interests with all kinds of means
including the manipulation and the mobilisation for the solidarity in crime while the latter,
ignorant and fearful, executed the orders from the authorities without questioning their basic
foundation. Fourth, the international community headed by the leaders of the so-called free
and "civilised nations" and the United Nations showed cowardice when it failed, one, to
provide the moral guidance, two to stand for what they affirm is in the heart of contemporary
civilisation, peace and democracy; they then pulled out their troops leaving defenceless
civilians being slaughtered in what was already known as a carefully planned massive
murder.
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Hence the accounts highlight the necessity, if Rwanda society must be healed, for its elite, to
go beyond the surface and reinvent the mechanisms for truth searching and telling, instead of
enclosing mentalities in the fatalism and the inevitability of the conflicts. This is why this
writer has been persuaded on the necessity to inquire on the sources, the factors and
processes of these awful acts.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1900's Christianity has become a new factor in Rwandan society. The research
upon which this thesis, "Churches and Ethnic Ideology in the Rwandan Crises", is based,
investigates the role Christianity played in the elaboration and development of the racial
ideology that culminated in the 1994 genocide. It has been assumed that the genocide and
massacres during which more than a million of human beings were killed resulted from the
'Hutu Power' ideology of the 'akazu' group, the entourage of Habyarimana (1937-1994).
The perspective of this paper acknowledges the reality of the 'Hutu- Power group' but then
identifies new lines of reasoning perceiving the root causes of the conflict from three angles.
Firstly, from the 1880's Rwanda was subjected to external influences which contributed to
the construction of a meta-narrative founded on the Hamite myth defending the 'Batutsi
supremacy'. Secondly, these meta-narratives built up the so-called 'race' differences which
were systematised and erected into policy of discrimination. Thirdly, the local elite
comprised of the traditional Batutsi nobility, followed later by the educated and then the post-
independence Bahutu ethno-politicians assimilated the constructs.
Though the Banyarwanda people had many common factors, the encounter between
the west and Rwandan society happened during a period of unveiling tendencies
among some of the Rwandan internal dynamics and lineages forces competing to
monopolise the power and resources. Then started a period of conceptions and
misconceptions of society which basically, through the new theories of Hamite
supremacy, reshaped society on a model of hierarchical stratification. This thesis has
argued that the difference between the Banyarwanda, either physical, cultural, social,
historical or biological have not been in any case proved. Hence it seems correct to
say that the obsession of categorising the Banyarwanda into different races, pursued
an ideological end in the sense Marxists, Mannheim and Dumont understand it.
This monopoly was granted in a process of mechanical hypocrisy, a deliberate
manipulation of peoples' feelings and identities. In fact, the tendency for an elite to
emerge from a social class and lineages so as to dominate was corroborated by the
given images, stereotypes and prejudices, narratives and mythico-history recounted on
and about the Banyarwanda people. These population who belonged to a same culture
and civilisation started to be ascribed into ethnic and racial boundaries, what F. Barth
considers as an obsession of the colonisers. From then on, the ideology has been
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expressed into practical actions through discrimination in education, evangelism,
politics or other sectors: the privileges were given to a selected elite on the detriment
of the rest of the population. This created the history resentment, a kind of ideology of
protestation. It seems that this has been the cause of the 1959 revolution and the root
cause of further crises. An ideology of protestation against the false consciousness of
Hamite supremacy from the late 1950s. This ideology of the rule of the majority,
Rubanda Nyamwinshi, would justify its claims on the monopoly of power with the
same weapons utilised by the colonial rulers and the conservative Batutsi: past
injustices or the theories like "the Batutsi, foreign conquerors". The defenders of this
'Rubanda Nyamwinshi' ideology have created loud-speakers and political, cultural
and violent infrastructures to spread it: political parties, violent groups, media of
hatred. From the perspective of the above analysis which is reflected in this thesis,
ethnicity as ideology has been an interactive process between the western agents and
the local elites.
However, the emergence of ethnic ideology in the interlacustrine region cannot be separated
from the conception and misconception of African societies by the early explorers, reporters
and travellers and ethnologists. These people produced accounts which betray a systematic
search for the confirmation of fixed ideas on race supremacy of which the Hamite theory
prevalent at the time among the Orientalists and Biblical exegetes would appear to be a key
factor. The Colonial and Church agents arrived in the new field of expansion at the same time
as Europe was clarifying a theory of race supremacy; inevitably they tended to perceive the
population through such a prism. Hence most of the new institutions including schools and
administration centres would reflect these ideas. The leading figures in the evangelisation of
Africa, Cardinal Lavigerie, Mgr Classe and Revd Johanssen believed that for Christianity to
be stable, it would first have to be adopted by the authorities and the 'dominant race'. Thus,
the identifying of superior and inferior races became a real obsession of the missionaries.
In fact, the Banyarwanda people, the group whom the explorers and then the missionaries
encountered, were distributed into three social categories: the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa.
These people had been living relatively peacefully together sharing many common factors
including: cultural unity, language, religion, major social organisations like the clan and
family customs such as intermarriage. Some lineages were, however, attempting to create
their own identity. Out of that encounter between the West and Rwandan society, the image
of Rwanda most persistently projected was of a land dominated by a 'race' of "Hamites of
Caucasian origin who arrived in Rwanda from Ethiopia or Egypt. The 'Batutsi' were chosen
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by the new rulers, colonialists and the missionaries to promote "a Civilisation founded on
Christianity". The other groups, the Bahutu and Batwa constituted the mass of 'roturiers'
relegated to a status of a second class citizens. Discriminatory policies were set up in cultural
and political practices to reinforce the so-called differences in schools, in evangelism and in
the public sphere. An ethnic ideology, this thesis argues, emerged out of that meta-narrative.
From the beginning of evangelisation, Christian missions reshaped societies according to the
doctrine of racial and ethnic supremacy with its rules, rituals, conversion, alliances and
allegiances. Like the colonial rulers and taking for its pretext the existing inclination to the
control of power by the royal lineages in the central core Kingdom, the missionaries would
select among the population, those considered of Hamite origin, namely the 'Batutsi' and gave
them all the privileges. At the same time, the other groups, the Bahutu (categorised as Bantu)
and the Batwa (as pygmies) were driven out to the periphery. This process created a history
of resentment which culminated in the 1959 revolution.
The emancipation in the colonies which occurred in the 1940s/50s brought the victims of that
discrimination to stand against this Hamite supremacy. The conservative ruling class,
entrenched in their feelings and beliefs of supremacy, clashed with those petitioning for more
justice and equity. Surprisingly, the former defenders of the Hamite theory, the colonial
rulers and the Catholic Church, converted to the Bahutu cause. These combined actions
generated the 1959 social revolution which initiated the Bahutu rule and at the same time, left
Rwandan society even more fractured.
A new ideology claiming the "rule of the indigenous majority" versus the "Ideology of
Hamitic Supremacy" was born. Subsequently, the shadow of the Hamite myth blocked any
chance of healing the wounds. There was a real need to bring about reconciliation. But in
both cases, before and after independence, the intervention of the Church hierarchy as in the
mediation in the 1990's crises, seems to have been an attempt to safeguard the triumph of the
"Christian Kingdom in the heart of Africa". The Church hierarchy over many years had
pursued a model of Church-State relationships legitimising the ideological world-view of the
MRND system.
This research, to a great extent, seeks to investigate how these theories were planted and how
they affected Rwandan Christianity. Firstly, it will identify the relationships that existed
between the Banyarwanda people at the eve of colonial and missionary domination. Was
Rwanda a society which promoted, harmony and equal opportunity for all? Secondly, what
was the role of the early explorers, the colonial and missionary agents in recounting,
describing, conceiving and misconceiving this society? Thirdly, to what extent did the local
elite participate in the ethnising of society?
A Socio-historical grounded Research
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In the 1920s and 1930s the monarch and the ruling class converted to Catholicism followed
by the masses. Rwanda was consecrated to Christ the King and to the Virgin Mary. During
the same period the Protestant missions were experiencing the Spiritual Revival which
started in Gahini in 1930s, a station of Church Missionary Society- Rwanda Mission. Was it
a real achievement of "the Christian Kingdom in the heart of Africa" or an excessive triumph
which blinded Christian leaders and prevented them from foreseeing the negative
consequences of their collusion with an unjust political system?
In the post-independence period, under the guise of a search for pragmatism and realism in
economic and social development in collaboration with the administration of Kayibanda
(1961-1973) and subsequently under Habyarimana (1973-1994), the Churches subscribed
unquestionably to the government's policies. In many instances those practices were oriented
toward the reactivating of the memory of the myth of supremacy for partisan interests while
at the same time, totally ignored the refugee issue and the necessary pursuit of political
reconciliation.
The Churches went as far as the Roman Catholic Church becoming the greatest sponsor of
the PARMEHUTU regime of Gregoire Kayibanda, then both the Catholics and Protestants
began to participate in the legitimisation of the Habyarimana regime (1973-1994). The
Church hierarchies accepted to be enrolled into the new MRND system; they participated in
the creation and shaping of the images of an acceptable regime at home and abroad. At the
time, Human rights were abused to a considerable degree, the Churches issued no single
word of criticism of the regime nor did they warn the public opinion of that reality.
This legitimising was made up with many metaphors, rituals and allegiances borrowed from
other post-independence dictatorial regimes like Zaire and Togo as well as the communist
regimes, in particular, that of North Korea under Kim-II-Sung. A large section of the media
participated in the promotion of the politics of victimisation and scape-goating of a section
of the population, spreading the ideology of the 'Rubanda Nyamwinshi' (majority: a metaphor
for the Bahutu) supremacy and rule, denying any form of participation and rights to the
Batutsi.
It took five decades for the dehumanising colonial rule to defect; and it took three decades for
the post-independent dictatorial regime of Habyarimana to collapse. Whether the Churches
would have adopted a different attitude if they were aware of the catastrophic consequences
of the ideologies perpetrated by both the colonial and post-independence systems, is beyond
the scope of this work.
From an ethical point of view, the attempts of the Churches to intervene in the 1950s and in
the 1990s crises can be seen like a late, desperate rush to 'extinguish the fire' as one Church
leader, Mgr.A.Ruhumuriza, once put it. Observers of the Churches in the last decades were
left with a constant concern at the absence of any commitment to address burning issues
while the morality of society was being eroded to a considerable degree. Was it because of
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the appallingly inadequate leadership training or because of a Christianity enclosed in a
political environment imbued with an ethnic agenda? There is, this writer suggests, a link
between these two aspects.
A Practical Grounded Research
The 1994 tragedy has deepened the wounds in the three communities of the Batutsi, Bahutu
and Batwa, though not to the same depth or extent. It raises the issue of whether there still
exists the means and signs of hope for the rehabilitation of a social harmony which once
existed. What is proposed in this research is to lead the Churches to reconsider seriously
what Christian life is about and the reasons for their failure in raising the moral standards of
society.
This research rests on some firm convictions. Firstly, the emergence of a human being on
earth is primarily a divine act; then a historical reality. Its integrity rests on a spiritual, social,
political and mutual interdependence of human beings. To restore a social harmony, a radical
change of attitude is needed from all those who played a key role in the Rwandan conflict.
And to become a true serving community, faithful to the Gospel, the Churches must confess
their own guilt and repent. Only then the Churches, if they adopt a Listening Ecclesiology,
can they be a true moral and mediating force in and between the various strata of society.
Secondly, the ethical and practical theology of the Church should converge on four
fundamental values: Repentance, Forgiveness, Healing and Reconciliation. In the light of
what we know of the crisis the Churches both in Rwanda and world-wide will not only
confess and repent but, like the nation, face the reproaches and challenges from the victims
and the survivors. To be able to accompany the survivors and others on the route of
reconstruction and reconciliation, the Churches, ought to help society set up the mechanisms
which could contain the anger, rancour, revenge or frustrations of the victims.
A Holistic Grounded Research
An introduction to both the research method and to the immediate political socio-historical
and religious contexts within which this research was conducted has a value here. Firstly, the
1994 genocide and massacres have become an ethical issue for Christianity. The Churches
have been accused of having either participated in the genocide itself or in the elaboration of
the ideology that culminated in the tragedy. These accusations have been framed in general
terms, mainly focusing on some individuals and rarely going beyond the period of the
Habyarimana regime (1973-1994). The plethora of publications on the tragedy simply
reproduce past stereotypes or state accusations without attempting any comparative analysis
of the responsibility to be bome by the two main Christian families.
Secondly, the tragedy resulted from the consequences of the recent multivalent crises which
broke out at the end of the 1980s. At that time the dictatorial regimes on the Africa continent
were subjugated to pressure to accept political changes. In Rwanda, the pressure increased
with the war started by the former refugees who attacked from Uganda on 1 October 1990. In
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contrast to the Church hierarchies caught in the same embarrassment as the rulers, many
individuals and grass-roots groups lobbied the Churches to speak out against injustices and to
undertake mediation. These groups also started to educate people on human rights,
democracy and reconciliation.
The present author was part of the lay groups lobby urging the Churches both to mediate and
to reflect on the challenges and potential arising from the on-going socio-political changes.
This involvement happened at various levels. Firstly a request was drafted by the Churches to
the AACC and WCC to assist in organizing a meeting between the Government and the
representatives of the refugees. This resulted in the first meeting for over 30 years between
these two groups together with the Church leaders; the meeting took place in August 1991 in
Nairobi. Secondly, the groups lobbied Church leaders to meet with the leaders of the newly
formed political parties. A meeting took place in December 1991. These contacts were
pursued between Church leaders, the party leaders and the Habyarimana regime. They led to
the formation of a coalition Cabinet of five internal political parties so as to plan negotiations
with the rebellion. The achievements and limitations of these initiatives are debated in
Chapter six.
The idea of this research grew up as the author elaborated an outline of a working document
and chaired a Presbyterian Church ad-hoc Commission appointed in 1991 and which
produced a reflection on the burning issues 43. It increased in February 1992 when the
Protestant Council (CPR) Church leaders and staff met in the Gihindamuyaga Monastery to
reflect on the CPR vis-a-vis the political changes and invited this writer to give an external
assessment about the Council.
In the same line, in September/October 1993 I was appointed together with Bishop A.
Birindabagabo of the Anglican Church and Rev. Mangolopa of the Baptist Church (CBK) in
the Kivu (Rep.Dem. Congo) by an Ecumenical Consultation of the United Evangelical
Mission partner Churches in Africa to draw up an outline of a series of seminars on
Reconciliation, Human rights and Democracy for which the UEM was guaranteeing a
substantial funding. In fact, while many Christians adopted the attitude of wait and see, the
author was persuaded that only participation would help Christians to influence positively the
ongoing changes. This explains his active role in the launching of reflections and rallies of
Christian peace groups (Umukristo mu Majyambere; Duharanire Amahoro; AEE); and in the
foundation of the Human rights organization (ADL) for which he carried out different tasks
in monitoring and facilitating seminars.
There was a need to identify the causes of the 1990 to 993 crises and to relate them to the
effort made by the Church leaders and Christians in mediation. When the studies for an
M.TH. in Media and Theology were envisioned, the initial plan was to write a dissertation
43The group was created by the Synodal Council to assist the Church in reflecting on the political changes. It met
for the first time in the Kibuye Guest House, Bethania, from 4 to 8 Janury 1992. The reflection was published in
February 1992 under the title Ukuri Kubaka Igihugu (the truth that builds the country).
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concentrating on what many considered as the "Crisis in Communication between the Church
hierarchies and Society".
Then the genocide happened. The tragedy opened a whole frame of unsatisfactory reporting
and publications on it. The few publications written by Christians such as the books of the
Canadian Journalist, H. McCullum; L. Bilinda, C. Lawrence and A. Rutayisire testify to the
personal sufferings and pain of the survivors ; they have no ambition to present a socio-
ethical or theological reflection. McCullum for example, recounts the tragedy and the role of
Churches from the perspective of a journalistic report of the massacres which happened in
many Church buildings.
The initial plan of the research was then expanded to allow a comparison between the
historical, political developments with its mechanisms of ethnic crystallization and the ethics
of the Churches. Consequently, the length of the period to cover was extended to 1900 -1994.
Why such a wider period? In fact, firstly, most of the witnesses refer to the colonial and
missionary era as the cradle of racial ideology; secondly, the 1990s crises relate in various
ways to the preceding years of 1973, 1964 and 1959. This led the author to refer to the
Rwandan context as the 'constellation of crises', meaning that before one crisis was
contained, another had emerged out of the consequences of the precedent. In recalling this
predicament, there is not, in his understanding, a slipping in fatalism. Rather, it is to
emphasize the lack of political determination to resolve these crises which left a vacuum for a
culture of violence to develop.
A research questionnaire was designed with the assistance of Professor Forrester, Dean of
Faculty of Divinity, Dr J. Thompson of the Centre for Studies of Christianity in the Non-
Western World, the Faculty of Divinity and Dr Robertson of the Social Science Policy
Department of the University of Edinburgh. The frameworth of the questionnaire was
suggested in order to conclude the thesis with concrete and practical actions to enable the
Churches to become agents of reconciliation. The questionnaire would lead the interviewees
to discuss the real causes of the tragedy; to discuss the priority of the Churches in the
aftermath of the tragedy; and in the case where reconciliation was chosen as a priority, to
identify personal and institutional concrete initiatives undertaken by the interviewee before
and after the tragedy. The questionnaire was also designed to motivate a discussion on the
signs of hope and the role of the Churches in the future.
Later, the questionnaire was adapted to include a discussion on the need and the response of
the Churches to the call for repentance and the healing of memories. It was intended to invite
the interviewees to discuss how the Churches should recover their ecclesial integrity and to
be able to communicate truth in society. The field work was undertaken in Brussels and
44
McCullum,H., The Angels Have Left us. the Rwandan Tragedy and the Churches. Geneva:WCC, 1995; Bilinda,
L., The Colour of Darkness, a Personal Story of Tragedy and Hope in Rwanda , London: Stoughton & Hodder,
1996; Lawrence, C., Rwanda, a Walk Through Darkness into Light. Gresham: Vision House, 1995; and Rutayisire,
A.. Faith Under Fire. Testimonies of Christian Bravery, Herts: African Evangelistical Enterprise, 1996.
7
Wuppertal in June-July 1996; in London in August 1996; three visits took place to Rwanda in
1995 and 1997.
It had been agreed that the design of the questionnaire would facilitate a general discussion
on the issues rather than a question-response procedure. This framework was helpful in the
securing of consent for the interviews. In fact, some including scholars who have written
extensively on Rwanda from the 1950s, opted to be referred to as an "interested person who
made valuable remarks". One understands how the tragedy shamed people who had a
closeness with the Rwandan reality. However, it is evident in chapter Seven, which is the
most substantiated by the frame of the field work, that many other interviewees fully
informed of the nature of the research did not object to being quoted. To a certain extent,
interview and observation techniques were combined.
A 'Data Collection approach'
The research methodology employed by the thesis values a qualitative and quantitative
collection of written material and discussion of various hypotheses. This was oriented to
ensure the thesis was documented from both the primary theoretical sources such as the
missionary and colonial material as well as the immediate witnesses from Colonial and the
1960-1964 periods. As commanding sources, the research uses the reports of the colonial
administration of Ruanda-Urundi, in particular the years 1922-1932 and 1957-1961 as well as
the missionary societies' reports. This first period was chosen to reflect what is known as the
colonial reforms carried out particularly by Governors Mortehan and Voisin (1924-1931).
When using missionary sources, the commanding figures within the Catholic Church will be
Mgr. Classe, Apostolic Vicar (1907-1945), and Father Kagame from the local clergy who
started writing in the late 1930s. Among the Protestants, the key figure referred to is Dr
Johanssen of the Bethel Mission.
In the course of the argumentation, three tendencies which have developed in the
interpretation of Rwandan ethnicity have been identified. One, the Primordialist school which
claims that ethnic rivalry existed among the Banyarwanda before colonization, two, the
instrumentalist school which presents the colonial and missionary agents as the planters of
ethnic ideology, and third, the 'indigenous tendency' or the attempt from the dominant
lineages to strengthen a group identity in order to monopolize power and resources in the
core kingdom. When debating the first tendency, the leading figure will be Jacques Maquet,
and Luc de Heusch; in the second case, Prof. Filip Reyntjens, Lemarchand, Catherine
Newbury and Claudine Vidal. In the last case, the major sources used are the writings of
prominent ethnologist missionaries including Father Kagame. During the crucial period of
ethnic mobilization in the military dictatorship, the leading figure is F. Nahimana and the
RTLM radio and Kangura newspaper.
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A "Participant Observation" Approach
The second method employed is "Participant Observation"45 so as to document the discourse
and to bring in complementary perspectives through observation and personal involvement.
Much of the interest deepened gradually in the pre -genocide observations, involvement and
questioning raised in seminars of human rights and reconciliation organized either by the
associations of Human rights, the associations of journalists and some Church organizations.
In the post-genocide era, the reflections deepened out of seminars and conferences in which
the author participated either as facilitator such as the "Detmold Confession Group" in
1995,1996 and 1997; the contribution to the publication of the Presbyterian Church book on
the Memorial of the victims of the Genocide46; the Contribution to Wereld in Zending
1998/1; the UEM Conference on Justice Peace and Creation in Kigali, September 1997; the
December 1996 Symposium in Wiesbeden/ Germany on Religions and Politics in Africa; the
Paper presented to the Research Forum and Consultation of the NAMP in Cambridge, April
1998; and not least, interviews and conversations given to media and parishes. All this
inspired the substance of the work.
The "Participant Observation" approach led gradually to a reciprocal relationship both with
Rwandans and expatriates which evolved at various occasions to 'hearing' meetings on the
theme of this research. Either in meeting or in discussions few people would pretend to fully
understand the real causes and motivations of the perpetrators of such an appalling evil.
Some times the discussions ended in tears and veneration of the innocent victims of the
horror, and in a burning desire to urge the Churches to repent for having underestimated or
ignored the suffering of the victims.
The integration of interview, observation and participation was facilitated by the fact that
many communication barriers were broken. In fact, the major language of communication in
Rwanda is Kinyarwanda, the mother tongue of the writer, and in rare cases French and
English which he claims to have some knowledge. Equally, the writer was acquainted with
most of the vocabulary, local idioms, hyperboles and understatements47 as well as some
moral codes derived from Rwandan culture. More importantly, he has been eager for a long
time to recount the experiences of suffering observed from my early age in various tragedies
(1959,1964,1973,1990's). However, it must be acknowledged that some disturbances
appeared during the research. These include hesitations, self-accusations of hypocrisy which
affect many Rwandans about what they did or could not do during the tragedy; or the traumas
and bad souvenirs left by the tragedy on some of the interviewees.
45
Paul,B., "Interview Techniques and field Relationships". In Kroeber,A.,(Ed), Anthropology Today. An
Encyclopedic Inventory. Chicago: Chicago University press, 1953,p.444/5 ff.
46
Gatwa,T., "Les defis de l'eglise Aujourd'hui et Demain". In EPR, Memorial des Victimes du Genocide de
1994, Kigali. 1998,
47
Paul,B., op.cit. p. 448
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In all cases, the writer found expedient to interview those people who have controlling voices
and hold power hierarchy in the Churches48 but also those who command respect in the ways
they dealt with the crisis before, during or after the tragedies.
A Document Analysis Approach
The third method employed is "document analysis". A lot of conference, seminars, letters,
media reporting, mission evaluations and books have been produced by people of various
professions. All of them were not inspiring but it was necessary to deal with most of them
(e.g. the messages of Church P. to the "President - Fondateur" of Rwanda Major-General
Habyarimana from 1984 to 1993; the documents of the International Conference on
Reconstruction after the periods of wars and conflicts, Kigali September 1994; the
International Conference on Reconstruction and Reconciliation organized in la Haye by the
European Council; the reports of different ecumenical bodies which visited the torn Rwanda,
in particular, the WCC, AACC, LWF and different other individual missionary organizations;
the pastorals of the Catholic bishops, from 1990 to 1994; the whole series of the Umukristo
mu Majyambere publications on human rights and democracy; the documents and reports of
Churches and Para-Church organizations before and after the tragedy. I have also analyzed
the major issues dealt with by some Newspapers, in particular Kangura and Kinyamateka
between 1990 and the early 1994 and a substantial amount of recorded programs of the
RTLM and a range of reporting published in British, French, Blegian and American
Newspapers.
Listening Ecclesiology
As the research progressed, certain "guiding principles" have been firmly sustained. Firstly,
this writer arrived at the conviction to envision a healed and reconciled society where no one
would be hurt or deprived of their rights, even life for being born Muhutu, Mututsi or Mutwa.
Secondly, there seems to be a need for a critical and creative Christian community capable of
relating the ethics of the Church to daily reality. For that reason, participating in different
humanitarian activities at the grass-roots helped the author to understand the critical
situation of Human rights abuse.
Stemming from these guiding principles, the perspective envisioned in this thesis aims at
creating awareness around a Listening Ecclesiology. A Listening Ecclesiology is one which
takes into consideration the experiences of the grass-roots, the poor and the victims of
oppression. As the research progressed, it became reasonably possible to anticipate the
feasibility of a Listening Ecclesiology in initiating "hearing discussions" with various groups
on the causes of the crises including the survivors who recounted the stories of the tragedy
and assessed the signs of hope for the future.
Likewise, the clergy (bishops included) should combine apostolic authority and teaching
ecclesiology on one hand with listening to communities, and individual members through a
48 Ibid. p. 431
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genuine dialogue so as to give to the grass-roots significant attention and confidence to speak
out the truth. In so doing they will educate a generation capable of challenging the monopoly
of power in Churches and society so as to question orders instead of executing them blindly.
This will break down the top to bottom culture of blind obedience where people have been
subjugated to manipulation from the defenders of all kind of ideologies.
Secondly, if, as this author believes, a new beginning was inevitable, then a 'Listening
Ecclesiology' will imply the companionship of the Churches of Rwanda by the universal
Church through what Helene and Jacques Kiing called a "Friendship interference"49.
Churches both in the north and in the south should then adopt a "Friendship Interference
Theology", that is an energetic mutual challenge model in which they listen to one another
and share the responsibility for mission including repentance for past misconceptions of
Rwandan society as a basic ethical issue.
Thirdly, a Listening Ecclesiology constitutes a pathway to a servant-hood ministry. It would
lead the clergy to overcome conflicts of leadership which have discredited Christian
communities. To put the end to the unpleasant experience of a style of the rulers among some
Christian leaders, on the top and the congregations who follow blindly on the bottom, the
listening ecclesiology combines the ecclesial authority with participation at the same time,
acknowledges as Jesus did, that the greatest in the Kingdom of God must be like the youngest
among us (Luke 22:22-26).
This may be a serious attack to those who traditionally have tendency to minimise the
contribution from the oppressed, the marginalised and many others ignored. If the accent was
put onto the increase of the chances of participation with the laity, if both the clergy and the
laity were given the chance to empower each other, then the process can result in a servant-
hood ministry which assists the communities and the individuals to recount the stories of the
breakdown of social harmony so as to be healed.
Lastly, Listening Ecclesiology could help Churches to integrate a holistic approach to
repentance in the teaching of the Churches. If the clergy was ready to accept confessing and
repenting in the name of the community and individuals as did Nehemiah, Daniel and
Jeremiah, then the process could facilitate the re-establishment of mutual communication
between the members of the community. Accepting the responsibility to bear the pain of both
the victims and the guilty fits in both Christian and Rwandan culture as the way forwards for
reconciliation.
In the Prologue, in a personal experience this work recounts the human suffering and
shows the state nature and organisation of the genocide. In chapter one it raises the issue of
identity and ethnic ideology. It questions the Church leaders' misleading accounts and their
49
Kung, J& H., " II y a encore des Artisans de Paix au Rwanda". In Perspective Missionnaire. no 33, Lausanne,
1997.
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failure to tell the world that the massacres were not 'inter-ethnic killings' but the
instrumentalisation of 'ethnic' feelings and a 'genocide' organised by the state machinery.
The second chapter discusses the concept of ethnicity and its inappropriate application to
the Banyarwanda people with regard to its anthropological definitions. The discussions
concern how the image given to the Abanyarwanda by others as well as the tools of
discrimination elaborated and implemented in the first half of this century created an 'ethnic'
conscience.
Chapter Three enquires into three Christian missions, the Roman Catholic White Fathers,
the Bethel Missions (Protestant from Germany) then the Church Missionary Society
(Anglicans) and their respective role in eventually propagating an ethnic ideology. In fact, the
research underlines the convergence between the Church and the colonial powers in
promoting the Hamite myth among Rwandans and practising the discrimination which sealed
the fateful destiny of Rwanda.
Chapter Four instead poses the issue of the Hamit myth kept alive in the aftermath of the
1959 uprisings. Here was the beginning of other forms of injustice coupled with violence
against the Batutsi. Phrased differently, yesterday's oppressed became the oppressors of
today. The monolithic regime with a state-party that emerged out of the Republican period
was characterised by the divinisation of a ruler who manipulated the instruments of
discrimination yet was still able to charm the international community. But why was not such
a new phenomenon of the divinisation of the ruler isolated by the ecclesial hierarchies so as
to prevent its impact on Church ecclesiologies?
Chapter Five, analyses the role of the media in spreading the ideology of hatred and
genocide. The Churches had enormous access to both their own and the public media but
then, why did they fail to enhance and to create a national conscience of fellowship among
Rwandans around some programmes? Media, this thesis suggests, must be a genuine tool
guided by strong ethical considerations safeguarding human dignity through koinonia.
Chapter Six then describes the determinants of the 1990 crises; the war, the deterioration of
social and political conditions and then gives an account of the "Church mediation" in the
1990's crisis. The mediation is presented in a chronological arrangement and commented on
with regard to its lack of ethical and theological perspective. In this regard, three case studies,
the Episcopalian quarrels, the apparitions in the Kibeho Catholic parish, and the Mariamu
and Bonnke teachings were assessed as a few of the factors that crippled the potential for
authentic mediation.
Lastly, Chapter Seven assessed some outside Christian experience of similar tragedies, as
in Germany, Ireland and South Africa. The insights gained from these contexts can help the
Churches face courageously the issues of confession of guilt, repentance and forgiveness.
One of the guiding principles of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South
Africa is helping people, both the victims and the perpetrators of violence to tell their story
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publicly so that people know how they arrived at such a degraded state. TRC promotes the
principles of the restorative justice (confession, repentance, reparation and amnesty) in
opposition to the retributive (punitive) justice.
When this work refers to Banyarwanda, it means the three groups of population, the Bahutu
(plural of Umuhutu), the Batutsi (plural of Umututsi), the Batwa (plural of Umutwa) who are
united by the same culture, speak the same language, Kinyarwanda (the Kirundi is its
variance in Burundi). For ease of pronunciation in foreign languages, a conventional spelling
has been gradually adopted, Hutu in the place of Abahutu/Umuhutu, Tutsi in the place of
Abatutsi/Umututsi and Twa in the place of Abatwa/Umutwa.
At the eve of the third millennium, Rwandan Christianity, approaching the centenary of
existence has not been able to elaborate a coherent theological body of thought, other than a
moralising and incoherent preaching. There is a feeling that through the diversity of their
social services, including education, health institutions, rural development projects and
media, the Churches can achieve what they have previously failed to do, to define the
guidelines for imaginative theological thought; to create a ministry for human dignity and for
the defence of fundamental liberties, to struggle against injustices and poverty. This has
something to do with a Church that would offer a holistic approach to Christian ministry,
interpreting the Bible to reinforce the unity of mankind liberated from all dehumanising
practices. In proposing a Listening Ecclesiology based on a guiding principle, the healing of
the Church and the nation, this thesis aims at face such a challenge.
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Chapter I: IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY
The 1994 Rwandan genocide50 has its roots in an ethnic ideology which has been exploited
by the 'Hutu power' hard-liners of the Habyarimana regime. There have been at least two
major trends in the interpretation of the causes of the tragedy; on the one hand, a tendency to
blame the 'secular hatred' between the Bahutu and Batutsi and on the other hand, a judgement
against the legacy of colonial policies. What is central, from the perspective of this thesis, is
an analysis of the development of the racial ideology and the role played by Christianity. To
this end the process started with the destruction of key factors of integration existing in
Rwandan society prior to colonial and missionary activity in 1900 and the building up of
ethnic identities that envisioned a new community in which the other is excluded, even
physically eliminated.
In the following paragraphs we will consider ethnicity in the Rwandan context, or in our
terms, Ethnicism, as an ethical issue that has had a dramatic impact on Christian Faith and
Church witness. Secondly, the massacres have been interpreted as inter-ethnic killings. This
interpretation, which this writer does not share, has been strongly sustained in different other
tragic events for almost a hundred years. Thirdly, the thesis will investigate how external
influences have affected both the factors of integration, and the construction of new
narratives. Fourthly, the elimination of the Other reached its height in the genocide whose
organisation by the state and party bureaucrats could be observed even at a very local level.
The tragedy was not accurately recounted because both the national and the international
community who controlled the means of communication had vested interests in hiding their
direct legal, moral and diplomatic responsibility or their failure to stop the genocide.
1.1. Ethnicity as an Ethical issue
Speaking about Christian Ethics refers to how the Church's presence in society relates its
mission to the social reality; to the problems of morality and to burning issues. To what
extent do the teachings of the Church deal with the issues of guilt and evil within society as a
whole? Christ's Church has been present in Rwanda from 1900 when the country was
evangelised by the Roman Catholic White Fathers missionaries, joined in 1907 by the
Protestant Missionaries from Bethel in Germany. Several other Protestant missions including
the Anglicans of the Church Missionary Society from UK, the Seven Day Adventists from
50 The genocide was confirmed by, Prof. Degni-Segui from Ivory Cost, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights on Rwanda: "Eminent persons have not hesitated to describe the massacres of the Tutsi as genocide. It is
necessary to confirm by reference to the facts that this term is appropriate". Degni- Segui, R., Report
E/CN.4/1995/7 of 28/6/1994. New York: 1994, Paragraph 43.
Similarly, in his letter of 9 December 1994 to the President of the Security Council, Boutros Boutros Ghali, then
General Secretary of ONU presenting the report of the Commission of experts on Rwanda said: "II existe des
preuves accablantes attestant que des actes de genocide ont ete commis a l'encontre du groupe Tutsi par des
elements Hutus agissant de maniere concertee, planifiee, systematique et methodique, en violation de Particle II de
la Convention de 1948 pour la prevention et la repression du crime du genocide". Boutros-Boutros Ghali., Lettre
S/l 194/1405, New York: December 1994.
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USA, two Baptist branches from Denmark and USA, and the Methodists from USA.
Pentecostals from Sweden arrived between 1920 and early 1940s51.
The present study covers the 1900 to 1994 period during which the seeds of ethnic ideology
grew its poisonous fruit. Ethics, to paraphrase Bonhoeffer, will engage us to speak about how
Jesus Christ took form in the world (Rwanda, in this case) in concrete decisions, actions,
commandments and instructions for which obedience is demanded. Churches face their first
ethical responsibility with regard to the way they assumed the Lord's Great Commission of
transforming all the nations into His disciples, the Great Commandment and the Golden rule,
Love the Lord your God and Love your Neighbour as yourself. The idolisation of power and
violence in society which is witnessed in this work is surely due to the absence of love and
justice; in other words, the body of Christ was not manifested enough in the midst of
Rwandan society. Consequently, the Church's teaching is under questioning as in many
regards the attitudes of the clergy (including the hierarchy) have emphasised ethnic ideology.
Ethnicity or the belonging to a particular group is not necessarily a negative factor. It is the
manifestation of the diversity received as a gift from God to human beings. Ethnicity is
always expressed through social and cultural diversities in a learned process. Through their
ethnic group, "human beings enjoy their roots and values of reference". As M. Slattery points
out, ethnicity is part of a system of identity which is concerned with the many categories
contrived by the world to define or name others, class, gender, religions, tribes and clans.
The quest of identity has its roots in the search of self vis-a-vis the Other; it implies
uniqueness, sameness and the Transcendent Other. This triple conception of identity is
shaped by a world-view made of internal and external influences which form a process of
socialisation52. This socialisation maps and informs our identity as a narrative providing the
tools for our good relationships or hostility to others. It is informed by our memory, our
relationship with the past, the present, the future, the place and the culture. This process is
clearly discussed in relation to the manipulation by the extremist groups of the Rwandan
'mythico-history' to nurture the hostility against their enemies. As such, ethnicity is linked to
self-image and image of others, of the world, our Divine Creator and His Creature's destiny.
In the present day, ethnicity is referred to as a manipulation of people's ethnic identity and
cultural differences53. However, recent historical developments in anthropological studies
have shown that cultural identity and ethnic belonging have been the tools exploited by the
holders of political and ideological systems who have no democratic ideal. In recent years
ethnicity has lost its primary meaning, that is the manifestation of our cultural diversities, it
51
Gatwa,Th. & Karamaga, A., Les Autres Chretiens Rwandais. Presence Protestante, Kigali: Urwego, 1990.
52
Slattery,M., Issues of Identity: Churches in Northern Ireland and Rwanda. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University,
1996. Maureen argues that in both situations, Northern Ireland and Rwanda, the colonisers, the British in the first
case and the Germans and then the Belgians as well as the Churches participated elaborated new narratives which
support the theory of differences.
53
Gorgendiere, L. de., King, K, and Vaughan,S (ed)., Ethnicity in Africa. Edinburgh: Centre for African Studies,
1996.
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has been more often used in relation to mobilisation and sectarianism. Many violent rulers
who want to perpetuate their monopoly of power by violence would take a group's identity as
a foundation of a patriotism and nationalism which exclude the others.
1.2. Ethnicity as Ideology
This thesis is not concerned with discussing the genesis of ideology. However, though
scholars including Mannheim, A.Kee and others trace its historical development to
antiquity from where it came to us as an intellectual and religious heritage54, ideology
has been associated to Marx and the 19th century and extended to any tendencies,
ideas and thoughts of a given society, an epoch or group which dissent from those of
the others. Mannheim detects three stages in the process of its forming. First, it started
with the disintegration of intellectual unity, in a form of psychological, theoretical and
non logical level without necessarily establishing a causal connection but the
characteristics of the total situation55. One refers to ideology when distrust of men
toward man becomes explict and methodologically recognised. That goes from simple
lies to errors of pyschological nature to questioning of visions and prophecies.
However, it cannot be a mere calculated lies of an individual but when we regard their
view as function of the social situation or group to which they belong to. Thus arises a
"group ideology" which occurs in popular speech, creating psychic interactions and
reactions of persons of that group conditioned by the same situation. Though
independent experiences are important, its inner structure is not a mere integration of
these experiences. A working class, for instance, does not experience all the elements
of the proletarian outlook56. In Rwanda, the "group ideology" has been promoted with
different theories of justification, i.e. the Hamite supremacy or the "Rubanda
Nyamwinshi", all promoted in cultural, political and social relations.
The second important historical development took place during the Renaissance in
particular during and after the Napoleonian wars. A rising elite and bourgeoisie not
content to fit in the old feudal system and in the imperial ambitions of Napoleon
brought a new style of thought interpreting and explaining the world. Napoleon who
was not happy with that group labelled them "ideologists". Napoleon was able to
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discredit his opponents showing that political speech often contains more philosophy
and significance than academic disputes which rarely goes beyond the academic
worlds57. As indicated in chapter four, the political monolithism of both the colonial
and post-independence eras in Africa, in particular, the totalitarian military regimes of
recent decades has left the ground to a single "divine ruler", the genius of the nation.
Thirdly, used by militant proletariat to unmask the hiding motives of its adversaries,
Marxist's conception of ideology is achieved by Marxist theory showing the role of
class position or interests. In fact, for Marx and Engels understand ideology as a
system of ideas and representations which, while giving the illusion of being
autonomous is rather determined by the reality because it is related to humans who
advocate it and produce socio-economical means of existence58. In their presentation
of the German Ideology, Marx and Engels suggest that the life of human beings is
expressed in what they produce and ho they produce to satisfy their basic needs. Such
a process creates the first real cleavage in society between the oppressors and the
oppressed59. In his Introduction to the English version of the Communist Manifesto,
1888, Engels reasserted this argument. For him, the history of mankind at any epoch is
that of class struggle between the exploited, oppressed, the proletariat and the ruling
class. The proletariat cannot really emancipate without emancipating at large from the
exploitation, oppression, class distinction and struggle60.
If there was no such group as the working class in the pre-independent Rwanda as
there was no industry nor bureaucracy, it right to say that the majority of the illiterate
and impoverished peasantry was exploited by a small minority of the colonial agents
Batutsi nobility imbued with the theories of race supremacy (Maquet, 1970). This
trend is also explained in the Marxist's view of ideology. A. Kee points out the fact
that Marx believed that the feudal order was itself evil, set up to mislead the many for
the advantage of the few. For Marx, ideas of the ruling class are, in every epoch
materially and intellectually, the ruling ideas. An ideology is a system of ideas and
values, produced by such a system. It may constitute a world-view; it presents a
picture of reality; it offers an explanation of why things are as they are. Because it
57 Ibid. p.65
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provides false picture and false consciousness, it is more likely that both those who
are served by it and those who suffered under it wouldn't be aware that it was a
merely social construction61.
In that process Mannheim thinks that the whole society is engaged in a process of
ideologisation. For him, the dominant group elaborates ideologies of justification,
whilst the dominated groups elaborates the ideologies of protestation. For him, an
authentic conscience is not to be found on the side of the proletariat ( poor) nor of the
bourgeoisie, but from an intelligentsia out of touch with the reality62.
In the same line of thinking L. Dumont establishes a link between those who
undertake the study of a given society and their motives and backgrounds. He thinks
that an authentic analysis of the anthropology of the ideologies can be authentic if
only two aspects were taken in consideration: on the one side the anthropological
community which justifies its privileges, and on the other hand, the ideology of the
society to which belongs the anthropologist as a synthesis of individualism and
universalism which found the anthropological project and at the same time rejects the
holistic ideology of the societies to which applies the project63.
There is certainly a combination of a few of Marx and Engels, a few of Mannheim and a few
of Dumont with regard to what took place in Rwanda. Images, mythico-history and theories
given by others have, as showed in chapters one, two, three, four and five, reshaped
Rwandan society and given a new consciousness to an elite which started to behave as if
they were no longer part of a same community of interests. What we see in Chapters IV and
five is the consequence of that. Obviously, the elites, the Batutsi and then the Bahutu have
alternatively participated to propagating these theories through a series of mythico-history
with the same purpose of monopolising power.
1.3.The Chronicle of Ethnicity
Until the 1960s, the prevalent scholarship on Rwanda supported the early explorers' and
colonisers' theories of a 'Hamite monarchy', where the 'Batutsi invaders' dominated over the
"indigenous Bahutu and Batwa"64. Following the 1994 tragedy, some of the media and
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diplomatic accounts as well as books reproduce the same simplistic discourse from the root
causes of the events.
1.3.1. Early Descriptions of Rwanda
The labyrinth of theories which underpinned the hegemonic narratives that ascribed new
identity to Rwandans are evident from early contact between Rwanda and the western world
representatives. The contributors to one of the best accounts of these ascriptions, the 1990
book edited by Gudrun Honke65, analyse with a degree of intellectual honesty, the profiles,
experiences, motivations and attitudes of the explorers, ethnologists and missionaries who
formed the first European contingent which encountered the Rwandans. The authors show
how the narratives initiated a process of ethnic ascription. From 1884 to 1962, Rwanda was
under the occupation consecutively of the Germans and Belgians. Rwandan historiography
and anthropology have since then been restricted to a domain that fascinated ethnologists and
historians from the perspective of socio-political relations, lineage, clans and ethnic groups.
One aspect which is noticeably present in those studies is the Hamite theory which opposes
the "lords of the thousands hills", the Batutsi to the "vassals, the Bahutu"66 . Dr Oscar
Baumann, an Austrian and the first European to sojourn in Rwanda (1892-1894), set the tone
to what was going to become a systematic application of the theory of race supremacy as
follows:
II y a avait partout des Watutsi qui surprenaient par leur sveltesse et leur type presque europeen. Certains
etaient a peine bruns et ont sans doute ete a l'origine de la legende des Negres Blancs. Partout on
pouvait differencier tres nettement la population negre indigene des maltres Wahuma. Leur fagon de
s'habiller rappelait les descriptions des figures royales de l'ancienne Assyrie67.
The Hamite theory is an exciting story. First considered as the cursed descendants of Ham,
exiled to the periphery of humanity, the Hamites would emerge according to Seligman as the
"civilising race of Africa", to be considered as Semites or Caucasoid68. The colonisers,
explorers and missionaries arrived bearing these theories, at the same time as some of the
ruling elite in Rwanda were spreading the myth of the origin of the reigning dynasty69, the
Banyiginya were at that time presenting themselves as people assigned by the deities and the
cosmos to a primordial role, of ruling over other clans. The Belgians who followed the
Germans in 1916, simply took these myths for historical sources70 and utilised them in the
formulation of a prosperous scholarship.
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1.3.2. Emerging Perspectives on Ethnicity
The politicisation and systematisation of the ideas of difference among the Banyarwanda
which had remained at scholarly and epistolary levels, became more evident in society
during the period from 1920 to 1940s. This period corresponds to the so-called colonial
reforms, and also to the conversions of the ruling class and the masses. From two major
sources, the missionaries' diaries and the Annual Report of the Belgian Colonial
Administration for Ruanda-Urundi we are informed of how both the colonial administration
and the missionaries collaborated to conceive a vast range of decisions and policies affecting
the population. It is worth noticing that from the second half of the 1920s, the annual colonial
report includes sections devoted to reports written by the heads of the Catholic, SBMPC
(former Bethel mission), CMS and Adventists missions71. In many instances, the colonial
reports linked with the ethnological scholarship which fundamentally affected the history of
modem Rwanda.
Maquet developed a theory of the premises of inequality which he said, was based on birth72.
The individuals were "physically and psychologically unequally equipped". Being born in
one or other 'caste' gave fundamentally different rights. This ideology, Maquet pursued, was
extended to all domains and reinforced by a number of theorems which proved that the
Bahutu accepted the Batutsi domination.
The study of Maquet had became a classic for the school of defenders of ethnicity in the pre-
colonial Rwanda. Maquet himself never refers to the context in terms of rivalry Bahutu-
Batutsi. Yet, his school, despite the variances such as the difference in socio-economical
systems between the centre-south and the north or the social mobility remarked in his book73
as well as the remarkable changes that took place through decades, can still refers to Rwanda
as an unchanged society. This line of thinking incorrectly inspired continues however, even
today, to have a substantial body of adherents74.
Commenting on the 1994 genocide, Luc de Heusch75 rejects C. Vidal's thesis in which this
French author affirms that the "crystallisation of the relations between the Bahutu and the
Batutsi into rigid 'ethnic groups' took place during the period of colonisation". De Heusch
rather repeats his thesis in agreement with Maquet, that the kingdom of Rwanda emerged
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from the meeting of 'indigenous peasants', the Bahutu and 'Batutsi pastoralists' and that
through wars against each other "the Banyiginya imposed their supremacy on their Bahutu
rivals"76. The author however, concedes that "the opposition between Bahutu and Batutsi was
evidently not a racial problem, but one of 'hierarchised social classes'. These were
transformed into 'racial status' by the ideologues of colonisation, the most influential among
them being the missionaries who were the first ethnologists"77.
Maquet and de Heuch's model, like the recent studies made by Maniragaba, Nahimana, Erny,
Overdulve and others take Rwanda as being a country of ethnic groups fixed in their
identities, stratified from pre-colonial period to the present day and yet seemingly well
integrated despite or because of the inequality. For Maquet, the equilibrium has been
disturbed by external influences, the system of mission education, printed media, the
introduction of elections in preparation for independence. We agree with Newbury that
"political relations were more complex, and identities less rigid. The structures of the Batutsi
domination were more recent and less extensive that the model assumed, and they were
transformed in important ways during European colonial rule"78.
At the opposite, we find a tendency to which this thesis adheres, demonstrating that Rwandan
ethnicism developed out of the actions of the colonial power with the backing from the
Catholic Church. Both the colonisers and the missionaries desacralised the authority of the
Rwandan monarch, deprived him of his prerogatives, formed an auxiliary elite from among
the Batutsi social category of Central Rwanda which was imposed on the rest of the territory
rulers in the east, the north, the north-west and the south-west. What were then social classes,
the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa were gradually transformed into ethnic groups. Reyntjens79
shows that each time politics and law were competing, during the colonial and the republican
periods, the political always had the upper hand. He also shows that post-independence
developments have been founded on the manipulation of fears and the practice of violence
and scapegoating leading then to political, social and regional tensions crystallised into
ethnic conflict.
The race theories that transformed the dynamics of social, cultural and political relationships
of one group over the others were imitated by French missionaries from a new theories of
which Arthur-Joseph Gobineau was a representative.80
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That there was a degree of a regional distinctiveness and autonomy is now an undisputed
reality confirmed by many researches on Rwanda. Various autonomous regions existed and
interacted economically, politically, socially and religiously with the King of Rwanda. This
reality was destroyed by the colonial rulers in imposing the centralising rule from the central
core monarchy over various regions. Various authors including Roger Louis81 have shown
that these colonial policies, the consequences of the divisions of Africa on the population, the
harshness of the colonial repressive machinery and the fate of the diplomacy of European
colonial powers which was motivated by hegemony and an appetite for huge economic
interests transformed the regional and class variables into an evil ethnic ideology.
1.3.3. Destroying the factors of Ethnic integration
The misinterpretation of social and cultural harmony of Rwanda has ended in the division of
the population into antagonistic units. For Georges Balandier, colonisation has eliminated all
the original factors of integration and accentuated divisions. For practical reasons he states,
political and religious leaders privileged the Batutsi group. The divisions were exacerbated
by the Bahutu after independence, for example by introducing the 'numerus clausus'82. Like
Balandier, Jean-Francois Bayart83 suggests that in designing what was called the evolues, a
westernised elite, the Belgians have created a "fourth ethnic group"- a concept developed in
the research of another French anthropologist, Claudine Vidal. This elite was more
destructive because it assimilated and reproduced the colonial stereotypes always referring to
the Batutsi as aristocrats of foreign origin, and to the Bahutu as peasants. These constructs of
an ethnic conscience were reproduced in the 40s,50s, 60s, 70s and 90s84.
More than the practical reasons referred to by Balandier, the root cause was the racial
ideology planted, watered and maintained by both the colonial powers and the Church. The
Churches' message seriously warped and distorted the essential tenets of Christian faith as
discussed in chapter three. What ought to be underlined here so far is that the process has
gradually built up a group's identity. The latter is rooted in belonging to the web of social,
economic, political, cultural and religious relationship. In marking the population into
distinctive 'races', it contributed to the destruction of many factors of ethnic integration .e.g.
some clans had specific community role which the members fulfilled irrespective to being
Bahutu, Batutsi or Batwa85. As Slattery rightly points out, identity then grows up out of
prevailing narratives, sketched and redrafted by culture, contexts, beliefs, values, ideals,
interdicts, changes and continuity out of human experiences and relationships86.
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1.3.4. The Rwandan Monarchy
The monarchy of Rwanda was dominated by the Bahindiro lineage from the Banyiginya clan
of Batutsi background. It had a number of symbols such as the Karinga emblem-drum. A
number of authors have described the Rwandan reality from the cultural, historical and
ideological symbols of a monarchy which combined charm and exclusion87. Some like
Father Del Perugia, a French missionary or a former colonial administrator, Omer Marchal
went even as far as to publish a nostalgic homage to the 'Hamite-Batutsi' supremacy, two
decades after the abolition of the monarchy88.
The role of the educated elite, the cultural and regional variations, the background to the
revolution are among other factors which have been transferred into a 'republican
monarchism'. The end of the monarchy in 1959 generated thousands of Rwandan refugees
who then became one of the major factors in the ethnic tensions in the region. Though
persistently using the inappropriate concept of caste, Lemarchand provides a good analytical
study of how the monarchy manipulated the existing cultural and ideological symbols which
in the end became the fertile field of ethnic plant89.
In the 1950's and 1960's which corresponds to the period of great political turmoil on the
African continent, the two major elite groups, were led to take an active role, for the first
time in a Bahutu-Batutsi confrontation with the colonisers and missionaries in the
background door. Nkundabagenzi's collection of the texts for that period90 describe the
process of the formation of political parties, their manifestos and profiles, their petitions and
counter-petitions, the UN and Belgian reactions as well as the religious, political and
diplomatic point of view. This material of unrivalled richness shows clearly the responsibility
of the different actors in reaffirming the foundations and accelerating the pace of 'ethnic
conflict' for which none of them has ever shown any sign of regret. For some, however, even
those ideologically oriented like Donat Murego the 1959 social Revolution was imminent
with or without the support from the Church and colonial powers91.
1.3.5. Propaganda of the Republican Regime, 1970's-1980's
The post-independence regimes have had their share in keeping alive the factors of
polarisation of society. For some internal and external defenders of these regimes, many of
these the 'Batutsi monarchy' was a backward system, a sufficient justification to ban the
Batutsi from any form of participation in political life. The essential features of the rare
publications within Rwanda paid homage to the President and his ruling party, the MRND.
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The authors including former colonial actors like Prof. Harroy and Colonel Logiest would
defend the policies of the Habyarimana regime, omitting to see how ethnically oriented they
were. C. Mfizi & al, J.P.Harroy, G. Logiest and A. Nduwayezu analyse the Rwandan reality
from the angle that sympathises with the Bahutu, considered as the only true nationals92. The
1959 social revolution is seen as an act that liberated the Bahutu from four centuries of
Batutsi domination and as a noble goal pursued in the ideology of the MRND. For this
category of authors, among other achievements of the MRND were to have promoted peace,
unity and development and at the same time, to have persuaded the population to accept
uncritically their three 'ethnic identities'.
One strategy was to continuously reactivate, as did P.Erny and C.Overdulve the hypothesis of
Hamite Batutsi domination93. These two studies stress the social and economical
achievements of Habyarimana whom they perceive as victim of the events rather than
perpetrator. Overdulve94, says this: the Bahutu, whom he refers to as "le peuple" have
suffered heavily from many injustices at the hands of the Batutsi. This suffering was recorded
in the collective socio-psychological conscience transmitted from generation to generation
but never experienced by the Batutsi. The colonisers and the missionaries found the system in
place and could do nothing. The social revolution of 1959 abolished this system, but sooner,
the Batutsi re-emerged dominant in diverse sectors. For Overdulve, it is true that the MRND
(former ruling party responsible for the genocide) regime used all the means it had to stop the
opposition from acceding to democratic power. However, the Bahutu were in self-defence in
killing the Batutsi each time their kin, the refugees organised various attacks (known as
ibitero by'inyenzi: attacks of cockroaches).
A thesis identical to Overdulve's has been developed by a professor of philosophy
(Maniragaba Baributsa) and in 1993 by an assistant professor of history (F. Nahimana) and a
French native, lecturer in Psychology, P. Erny.95 This category of authors build up an
ideology justifying the massive human rights abuse which is recounted in chapter four. Their
perspective is a distortion of the reality; it fixes the structures of social relations between the
Rwandans into a framework of "secular ethnicism" on the one hand, while, on the other, it
hides the role of the external agents and the elite in the conflict. They don't expose the root
causes and agents of ethnicism.
Moreover, this school defends a cynical style of argumentation namely that the Batutsi died
because their kin attacked the country. Defending such a hypothesis leads in the view of this
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thesis to at least two dangers. First, if the regime dominated by the Bahutu was justified in
killing the Batutsi because their kin attacked, then in return today's 'Batutsi dominated'
regime would have the right to kill the Bahutu if their kin who went in exile in 1994
attempted to attack. Such reasoning offers a justification to cynical regimes to abuse power
over those considered as the losers. The second danger is to divide the population between
those who are recognised as true citizens and beneficiaries of a state protection and those
who aren't.
This thesis acknowledges the effort made by Kayibanda and his successor, Habyarimana in
transforming Rwanda from a political and economical retrograde colonial-feudal society to a
modern state, but still believes that the cost in human lives overshadowed positive efforts. In
fact, the whole population of Banyarwanda without exception needed to be liberated from a
degrading colonial and mystifying system of both the colonisers and the akazu k' i Bwami
(household of the kingship). The initiation of a culture of violence which followed the 1959
revolution diverted it from a noble goal, that of liberating both the oppressed and the
oppressors from the chains of an obscurantist and degrading system so as to rehabilitate them
in their dignity as the children of God.
Hence, the revolution was confiscated by a clique of rulers. Such a confiscation up to the use
of violence, has been described in penetrating writings by Shyirambere Barahinyura95,
Gasimba, N.Gordon and Prof. Reyntjens97. These studies were really among the rare
discordant voices during the Habyarimana's regime. The authors showed the cynicism of a
regime perpetuating horrific acts such as the assassination of Kayibanda, Habyarimana's
predecessor and hundreds of politicians in terrible conditions, a systematic corruption and
hold -up on the institutions and economy of the country while at the same time being able to
maintain its credentials before the international diplomatic world.
The rare publications available among the Protestants focus on the record of the 1930s East
Africa Revival, on Catechism or on the assumed apparitions in Kibeho98. Some publication
have attempted to trace a path for a critical and visionary ethic and a liberating ecumenical
theology; yet they had relatively little impact99.
I. 4. Ethnicity and Issues of Identity
Despite the above mentioned factors of integration, it must be recognised that Rwandan
society prior to colonisation had some distortions. In fact, the monarch and his entourage
were shaping the political, administrative, cultural, social and military instruments of power
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and control of resources on the eve of colonisation and implantation of Christianity. Among
other tools, they would exploit the myths, legends and the culture of secrecy reinforced by
the ritual secret code kept by the college of Abiru, the specialists of the tradition of the
monarchical institutions. This was asserted by Ntezimana 100 who then offered a severe
criticism of our past and recent culture:
La culture Rwandaise, une culture fermee, d'enclos (umuco w'urugo, umuco w'infunganwa,
w'inkomane) est en crise, elle eclate meme et c'est heureux pour les jeunes et les generations futures.
Politiquement, et les 25 ans de regne aussi bien monarchiques que republicans le montrent, cette culture
est esoterique, cynique, sinueuse et souterraine. Elle legitime regulierement un rythme, cyclique et
infernal, de crises fratricides.101
Prof. Ntezimana insinuates in this passage the culture of violence initiated by the politicians.
He went further and invited the Rwandan people to "explode" this culture of secrecy and
exclusion imposed by the political decision-makers, to liberate all the categories manipulated,
the poor and the marginalised so that they may have hope instead of resembling a people
always turning to their pre-history.
Instead of smoothing away the distortions like these denounced by Ntezimana so as to
cement in place the many factors of unity, an imperative of the Christian message, the
Churches co-operated in modelling a society for the interest of the imperial power102. Both
Catholics and Protestants, not only identified themselves with the political power, but went
one step more in spreading a discriminatory ideology, thus compromising the chances to be
the alternative to the unjust system. D. de Lame has a similar observation when she says that
in the early 1930s the Catholic Church was so close to the colonial power that it was
incapable of being an alternative to forced labour, to fatigue, to compulsory conversions and
so forth103.
The handicaps that prevented the Church from becoming a healing factor, are threefold. One,
when they engaged in a competition in the new fields of mission, both Catholics and
th
Protestants were not healed from the wounds of the 16 century that resulted in the
th th
Protestant Reformation. Two, their theologies were influenced by the 19 and early 20
centuries based on the theory of racial supremacy. Three, as in the colonial period, the
Church leaders in the post-independence era became part of a dominant system that subsists
by victimisation and perpetuation of prejudices and violence against others. Today's
emerging theological thought in Rwanda attempts to challenge the approach that stereotyped
people into fixed units; it establishes the continuity between two interpretations of the
message of God. The one made by the external missionaries, and the other made by the local
100 In December 1992, the late Prof. Ntezimana, President of the human rights association, ADL pronounced a
prophetic speech in introducing the 382 page book containing the first report made by this first born Rwandan
Human Rights organisation. He evoked the "words of racist ideologues inciting the population to apply and
generalise the law of lex italiano". He wondered if the "predictions of the unfortunate 'diviner' or 'prophetess'
Magayane- who several years ago predicted the death of the leader of the country which would be followed by a
bloodshed without precedent- were not beginning to happen".
""Association de Defense des Droits de l'homme et des Libertes Publiques (ADL), Rapport sur la Situation des
Droits de L'homme. Kigali : Decembre 1992, p.l 1.
102 See chapter III, the section on the revocation of King Musinga.
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population in the pre-missionary era in showing that God the Provider, the Creator (Imana
y 7 Rwanda, Rugira, Rurema) for the Rwandans, the heavenly Father for the Christians, gave
us an identity constantly transformed, renewed by Jesus-Christ through conversion, baptism,
Eucharist and Koinonia.
I. 5. Identity and Shaping of Hostility Against the Other
In Rwanda the ethnic identity process owes much to the historical, cultural, colonial and
Christian narratives. These factors helped to draw up the tools of ethnic bounds for control of
power in a community where the other is effectively eliminated. According to Slattery, two
processes intervene: firstly, a strategic syncretism marrying diverse versions of history with
myth, facts and reality. Secondly, the legitimisation or rejection of changes in reinventing the
past is always motivated by a passion to reverse the balance of power and is often
accompanied by an ideological dimension proving the theory of differences104.
1.5.1. Identity and the Past
In the process of the shaping of ethnic identity, links are established with the past, space and
the culture, not so as to assemble positive factors for the reinforcement of a common present
and the future, but to justify the division and to emphasise the necessity of a projection
excluding the Other. The "fourth ethnic group" (i.e. the elite) reproduced the mythical history
of a warrior Hamite dynasty who subjected the Bahutu monarchs and unified Rwanda on the
other hand. Rightly or wrongly, they nurtured the ambition and aspirations of those in the
inner circle of the regime were opposed to sharing power with the opposite group.
The justification of present or projected exclusion of the members of a different community
is built around the images and descriptions made on us by the myths, legends, tales and
narratives told to us and on us. On the other hand, the tragic specific events become a
powerful 'evidence' for the rejection of the vision of a common destiny. The Bahutu hard¬
liners would etch stories of domination when they were excluded, humiliated by the coalition
of colonisers, missionaries and the Batutsi elite. They perceived the Batutsi through the eyes
of Uburetwa, ubuhake and ikiboko, all forms of discrimination before 1959 and the 1972,
1988 and 1993 tragedy of the Bahutu in Burundi. At the same time, cultural activities which
praise the achievements of one's group may fuel the hostility of the other105.
The Bahutu on the other hand, are perceived by the Batutsi through the violent traumatic
events of the 1959,1964, 1973, 1994 and selected portrayals that enhanced the state of
martyrdom. At the same time cultural realities of the exiles such as songs, poems, literature
that reminds the empire of a thousand hills conquered by Tutsi warrior monarchs exhume the
resentment of previous generations who experienced the exclusion in the pre-independence
period.
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From both sides, these aspects threaten the other's vision. In fact, while celebrating one's
identity, those enclosed with their ethnic boundaries rarely take into account the frustrations
and marginalisation their actions create in the opposite group. The Batutsi hard-liners would
rarely refer to the pre-independence injustice and oppression of large sections of the
population, Bahutu and Batutsi as the root causes of the 1959 revolution. Similarly, the
Bahutu hard-liners, would rarely refer to the repetition of violence against the Batutsi and
their exclusion as the motive of the 1990 RPF attack.
These aspects charged with sufferings of the emotional resentment of the present day
generations were constantly renewed, during the 1990s crisis. The hostility against the other
was organised on a political, military and cultural basis. The MRND/CDR political
organisations had promoted their armed right hands, the Interahamwe ("those who attack
together") and Abahuzamugambi ("those who have the same goal"), Amasasu, death squads,
Zero networks, the 'loud-speakers' which claimed to represent the aspirations of their
institutions. On the ideological and cultural level, they developed a chain of media and
cultural activities which ran almost exclusively anti-Batutsi and anti-ibyitso (accomplices)
programmes.
Although the Banyarwanda lived together in their mixed neighbourhoods, in the identity
narrative of the 1990s, the Bahutu extremist swore to send the Batutsi towards Ethiopia106.
Ethiopia was the country to which the explorers, colonial and missionary accounts associated
with the Batutsi; the reality for the hard-liners has never changed since. On the other hand,
there is a potential for those who perceive society in a continuing binary opposition to
interpret the installation of the 1959 refugees by the new regime, in the former mythical
kingdoms of Mubari (present day name: Mutara), Gisaka and Bugesera l07as well as the
occupation of the lands, properties and businesses of the Bahutu who went in exile in the
aftermath of the genocide, as a strategy to 'reinvent' a mythical past for domination.
In fact, Rwandans have come to the stage when many of them interpret the reality of their
country through a mythico-history. Writing on the issue of interpreting the history of
violence in Burundi, Lemarchand uses the notion of 'mythico-history' borrowed from Liisa
Malkki108. In our turn, we borrow the concept to characterise the ongoing process of reading
or rewriting Rwandan history. The mythico-history as Lemarchand says, is "the mixture of
fact and fiction designed to offer each community retrospective validation of its own
interpretation of the genesis of the conflict. This phenomenon brings inevitably the notion of
'cognitive dissonance' or the perceptual screening of dissonant facts omits critically important
1(16
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see chapter 3 of this work.
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bits of evidence from the picture, making it consistent with one's normative assumptions
about the why and how of ethnic violence"109.
1.5.2. Identity and 'Meta-Discourse'
The first version of the mythico-history supports the idea of ethnic conflict resulting from the
historical antagonism of Bahutu and Batutsi. For the tenets of this primordialist theory, all the
Batutsi, including those totally excluded from power and resources110 were oppressors and
all the Bahutu oppressed. The defenders of such a view never acknowledge the reality of the
genocide but talk about the war which they fought and lost, or the inter-ethnic massacres in
which the Bahutu who were attacked defended themselves111. This theory of 'secular rivalry'
imprisoned the Church leaders in the fatality and inevitability of the conflict. It reinforced
their complacency faced with the cynical politics of ethnic discrimination which manipulated
people's identities, feelings and frustrations.112 This collusion was reinforced by the fact that
the two main Christian families and their hierarchies were enrolled in the MRND system,
first as individual members of the clergy as it was for all citizens of the land and then as
representatives of their institutions as discussed in Chapter Four.
The second mythico-history presents the ethnic conflict as the direct outcome of colonial
rule. According to this tendency, pre-colonial society was harmonious, tolerant, and
responsibly participating. Racial ideology was strongly planted in 1959 by Perraudin, Logiest
and Kayibanda. It came as the direct extension of the colonial and missionary divisions of the
1920s,30, 40s out of which numerous factors were used to group the population along ethnic
lines as described in the conclusions of the reflection of the Protestant Council of Rwanda
(CPR).
The ideology of ethnicism is the main cause of the genocide, the divisions and the recurring tragedies
which have plunged our country into mourning since 1959. It is the Church in its institutions and in
some individuals which has a great responsibility both in the elaboration of this ideology and of its
diffusion. Influenced by the pseudo-scientific theories of their time and in the shadow of colonisation,
the missionaries have contributed to create the ethnic problem by confusing social economic categories
with ethnicity113.
The evidences of colonial role in the ethnisation of Rwandan society is irrefutable as
indicated above. Nonetheless, this thesis aims to overcome the danger which occurs in the
CPR passage of underestimating the role of the Rwandan elite in both groups, in the
l(wLemarchand, ibid.p.
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Churches, as well as the risk of reducing the whole process of exclusion of the Other to the
responsibility of a few individuals.
The third myth-history refers to tragic events, - the massacres which occurred in 1959, 1964,
1990-1994 and identifies the responsibility of the extremists on one side but omits to link the
less than tolerant attitude in the other camp. Abundant literature, in particular the
Nkundabagenzi's valuable collection (1961) shows the responsibility of the extremist Batutsi
elite in rejecting moderate changes proposed by the Bahutu elite, or the obvious
responsibility of the ethno-republican politicians. Nkundabagenzi's collection also highlights
the role and compromise of other actors including the colonial administration and the Church
in organising the events that had such a subsequent negative impact
The fourth mythico-history presents the conflict as a 'politico- ethnic' violence as a plot from
outside. Instead of considering the concerns of the refugees and the Batutsi who were
deprived of their rights, the Habyarimana regime preferred to advance the hypothesis of a
Museveni hegemonic plot to install a "Hamite/Hima-Tutsi empire" in the great lakes region
of Africa with the Batutsi as his instruments. This attitude does not move an inch from the
conservative Batutsi elite who refused to listen to the suffering of the Bahutu in 1958 and
later continued to explain the 1959 revolution as a plot of the Belgians and the Church to
perpetuate neo-colonialism. A similar attitude marks the thinking of the militaro-bureaucratic
elite in Burundi which constantly accuse their fellow Bahutu citizens of being influenced by
the Rwandan regime, thus refusing them a genuine sharing of power. Jacques and Helen
Kiing rightly point out that "troubling stories of atrocities committed against the Batutsi in
Rwanda, or stories of atrocities committed against the Bahutu in Burundi created 'a symmetry
of distress', even before the 1994 tragedy:
Partager le pouvoir ici au Rwanda avec les Tutsi? Vous n'y pensez pas! Voyez comment ils traitent les
Hutu au Burundi!", "Partager le pouvoir ici au Burundi avec les Hutu? Pas question, ce serait notre
mort: voyez comment ils traitent les Tutsi au Rwanda!114
The various tragic events and the suffering of one group in one country created a syndrome
of fear and mistrust among the opposite group in the other country. In the end, the
interpretation of the history throughout the prism of ethnic ideology in both countries is a
factor that cannot be left out in an eventual attempt at mediation.
The last mythico-history was a calculated misinformation in which the extremists
manipulated the fears, angers and frustrations of the masses with, "kill the enemy before they
kill you". One of these frustrations came from the poverty and the uncertainty in peoples'
lives"5. The propaganda of the regime would permanently brandish the threats of the former
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'Batutsi conquerors' who would attempt re-appropriate the lands, the cattle and all the
business that had been acquired by the sweat of the Bahutu.
1.5.3. Identity, the Being and Becoming
Lastly, Identity relates to the present and future and implies both being and becoming.
Projected to the present and the future, the conflicting past would contemplate the
achievements of the regime in various domains then, predicting an eventual withdrawal from
political power would consider the Other as a threat, or an usurper. The process nourishes
pride, fears, projections and speculations for new rituals, identities, formulations and plans.
This has something to do with the tendency to restrict privileges to a selected elite.
Christianity has provided literacy sponsorship, social constructs, new rituals of a hegemonic
character. Being educated in selected missionary schools for the sons of the Batutsi chiefs,
and converting to Catholicism gave rights to be named to posts of responsibility and to gain
other privileges.
Following the political changes in the late 1950s missionaries and colonisers now reversed
the narratives in asserting that, the Bahutu, once considered not clever, incapable of ruling,
were now intelligent and could accede to command. Paradoxically, there was no sign of
confession and repentance for the past malformation of the social reality116 by the Churches.
Unlike the Kayibanda regime where only the Catholic Church was privileged, Habyarimana
(1973-1994) gave a new dimension of extreme cordiality to the Church- hierarchies both
Catholics and Protestants. These personal and friendly relationships developed with the
Church hierarchies, were, I believe, one of the crucial steps which led the Protestant leaders
to endorse the regime's ethnic policies. As we will see, Church-State relations improved,
whilst ecumenical relations remained as distant and suspicious as ever117. Equally, the
relationship and communication within individual ecclesial denominations did not improve
much either as evident from the example of Episcopalians and the hidden tensions within the
Catholic Church described in chapter four.
The fact that Christianity failed to develop forms of mutual enrichment and common witness,
allowed the regime free reign to conceive strategies for its divinisation. Equally, despite a
number of achievements in the sector of development to which the Churches gave their full
support, the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions and the hopelessness of the
population have proved to be a fertile field for the manipulators of ethnic hatred. The impact
116 In fact, society was dominated by the two institutions, Church and State. The hierarchies 'wisely' avoided to
getting in each other's way, except for some scuffles in 1966 and 1968. In 1966, the government nationalised the
schools in a period when dissenting voices were starting to be heard among the politicians of the ruling party, the
Parmehutu. In 1968, Semusambi a journalist of Kinyamateka newspaper was imprisoned while its director, Father
Enzo Maida, an expatriate was expelled from Rwanda. In the 1980s, the director, Father Sindambiwe, was
continusly harassed by the Intelligence Service. Dismissed, he later died in a not elucidated road accident. In
1990s his successor, Father Sibomana and the journalists were brought to tribunal by the same Intelligence
Service. When the journalists threatened to reveal to the public all they knew on the corruption of the regime, then
the regime withdrew the accusations.
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of poverty in the genocide was emphasised in a number of publications118. In an article
written by the head of a British Charity organisation, the author, Fiona Fox, sees two major
causes of the tragedy: the impoverishment of the population following the fall of coffee
prices, the major source of income, and the international pressure for economic and political
reforms and peace negotiations119. Poverty is a major factor in the shaping of people's
identity, severely determining the potential of being and becoming. However, we must avoid
blaming the poor; these did not recruit, train, organise the convoys of the militia nor did they
give the orders to perpetuate the massacres around the country.
1.6. Rwandan Ethnicity: A Poisonous Plant
To conceptualise our reflection on the development of ethnicity, we can detect two
competing schools. On the one hand, stands the primordialist- school which claims that the
Bahutu-Batutsi rivalry is a pre-colonial reality which grew from the early period of myths and
legends in Rwanda.On the other hand there is the instrumentalist school with its tendency to
argue that ethnicity is a colonial and missionary invention. But at least, both schools
converge on the fact that notions like caste, race, ethnic group, tribe, were unknown prior to
colonisation as people identified themselves by clan and shared various social and cultural
aspects of life120. This thesis defends the opinion that the 'instrumentalist school', or the
authors who trace the genesis of ethnic rivalry to different mechanisms set up during colonial
and missionary era to shape society as being a key factor in the development of the conflict.
This said, the thesis acknowledges the enormous responsibility of the conservative Batutsi in
the pre-independence period, and the ethno-politicians in the post-independence in
amplifying the ethnic ideology. By no means does the author perceive social, cultural and
political relations among the Banyarwanda people as marked by ethnic rivalry outside the
influence of these three categories of actors, colonial, missionary and local elites.
This line of analysis fits into some recent historical developments in anthropology.
According to the 1991 Dictionary of Ethnology and Anthropology, the scholars have come to
realise that what were supposedly traditional ethnic groups are in fact a colonial creation with
a set of strategies designed to transform in a scholarly language the stereotypes ascribed to
the populations. Hence Frederick Barth's definition of ethnic groups: "a category of
ascription whose continuity rests on the perpetuation of boundaries and the codification
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constantly renewed of cultural differences between neighbouring groups"121 pertains to the
perspective of this thesis.
Assessed from F. Barth's point of view, Rwandan reality was a high degree of harmony
through the manifestation of cultural, religious and social unity: the community of customs,
the social organisation, the intermarriages; the mixture in the prominent social organisation,
the clan; the mixture of inhabitants around the country. It is also worth noticing that the
majority of the population were impoverished within the three social categories, that the
traditional professions commingled (many Bahutu were pastoralists and many Batutsi
agricularists) and lastly, the absence of any conflict opposing the Bahutu to the Batutsi or the
Batwa122. Secondly, the hypotheses of the assumed migrations of the Batutsi from either
Egypt or Ethiopia as recently as the 16 century123 or elsewhere are not yet substantiated
scientifically either from the chronicles or through oral traditions of the regions including
Ethiopia itself which has a long history of written literature.
Hence, whatever origin the Bahutu and Batutsi might have had they came to gradually form a
community of common destiny unified by language, history and culture, religion and a vision
of the universe, sharing similar custom and tradition. They shared a geographical space,
before the society was fractured along ethnic and regional lines as shown in the next chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to define the social, cultural and human context out of which ethnic
ideology in Rwanda has developed. The discussions outlined three dimensions related to the
rise of Ethnic identity in Rwanda; the early descriptions of Rwanda by externals; the
destruction of the factors of ethnic integration; the issues of identity and hostility against the
Other. The central argument was that the narratives of Rwanda from the beginning of
evangelisation in 1900 were formed out of a Christianising process which did not hesitate to
appeal to the theories of race supremacy. These narratives have continued to be manifested in
the mythico-history, or the validation of one's own interpretation of the genesis and factors of
the conflicts. From then on, the scholarship on Rwanda developed into two schools, the
primordialist and the instrumentalist. The subscription of the Churches to the myths of ethnic
identity exposed their incapacity to manifest the body of Christ in love, compassion and
reconciliation.
As part of the discussions a range of concepts have emerged. These include the ruling class
or the Batutsi nobility, external influences including explorers, colonisers and missionaries
and the ethno-politicians (some post-independence Rwandan leaders); hegemonic narratives;
ascriptions; mythico-history and history resentment; planting of racial ideology, divinisation
and legitimisation of the dictatorial regimes. The next two chapters explore in a comparative
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manner, diverse degrees of responsibility of the external agents and investigate the new
images given to Rwandans.
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CHAPTER II: FROM ETHNIC INTEGRATION TO RACIAL
IDEOLOGY: ROLE OF COLONIAL POWER 1900-1960
Introduction:
The examination of ethnic ideology in Rwanda is inevitably linked to the confrontation
between two realities: pre-colonial Rwandan society and colonialism together with
Christianity. It implies the study of the organisation of Rwandan society before the encounter
as well as the aspects brought in from outside by colonialists and missionaries. Was Rwanda
a harmonious society of equal opportunities for all ? Were the populations part of an
integrated nation, or were they antagonist groups branded with their own identities ? How
was the social, political and economic organisation structured ? Equally, it may be relevant to
know how both colonialism and Christianity conceived their relationships with the Rwandan
population. Have they been factors for harmony or for the disintegration of social relations?
This chapter looks at ethnic ideology as an instrument of domination from two angles. First it
discusses how the elite from the dominant lineages in pre-colonial society was trying to
monopolise political power; second, the role of colonialism. The scope of this chapter
together with the next, starts at the beginning of this century and includes the narratives of
Rwanda which have been told by five categories of agents: the explorers, the colonisers, the
missionaries, the Batutsi ruling class and elite and then the Hutu elite.
The core argument here is that the development of that ideology has been reflected in a
number of presuppositions. First, the conception of Rwanda as an unequal society, a stratified
hierarchy dominated by "a clan of foreign conquerors". Contrary to much of ethnological
scholarship, the present work argues that this unequal system was restricted to the domain of
political power and served the purpose of conserving the economic resources in the 'central
core' regions while in the satellite and frontier regions they had another type of socio¬
political organisation.
In the central core, the King and Queen mother reigned in the name of the emblem-drum,
Karinga ; they were represented in the whole country by chiefs and sub-chiefs, named from
the akazu k'i bwami (the household of the royal family). In the various satellites and in north,
west, south west and east and the satellite regions, the south- west of Uganda, the Karagwe
province in the west of Tanzania, and east of Zaire (all speak the same language
Kinyarwanda, the same language spoken in Burundi, the Kirundi language), the authority of
the Mwami of the central Kingdom was nominative. However, these regions and countries
have many factors that reinforced cultural, linguistic, social, religious integration. They
belonged to the same social organisations, the clans and had the same cultural and religious
practices.
It is during the attempt made at the beginning of this century- and that is the focal point of
this chapter- to impose by force the representatives of the unequal political organisation
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predominant in the central Kingdom on the autonomous regions, that most of the factors for
integration disappeared.
Another presupposition evoked in the precedent chapter is that the internal centrifugal forces,
including the royal lineages of the fractions of Banyiginya-Bega clans, in their struggle for
power and control of production had started (at the eve of colonisation and Christianisation)
to form a class identity which became the cradle of the colonialo-missionary ethnic
infrastructure.
The introduction of colonisation- first German from 1884 to 1916, then Belgian, 1916 to
1962- and Christianity, both Roman Catholic and Protestant from 1900 brought new actors
who shaped people, institutions and the entire society. These new actors- and there is the
third presupposition- would separate the population and conceive the policies according to
'race' differences. Colonisation together with Christianity inaugurated their encounter with
Rwanda within the framework of new theories in social science such as 'social Darwinism'
which provided the theoretical underpinning of race supremacy. Both colonialists and
missionaries opted for the formation of a so-called elite capable of "understanding and
promoting the western civilisation and Christianity". According to both missionaries and
colonialists the Batutsi who were believed to be the Hamites, a civilising race, were assumed
to be the only ones capable of providing such an elite.
This was reflected in the continuous caricaturing and stereotyping of the population. It was
reflected also in the offering of privileges in schools, administration and in imposing the
Batutsi rulers on the formerly autonomous regions. The new rulers thus modelled a gradual
fractured society ending in the social revolution of 1959 which aggravated the wounds. There
too was inaugurated another presupposition, the new dimensions to a culture of violence and
impunity, an episode which ended in the 1994 tragic events.
This chapter also examines, some of the factors of integration between Bahutu, Batwa and
Batutsi that existed in pre-colonial Rwanda. It discusses the existence of an unequal political
organisation in the central Kingdom and the role played by its social dynamics as well as the
responsibility of the colonisers in the disintegration of these factors. Equally the chapter
debates the motives which led the colonial authorities to shift their alliances from the Batutsi
nobility towards the Bahutu.
II. 1. Rwandan Society: the Factors of integration
At the end of 19th century, Rwanda 'territorial reality' was made up of several Kingships of
variable longevity and dimensions. There was a central 'core', the satellites or autonomous
monarchies in the periphery, in the northern region, the west and the south, and the frontier
regions outside the present day borders124. To put this reality in the way of the mythical
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ideology of the central Kingdom, and in the terms of Father M. Pauwels, when the Germans
arrived in 1898, the unity of the country around Karinga (see details below), was not so
evident as often claimed. There were still "Hamite rebel Kingdoms" recently conquered
(Bugesera, Gisaka, Ndorwa) and some autonomous 'Bahutu monarchies' in the remote regions
of north, north-west and south-west (Bukunzi, Busozo, Bushiru, Cyingogo, Ndorwa, Rukiga,
Bugoyi).125
However, the population, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa shared many common factors, a
linguistic unity, a social organisation based primarily on the clan; they shared the same
religion. These cultural and social realities as said before, went beyond the political system
prevailing in the central Kingdom where the military and administrative institutions were
under the control of a monarch from the Batutsi lineages of the Banyiginya clan. Most of the
scholars agree on the fact that in pre-colonial Rwanda, people identified themselves not by
ethnic group or races which were unknown to them126 but by clan.
II. 1.1 Social organisation: the notion of clan
There has been unanimity among the ethno-historians that the clan was the far most
important social organisation in pre-colonial society. Equally, scholars agree on the fact that
Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa constituted socio-classes which belonged indistinctly to identical
clans127. The clan is a social category whose members declare they descend from an
eponymous common ancestor, fictions or mythical. It is a common denominator, a designer
of lineages separated and who do not necessarily know each other, many estranged by their
social stratification. Ethnicity, according to many scholars is a collective group consciousness
defined by reference to a configuration of elements such as language, homeland, descent,
religion, values; it is always in comparison with other neighbouring groups. Some of these
characteristics may shift, but the need for that identity seems to be permanent, fulfilling the
need for belonging128. The presence of the three classes, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa in each
of the clans is one of the significant phenomenon characterising the integration of the
Banyarwanda people. In his study completed at the end of 1950s, D'Hertefelt summarised the
existing studies on the notion of clan from Czekanowiski (1907) to the late 1950s129. He
identified 18 clans all of them common denominators to Bahutu, Batutsi, Batwa130.
125Rapport colonial administration Ruanda-Urundi,1922-1930.
126
Maniragaba, op.cit. p.98.
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128 Consultation WCC, WRA, WLF. In Tschuy, 1997, p. 156.
129 D'Hertedfelt,M., Les clans du Rwanda ancien. Elements d'ethnohistoire et d'ethnosociologie, Tervuren;
MRAC, 1971
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Composition of clans per social class( %) situation of 1960 ( d'Hertefelt: 1971, see note 21)
Singa Sindi Zigaba Gesera Nyiginya Ega Banda Cyaba
Hutu 86,23 93,04 93,64 90,026 57,50 78,22 95,29 85,74
Tutsi 13,62 6,71 6,12 9,16 42,27 21,36 3,92 14,14
Twa 0,11 0,17 0,21 0,58 0,15 0,38 0,71 0,10
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Irrespective of being Bahutu, Batutsi or Batwa the members of the same clan have in
common many factors such as the totemisms, religious beliefs and ritual functions such as
ubuse13'. The members of the same clan were compelled to adhere to the clan solidarity and
fraternity132. D'Hertefelt then concluded that the most important problem of Rwanda has
been the failure of the first western reporters to understand the meaning of the clan, the "most
meaningful social organisation of Rwanda".
D'Hertefelt does not demonstrate the process of the creation and the organisation of the clan
which is neither the scoop of the present thesis. However, he shows his disappointment at
what he considers the failure of the abundant ethnological studies to define clearly the link
between the clan and the concepts of Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. He tends to suggest that the
three groups were initially distinct but then mixed up at various stages to form social classes
which have now lost their meaning to become 'ethnic' group or 'tribe'133 by the will of
ethnologists. In a prophetic reflection Dr Johanssen of the Bethel mission warned about the
unpredictable consequences of the dissolution of the clans which he considered as a
"religious communion"134.
The importance of the clan factor was shared by many other authors, even the most partisan
of racial difference, like Ferdinand Nahimana135. Nahimana estimates that "around the whole
country Rwandan people attach the highest importance to the clan as unifying factor, because
it confers a feeling of belonging to a 'social entity'. That brings him to raise "a pertinent
question: how Rwandans arrived at this positive, attaching, responsible attitude towards
members of their respective clan which does not necessarily correlate immediately with
family and lineage"136.
Ungura Shamba Tsobe Kono Ha Shingo Nyakarama Sita
Hutu 97,78 63,44 62,94 28,34 41,30 26,32 39,85 48,44
Tutsi 2,07 36,34 36,81 71,66 58,70 73,68 60,15 51,56









Comments on the table
N: total interviewed
a. The poll was made through an interview with all the voters of 1960 elections organised by UN prior to the
abolition of the monarchy and the colonial administration.
b. People were asked to say their clan and the interviewer had to check in the identity booklet. The same clans
comprise Abahutu, Abatutsi, Abatwa in the proportions they are represented among the population.
131 Ubuse phenomenon has for among other functions, a ritual of purification for members of family at the ends





134 Se Chapter III.3.5.
135 Ferdinand Nahimana was a key figure in the ideology of the genocide. See Chapter five.
136 Nahimana, F., Rwanda.Emergence d'un Etat. Paris: L'harmattan, 1993, P.64.
38
We are of the opinion that the clan as a social organisation, a unifying factor has been
overshadowed by the spirit of the colonially oriented ethno-historical studies characterised by
F. Barth as 'ascribed boundaries'137. The concept was gradually abandoned and replaced by
the notion of ethnic group with the intention of setting up the mechanisms of race supremacy
benefiting one group over the rest.
However, this erroneous interpretation was given further support by some indigenous elite
including Father Kagame, from the 1940s onwards. Without scientific arguments, Kagame
would argue for the clan to be exclusively of Batutsi origin. He suggested that the presence
in the clans of the Bahutu and Batwa attested by all researchers, resulted from their
assimilation to the Batutsi through social, economic and political relations. This appears to be
a deliberate bias deviating the concepts of Mututsi, Muhutu and Mutwa from their socio¬
economic primal meaning to imbue them with a more political and ideological significance. It
seems to be a deliberate bias because Kagame still admits unequivocally that these three
concepts had originally a socio-economical meaning:
II faut reconnaitre que dans les zones orientales, centrales et centre-sud, les Bahutu et les Batutsi ont
realise un metissage assez pousse. II y avait, certes, le cas des relations extra-matrimoniales; mais la voie
la plus courante etait constitute, dans l'ancienne societe, par le cas des Bahutu devenues proprietaires de
gros betail et qu'on appelait ibyihuture: les quittant-la condition de cultivateur et passant dans la
categorie politique des Batutsi. lis prenaient femmes chez les Batutsi. II y a avait surtout le cas des
Bahutu nommes par le Roi Prefets du sol (Abatware b'ubutaka) qui avaient le titre et le rang de chefs. lis
se mariaient parmi les Batutsi qu'ils precedaient alors en dignite. II y avait enfin, le cas des Batutsi
dechus de leur richesse bovine et qui etaient obliges de s'integrer a la classe des cultivateurs. lis
mariaient desormais leurs enfants dans leur nouveau milieu social138.
Equally, Kagame acknowledged the fact that there existed a high degre of mixture of the
populations due to intermarriages. But then he drew a ideologically oriented conclusion
defending a hypothesis of Hamite origin for all the clans, thus backing the process of
'racialising'; this led to a poignant comment of Father Muzungu endorsed by Prof.
Mbonimana that the precedence given by some authors including Kagame to 'ethnic groups'
over the clans had no other motive but racial ideology139.
The ethnicising of the notions of Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa is a more or less political and
ideological recent phenomenon. According to Reyntjens, the concept of Bahutu and Batutsi
as antagonists, was introduced for the first time in 1917 in the legislation by the Resident's
circular letter 791/A/53 who took all the Batutsi for Lords and cattle-owners, and all the
Bahutu for subjects and agriculturists140; the Hutu and the less wealthier Batutsi were
subjected to a considerable number of requirements. From then on the process of group
identity received a powerful political and intellectual justifications analysed in further
sections.
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To sum up this section, in the Rwandan context the three groups of human beings share
numerous factors of integration making irrelevant the ethnological definition of ethnic group
or race. F.Barth's, accurately defines ethnic group as "a category of ascription whose
continuity rests on the perpetuation of boundaries and the codification constantly renewed of
cultural differences between neighbouring groups"141. We must have in mind F. Barth's
definition when we discuss the issue of ethnicity as opposed to relational harmony.
II. 1.2. Relational Harmony
In addition to their belonging to common clans, the Banyarwanda shared a community of
customs and traditions, a common language: the population coexisted in the villages,
intermarried; experienced a social mobility (descending and ascending in social rank). They
also shared the notion of life and death, the place of God and religion in their life and
culture142.
This community of life was managed by what Karamaga calls 'relational harmony', described
by Father Tempels, as 'Bantu Ontology', a logical complete system of universe, of people and
things, of existence, life and survival. According to Tempels, this system rests on the
principle of 'vital force'- body, breathe and shadow- which regulates the manifestation of the
thinking, ideas and the universe under a metaphysical system which influences the religious,
political, social and judiciary life143. These notions are inter-connected with 'vital force' in a
hierarchical order whose integrity must be respected: the Supreme God; the primary Fathers
and the dead of the tribe; the living elders (chiefs and others); the inferior creatures (animals,
vegetation and the rest of the ecology)144. This relational harmony coherently regulated the
factors of integration to prevent harm between the communities, between individuals and
between human being and creation.
II.I.3. Cultural Unity
By language, people would identify themselves as belonging to a community of aspirations,
meaning and interpretation. By language, in particular, the mother tongue, people share their
very reality of the universe, symbolic, mythical, factual and transcendental. They can
communicate their being, socialise and identify themselves vis-a-vis people of other groups,
though people of the same group may not be able to communicate in the same language, nor
those who communicate in the same language be identified with that particular group.
Nevertheless, distinctive language has often been taken as a reference for belonging to a
separate ethnic group.
In Rwanda, the Kinyarwanda language unites all the people who live within the borders of
present-day Rwanda but also the former autonomous regions integrated from the beginning of
141
Barth, F., Ethnic Boundaries. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969, pp. 14/15.
142
Muzungu, B., 1996; see also Karamaga, 1990,p.
143
Tempels.P., La Philosophie Bantu. Paris: Presence Africaine, 1949,pp. 23/4.
144 Ibid. p.42.
40
the century145. Although the Kinyarwanda language has been the language of that millions of
people and though it has given the name to the present territory of Rwanda, it must be clearly
understood that this vast linguistic entity was much larger than the political entity now called
Rwanda . People who lived in the vast area have had the same economic, cultural, and social
stmctures though living under different political systems.
In the monarchy that covered the centre of Rwanda, the political organisation was an
inegalitarian structure as mentioned below. The expansion of Rwanda in particular under
king Rwabugiri, intended to correspond the political entity with the political organisation.
The attempt to impose that unequal political structure was however far from being successful
at the eve of colonisation. When Earl Gustav-von Gotzen crossed Rwanda from east to west
to meet King Rwabugiri in Kageyo, in 1894, the country was still expanding146.
If an ethnic group was really to be defined by reference to a configuration of elements like
social organisation, religion, homeland and language in comparison with other groups, then
all the Banyarwanda (Bahutu, Batutsi, Batwa) plus the population of Burundi (Bahutu,
Batwa, Batutsi) and other regions mentioned above would constitute one ethnic group united
by the Kinyarwanda culture. But we have already acknowledged F.Barth's definition of
'ethnic group' which I abbreviated as a category of ascription constantly renewed for
ideological reasons. The question of how these peoples came to speak the same language
though living under different political systems goes beyond the scoop of this research.
II.1.3.1.Cultural Unity or Strengthening Lineage's Identity?
According to Gasarabwe147, Rwanda was united under the ubwenge (intelligence, wisdom) of
the Banyiginya princes who by their movements and the confinements of their troops in the
rebellious regions, facilitated the ethnic mixtures through intermarriages; they politically
unified the country. This mixture, however, according to him, did not prevent the
development of an ethnic conscience which, on the eve of decolonisation was raised to
racism even among people considered to be very 'westernised: the clergy'. Two other factors
favoured the unification of the country, religion and the 'feudal university'148.
The religion in which the representation of the universe was an essential aspect was not a
separate institution as in the case of Christianity and Islam. It was rather, as Gasarabwe
rightly put it, "part of the whole life, beliefs, manner of being, model of relationships
between human beings and the elements"149. Religion has an indisputable role of unifier. In
the end of the ritual ceremony of the initiation to the cult of the heroes, imandwa which
145 The satellite regions comprised the south-west of Uganda (Bufumbira), the west of Tanzania (Karagwe), the
East of Congo-Zaire (Kivu); Burundi, though a historically separate state from Rwanda, the Kirundi, the language
spoken by the population of that country, Bahutu, Batusi and Batwa, is identical to Kinyarwanda in the sense of
the French spoken in France, and the French spoken in Quebec.
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concerned the Rwandans of the three groups except the Mwami, a pact was sealed between
the 'godfather' and the 'disciple'. These would exchange presents, like bovine and food,
develop solidarity into work and through the symbols of peace and prosperity.
The feudal school allowed young men selected among the Batutsi and some Bahutu families
to grow up beside the great masters who would command them; they shared times, milieus
and cultural contexts together. Gasarabwe was right to show that education in Rwandan
society inculcated common factors to Bahutu and Batutsi by family authority and superior
organisations. This view dismisses Sibomana thesis according to which education in society
inculcated different values.150 In fact, we see instead a high degre of integration in the social,
cultural symbolisms and religious practices.
Under the Kinyarwanda cultural entity, a panoply of legends, myths, tales, proverbs reflected
national cultural life into which was rooted social intercourse. Many among these myths and
legends were collected by ethnologists, then missionaries including Pastor Johanssen, the
founder of the Bethel Mission, 1907-1916 (Memoirs:'Ruanda'). Maniragaba who referred to
the collection as belonging to Mensching151 defends a theory of the 'lost fraternity'. The
myths according to Maniragaba, pose the eternal problem of the Batutsi supremacy
pretending that there was a brotherhood between Gahutu, Gatutsi and Gatwacosmologically
and divinely defined and accepted by the Bahutu. The Bahutu, he argued, were the eternal
losers. For him, the Batutsi have always opposed themselves to the fraternity. They
dominated the Bahutu by the Ubuhake during four centuries; they asserted their foreign
origin and colonialism on the Bahutu for nine centuries and later refused to recognise the
1959 revolution. Finally, the Batutsi organised the 1990's RPF/ Inkotanyi attack152.
One myth tells how God proved the perspicacity and patience of the ancestors of the three
groups. Imana (God) created Gahutu (ancestor of Bahutu), Gatutsi (ancestor of Batutsi) and
Gatwa (ancestor of Batwa) and a young girl. According to the myth, one day, God gathered
them in a hut and confided them three pots of milk to test their patience. "Keep it and do not
sleep", he told them; "I will come to check".
When God returned, He found out that the milk of Gahutu had evaporated and fell in his
hands and that he had licked it. Then God told Gahutu: "I put your milk in your hands, you
will cultivate and live upon your effort. You cultivate for the Mututsi, make nets, produce
crops and other tools". God turned to Gatutsi and found that his milk had evaporated and
diminished by a half; He told him "you will grow hundreds of cows, half of them will die
and half survive". Turning to Gatwa, God found that, tired of running from hunting in the
forest, the ancestor of Batwa wanted to sleep and drank the whole milk; God told him: "go
and make pots, you then will beg toward Gahutu and Gatutsi, toward the monarch who will
never refuse to give you something". Laslty, God turned to the young girl and found out that
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her milk had spilled on her bosom. God told her: "you will marry a Muhutu who will give
you milk; you marry a Mutusi who will give you milk and you will marry the king to give you
milk"153.
These myths fixed the three groups into professional specialisation. Maniragaba restricts his
comments to an ideological aspect, that is that the myth justified the Batutsi domination over
the Bahutu. We must underline two other aspects often hidden in many of the comments:
first, the myth raises the question of intermarriage between Bahutu and Batutsi to the very
family of the monarch when God commanded the young girl to marry either a Muhutu, a
Mututsi or the King. Different sources confirm this reality154. It however left open the place
of the Mutwa who has been the eternal forgotten, marginalised by the two 'brothers'.
Secondly, unlike Maniragaba's conclusions, the myths underline the dimension of fraternity
and brotherhood; an imperative duty to care for the most vulnerable of all three, Gatwa, was
assigned to the two brothers. The three belong to the same ancestor who actually utilises the
milk to distribute without confining the roles as symbol of a new life. They were called
instead to complement each other. In later developments however, we know that irrespective
of all the evidence now available, the cows were associated with only the Batutsi.
In addition to these long tales the Rwandan oral tradition has proverbs referring to the three
groups in negative and conflicting ways. A large repertoire has been collected by diverse
authors and institutions155. These aspects of culture have led some observers to conclude that
there existed tension between social groups and eventually, a nascent ideology of supremacy
in some circles which was resisted by the popular culture156. The present author is of the
opinion that there must have been a process of social constructs aiming to shape a group's
identity. This culture which was unveiling at the eve of colonisation has became both an old
and new loyalty and emerged as a political and scholarship variable during the 20th century.
Rumiya is right to point out that a racial ideology could not have sprung from the court and
from the great chiefs grounds where most of these proverbs originated. There, the Bahutu, the
Batutsi and Batwa gravitated all together. The use of pejorative proverbs, he rightly suggests,
neither constituted an act of rejection nor of violence between the Bahutu and Batutsi groups.
Jokes, tales, legends, myths exist in different cultures without constituting a racial issue. The
emphasis put on such an aspect which, indeed, is not peculiar to Rwanda has been, in our
sense, exaggerated for ideological reasons in the obsession of discovering differences
between people. Rather, the codification, standardisation and reproduction of these
153Johanssen, E., . Memoirs. Rwanda. 1907-1916. VEM. Mbacire umugani... See also Lestrade, A., Notes
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differences as cultural models and historical sources, has constituted the crucial step into the
racial ideology as discussed in further sections.
II.2. Divisive Factor: Inegalitarian Political Organisation
We have considered a number of common factors among the three social classes of the
Banyarwanda. We now turn to discuss the other side of the reality, the development of an
inegalitarian political system in the central Kingdom of Rwanda and the emergence within it
of the social dynamics determined to shape a group's identity as means of the monopoly of
political power.
II.2.1. Control of Political Power and Resources
From the 17th century, King Yuhi Gahindiro installed a regime of ibikingi/Ibiti or districts in
which the king was represented on a triple basis: the chief of pasture, the chief of land and
the chief of the armies. This structure was maintained by the ubuhake system described later
in this work. Despite the many integrative factors analysed above, this structure reflected a
hierarchical and unequal organisation that accumulated most of the wealth, land and cattle in
the hands of the Mwami (monarch) and his subordinates. Roger Louis described how the
accumulation of power and wealth in the hands of the mwami and his subordinates was
evident:
All the land, theoretically, became the property of the mwami, the absolute and semi-divine sovereign,
whose symbol of authority was the Kalinga (in Urundi the Karyenda), or sacred drum from which were
hung the genitals of the enemies of Rwanda killed by the mwami. To the Mwami all subjects were
obliged to pay tributes. The collection of these tributes was the responsibility of a complicated
administrative hierarchy. Administratively below the Mwami was a council of ministers, batware
b'intebe, below them the chiefs who governed the provinces, and beneath them the sub-chiefs. The
Mwami was required to consult the biru, or council of guardians of tradition, for important decisions.
Supreme judicial authority was vested in the Mwami, who delegated authority to courts composed of
great chiefs, who in turn delegated authority to more local courts. In a similar way, the Mwami
distributed land and cattle among his subjects, who in return administered regions, paid the tributes, and
provided military services ...; this system of obligations and tributes descended from the Mwami to the
most common farmer. Obligations were not usually to the same person; one might be bound to one chief
for cattle, to another for land, and another for military service157.
This tendency to monopolise the political power and resources described by Louis was
pursued by King Rwabugiri in the second half of the 19th century. This monarch created a
Rwandan empire in the interlacustrine region which reached its summit in the far north and
the west of present-day borders. This imperial adventure, however must be separated from
what Pottier wrongly considers as Rwabugiri's ethnicising of society by institutionalising
physical differences and the uburetwa (corvee)158. According to concordant sources, it is out
of doubt that the majority of Batutsi were compelled to uburetwa like their fellow Bahutu by
the ruling elites. In addition uburetwa was structured, institutionalised and generalised by
colonial administration from 1924 on159.
What has been also proved in recent discoveries, is that in many regards, Rwabugiri
associated the three social classes, Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa to one degree or another with
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the management of the institutions160. This is confirmed by many scholars including Canon
de Lacger, Father Kagame and Ntezimana. In fact, the administrative and political divisions
of the country mentioned by Louis were called in Rwanda political terminology the
umunyamukenke (chief of pasturage) and the umunyabutaka (chief of soils), umugabe (chief
of armies). The late Rwandan historian, E. Ntezimana, supports a similar argument in his
th
study on "social, political and administrative institutions at the end of 19 century".
Ntezimana showed that King Rwabugiri ended the influence of the powerful royal lineages in
recruiting his confidants and entourages in his multiple fiefdoms among the Bahutu and
Batutsi161. This reasoning goes at the opposite of Pottier's thesis with regard to King
Rwabugiri's responsibility in ethnicising society162.
But it is only when this political inegalitarian system was adopted by the colonial rulers and
the missionaries and imposed on the rest of the country, as indicated below, that it
accelerated the process of transforming the Batutsi social class into an ethnic group, the
rulers, to the ongoing detriment of the peasants including the Bahutu, the less privileged
Batutsi and the Batwa.
II.2.2. Cultural Justification of Control of Power
Among other instruments conceived by the system in the central Kingdom monarchy for the
preservation of privileges and power were a panoply of codes and official literature. Different
categories of elites: Abatekereza, Abacurabwenge, Abasizi, Abisi, Abiru have participated in
creating the space in favour of the reigning Batutsi dynasty, the lineage of Bahindiro in the
segment of the Banyiginya clan163. Pre-colonial Rwanda had three major categories of
16(1
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a. Abatekereza. The memorialists. The official genealogies were told by specialists who leant them from their
ancestors, parents, or neighbours. The texts were submitted to the official censure, thus subject to modifications.
The collection was made by Fathers Pages, Kagame and Vansina from 1957 and 1960. The popular genealogy
texts were less controlled that the other ones. The family genealogies in particular those referring to the Bahutu
monarchs were precious as they provided aspects of the past not taken into consideration in the official
genealogies.
b. Abacurabwenge (genealogists), literally the creators of intelligence were specialists of genealogies and
bibliographies of the monarchs and the queens. Their documents were the "legal foundation of the reigning
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literature, the dynastic, the pastoralist and warrior poetry. The central themes in this poetry/
literature were the cattle, the King and Karinga, the emblem-drum. In a section reserved to
the army institution in his book Le Code des Institutions Politiques du Rwanda pre-colonial,
Kagame described the military institution as the most coherent and inclusive political
institution, the basic social organisation of pre-colonial Rwanda. The Mwami was invested
with full title-deeds to all cattle; the latter served as the foundation of the Ubuhake pastoral
clientship contract that guaranteed the economic and social domination of the Batutsi over
the non Batutsi population164. Thus the code published during the period when the UN was
pushing Belgium to operate political reforms with a view to reaching the autonomy of the
colony was interpreted by some as giving an intellectual justification for the Ubuhake system.
Kagame wrote his book into 391 articles, in a form of legal codes, certainly intending to
show that the structure had sufficient flexibility for its adaptation.
As an essential principle, Rwanda must be unified under a king of a unique dynasty, the
Banyiginya. Being the "supreme patriarch of the parenthood", chief of armies, the king was
equally supreme chief of the civil administration. In fact, in Inganji Karinga (the triumphant
Karinga, the emblem drum of the dynasty, 1943), Kagame had attempted to show that the
organisation of the army had a participatory character.
Like E. Ntezimana, Kagame shows that Rwabugiri's recruitment outside the lineages
associated with the royal family has not been an exception to the rule. Without departing
from his theory of Batutsi supremacy (see chapter three), Kagame, indicates that each
Rwandan regardless of their social class and condition, including the king, belonged to a
specific army unit through their parenthood165. The armies were formed at the beginning of
each new reign. Yet, for Kagame whose theses of 'Hamite- Banyiginya' supremacy were
obvious, the spearhead of these armies, were the sons of the "hamite nobility, intore(those
selected), who constituted the official professional warriors"166 with whom were associated
the Bahutu and Batwa as auxiliaries.
As the Buhake institution has been targeted by outsiders as feudal, the code of the military
organisation provided a ground to value the supremacy of an inclusive Banyiginya- Bahindiro
'political institution'. To ran the economy each Muhutu was assigned manual activities in the
dynasty", thus subject to modification each time the succession was in question. The whole text was published by
father Kagame in Inganji Karinga (1943).
C. Abasizi (poets). The poetry was transmitted in a fixed form, in the vocabulary of the tradition. First the
dynastic poems referring to dead or living monarchs were kept by rhapsodic poets. The collection was made by
fathers van Overschelle and Kagame form 1936. They give valuable details on contemporary events but
eventually needed commentaries.
Abiru were the most important ritual councillors of the court. Their text called ubwiru, or 'esoteric code'. They
were special councillors of the monarch in charge of the knowledge and application of all regulations regarding the
acts, deeds and rites to be accomplished by the monarch. As the monarch has a divine character, these were
influential personalities.
164 Kagame.A.. Le Codes des Institutions, p. 116.
165 Ibid. pp. 116-133.
166 The dynasty poetry is a corpus of 176 poems complete or fragments dictated to Kagame by more than 20
composers (!). It is divided into three parties: the military section with 197 articles, the pastoral with 133 articles
and the administration of the population and territory comprising 21 articles.
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royal or sub-chief residences. In addition, during the harvest, each individual family would
provide Mwami with crops: beans, peas, sorghum through the Prefet of the soils. Whoever
refused to execute such duties was exiled 167.
As such, the military organisation had closer links with the Buhake system. Although some
authors have suggested that the Buhake was flexible,168 a reflection made by three members
of the Batutsi elite in 1948 showed that the Buhake was an odd practice, an exploitation of
man by man, of the poor by the rich in which the clients were always the losers169. But it is
Nkurikiyimfura who highlighted the alienating character of the Buhake system. The client's
life and belongings were alienated by the Shebuja (the patron). The latter would have the
right over the property and cows of his client even those acquired through other sources
different from clientship. This had a negative impact on the social relations between the
Batutsi ruling class and the peasantry170.
In 1941, the Superior Council of the Mwami tried to regulate the Buhake system in
elaborating the "Contract of Ubugaragu". But instead of correcting, the new contract codified
the injustices. The burden was still to be carried by the mugaragu (client: Bahutu and Batutsi
of lower stratum). Article 1 defined the obligations of Shebuja: giving a cow and protecting
his client without any other details about the kind of protection required. Rather, the official
contract put higher the obligations to be rendered by the mugaragu (client); he would now
provide many activities ranging in two categories, those called "facultative" and those
designed as "obligations of services". All this would require most of the client time in the
Shebuja's home171.
Papadopoulos remarks rightly the limit of such a "pastoralist civilisation, nomadic by origin,
fixing a political theocratic organisation. Its intellectual ground was strained by the fact that
it could only be fertilised by a limited number of models of existence reached by such a
system172". As we can see, the central theme of this literature was the glorification of the
sacred royalty. The participatory character that sustains the work of Kagame is questionable;
there was really little room for the population, most of them Bahutu and Batutsi of lower
strata. This surely diminished the impact of the factors of integration.
167 Ibid. art. 354, p. 125.
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II.2.3. Karinga Drum: Symbolism of Royalty
Karinga was invested as an emblem-drum of the Banyiginya- Bahindiro dynasty lineage who
reigned over Rwanda until 1961. Karinga was a myth, the incarnation of power, an object of
veneration and prestige. Its significance overlapped political and cultural sectors. It had a
supreme authority over the king and the queen. It had metaphysical properties, required
sacrifices, honour and dignity and possessed a mystical personality. It was Karinga who
reigned through the Mwami chosen by God173. Thus, the country, the soil, the females
(human and animals) were fertile due to the emblem-drum and the monarch. Its magico-
religious character was associated with legal, political and social life.
An orchestra of drums was regularly played in its honour. It intervened in highly emotional
affairs such as executions (Pauwels:1962). Other prominent drums were associated with
Karinga as substitutes to prevent the vacancy as when it was taken by Nsibura, King of
Bunyabungo (east of Congo-Zaire): Cyimumugizi (the sovereign is the maker); Kiragutse
(the country is expanding); Mpatsibihugu (I conquer and dominate the countries). For that
reason, the enemies of the country were sacrificed: it was believed that Karinga and its
substitutes were decorated with the genital remains of the defeated monarchs (Pauwels,1962).
For the polemicists, these victims were of Bahutu background, but for others, there was no
detail on that. One of the points of polarisation later in 1950s between the conservative
monarchists and the Bahutu reformers was the Bahutu leaders' insistence on abolishing
Karinga and reforming the monarchy.
In fact, Karinga was one of the symbols of the monarchy, the mystification of a system which
discriminated against large sections of the population. Yet, it was globally wrongly
associated with the entire Batutsi community when the time came for the political reforms .
II.2.4.Religious and social Justification of Power Control
The desire for control of socio-political life was manifested in the tendency to exert control
on the factors of daily social intercourse like religion, production and reproduction174. The
tendency in the ruling circles was to divinise both the power of the reigning dynasty and the
monarch.
The religious justification of the control on power was manifested in the ritual initiation to
the universalist and organised religious beliefs, the cult of imandwa heroes (practised in
Rwanda, Burundi, West of Tanzania, east of Congo-Zaire and South west of Uganda). For
some lineages, the ritual cult was an encounter between the three groups: Bahutu, Batwa and
Batutsi recreated into Muhima (an eponym 'hamite hero'), Munyoro (labourer) and the
Mutwa. As such, the ritual gave pre-eminence to the Munyiginya over the two other groups.
On the one hand, it emphasised the marginal role of the Mutwa; on the other, it showed
173 Gatwa, T.,1982 interview with Mgr Kagame in Butare, 1981; see also Father Pauwels: "Karinga, Tambour
Enseigne, 1962.
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Mashira, the last King of the Babanda Kingdom of Nduga whose population, Bahutu and
Batutsi were defeated by the Banyiginya-Bahindiro dynasty. The ritual shows that the
Babanda, both Bahutu and Batutsi were since then considered as Bahutu and would obtain no
favour from the new rulers as opposed to other clans, i.e. Basinga which was allied with the
Banyiginya175.
According to Father Muzungu, the process of divinising the king started under Mibambwe
III Sentabyo (1741-1746). The composer Semidogo, son of Gasegege composed a poem
entitled: "the monarch is not a human being". The process was pursued under Rwabugiri
towards 1855 when another composer, Singiyimbaga, son of Nyakayonga, produced a poem
of the same tone as the first one. The idea that the monarch was not a human being was
reinforced with the myth of origin which supported the belief that the Banyiginya dynasty
descended from the sky. This myth bore an ideology for the power control based on religion;
it was made to guarantee a theocratic reign176. The Mwami was then a supreme sovereign, a
super-Father of the families. Because of his supra-lineages and clans and his almost 'divine'
character, he was not concerned by the religious cult mentioned above.
Another desire to control the daily reality and the survival of the population occurred in the
domain of production. Production was a collective affair, familial and sacred. From the
beginning of the agricultural process to the end, production was facilitated by community life
and sustained by religious symbolisms. The production process was gradually falling into the
hands of the royal household. Not only had they set up the structural hierarchisation for the
control of the means of production (land, pastures, cattle, harvest: see Kagame above) but
had also conceived a form of religious control.
The phenomenon of Kuvukana imbuto (to be born with seeds), which meant that the next
king was to be born with the seeds in his hands, was part of such a desire for political,
economic and religious power. Kuvukana imbuto was carefully organised by the Abiru. In the
opinion of the present writer, the intention behind this was to ensure control of the means of
production by the monarch as heavy tributes in crops and animals were paid by all the
families at harvest. Religiously conceived, violation for refusing to pay the harvest
(imiganura) would be more compelling to lineages; these feared that an unhappy mwami
(monarch) who was considered as a deity would accurse any rebellious region or lineages.
Unfortunately, the Mwami failed to use this mythical role to alleviate the inegalitarianism.
Because the inequality was required by God, the king couldn't change anything though he
was considered as an appeal court of the poor177. The risk of such a system was an arbitrary
command with an unrestrained ruler. The individual was at the same time exploited and
allegedly protected by society, i.e. through his clan and the king. Hence the monarchical
175 Gasarabwe, op.cit. p.56.
176 Muzungu.B.. "Je ne suis pas Venu Abolir mais Accomplir". Kigali: Centre Saint Dominique, 1996, pp.151-
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lineage and its intermediaries pushed their dominance to a higher degree, unquestionably, the
divinisation of the regime and its incarnation, the King.
II.3. External Agents as Divisive Factors
From the end of the 19 th century, external agents including German colonisers, and
missionaries, Catholic and then Protestants arrived in Rwanda. For more than sixty years,
society was governed by new factors different from most of its traditional values and
principles. The drawing of boundaries which divided the populations of the same
backgrounds into different colonial empires, the continuing caricature of the populations,
different theories on races which were introduced in society, the process of christianising, all
contributed to destroying the existing factors of ethnic integration.
II.3.1. Redefining Boundaries
The installation of the colonisers followed the cutting up and the parcelling out of the Africa
Continent during the 1884 Berlin Conference chaired by the Prussian Chancellor, O. von
Bismark. First, with regard to the Great Lakes region of Africa including the cultural zone
covered by people of the Kinyarwanda language described above, the arbitrary boundaries
established by the colonial powers had a negative impact. The Berlin Conference was
followed by the 1910 Convention between Germany, Belgium and Britain. Rwanda was
divided into three parts, to use Ndeshyo's terminology, the German Rwanda, the Belgian
Rwanda and the British Rwanda 178.
This division had devastating consequences from the 'ethnic' point of view. The same
population was scattered into different principalities. First, the flexibility of geographical and
cultural boundaries which facilitated the movement of the populations for social and cultural
reasons was abolished. People were fixed into these new imposed boundaries. In what he
called the Kivu-Mfumbiro crisis, Louis explored the effect of such an arbitrary division on
the whole of central Africa in which the French, Portuguese, Belgians, Germans and British,
were all involved and suggested that it had devastating consequences. This 'fraud' in which
Rwanda lost half its territory179 added to the country's problems with regard to the shortage
of land in an overpopulated territory where more than 95 % of the population were rural. This
178
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shortage of land has caused despair and frustration in particular for young generations and
made them vulnerable to the exploitation of the tensions among the population.
But by far the most damaging consequence would be the perpetual victimisation by the post-
independence ethno-politicians of the populations of Kinyarwanda speakers who were caught
in the territories that were now apportioned to Uganda and Congo-Zaire. These rulers who
had no democratic ideal and who had no legitimacy have continuously promoted the ethnic
tensions and relegated these populations to the status of second rate citizens. Clearly, the
potentially manipulated 'ethnic tensions' of the recent years in the great lakes had been
planted a hundred years ago Unfortunately, this potential was exacerbated by the continuing
caricaturing of the Batutsi and Bahutu by leading scholars among the colonialists and the
missionaries.
II. 3.2. Stereotypes and Caricatures
From the early encounter of Rwandan society with the exterior, the country was given new
boundaries by explorers. These boundaries were set up by the anthropologists and ethno-
historians including missionaries with a background of race supremacy theories. According
to I. Linden, the encounter between western civilisation and Rwandan society provoked a
shock, not from Darwin, Lyell or Hegel but from missionaries who were the first
anthropologists to describe Rwandan society. For him, from then on, the Europeans
th
introduced the 19 century divisions of rulers and ruled. They described the society as a
country of strange Semitics, Hamitics, aristocratic castes, giant conquerors and invaders. The
'Hamites' were considered as 'born-rulers'. All this, according to Linden was dressed in the
ideology of Christian brotherhood from above180. On the other side, were the 'indigenous
Bahutu, 'agriculturalists', 'humble labourers', 'fearful' peoples.
Socio-economic boundaries were also created associating Rwanda to a "feudal regime similar
to Middle Ages Europe". The populations were fixed into three different castes. Equally, the
descriptions took the Hamite as intelligent people, born-rulers, courageous, virtuous and
authoritarian who had government and defence as a duty181. They governed by 'hierarchical
stratification'.
According to Maquet the hierarchical stratification based on the supremacy of the Batutsi
over the Bahutu and Batwa developed in two ways. On the one hand, the Batutsi's warrior
capability, their intelligence combined with the distribution of the cattle products182. For this
author his thesis was also valid for Rwanda, Burundi, Ankole (south Uganda) and Buha (east
Tanzania), Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa were 'castes' because they had distinctive physical and
psychological characteristics, grouped in sub-cultures with myths, diet, housing, clothing,
18H
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domestic social life and practised endogamy. Thus the divisions of society ranked in an order
of inferiority/superiority which has been reinforced by colonial powers and the Church
Hasting pursues the same reasoning when he asserts that the Bahutu and Batutsi differ in
height, possession of cattle and diet183.
Obviously, Maquet is right to emphasise the stratification hierarchy which created a
dichotomy within the relational harmony described above. He is right also to underline the
role of colonialism and Christianity in reinforcing and promoting the inequalities. Yet, his
analysis implicitly rests on a primordialist hypothesis of stratified hierarchy which as many
monographs on various regions of the country have shown, was not fully generalised (see
chapter 1). His hypothesis of ethnic binary opposition coincides with the obsession to search
for and promote the differences by a rather hypothetical description of the 'caste' as having
psychological characteristics184.
In fact many scholars have come to see the inaccuracy of using the notion of caste outside the
Indian context where it has not only a social and economic but a philosophical and religious
significance. In many regards, these physical characteristics rehearsed in the diverse
interpretations of the recent tragic events, have been used to put the blame on the traditional
social and political organisations. Balandier says the same thing in the interview mentioned
above but with certain nuances; he adds an argument that is missing in Hasting's analysis:
that of the nature of the responsibility of the colonial policies.
Balandier had insisted on the disastrous consequences of the measuring of the population, the
systematic grouping of the population with identity cards referring to ethnic origin defined
along arbitrary criteria, a process which has been recently acknowledged in the report of the
Parliament of the former colonial power, Belgium185.
Yet, another emeritus Professor of Ethnology, M. d'Herteflet insistently referred the present
writer to "the scientific studies of Hiernaux". In fact, the latter has proceeded to the blood
test , and the measurements, out of which he arrived at the ridiculous conclusion that the
Batutsi were, 1.79m, the Bahutu, 1.67m and the Batwa, 1.59. The Belgians colonial
authorities relied on these studies which included also the weight, the nose width, the nasal
index, the face height, the facial index for the three groups186. But even if these measurements
were reliable, the question if they would constitute a condition for people to necessarily
belong to different 'races' is unanswered. D. Franche said that during the first Empire in
France, Senators and Peers were measured at 1.74 whilst the conscripts were at 1.62.
However, they were not classified as belonging to different races187.
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For Rwandans all over the land who know the reality of many Bahutu, Batutsi, Batwa who
are taller and smaller; who knew many impoverished Batutsi who had no single cow nor even
a goat and had to work for the Bahutu to earn their daily survival, this kind of scholarship is
simply ridiculous and misleading. Partly, not only it is the question of extent of how many, or
whether these were members of exceptions, but because the study itself fell in impasse when
what were considered as exceptions were too many to be kept in such a category188.
The second hypothesis regarding the Batutsi as invaders who would have brought the cows
has also been questioned. The last archaeological discoveries in the land show that the cow
was known in Rwanda before the supposed date of arrival of the Banyiginya. This was
confirmed in 1983 by a group of Belgian scholars, including Marie-Claude Van Brunderbeek,
Emile Roche and Hugues Doutrepont in the publication of their findings entitled: "Page du
fer ancien au Rwanda et au Burundi. Archeologie et environnement"189.
Another area in which this 'caricaturing scholarship' of colonisers and explorers converges
with the missionaries' thinking is in the description of the religious and cultural values of the
indigenous populations discussed in chapter three.
II.3.3. Transposing Racial Inequality
The impact of the Hamite myth as a key factor in the thinking and behaviour of the
missionaries is discussed in the next chapter. But to anticipate the debate on the issue it is
best to have in mind two aspects: First, the Hamite myth has been prevalent in
anthropological scholarship which influenced explorers, colonialists and missionaries from
th
the end of the 19 century in the interlacustrine region of Africa. Second, the development
of the myth corresponded to the theories of race inequality which have been applied in
Europe and damaged the social harmony there as in for example France or Germany. The
Hamite myth was, indeed, that central piece needed in the colonial expansion within the
Great Africa region190.
Ali Mazrui analysed and placed such considerations in the perspective of the "European
expansionism that went back to the Greeks and their immediate successors", the Graeco-
Romans and the Judeo-Christian world. For him, two forms of Europeanism had inculcated
two attitudes among the Africans. First, the Judeo-Christian sense of sacred superiority
contributed to the birth of Ethiopianism and African syncretism whilst the Graeco-Romanism
arrogance had contributed to the birth of Negritude. This forced the Africans into a position
of 'cultural defensiveness'. Mazrui concludes then that by defending the thesis of a Eurasia -
Mediterranean Hamite - Semite civilising race on the continent either by blood or culture,




Muzungu, B.,"Ethnies et Cans au Rwanda". In Cahiers du Centre St Dominique. No 1. 1995, p. 19-51.
190 Franche, D., op.cit. pp.32/33.
53
ethnologists deny to Africa: the existence of a deep symbiosis of cultures among many
nations of the world191.
Applied to the context of Rwanda, the persistent search for the superior and inferior race, the
search for differences between the 'races' was appalling; it ended in creating a historical
resentment perpetuating a binary opposition. When the Belgians took over from the Germans,
they carried on the race differentiation strategy and elaborated it more fully. From 1925 the
colonial administration reports include an extensive description of the 'races' in a chapter
called 'race policy'. The Batutsi were described as having no physical resemblance with the
Bahutu except for 'some aliens' of impure blood.
Les Batutsi sont un autre peuple. Physiquement ils n'ont aucune ressemblance avec les Bahutu, sauf
evidemment quelques declasses dont le sang n'est plus pur. Mais le Mututsi de bonne race n'a, a part la
couleur, rien de negre. Les caracteristiques physiques "rappellent de fagon troublante le profil de la
momie de Ramses II. Les Batutsi etaient destines a regner...D'ou viennent ces conquerants? Ils ne sont
pas Bantu, cela est bien certain. Mais leur langue est celle du pays, nettement bantoue, sans trace
d'infiltration quant a leur origine192.
For the authors of this colonial administration report, the Bahutu and Batutsi belonged to
different races. Like the German Governor, the issue of cultural unity in particular the
Common language purely 'Bantu', remains for them, a mystery; they faced an undisputed
reality, the 'ethnic integration' of the population, but persisted in speculating on an eventual
'race' difference in evoking "les declasses dont le sang n'est plus pure". The convergence of
opinion of explorers, missionaries and colonisers in relation to the philosophy expressed in
this passage is highlighted by the editors themselves. Father J.M.van der Burgt, the colonial
administration report states, located their origin in India. Their physical characteristics relate
them to Masai, Ethiopian and ancient Egyptians. But according to the Batutsi themselves,
"they believe they arrived in the country at the same time as the Bahutu". Both the French
priest, Del Perugia and a former colonial administrator, O. Marchal in two separate
vindications of the Hamites mentioned above, two decades after the independence,
reproduced in exact similar themes the colonial and ethnologic theories originating the
Batutsi 'conquerors' in the plateaux of Tibet from where they drove their cattle, across India
and Persia and into the valleys of Mesopotamia eventually arriving in Ethiopia as both their
promised land and apportionment.193
However, the 1926 colonial report also acknowledged that there existed many common
characteristics and customs among the Banyarwanda and among the Barundi194; visibly, the
authors of the report were really much at pains to discern why. They then concluded that both
Banyarwanda and Barundi were the same race which divided into distinct groups called
Mututsi (singular of Batutsi) and Muhutu (singular of Bahutu) or Mutwa (singular of Batwa).
Pour les Banyarwanda, le terme Mututsi n'implique pas necessairement un caractere racique (sic) pur: il
determine plutot une situation sociale et Ton pourrait citer plusieurs families considerees actuellement
sans contestation comme Batutsi, mais descendant d'un ancetre Muhutu, voire meme Mutwa, ennobli
191 Mazrui, A., Political values and the educated class in Africa. London. 1978, p. 93.
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jadis pour des services exceptionnels rendu au Mwami... Le metissage des Batutsi et Bahutu est frequent,
non seulement par relations clandestines, mais encore par union legitime...195
The colonial administrators, who were the authors of the report had evidence of Batutsi,
Bahutu and Batwa concepts being social categories, "terme Mutusi n'implique pas
necessairement caractere racique (sic)... plutot une situation sociale'. In fact this was an
'uncomfortable' discovery; the authors persist in maintaining that the Batutsi have inborn
qualities of leadership. At the same time however, the Batutsi were described as being
marked by the spirit of 'ferocity', 'intrigue' and 'tendency for domination'".
Le Mututsi du Rwanda est, d'autre part, comrae son voisin du Burundi, doue des qualites qui font le
chef. D'intelligence vive, souvent d'une delicatesse de sentiments qui surprend chez les primitifs, ayant
au plus haut point le sens du commandement, possedant un extraordinaire empire sur lui-meme et
sachant sans effort se montrer bienveillant, le Mutusi de bonne souche s'impose tout naturellement au
Muhutu qui fermera les yeux sur les defauts (du Mututsi) qui en sont le revers: l'arbitraire, l'arrivisme
feroce, la passion de l'intrigue et l'esprit de domination absolue196.
Regardless the above evidence of common factors, the authors still affirm that, only the
Mututsi of Rwanda and his neighbour of Burundi, have "inborn qualities for leadership";
such a statement, in the view of this thesis, is part of the obsession to have a society of
superior and inferior, good and bad people.
Various other views and perceptions have been presented as to whether the Bahutu and
Batwa have not had socially and politically credible institutions. Canon de Lacger in his
research, Le Rwanda ancien, though partisan to the Hamite supremacy theory, has shown that
the Batutsi Banyiginya borrowed the social and political institutions from the existing
monarchies197. Nevertheless, a series of economic, political and cultural measures have been
introduced to reinforce the capacity of the ruling class as trustworthy auxiliaries in the
management of the colony. The following paragraphs consider how those policies developed
the feeling of belonging to two separate identities.
II.3.4. Imposition of Colonial Reforms
Through concepts, policies, attitudes, descriptions, the colonial administration, German and
then Belgian, have defined what they had called 'race policy'. The German colonial policies
were by far the most marked by the first Governor, Dr Richard Kandt. A distinguished
Geographer and Anthropologist, Kandt wanted to apply his own discoveries in the definition
of the colonial policies.198 Kandt, like his contemporaries, wanted to keep a hierarchical
stratified society. Honke puts it as follows:
En ce qui concerne l'organisation administrative Kandt pensait conserver l'appareil de pouvoir royal
dont les structures complexes ne correspondaient pas aux besoins d'une administration rationnelle et lui
adjoindre une composante rendant aux exigences allemandes. II prevoyait de choisir dans chaque unite
administrative une personne specialement qualifiee parmi les responsables traditionnels pour lui faire
assurer en outre les fonctions d'un representant du gouvernement199.
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This position of the German colonial administration with regard the keeping of the
hierarchical structure of the central core Kingdom and even to choose within the dominant
class the representatives of the colonial power, was espoused as seen above by the Belgian
colonial administration.
From 1916 when the Belgians took over200 and succeeded the Germans, the colonists and
missionaries developed a close collaboration in which the Catholic Church became more
privileged while the Protestant were merely tolerated. Firstly, to affirm their authority, the
Belgian administration would now rely on the Catholic missionaries rather than on
Protestants. This happened because, on the one hand, Belgium is mostly Catholic and most of
the colonial authorities were recruited within the catholic political parties; and on the other
hand, the Catholic missionaries were believed to have been acquainted with the country and
its inhabitants and had a working knowledge of the realities of life in this colony. Thus, to
elaborate and implement the 'race policies' the Belgian administration ordered a reflection
from the White Fathers on Rwanda.Fathers Arnoux, Hurel, Pages, Schumacher prepared
anthropological treatises to underpin the Belgian policies of adaptation. The document which
was drawn up in 1916 by R.P. Classe, head of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, had a
widespread readership201.
Not surprisingly, it reflected the presupposition of race supremacy which would remain the
core line of the ecclesial authorities in judging and characterising society. According to the
document, Rwandan socio-political system was similar to the feudal regime of the Middle
Ages. The authority was held in theory by the Mwami (King) Musinga, but in reality it was
the Queen mother who ruled. The country was divided into small regions with rival chiefs
(Bahutu and Batutsi) in particular in Nduga where powerful chiefs competed for the royal
privileges. Mgr Classe recognised that the Bugoyi, Kinyaga, Budaha, Gisaka, Kingogo,
Bushiru were not subordinate to the central Kingdom202.
The tributes paid to Mwami and chiefs - chiefs of lands and pastures- mainly by the Bahutu-
ikoro ry'ubutaka, amararo,etc.- were the pivot of the political institutions and were lucrative
for the intermediaries. The social structure was the Buhake whilst the social organisation was
the armed militia and the ethnic groups were known as the Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa. Classe
said however, that any owners of cattle and privileges, were considered as Mututsi203 whilst
in "the Mulera region anyone from the Nduga (centre and south) region was called
Mutusi"(sic)204.
The documentations consulted, particularly the colonial administration reports, 1922-1959,
the missionary reports and in particular, the scholarship of Prof. Reyntjens including his
2"" Ruanda-Urundi were officially handed to Belgium in the Versailles's treaty which distributed the Germany's
colonies to the victorious powers in 1919.
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doctoral thesis in law205 and the December 1997 report of the Belgian Parliament on Rwanda,
show that the colonial reforms of the 1920s and 1930s had several aspects that reflected the
clergy's influence. From the Political aspect: there was a desire to enforce a new charter
order having at the top the King of Belgium, then the Minister of the Colonies in Brussels,
the Governor General of Congo, Ruanda- Urundi in Leopoldville (Kinshasa); Vice-Governor
of Ruanda-Urundi in Bujumbura, the Governor (Resident) of Rwanda in Kigali and only in
sixth position, the King of Rwanda.
The reforms included the unifying integration of several small chieftdoms. In that process
several traditional Bahutu monarchies disappeared.206 In addition the triple chieftdoms in
which the king was represented in the territory by the chief of lands, the chief of pasturage
and the chief of armies were joined and subsequently had a single chief nominated by the
administration. This administration was essentially dominated by authorities of Catholic
confession.The reforms also included forcing King Musinga to sign the bill of religious
freedom as well as to nominate young literate Batutsi who graduated from the schools for
sons of Batutsi chiefs. The social aspect of the reforms comprised among other things the
attribution of an identity card referring to their ethnic origin. According to Luc de Heusch,
arbitrary criteria were taken into consideration to differentiate the population. It was by
owning either large herds of cows or by your physical measurements or by oral information
that the administration deemed you Bahutu or Batutsi.207
It was planned that the Buhake system would be gradually transformed and disappear208. But
instead, in 1924 it was reinforced in the codification of the uburetwa (forced labour) custom
by the colonial administration. According to various sources the uburetwa (corvees) were
extended to the rest of the country by the colonial administration though reduced gradually
from 142 (traditionally a week had five days) to 42 days per year. The fact that some wealthy
people or elite were allowed to pay the counterpart of uburetwa in currency underlined the
injustices against the poor209; the peasantry (Bahutu and Batutsi) were compelled to the
activities of public interest without being liberated from numerous obligations in the
residence of the chiefs. It was in that period that the cash crops like coffee were introduced
to generate income and to initiate a cash economy. To achieve such a programme the
population was submitted to heavy coercion, including physical punishments carried out by
chiefs and sub-chiefs who then became unpopular. In addition, the taxes introduced in 1914
by the Germans were reinforced and extended to individuals and cattle.
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The reforms aimed at transforming the traditional rulers, including the king and the chiefs,
into bureaucrats paid with taxes collected by themselves through the population.
Consequently this caused resentment within the peasantry whose destiny was set to
deteriorate progressively in the years to come.
II.3.5. The Fate of the Masses
All these measures created what C. Attenbury calls the 'cumulative impact', or the package of
the actions that exacerbated the frustrations, rancour of the population and became the
catalysts of the 1959 Revolution. There were among other things, the introduction of the
market economy, taxes, cash crops and the exploitation of the mines even the Church under
Mgr Classe introduced a Church tax of IF per adult210. The colonial authorities were led to
institutionalise the forced labour. All these measures left the populace in precarious
conditions.
In fact, although the peasants who were Christianised in theory were freed from their shebuja
(patrons) obligations, it was to be subjugated by the priests who also behaved as patrons.
According to Linden: "conversely the Hutu also thinking in terms of patron-client
relationships, treated the Fathers as their new preferred Abanyabutaka, paying them against
the Abatware... The Fathers treated their Hutu as Garagu rather than tenants, whilst the Tutsi
made valiant efforts to come to terms with idiosyncratic views of property"211. Clearly, the
Church contributed to worsening the conditions of the peasantry. The destiny of the 'Hutu
masses' disintegrated irreversibly.
Then there were taxes called Minimum Personal Contribution paid by each adult male,
whether or not he earned. This led to arbitrary arrests and the expatriation to the British
colonies of those incapable of paying. Almost 50.000 per year or one out of six male adults
were exiled212. In response to this injustice, Lemarchand wrote that: "the destiny of the
Bahutu masses was considerably worse under the Belgian administration than ever before".
Linden accurately notices that the colonial authorities, the White Fathers, the Court and the
ruling class were all competing for one commodity Rwanda could supply in abundance, the
labour of the peasantry213.
II.3.6. Mutual Devotion of Colonial and Religious Powers
The colonial reforms were conceived, and applied by the coalition of the Catholic hierarchy
and a colonial administration. For most observers Belgium as 'colonial power' has transferred
to its colonies most of the divisions of its society. Her study identifies one of these divisions
as being the difficult equilibrium between the political parties in Belgium. The majority of
the authors who studied the colonial period, including A.des Forges, Reyntjens and Feltz
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unanimously acknowledge the fact that all the authorities were pressured directly or
indirectly to convert to Catholicism as explained in the next chapter214.
Equally, religious affiliation of the colonial authorities has been one of the factors that
enhanced the alliance between the Catholic Church and the colonial government. These
authorities from the Minister of colonies, the Governor General of Congo and Ruanda-
Urundi based in Leopoldville, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi who had his office in
Bujumbura, the Resident of Ruanda who lived in Kigali, were carefully selected from among
the Catholic parties in Belgium and have been with few exceptions fervent adherents, as was
the Mwami of Ruanda in Nyanza. From 1948 to 1951 all these authorities belonged to the
Catholic political Parties, except Resident Sandrart, liberal (1948 to 1950), Minister
Buisseret, Socialist (1954-1958) and Vice-Governor Harroy, Liberal (1950 to 1959) 215. The
religious affiliation can not be a neutral subject in the formation of a "Christian Kingdom in
Central Africa".
The "catholicising of the King and the chiefs" against which Protestant missionaries have had
to protest more than once, can not be perceived as a matter of Catholic clergy putting
pressure on the colonial administration. There might be a great sympathy from the civil
servants and the politicians towards the Church to which they belonged. These were backed
up by the young Batutsi chiefs selected, educated and nominated with the sponsorship of the
missions. The personnel of the colonial administration she asserts were mainly recruited
under the Catholic political parties, a point which is confirmed by Father Theunis216. The
colonial representatives put it as follows:
Les delegues du Resident du Rwanda sont unanimes a affirmer l'excellence de la methode consistant a
recourir a la cooperation de jeunes Batutsi lettres, ceux-ci reussissant rapidement, grace a leur vive
intelligence et a leur remarquable esprit d'assimilation a adapter sans heurt le point de vue de
1'administration a la mentalite indigene"217... The report then says: "Le programme des reformes
destinees a ameliorer la situation sociale de la population- programme elabore anterieurement a ete
applique methodiquement et complete par diverses mesures d'execution qui peuvent se resumer comme
suit:
- les agissements de chefs ont ete etroitement surveilles;
- les indigenes Batutsi and Bahutu qui n'ont obtenu un commandement qu'en abusant la credulite
superstitieuse du Mwami ou des grands chefs - faiseurs de pluie, sorciers et devins- ont ete deposes et
remplaces par de jeunes Batutsi lettres, anciens secretaires indigenes.218
The "young literate Batutsi" were in fact the products of the missionary schools, the sole
operating in the country. The summary of the reforms completed as made by the
administrators, included the dismissal of both the chiefs Batutsi and Bahutu from the
traditional and political entities judged as having earned their position through 'intrigue and
divination'. The disappearance of the Bahutu chieftaincies, or monarchies in the new political
214 Out of 69 chiefs, 54 were Catholics and 15 pagan; out of 900 sub-chiefs, 781 were Catholics and 119 pagan. In
1938 there were 56 chiefs: 51 were Catholis, 5 pagan; 860 sub-chiefs of whom 726 were catholic, 21 Protestant, 5
Adventist and 108 pagans. In 1947, out of 51 chiefs, 48 were Catholic, 2 Protestant and 1 pagan; of the 625 sub-
chiefs, 555 were Catholics, 42 Protestant, 9 Adventist and 19 pagan. G. Feltz., "considerations sur l'histoire
contemporaine du Rwanda". In RFEP A, 1971, no 69, p.76-97. Quoted in Reyntjens, 1985,p. 125.
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panorama which needs further discussions, has been an episode which sadly highlights the
responsibility of the Catholic Church in the polarising of society219. This section of the
colonial administration report however, does not mention explicitly the Christianisation of a
young Batutsi generation and the collaboration of the Church with the colonial power but in
reality it is what lies behind. The young literate Batutsi whom the colonial administration
needed was educated in the missionary schools; the nomination and the revocation of the
chiefs were always made with the co-operation of the local clergy. The comments also
indicate on one hand a disdain of the established procedures of delegating authority in
Rwanda society, and on the other, it shows, to what extent the exclusion of the old guards of
Batutsi and Bahutu chiefs, were placed in the search for a Christianised young Batutsi
generation. The reforms sealed in a negative way the destiny of the peasantry and accelerated
the potential for the 1950s explosion. Another dimension of these reforms was the impact of
the imposition of the Batutsi on formerly autonomous regions of Rwanda.
II.3.7. Rulers Imposed Provoked Resentment
One of the key measure in the colonial reforms of 1924 to 1935 was the imposition of the
regime of Musinga over the formerly autonomous regions which had been under the
leadership of the traditional clan chiefs. In fact, the process started under the Germans in
1911 and continued under the Belgians. The colonial authorities decided either to suppress
those monarchies, or to integrate them with others and to nominate over them young chiefs
from the central monarchy in Nyanza. The Church provided both the education of 'young
literate Batutsi' and also the necessary assistance in their recruitment and installation as
indicated in the quotation at the previous page.
This episode left society with many unhealed wounds. One of these fractures which has been
largely present in the Rwanda tragedy was the fracture of society on the line Bakinga
(northerners - Banyandunga (the rest, particulary,the central and southerners). Catherine
Attenbury considers that the colonisers (Germans and then Belgians), through arbitrary and
repressive use of the Batutsi rulers from the central core area in the satellites and frontier
regions have created a "cumulative impact" and the resentment that exploded in the 1959
revolution220.
Assessing the 1925 events, the colonial administration report praised the "completion of the
reforms of the political administration" on the country from 1916. Prominently mentioned,
was the control and at the same time, the reinforcement of traditional authorities; the
imposition by force of the authority of Musinga in the "Busozo and Bukunzi provinces,
219See chapter three, section 4.1; Reyntjens, 1985, p.104; Lemarchand, 1970,p.85.
220 Like Canon de Lacger, Pauwels and others, Attenbury shows that Rwanda pre-colonial was not unified. It
existed in three regions: a. a central core; the satelite regions and the frontier regions. In the central core, the
system rested on the Mwami, Abiru, a centralised triple administration of chiefs of land, cattle and armies who
represented the king around the country; then the ubuhake system.
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Shangugu which were governed by a Bahutu family, maker of rains", and in "Bushiru-
Chingogo, where the authority of the Bahutu monarch was ended in 1924"221.
The Local populations protested against this violation of their sovereignty which
started under the German rule but were heavily repressed. According to Louis222,
several revolts emerged in the south, south west and the north early in 1910s. In the
north a certain Ndungutse223, together with Bilegeya another son of Rwabugiri with
Nyiramuhumuza and chief Mutwa, Basebya, succeeded in mobilising both Bahutu and
Batutsi. The revolt had some success in the Buberuka, Buyoga, Kabaya, Ruhondo,
Kibari and Bumbogo regions while open resistance was noticeable throughout the
country. The German Governor ad interim, Gudovius moved quickly not only to stop
the opposition against Musinga, but to prevent "the Ndungutse movement from
inciting a revolution of the Hutu against Tutsi". Captain Godovius organised a
punitive expedition against the insubordinate districts. He committed his troops to:
causing the greatest possible damage until complete submission; otherwise, destruction of crops and
settlements, and occupation of the theatre of operations by chiefs appointed by the Resident who are
faithful to Musinga. Gudovius entered the village- where Ndungutse had retreated- and his escort fired
continuously, killing about fifty people. Most of the villagers attempted to break out of the circle of
surrounding soldiers; most were slaughtered. Ndungutse himself was killed during the fighting.
Gudovius burned the village; nothing was left but ashes... the Chief Lukara- murderer of Father Loupias
in Rwaza- was executed after summary proceedings on 18th April for the murder of Father Loupias; the
Twa Basebya was shot on 15 May. The result of the Ndungutse expedition, however, was a
strengthening of authority of the mwami and the German administration. The sultan expressed his thanks
to the Residency through a special delegation and the presentation of a great elephant tusk. Godovius
reported after the expedition that the administration could continue to count on the 'complete loyalty of
Musinga' and could be assured that he would try to fulfil every wish of the Resident 224
This punitive expedition aimed, in the words of Capt. Gudovius, "to end one for all the
revolts in the north" against the authority of Mwami Musinga. That it reached its ends is
questionable. But at least, it left behind many victims among the local populations, serious
damages to their belongings and created a resentment.
In his acrimonious attack against the Batutsi, Nahimana describes what he calls the
"conscience of the Rwandan masses" which played a role in the defence and the extension of
the kingdom225. Obviously his 'mass conscience' was part of his campaign in the 1990
mobilisation against the Batutsi and their 'accomplices'. In chapter VI of his book he presents
what he calls the colonialo-missionary military operations for imposing the Batutsi chiefs in
the north and north-west. For him, the operations crystallised the tensions. The German
troops accompanied by the warriors of chief Rwubusisi crossed the region, from Bushiru to
Bugoyi, Buhoma, Bwanamwali, Bukonya and Bwimba.
These regions were the theatre of fighting. The crops were devastated and the houses
destroyed. They arrested and killed chief Basebya and Ndungutse. Some of the consequences
were famines which affected the region in the following years. Nahimana enumerated almost
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52 epidemics and disasters which destroyed animals, human beings including local heroes
and chiefs from 1890 to 1931. Consequently, the population attributed them to the Inkemba
warriors of chief Rwubusisi. The resentment went to such an extent it left a legacy of
popular disagreeable language that evokes the horrors; it also gave vent to the strong
sentiments of revenge226.
Ndungutse's 'revolts' were also recounted by Honke227. While Louis says that Ndungutse was
killed in the German attack, the 1928 colonial administration reported a new insurrection of
more than 2000 rebels conducted by 'Dungutse' (sic). The revolts, according to the accounts
were overcome by the Belgian troops who left several victims among the population228.
The imposition of the Batutsi rulers from the centre and south of Rwanda on the autonomous
regions generated psychological frustrations, rancour and wounds which have never healed.
Apart from the losses in human and material resources, the centres of local government based
on the traditional socio-political and religious equilibrium, respecting the consensus of the
inhabitants of the clans were brutally ended. Their organisation was ignored, even destroyed,
and replaced by foreign Batutsi rulers imposed with force. For the populations concerned,
especially those from the north, history did not end like that; the processes provoked
frustrations, revolts, repression and rancour and created resentment against the native of the
centre and the south widely considered as the 'Batutsi or Abanyenduga'(natives of the centre
and south of Rwanda)229 as earlier indicated.
II.4. Shifting Alliances and Allegiances
C.Attebury put forward as a major cause of the 1959 revolution, the 'power deflation'
provoked by the arbitrary and repressive generalising of the central core system; the
'cumulative impact'; the intransigence and indecision of the colonial administration which
was then incapable of regulating the accelerators. The changes introduced by both the
colonisers, Germans then Belgians and the missionaries increased the exploitative capability
of the Batutsi oligarchy over their subordinates the Bahutu and many Batutsi, while at the
same time, created the conditions of 'power deflation'. This is because they misunderstood the
functioning of the traditional system.230
II.4.1. 'Deflation' of Colonial and Monarchical Authority
What C.Attenbury considers as cumulative impact was the western education which provided
the possibilities of the formation of the Bahutu elite in the Catholic seminaries who later
became the prominent protesters; the growth of the population in the rural areas reaching a
density of 177 per Sq.km. in Ruhengeri and 159 in Save in Butare in the 1950s. There were
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also the delay in introducing the socio-political reforms. Though a decree making provision
for the elections existed from 1943 onwards these could only take place in 1956 under UN
pressure. Organised in 1956, the first elections ever held deceived both from the aspect of
correcting the imbalance and from the fact that they became a pretext for some to pursue the
polarisation of the problem into the Bahutu-Batutsi opposition. Only one person from Bahutu
background out of 45 chiefs; and 10 sub-chiefs out of 559 were elected. Astonishingly, the
blame for the poor score was put on the psychological, cultural and historical domination of
the Batutsi over the Bahutu; the colonial power and missionaries were acquitted. M. Maus, a
member of the Superior Council of Rwanda-Urundi commented:
Que peut-on attendre d'elections chez un peuple esclave? Au depart tout le processus est deja
fausse...Pour les campagnes electorates toujours influentes, le clan Tutsi a tous les atouts: chefs, sous-
chefs, notables, qui etant riches et puissants, disposent de voitures pour se deplacer, peuvent acheter des
candidats a leur devolution, menacer leurs sujets et clients, etc. Le clan hutu, lui, n'a rien que sa
profonde ignorance, son complexe d'inferiorite, son extreme denuement, sa terreur atavique des autorites
Tutsi231.
The passage is characteristic of the blame which, from the beginning of the petitions for
independence, precipitately started to be put to the Batutsi, the yesterday allies of the
Europeans. Honestly, this should not have been the case. Section 3.6. of this chapter suggests
that the authorities responsible for the elaboration and implementation of the discriminatory
policies were the colonial administration and the Church, not the Batutsi elite, though the
latter were beneficiaries.
A second failure of the ruling coalition came from the attempt to suppress the Ubuhake
system. Ubuhake, one of the most documented aspects as mentioned above, was suppressed
by Mwami (king)'s decree in 1952. The system linked the monopoly of the economic
resources to the control of politics. In fact the ubuhake would not end with the death of any
contracting party; it was rather inherited by the male descendant, the shebuja (lords) and the
clients. It guaranteed to the owners of the cattle to have the symbolism of political power,
while leaving the clients with the precarious possession of the cows.
Responding to many demands including those from the Batutsi elite232, the Mwami
suppressed the ubuhake. He justified his decision before the Superior Council: "L'ubuhake
etant considere comme une entrave reelle a revolution du pays, une exploitation de la masse
par quelques shebuja, il ne reste qu'a le supprimer sans se soucier des mecontentants qui
pourraient provenir de certaines categories de gens"233.
However, the decree suppressing the ubuhake failed to make provision for the land reforms,
thus leaving the Clients who earned cows with shortage of pastures. These remained under
the control of the ruling classes; an appeal to distribute them was rejected by the Superior
Council in 1955. Reyntjens rightly concluded that the incapacity of the regime to resolve the
231 Maus, A., Member of the Superior Council of the Country. Quoted in Reyntjens, 1985, p.190.
232 See section II.2.2.
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land properties issue may have been at the heart of the 1959-1961 revolution. Many Bahutu
became aware of the continuing dependency upon the Batutsi aristocracy234.
II.4.2. Accelerators of the 1959 Revolution
The other factors which accelerated the 1959 revolution were both the intransigence of the
Batutsi ruling class and the indecision of the colonial administration. From 1948 the UN
missions had visited Rwanda every three years and requested that democratic reforms be
accelerated.
In 1957 during the presence of the UN delegation, the Superior Council of the Country under
the chairship of the Mwami, issued a white paper asserting that the crisis which generated
many petitions and articles in the press was not a 'Hutu-Tutsi' one but a White-African
problem. In fact, while Belgium was slipping into muteness showing refusing to think about
democratic reforms, some Bahutu leaders started petitioning for constitutional changes but
met with the resistance and arrogance of the conservative entourage of the Mwami. For
example in 1956 and 1957 petitioners led by Joseph. H.Gitera were ignored by the Mwami in
Nyanza. Though in the first instances they were still imbued with reverence to Mwami
considering him as their ' father' and expressing their deep gratitude for being invited at the
court, the delegation was shocked to realise that the king too was as an 'arrogant Tutsi' as his
entourage. In fact, the myth of 'Hamite supremacy' has been strongly assimilated by the ruling
class, an attitude which was soon going to be used on their detriment by those ignored.
In March of that year, a petition of nine Bahutu leaders had posed the problem in terms of
the 'Hamite-Hutu' opposition. While the Batutsi leaders campaigned for immediate
independence, the Bahutu leaders asked among other things: the abolition of the indirect
administration favouring the sole Batutsi elite; the abolition of the corvees; the installation of
a social charter designed to promote syndicalism; the freedom of speech; the privacy of
property and the creation of a rural trust for the promotion of peasantry; the codification of
the custom; the promotion of the Bahutu in the public administration; equal access to
opportunities in education and scholarship.
The petitioners also demanded a democratisation of the institutions before the independence:
they perceived it as a double liberation of the "Hutu from both the 'Hamites' and 'Bazungu'
(Whites) colonisation"235. However, they insisted that Belgium should not withdraw from
234ibid. p. 208
235 The 'Bahutu Manifesto' was in the beginning a petition of nine young leaders including: M. Niyonzima,
Gregoire Kayibanda. C. Ndahayo, I. Nzeyimana, C. Murindahabi, G. Sentama., S. Munyambonera, J. Sibomana
and Joseph Habyarimana Gitera. It stands in three sections: the first part objects on the pretexts given in refusing
the promotion of the Muhutu; second, it identifies the dimensions of the 'indigenous racial problem' and third, the
authors propose 'immediate solutions':
I. "Les rumeurs seront deja parvenus a l'autorite du Gouvernement par la presse et peut-etre aussi par la
parole au sujet de la situation actuelle des relations Muhutu-Mututsi au Rwanda ... La situation actuelle provient
en grande partie de I'etat cree par l'ancienne structure politio-sociale du Rwanda, en particulier le Buhake, et de
l'application a fond et generalisee de 1' administration indirecte, ainsi que par la disparition de certaines
institutions sociales anciennes qui ont ete effacees sans qu'on ait permis a des institutions modernes, occidentales
correspondantes de s'etablir et de compenser .... L'interaction elite - masse est indeniable, mais a condition que 1'
elite soit de la masse. Au fond du probleme il s'agit d' un colonialisme a deux etages: le Muhutu devant supporter
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Rwanda or accord independence before the 'indigenous colonisation' was resolved. The
authors of the petition used a language which shows a degree of assimilation of the Hamite
theory and a resentment due to the test of exclusion their group had endured.
The entourage of the Mwami and the Mwami himself, rjected energetically this aspiration to
changes. In May 1958, 14 senior councillors of the court (abagaragu bakuru b' I bwami) in
the capital, Nyanza, issued two documents of a very arrogant and ethnic tone rejecting these
demands en bloc. They ridiculed the claim of cooperation. The first document introduced
what they called the "historic detail of the Banyiginya reign in Rwanda and rejected the claim
of brotherhood with the Bahutu justifying their argument with myths and legends:
The ancestor of the Banyiginya (the reigning lineage) is Kigwa. He arrived in Rwanda with his brother
Mututsi Mutusi and their sister Nyampundu... To reclaim resources sharing, one must prove a
brotherhood. But the relations between us (Batutsi) and them (Bahutu) have always been build on
servitude. Thus, there is no foundation of brotherhood (...)The Bahutu have also pretended that
Kanyarwanda is our common ancestor, the 'mediator' of all the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa families. But
Kanyarwanda is the son of Gihanga, of Kazi, of Merano, of Randa, of Kobo, of Gisa, of Kijuru, of
Kimanuka, of Kigwa. This Kigwa found the Bahutu in Rwanda. How then 'Kanyarwanda far posterior to
the existence of the three races, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa, found existing, can be their common
ancestor? Our history says that Ruganzu had killed many 'Bahinza (Hutu monarchs) and then conquered
the Bahutu counties of which those Bahinza were kings. How then the Bahutu could pretend being our
brothers? All the details are available in Inganji Karinga (our: Kagame, 1943)236.
le hamite et sa domination et T Europeen et ses lois passant systematiquement par le canal Mututsi (leta mbirigi et
leta ntutsi)!. La methode de la remorque ' blanc-hamite-muhutu' est a exclure ...
II. On pourrait cependant le preciser: le probleme est avant tout un probleme de monopole politique dont dispose
une race, le mututsi; monopole politique qui, etant donne l'ensemble des structures actuelles devient un monopole
economique et social..., vu les selections de facto dans l'Enseignement, parvient a etre un monopole culturel, au
grand desespoir des Bahutu qui se voient condamnes a rester d'eternels manoeuvres subalternes, et pis encore,
apres une independance eventuelle qu'ils auront aide a conquerir sans savoir ce qu'ils font... Les privileges de son
frere qui commande la colline ont toujours concouru a rehausser le Mututsi prive. Certaines fonctions sociales
furent meme " reservees" a la noblesse et la civilisation actuelle, par 1' administration indirecte, n' a fait que
renforcer et quasi generaliser cette reserve.
... Encore une fois on pourrait contester la qualite de vrais hamites a quelques numeros; mais la selection de fait
(operee par le hasard?) que presentent actuellement les etablissements secondaires, creve les yeux. Des arguments
ne manquent alors pour demontrer que le Muhutu est inapte, qu'il est pauvre, qu'il ne sait pas se presenter. L'
inaptitude est a prouver; la pauvrete est son lot dans le systeme social actuel ...La jeunesse muhutu (quelques
elements batutsi completement dechus ont aussi le meme sort) qui a pour devise "in itineribus semper" a 1'
interieur du pays ou a 1' exterieur, fuyant le travail- corvee, non plus adapte a l'etat et h la psychologie
d'aujourd'hui, n'accepte plus ou a peine la discipline de la contrainte qui donne d'ailleurs occasions aux abus que
les autorites semblent ignorer....
III. Ce n'est pas que nous veuillions un pietinement sur place: nous sommes d'accord que le Conseil Superieur
Tutsi puisse participer progressivement et plus effectivement aux affaires du pais; mais plus fortement encore,
nous reclamons du Gouvernement tutelaire et de 1'administration tutsi qu'une action plus positive et sans
tergiversations soit menee pour l'emancipation economique et politique du Muthu de la remorque hamite
traditionnelle.
... Les gens ne sont d'ailleurs pas sans etre rendu compte de l'appui de 1'administration indirecte au monopole
mututsi. Aussi pour mieux surveiller ce monopole de race, nous nous opposons energiquement du moins pour le
moment, a la suppression dans les pieces d'identite officielles ou privees de mentions 'muhutu', 'mututsi', 'mutwa'".
Nkundabagenzi, F., Rwanda Politique 1958-1960, Brussels. CRISP, 1961, p 20-29.
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The second document, les political was an opposition to the suppression of the ibikingi (the lord-land properties)
on the ground that it was the custom of the country. They instead proposed to remove the over demographic
population towards the then unoccupied lands in the east (Mutara, Bugesera, Rukaryi, icyanya, Mubari,etc).
On 12 June 1958 Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa summarised the deliberations of the Superior Council of the
country on the problem 'Bahutu-Batutsi'. "It is a damaging increasing noisy propaganda spread by a small group
acting under foreign influence with communist ideas. Their intention is to divide the country. They would not
succeed to divide a country whose national unity and secular political force organisation has annihilated the most
powerful attackers. The country is reunited to identify, cut down, eradicate and burn that ill tree which is infecting
its life. Then a motion was voted to "ask that the colonial government remove from the official documents the
terms Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa". Nkundabagenzi,F., op.cit. .37.
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This was also part of the deification of the founder of the dynasty otherwise made by the
Abiru including the most learned of them, Father Kagame who claimed the paternity of the
myth. In taking such a hard-line position, they confined themselves in the role of Hamite
equals foreign, equals conqueror, dominant; they thus gave the weight to the attacks of their
opponents. The text was an extract of the myth of ibimanuka (those who descended from sky)
known also as umugani w'ibirari( the story of the journey) which has been popularised by
Father Kagame from 1943.
If there would be no single intelligent human being today to believe in such a thing like
people descending from sky to rule over Rwandans, it seems to the present writer that in
recounting this legend of Gihanga which occurred within the interlacustrine region, the
entourage of the Mwami attributed to that myth classic functions, in particular: "offering
explanation of origin and presenting a story which, partly because of its fantastic or
supernatural elements, will have a special appeal to the imagination"; being a "legend
echoing the power and wisdom of venerated princes who lived in bygone days who have been
deified by later generations ...; and being the products of fraud committed by princes and
priests who took advantage of the superstitions of the masses to keep them under control" 37.
As such, the myth plays a role of the fraud so as to allow the elite to keep the masses under
control. The entourage of the Mwami including Father Kagame who, at the time, was
chaplain to the King, surely knew about such a fraud but still perpetuated mysticism to justify
their privileges. Whether people still believed in that myth was not an issue at the time. The
conservative Batutsi who themselves, had been confined in such an attitude by the different
theories and policies, by the colonial administration and the Church, wanted to impress a
large segment of the population.
The moral of the myth of ibimanuka does not differ from that of the Hamite recounted in
chapter three. They all profess the supremacy of the Batutsi ('Hamites'; they attributed them
an origin different from the Bahutu's; they characterise them as conquerors).
A month later, Mwami (King) Mutara III tried to be more inclusive when he said that "Ces
ennemis du pays ne reussiront guere a diviser le Ruanda dont 1'union nationale est neuf fois
seculaire et dont la force d'organisation politique a toujours aneanti les plus fortes attaques
des envahisseurs" 238. This position contrasted from the following paragraph of the same
message in which he became less tolerant arguing that the "mauvais arbre sera trouve,
deracine et brule"; it also contrasted from the arrogant and divisive message of his entourage
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whom he did not correct nor invite them to find a ground for a mutual understanding with the
petitioners Bahutu and the colonial power.
In that polarisation, surprisingly, the Bahutu leaders received full support from the colonial
rulers and the Catholic Church hierarchy, a move which needs further discussions. The
intransigence of the Batutsi ultra-conservatives and the Mwami himself, the indecision of the
Belgian colonial administration which failed to show when and how the changes would come
made the Bahutu feel weak in the event that the Belgian administration left without having
achieved substantial reforms.
The intransigence led to an escalation of the conflict. And what was set to be a struggle for
an ideology of liberation became a political intolerance. Many people who experienced the
suffering of the Batutsi which followed the 1959 Revolution have criticised the Bahutu
manifesto for having been the beginning of the 'racial ideology' (Chretien, 1996). But many
others condemn rather the poor management of that period by the colonial power as well as
the management of the aftermath of the revolution by the politicians and the Church.
According to Antoine Mugesera, the Bahutu manifesto was not ethnicist in its foundations. It
asserted the intention to co-operate with the 'Batutsi patriots' and the Batutsi less privileged.
But then those were forgotten during the massacres. For A. Mugesera, the 1959 revolution
had not liberated either Bahtutu, Batutsi or Batwa of their humiliation, 'ethnic complex' and
regionalism, exploitation and domination, cultural alienation. A.Mugesera also condemns the
UNAR (With Batutsi dominance) monarchist party for having initiated physical violence and
then the attacks of the Inyenzi which produced many sad consequences such as, first to
provoke the massacres of the Batutsi, second to legitimate the extremism of ethno-politicians
and third to link the security of the Batutsi inside the country to the attitude of a clique of
'external terrorists'239.
Similarly, Muzungu's argues that Kayibanda did not depart from his political programme, the
liberation of the poor, the exploited masses. He did the "liberation theology before the letter.
But he could not control some of the strategies he was brought to adopt such as the colonial
power the concept of "ethnic majority equals political majority" inspired by the
colonialists240.
II.4.3. Hesitations and Indecision of Colonial Authorities
Meanwhile, the colonial authorities were indecisive on whether or not to conduct the political
changes and how. Governor, J.P. Harroy gave a speech in which he said that the problem was
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not political but the abuse by local representatives on the peasants241. Nevertheless, he failed
to indicate how and when the reforms would come. So on the one hand, there was an ultra-
conservative group rejecting the call for power sharing; on the other, a colonial
administration making the provision to present the Batutsi ruling class ('local representatives')
as solely accountable for the mistakes and the unjust system.
It is in such a tense climate of suspicion and open intolerance that the first political parties
were born, including the MDR-PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, UNAR and RADER.
Although all campaigned for independence, they had different visions, perceptions, alliances
and strategies. The two major groups, MDR-PARMEHUTU had opted for a close co¬
operation and a low profile in its demands towards the colonial power, with the assistance of
the Church whilst the UNAR had opted for a demand of immediate independence in a
discourse that was characterised as nationalist, "openly anti-foreign, anti-colonial and anti-
Church"242.
Belgium and the Catholic Church opted for the Bahutu, considered flexible and less dangerous. The
UNAR reclamations were echoed by the UN under the influence of the non-aligned movement. The
motives of this volte-face of the two ruling powers, the Church and the colonial power are discussed in
the next chapter as we debate the shift of alliances and allegiances.
One of many other controversial issues was the succession of King Rudahigwa whose
death in Bujumbura, 25th July 1959 surprised the population. The Mwami descended
in Bujumbura on July 24 where it is believed he was called by telegram for a meeting
with the colonial authorities. Surprisingly, he arrived in a deserted city (Governor
Harroy was on holiday in Belgium) and his deputy, Toldeur was touring the south of
Burundi). Then he decided to visit his doctor, Mr Vinck, a Belgian native, working in
the colonial hospital in Bujumbura. The Mwami received a fatal injection243. Several
hypotheses regarding the cause of his death occurred ; one which is relevant to our
work implicated the colonial administration together with the Church in the plot244.
As a consequence of this tragic death three groups engaged separately in planning the
take over of the throne. The first group was made of the ritualists, Abiru including
Father Kagame ; the second group was the colonial authorities in co-operation with
the Church (Archbishop Perraudin) ; the third group was the opposition leaders. The
third group (opposition) wanted a constitutional monarch ; the second (colonial power
and the Church) opted for the designation of a Regent which would be set up after the
burial; the first group which were successful, opted for the tradition to be respected,
the name of the successor to be known before the burial took place to avoid the
vacancy of the throne245.
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Hence, the burial ceremony, 28 July 1959 in Mwima (Nyanza), the ritualists, who
probably wanted to have their revenge against the colonialo-missionary coalition,
surprised the colonial sponsors by announcing the name of the incumbent, Kigeri V
Ndahindurwa, without their consent. Following this incident the already damaged
relations between the Batutsi and the two powers deteriorated and accelerated the
arrival of the 1959 revolution. In the perspective of this thesis, the colonial powers
(the Catholic Church included) were confirmed in their determination to end their
alliance with the Batutsi ruling class whom they blamed for being 'pro-Communist',
'anti-foreigners' and 'anti-Church'.
Lemarchand observed the same phenomenon in the chief of the same Governor,
Harroy and his subordinates towards the leading politicians from Batutsi background
in Burundi246. Neither analysis of the crisis by the Bahutu protesters, nor the resistance
of conservative oligarchy to power sharing rendered a service for peace, justice and
confidence between the two communities. Yet, despite the questionable democratic
and nationalist character of the Batutsi oligarchy's demand for independence, it is
right to underline the fact that the position adopted by both the colonial and Catholic
Church authorities left the feeling that, to paraphrase Linden, they were engaged in "a
subtle plot to divide and break a potentially powerful nationalist movement led by a
Tutsi vanguard"247.
After that, the competition developed into intolerance and threats which culminated in
violence. This was inaugurated on 2 November when one of the Bahutu sub-chiefs,
Dominique Mbonyumutwa, was attacked and apparently harassed by a group of young
Batutsi. This opened the way for the Bahutu upheavals which later became the 1959-1961
'Revolution'. The monarchy was rejected in Gitarama, 28 January 1961 and the Republic
proclaimed. Independence came on 1 July 1962, 248.
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Following the 3 November 1959 uprising, several chiefs and sub-chiefs were displaced or made victims of
violence. On the 25 November 1959 the colonial power issued a decree suggesting its intention to democratise the
institutions but at the same time the Resident, colonel Logiest nominated 120 Bahutu to the vacant posts. UNAR
refused any collaboration till UN had intervened to guarantee independence. In April 1960, the democratic
opposition met and ask the colonial power to nominate a progressive king in the place of KigeriV Ndahindurwa.
June to July 1960 the colonial authority organised communal elections that gave as results: PARMEHUTU
winning 70,4 % votes, APROSOMA, 7,4%, RADER 6,6 % and UNAR 1,79 %. This poor score of UNAR was
perceived as resulting from its call for abstentions. It further refused to recognise the outcome of the elections. The
king-headed "Superior Council" was replaced by a provisional assembly of 48 members elected by an electorate
made of the interim communal authorities. The leader of Parmehutu, Gregoire Kayibanda formed a provisional
cabinet of 19 members including 9 Europeans and 3 Tutsi.
On 28 January 1961 a congress of Burgomasters and local councillors was organised in Gitarama by the
Provisional Government assisted by the colonial authorities with the consent of the Church. In Gitarama 25000
people spontaneously assembled to hear about the unusual event. The meeting turned into an anti-monarchical
event which proclaimed the abolition of the monarchy and the reign of King Kigeri as well as the symbols of the
monarchy, Karinga and Abiru. The Congress elected a new president Dominique Mbonyumutwa, and a
government led by Gregoire Kayibanda, both from the Parmehutu political Party.
The results of this congress were rejected by UNAR which appealed to UN. The latter organised a referendum on
the monarchy together with the parliamentary elections on the 25 September 1961. The monarchy was rejected by
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II.4.4. Role of Colonel Logiest
Into this process appeared Colonel Logiest, a Belgian native from a Catholic social democrat
political background who arrived from Congo where he had been deputy - commander of the
colonial troops249. Like Mgr Perraudin, Logiest gave a determinant emphasis to the
revolution. Their actions complemented with the resentment of the vast majority of the
population, the 'power deflation', the international pressure, the intransigence and the death of
the Mwami in precipitating the revolution.
For Linden, political developments following the revolt were dominated by three factors: the
resolute bias on behalf of the Bahutu of the Special Resident, Colonel Logiest, a Catholic
Social Democrat; the increasing sophistication of the PARMEHUTU propaganda and the
success of Kayibanda's men on the hills at the time when hundreds of new chieftaincies were
becoming available ( 270). It seems, from the point of view of this thesis that it would not be
an insult to the quality of organisation and determination of Kayibanda and his colleagues to
say that their sudden success and the penetration of the PARMEHUTU propaganda on the
hills heavily relied on Colonel Logiest and the Catholic Church resolute support. At least in
the court-term, the victory would have been unthinkable given the fact that, on the one hand,
the masses still religiously associated the power of the Mwami to Imana, and on the other, the
UNAR party and the conservative Batutsi were determined to snip out any dissent voice.
Would Logiest and Perraudin have had different attitude that Kayibanda and some prominent
leaders would have been eliminated and the revolution delayed for some more decades as
King Rudahigwa himself unambiguously put it: " le pays entier est coalise a la recherche de
l'arbre mauvais qui produit ces mauvais fruits de division. Quand il sera trouve, il sera coupe,
deracine et brule pour qu'il disparaisse et que rien ne reste"250.
In his memoirs, Logiest presents the problem of Rwanda at the time, as resulting from the
domination of one "caste, the Hamite" over the Bahutu. Logiest shows how, after contacting
some political and religious authorities, and after reading the documentation provided by the
leaders of the political parties, he took the decision to support the Bahutu cause.
La lecture de ces documents fut determinante pour moi. II fallait absolument faire quelquechose pour
donner aux Hutu une raison d' esperer meme si cela signifiait un usage quelque peu force des pouvoirs
qui m'avaient ete conferes sous les regime de l'etat d'exception. Je decidai de convoquer les
administrateurs et chefs de territoires.251
80 % of the voters. MDR-PARMEHUTU won 77,7 % (35 seats), UNAR 16,8% (7 seats), APROSOMA 3,5% (2
seats). Kayibanda was then elected president of the country and prepared the country for independence, the 1 July
1962.
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Burundi.London: Pall Mall, 1970 ; Nkunzumwami,E., La tragedie Rwandaise. Historique et perspectives. Paris :
L'harmattan, 1996
249
Logiest was named Military Resident' on 11 November 1959 'to pacify the country'. This person played a key
role in the events that fractured the country. On 3 December, he was promoted new 'Special Resident'.
250 Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa before the Conseil Superieur du Pays, 12 June 1958. In Nkundabagenzi, op.cit.
p.37.
251
Logiest,G., Mission au Rwanda. Un Blanc dans la Bagarre Tutsi-Hutu. Paris : Didier Hatier, 1988,p.58
70
Colonel Logiest invited the population to form committees to expell indesirable people; to
oppose the authorities who wanted to renegotiate their reintegration. This kind of invitation
to 'popular justicia' blocked any process of conciliation between the population and the
authorities in an eventual negotiation of their reintegration. Instead, the invitation was a
formula encouraging the population to express resentment and to spread violence.
Logiest's determination to handle the problem in automatically withdrawing the privileges of
authority from all the Batutsi chiefs and handing it to the Bahutu leaders deepened
irremediably the 'ethnic' divide; what was a more political problem needing the reform of the
mechanisms of power sharing, the respect of rights for every single Rwandan, the liberation
from the colonial spectre, was then conceived by the senior colonial authorities in the land, as
a question of liberation of the 'enslaved Hutu' from the domination of the 'foreign powerful
Hamite'. During the events that followed a large number of positions of chiefs and sub-chiefs
were vacant. 23 chiefs out of 45 and 158 sub-chiefs out of 489 in place before the upheaval
of 2 November 1959, were either arrested, exiled, displaced, had resigned or been killed.
Logiest took the opportunity to sweep away the Batutsi authorities. Reyntjens puts it as
follows:
Ce fut une occasion inesperee pour le colonel Logiest, qui voyait son action contrecarree par la
hierarchie coutumiere tutsi. II etait ainsi difficile de relayer des ordres et des messages a la population
sans deformation en cours de route, lorsqu'il fallait suivre la filiere coutumiere (mwami- chef- sous-chef)
Logiest donna par consequent ordre aux administrateurs de territoires (Europeens) de lui proposer la
revocation du plus grand nombre possible de chefs et de sous-chefs tutsi Meme la oil les autorites tutsi
etaient restees en place le resident special voulait les deloger par tous les moyens. Passant outre aux
objections du resident General Harroy qui - sans trop insister- fit remarquer l'illegalite de pareille
solution, le colonel Logiest conseillait 'la constitution de comites qui feront connaitre les noms de
personnes qui seront declares indesirables et qui seront eloignes. A la question de savoir si comme le
prevoyait le decret de 1952, les chefs qui le souhaiteraient pourraient reprendre leur commandement,
Logiest repondit que 'si une autorite chassee par la population manifeste le desir d'etre reintegree, il faut
s'y opposer pour des raisons d'ordre public et de securite' S'adressant a l'administrateur de Ruhengeri,
Logiest dit: 'avec la quasi totalite autorites hutu , votre territoire doit servir d'exemple a tout le Ruanda.
Vous devez prouver que les Bahutu sont capables de participer activement a la direction de leur pays'252.
We come across good intentions in favour of the Hutu. However, following the illegal and
violent procedures utilised to implement the supposed reforms, these intentions dramatically
fractured Rwandan society. Inviting the population to form commities which would elaborate
the list of the undesirable people was clearly an act susceptible to oppose the population; it
was a suggestion that some were not desirable. It is an indisputable reality that many Batutsi
chiefs had extremely cordial relations with the population as proved by many who remained
in their chiftaincies protected by the population. Rejecting the idea that those who wished ask
for keeping their positions- which actually would involve negotiating their reintegration
towards the population- has burned the chances for conciliation.
Assessing the event thirty years later, Logiest accepted that he acted illegally, adding
however, that the illegality was justified in the case of a simple upheaval. For him, there was
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he is really saying that there was no political ethics during a revolution, that the end justified
the means. But did this justify a total ban on a party of the population, even if they had been
associated with and participated in a discriminatory system? Clearly, the independence of the
former Belgian colonies has been rashly and poorly prepared as the French Foreign Affairs
Minister Mr. Vedrine put it in his responses to the Commission of the French Parliament on
the role of France in Rwanda.
Conclusion
The factors that contributed to the cementing of the pre-colonial Rwandan reality were bound
into a system of 'relational harmony' which rarely, incited to rejection or violence according
to the limited evidence we have. However, the discussions isolated an attitude of
distinctiveness within the ruling lineages which have become the ingredients of the seed of
disintegration.
It was necessary to demonstrate that in the end of 19th, beginning of 20th century the new
actors, including colonial agents and missionaries arrived and then played a key role in
spreading the theories and policies based on race supremacy.
Such a demarche was necessary so as to question an order founded on the presuppositions of
'race supremacy' to which Christian missions fully co-operated in reshaping Rwandan society.
The following chapter recounts the story of the Christian missions, their implantation; their
principles of evangelism, their relations with the population and examines whether or not
they fulfilled the Gospel's mandate of being the witness of God's reign of Love and Justice.
Among other things that will be debated is whether the Churches have been factors of unity
or of division among the Rwandans.
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Chapter III: THE CHURCH: PROMOTER OF RACIAL
IDEOLOGY AS TOOL OF DOMINATION
Introduction
During its short period of existence (less than a century) Rwandan Christianity has become
one of the major factors beside the state organisation. In fact, both Church and state are two
institutions which converge spatially and temporarily. They may collaborate with or oppose
each other, they may even oppose each other and at the same time collaborate. This joins the
debate started in the preceding chapters where it has been shown that the explorers and
colonialists who have introduced the ideology of race supremacy endorse a great deal of the
polarisation of society. Christianity has been another external agency which participated in
the shaping of Rwandan society. Both Catholics and Protestants played a key role alongside
the colonial rulers in the making of policies and practices.
In the course of evangelisation Rwandan Christianity has generated two significant
movements, education in missionary schools and mass conversions. The development and the
achievements of these two events was marked by the theory of 'race supremacy' mentioned in
the precedent chapter and which became a premise to the crystallisation of ethnic
consciousness. The latter led into open tensions during the political changes of the 1950s; in
the end, the fabric of society was severely torn then left unhealed.
This chapter aims then to look at, first, the implantation of Christianity, Catholic and
Protestant; second, how both Catholics and Protestants created images of Rwandans and told
new narratives; third, what were the backgrounds of the missionaries; fourth, some examples
of how ethnic ideology was shaped, the case of the missionary schools and the mass
conversions; fifth the U-turn of the Churches during the 1950s.
III.l. Missionary Scramble for Rwanda
From the beginning Catholic and Protestants would occupy the Rwandan territory in a kind
of competition, aiming in particular to evangelise through converting the ruling class. The
evangelisation of Rwanda began in 1900 with the installation of the White Fathers
(Catholics) founded in Algiers in 1868 by Mgr. and then Cardinal Lavigerie. Led by Mgr. J.J.
Hirth, the missionaries arrived in Rwanda from Uganda. They were impressed by the highly
populated Rwanda and by the fact that there was no other religious influence254. The White
Fathers then established a plan of occupation of the territory before the arrival of the
Protestants and the Muslims. Their work was facilitated by the German colonial authorities,
in particular, Resident Dr Richard Kandt who saw in the development of Christianity a factor
254 Butselaar & Twagirayesu,M., Ce Don que nous Avons Recu. Bruxelles: EPR, 1982.
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for promoting pacification (in particular with regard to the rebellious northern region) as well
as an ingredient for development and a bulwark against Islam.
But how then and why the Catholics pioneered in evangelising a German (mostly Protestant)
colony? There was, on the one hand, an accidental meeting of the humanist activities
developed in Germany by anti- slavery groups and on the Africa continent by Cardinal
Lavigerie, and on the other hand, the failure of the German Protestantism to carry the Lord's
Great Commission outside Germany255. With the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) which
divided the Africa continent among the imperial powers, Cardinal Lavigerie established
contacts with Germany through his anti-slavery movements. He received ideological backing
from groups which were campaigning against the Arab slave trade. Thus, the Reichstag
authorised the White Fathers to start evangelising in 1884 in Germany's East Africa colonies.
Equally, the Catholic missionaries were left the ground because the Protestant missionary
organisations were reluctant to start working in Rwanda.256
The first Protestant missionaries from the Bethel mission257 established themselves in Zinga
(east) and Kirinda in the west (1907), Rubengera (1909), Kiteme on Idjwi ireland (1910) at
present day in R.D. Congo, Remera-Rukoma (1912) in the centre. When Germans were
defeated in the First World War, the missionaries left in 1916. The activities were taken over
by the Belgian Protestant Missions Society for the Congo (SBMPC) in 1921. Other Protestant
missions including the Church Missionary Society-Rwanda Mission (1922) joined later258.
This scramble for Rwanda leaves us with some thoughts. Firstly, the Catholic missionaries
set up a strategy which allowed them to cover the whole country in a short time starting, in
particular in the regions which were highly populated (Save, Bugoyi, Kinyaga, Kabgayi
respectively in 1900, 1901, 1903, 1905), or had historical, cultural and political
importance259. This coverage allowed the missionaries to start influencing the chiefs around
the country and to gradually modify the symbols of the cultural and regional diversity.
Secondly, during the colonial era, Rwanda had one Church establishment whose presence
was widely distributed throughout the land. The Protestants who arrived at different epochs
were scattered around the country. Adding to the Protestant compartmentalisation, a 1930s
Comity Agreement parcelled out the country into spheres of influence which emphasised
their geographical and denominational isolation. Nevertheless, those who became Christians
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were largely peasants, deeply rooted in the countryside and in the social fabric. In fact, the
country had no urban tradition (more or less than 10% of the population lived in cities in
1990s). However, in contrast to Kevin Ward's accurate remarks on Uganda260 the chiefs
were forcibly Catholic while the peasantry remained divided between Catholics and
Protestants.
From the beginning of evangelisation to 1930, the court and the majority of the ruling class
had resisted conversion. This was of course a dilemma to Lavigerie's missiology of
converting the ruling class first. The affirmation commonly admitted that the first Rwandans
to convert to Catholicism during the German period were the Bahutu is untrue. Such an
affirmation belonged to a constant identification in the missionaries reports and publications
at the time, of the Batutsi with the chiefs. These two terms, however meant two different
realities261.
From a sociological point of view, Protestants tended to be more in peripheral and less
economical developed areas whereas Catholics were found both in rural areas and near the
administrative centres. The appearance of Protestant in cities is a recent phenomenon of the
1970s generated by a competition started by the Pentecostals. Lastly, all together shared the
tendency to associate the elements of cultural and historical patrimony with the ruling class.
It appears clearly that there was a competition for the monopoly not only of the geographical
territory, but also spiritual, cultural, social and political realities which would be utilised as
factors for religious rivalry. We must complete this section by saying that, the French
background would become an asset for the Catholic Church because after the First World
War, their missionaries could pursue their activities whilst the German Protestant
missionaries were forced to leave262.
III.2. Inherited Theology of Missionaries
The early development of Christianity in Rwanda has been marked by three aspects. First, the
socio-cultural, political and religious contexts of the Europe which influenced the
missionaries. The second factor was the influence of three men; on the Catholic side,
Cardinal Lavigerie, the founder of the White Fathers Order and Mgr Classe, the Apostolic
Vicar of Rwanda, 1907 to 1945 and, on the Protestant side, Dr Johanssen, the founder of the
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Bethel mission in Rwanda. The next factor to consider is the view of the missionaries on
peoples of Rwanda.
III.2.1. Impact of European Contexts on Early Missionaries
The missionaries who arrived in Rwanda at the beginning of this century were marked first,
by different theories in social science, in particular socio-Darwinism and the new science of
anthropology as well as the historical and ideological developments such as the ideas of
colonialism. Father Heremans, a Belgian historian, argues that all sectors of society were on
what can be considered as the 'present day right'. The Church was at the extreme right. No
one would consider that colonisation was a disputable enterprise at any stage263.
In fact, the schema of interpretation of history which has been applied to many regions of the
world always gave primacy to racial conquests. According to Dominique Franche, it
flourished in France in the 16th century with the myth presenting the French nobles as
descending from the Franks who came from Franconie, in Germany in opposition to the
'roturiers'Cpeasants!') descending from the Gallo-Romans. The theory was adopted and
reproduced by the nobles who embraced it. The staunchest of this theory was Henry
Boulainvilliers who influenced Jean - Joseph Gobineau. The French revolution in 1789 then
came as the reverse of the conquest, the revenge of the 'roturiers' of Gallo-Romans against the
foreigners of Franconie264. These theories have been adapted in Rwanda and the Great Lakes
Africa region. The missionaries would constantly refer to Rwandan society as resembling the
Middle Ages in Europe of the lords, nobles, vassals, 'roturiers'. as indicated in the following
passage quoted from Basil Davidson:
Before the 19th century however, these lord-and-vassal system composed a structure that was based, at
any rate ideally on a two-way exchange on benefits. Whilst Tutsi nobles gossiped among their equals,
sipping honeydew and arguing the wisdom of the ages, or leaned upon their spears while composing
verse in praise of their courage, virtue and authority, the humble Hutu laboured at their gates in
producing food and hearing burdens. Yet the Hutu and their kind also had their expectations. For the
Tutsi nobles and their like were under obligation to assume not only the responsibilities of government,
but also those of defence, Just as the women of medieval France preferred themselves to vow to strong
masters, seeing in this their best assurance of safety and protection so did the fearing peoples of these
inland kingdom thing it wise to make themselves the tribute paying vassals of men whom warfare and
government were a professional duty265.
The idea of Rwandan society resembling to the Middle Ages Europe was highlighted again
and again. The notions of 'nobles' and 'roturiers' have been extensively utilised in by the
colonial and missionary agents in the new field where they would associate all the Batutsi to
the rulers and owners of the cattle. To put it the way the colonial administration mirrored the
thinking of the missionaries, they wanted to have a 'social elite' from the Batutsi group,
capable of supporting 'our civilisation', thus wanted to create Rwandan society as
hierarchised as European society was in the 18th century266.
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The missionaries were marked by conservative and anti-ecumenical theologies. Such a
context led the missionaries into a double mistaken path: one, in the course of evangelising
the ruling class before the Protestants and Muslims came in, they associated the Gospel with
the powerful; two, Christianity arrived divided and made a negative impact on a society
which did not know them before and on people who needed the examples of unity and love.
th th
Father van der Meersch points out the fact that the 18 and 19 centuries European
theologies (Catholic) which influenced the missionaries lacked an ecumenical vision267; they
were inspired by a defensive line against Protestantism, then the Jansenism and modernism.
They wholly depended on the theologies taught in the seminaries reflecting the disunion with
the Oriental Churches and the Protestant Reformation fracture. Equally, they were
disconnected from the biblical sources: the very tool for faith was the philosophy of Aristotle
adapted by Thomas Aquinas, with a very technical vocabulary258.
III.3. Images Given to Rwandan Society
Like colonists, from the very beginning the missionaries developed two firm convictions: on
the one hand, the theory of a Hamite race and on the other, a selection from that Batutsi
community of an elite designed to assist them in promoting 'western civilisation'. In fact, the
Hamites/Batutsi dominant and the Bahutu 'indigenous' dominated, and the Batwa who
accounted for nothing were the prevalent images in the early descriptions of the
Banyarwanda people269.
III.3.1. Hamite Myth as Factor of Conception
and Misconception of Rwanda
In the interlacustrine African region, the images of the Batutsi warriors, giants of Semitic
origin, kin to the White race, and dominating the indigenous populations has been nurtured in
the literature of the first western explorers, anthropologists, missionaries and colonial agents.
These images have not disappeared in contemporary writings as indicated in chapter one.
With regard to its application to Rwanda, the major settings of the Hamite myth were
elaborated from the 1880s. According to Gudrun Honke, Captain Speke (1861) and Henry
Morton Stanley (1871)270 were the first explorers who, from the south- west of Uganda,
collected stories, myths and legends from voyagers about the Banyarwanda people. Two
major sources were used. First, the Ugandans who told of the images left by Rwabugiri, the
warrior king of Rwanda who had occupied their country. The second source was the Arab
slave traders. These described the population who resisted strongly and prevented them from
entering Rwanda.
Speke described Rwanda as a country in the hands of foreign invaders, of Galla origin from
Abyssinia and Asia.
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In the countries the government is in the hands of foreigners, who had invaded and taken possession of
them, leaving the agricultural aborigines to till the ground, whilst the junior members of the usurping
clans herded cattle- just as in Abyssinia, or wherever the Abyssinians or Gallas have shown themselves-
There, a pastoral clan from the Asiatic side took the government of Abyssinia from its people and have
ruled over them ever since, changing by intermarriage with the Africans, the texture of their hair and
colour to a certain extent, but still maintaining a high stamp of Asiatic feature, of which a marked
characteristic is a bridged instead of bridles nose271.
Speke was part of an expedition organised from Aden by the Government of Bombay
commanded by Lt Burton assisted by Lt. Heme, Speke and Stragan. Like Stanley, Speke was
searching the sources of river Nile. He crossed the hom and east Africa from Berbera to Lake
Edward, in the interlacustrine region272. It is not clear why Speke accepted uncritically the
accounts of the Hamites and of Gallas who would have emigrated from Ethiopia or Somalia
toward Rwanda; he had crossed these regions where no source either the chronologies (which
in the case of Ethiopia were written), nor the oral traditions, recount the migrations.
Thirty years later in 1894, the second European to enter Rwanda Gustav Adolf Due von
Goetzen gave a description that would be repeated again and again:
A strange Semitic or Hamitic aristocratic caste, whose ancestors originated from Gallaland, in South of
Abysinia, and had occupied the regions of the Great Lakes. The country is divided into provinces or
districts, under the exploiting rule of the Tutsi.Their giant figures, with a height of more than two meters,
remind one of the world of fairy tales. At the top of the regime stands the king who restlessly is
travelling in the country where he has his residence in every part273.
Like Speke, von Gotzen accounts of a "strange Semitic or Hamitic caste" society. The
background to the passage quoted was the central core Kingdom, a highly organised society,
as were various other interlacustrine monarchies which were not necessarily under the
"Hamitic aristocratic caste" rale274.
III.3.2. Hamite Theory. Its Genesis and Applications
Before pursuing the reflection on the shaping of Rwandan society by the images dominated
by the Hamite theory, it is best to briefly examine the genesis of that concept. The Hamite
concept has been created out of some European terminology from the biblical story of Noah,
Genesis 9.18-27. The Hamites were descendants of Ham who saw the nudity of his drunk
father, Noah. Ham's latest son, Canaan, brother of Cush (the Ethiopian), Mizraim (Misri) and
Put, was accursed by Noah when he knew that Ham spied out his nudity (Genesis 10.1-32). It
is assumed that later, the Hamites came from Mesopotamia to settle in Egypt, Kusch and
Ethiopia. According to C.A.Diop who recounts the sources of Herodote, Diodore of Sicile,
Amelineau and other ancient scholars, the ancient Egyptians called themselves Kamit
271
Speke, J., Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile. Edinburgh/London: William Blackwood & sons,
1863, p.247.
272
Leaving Berbera in April 1855 to explore the east Africa, the expedition was attacked by the Somalis. Stragan
was killed, Speke wounded, captured but could escape while, Burton also wounded was made hostage, liberated
later after negotiations. Deresse.J., Histoire Sommaire de la Corne Orientale de 1' Afriaue. Paris: Paul Geuthner,
1971,p.250. Also consider the fact that the reports of migrations of the Hamites/ Batutsi from Ethiopia have not
been substantiated with regard to why in Ethiopia where exist more than 70 ethnic groups, many of them belong
to a 'Negro-Bantu' background only the 'Hamites1 should have migrated. They never show how they would have
faced the proving environmental and human barriers like the Bahr-el Ghazalar marshes
273
Honke, G., op.cit.pp 97-110.
274 De Lacger (Canon )L., Rwanda. 1939, 2nd ed., 1961 quoted by Nahimana,F., 1993, pp. 152; 192; 197.
78
(Hamites, Black or Ebony). However, nobody, said C.A. Diop, can define exactly the
primitive cradle of the Hamites, their language or their route of migrations275.
In his theory on race inequality, Jean Joseph Gobineau (1853-1855) affirmed that the
Hamites descended, 5000 years ago from the white superior race in Mesopotamia.
Confronted by the black African masses, non Adamic from the south, they should have
mixed and diluted. However, many different other sources described the Hamites as
tributaries of great civilisations in Africa and founders of other great civilisations in the
antiquity (Baron d'Eckstein, 1854; the Dominican Vicwa-Mitra, 1892).276
Such a perception of the origin and the achievements of the Hamites touched the religious
circles. For example, a Protestant Theologian, August Knobel of Giessen University wrote in
1850: "the Hamitic peoples, judging from their physical characteristics, belong, with the
Japhetites and Semites to the same race of human beings categorised by the naturalists as the
Caucasian branch"(Die Volkertafel der Genesis).
In 1870, 68 Fathers of the Catholic Church in their Vatican I Council appealed for a
missionary vocation towards the Central Africa region to alleviate "the antique malediction
weighing on the shoulders of the misfortunate Hamites inhabiting the hopeless Nigricy"277.
For a long- time the Hamites were rejected at the periphery of humanity. At that time, the
Oriental studies and the exegeses were combining with social science theories to deepen the
gap between Whites and Blacks278. How then did the Hamites emerge as the "civilising race
of Black Africa" as C.G. Seligman put it? Following the Napoleonic wars, the greatest
civilisation of Egypt was discovered; and later, the socio-political organisations and
institutions and the populations in the interlacustrine region of Africa. The reverse of the
sense of the Hamite, according to French Historian J-P Chretien took place in midst of 19th
century under the influence of European philosophers. Nevertheless, according to the
immediate need, the Hamites would be taken for Whites or at least the African of 'non Black'
origin when tracing the Egyptian civilisation; but accursed when the concept applied to the
Black civilisations.279
The existence of socio-political organisations in the monarchies of these regions including
Buganda, Karagwe, Ankole, Bunyoro, Rwanda, Buha, Burundi as well as human beings
whose physical characteristics would not correspond to the stereotypes of the Black people as
described in the reports of early travellers and missionaries, constituted a dilemma. The
Hamite theory and the technique of physical anthropology were called to the rescue. For
many anthropologists such great civilisations could not be the work of 'inferior' beings; there
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must be a White hand on the back of them. This, possibly, was a shift which led to the
"rehabilitation of the Hamites"; after all, Egypt was considered as the land of the Hamites.
From then on, the disturbances created a scholarship which associated any artistic, political
and cultural creativity on the Africa to European or Asian origins. The German scholar, Franz
Stuhlmann, who, with Emin Pacha, headed an expedition send by Wissmann, the
Commissioner of the Reich, to establish the first contacts with Rwandans, after attempting
unsuccessfully in March 1891 to penetrate Rwanda, wrote in 1910 about a monogrphy on the
east African handcraft industry that it "should be always necessary to assume that any trait of
civilisation in Africa comes from outside, namely Asia"280.
The argument about the Asian origin of most African cultures was inaugurated by Leo
Frobenius in 1898. In 1904, it received the support of two other scholars, Graebner and
B.Ankermann. In an address presented to the "Berliner Gesellschaft fur Anthropologie,
Ethnologie und Urgeschichte", on "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Africa" (published in
ZFE 37, 1905), Ankermann suggested that a 'culture stream' flowing from Melanesia to West
Africa passed through Indonesia and Madagascar, finally reaching West Africa through the
Zambesi Valley. He then succeeded in the construction of the following scheme of
subsequent culture layers characterised by van Baal and W.E.A. Beek, as 'speculative
hypotheses': The nigritic layer, corresponding with old-Australian culture; West Africa
culture, mainly East Papuan and Indonesian; in the west Sudan, a layer of unidentified origin,
probably from India; a Hamitic or old-Semitic layer in the Sudan, East Africa and South
Africa; and a younger Semitic (Arabian) layer in the same areas281.
In fact, the period of 'explorations' and evangelisation of the interlacustrine region of Africa
coincided with the development of a controversy between religion and social science, due in
particular to the Social Darwinism theory282. This theory constituted the base of race
supremacy which would group human beings in three categories: a. the White race, superior
and developed; b. the less white races, 'developable', in the long term, including the Hamites;
c. the primitive, immature Black, good for servitude, who had no organisation283. The idea of
immaturity, primitivity, lawlessness or unhistoricity of Black Africans, present in most of the
ethnological scholarship has been expressed by the German Philosopher, Hegel:
All our observation of African man show him as living in a state of savagery and barbarism, and he
remains in this state to the present day. The Negro is an example of animal man in all his savagery and
lawlessness, and if we wish to understand him at all, we must put aside all our European attitudes. We
must not think of a spiritual God or of moral laws; to comprehend him correctly, we must abstract from
all reverence and morality, and from everything which we call feeling. All this is foreign to man in his
immediate existence, and nothing consonant with humanity is to be found in his character ,284
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A tendency in Hegel's thought which made a prolific scholarship, was to separate the 'Black
Africa', he called Africa Proper considered as 'unhistorical' from the two other divisions: the
north, which he called the 'European Africa', "has always been subject to foreign influences a
theatre of world-historical events", and the Egypt, "the land of the Nile", attached to the
Euro-Asia, and described as "constituting a focus, as destined to become the centre of a great
and independent culture". Africa proper, Hegel insisted heavily, "has no historical interest of
its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery, the land of childhood,
removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of night".
He pursued in saying that, what he called the African race remained in the "state of
innocence" or the state of nature "in such that there can be no such thing as a constitution"
nor any development or culture. "The earliest reports concerning this continent, pursued
Hegel, tell us precisely the same, and it has no history in the true sense of the word. We shall
therefore leave Africa at this point, and it needs not be mentioned again. For it is an
unhistorical continent, with no movement or development of its own"285.
Hegel's theories covered a range of domains including history, intellectual developments,
socio-political organisations, religion, theology and culture whose existence for the Black
Africans was out of question. These misconceptions and prejudices, actually developed
throughout history and occurring in slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism, they provoked
immense psychological, social, moral and cultural destruction. With the huge influence of
Hegel on the western philosophy and theology, it is certain that many among the missionaries
had read, or were vastly acquainted with such a devastating thinking. Many among the
missionaries who brought the Gospel had grown up in such an atmosphere of prejudices and
myths with regard to Africa.
III.3.3. The Hamites, a "Civilising Race of Africa"!
Part of the dilemma would be to trace the authorship of the 'impressive' socio-political
organisations in the interlacustrine region. Charles Gabriel Seligman, one of the most
influential ethnologist scholars of this century, from his chair of Ethnology in the University
of London,286 has argued that the Hamites, whom he consider to be of Caucasian and Semitic
origin, were the "great civilising force of Black Africa"287. Specifically on the interlacustrine
region that includes Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, East of Zaire and west of Tanzania, he drew
his conclusion:
this long introduction of the philosophy of History, Hegel concludes the section related to Africa in saying: "At
this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or
development to exhibit. Historical movements in it- that is in its northern part- belong to the Asiatic or European
World . What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the
conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the World's History".
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No doubt it is at least in part due to this Caucasian influence that we find the curious mixture of
288
primitive and advanced elements in the social institution of the interlacustrine communities
While Seligman insisted on the Caucasian origin of the Hamites, the missionaries, Catholic
and Protestant, worked hard to show that the Batutsi ('Hamites') brought everything that was
valuable from outside, Asia, Egypt or Ethiopia. Father Arnoux put is as follows:
Manifestement apparentes aux Abyssins, les Batutsi vinrent au Rwanda tres longtemps apres les autres
races. Ceux d'entre eux qui descendent de souche nomade se reconnaissent a leur figure Semite, a leurs
traits fins, reguliers, a leur teint bronze plutot que noir, a leur sveltesse mais surtout h leur taille elevee...
Les bovins, voila bien surtout par quoi les Batutsi exercent leur domination sur les races inferieures,
dans le cadre d'un systeme feodal equivalent exact de celui qui a fleuri au moyen age. En vue d'en
obtenir protection, secours varies, vaches, le Muhutu se met a la remorque d'un Seigneur puissant, chef
ou non, se proclamant son homme, son serf289.
For Father Delmas, the Hamites of Rwanda themselves divide into four categories: a. the true
nobles descending from sky- a thesis that meets the myth of ibimanuka of Kagame-; b. the
hybrids of the indigenous Bahutu rulers and the Hamites; c. the nobles of unknown clans; d.
the Batutsi of foreign origin290. As such, the theories of race purity end in an impasse which
even in the present day remains unresolved. No Rwandan, be they of Hamites or Bahutu, can
claim to be authentic.
But did the missionaries ignore the existence of petty Batutsi, simple peasants who were
exploited by the ruling class in the same conditions as their fellow Bahutu? For being in
contact with the peasantry, I will suggest, they were fully aware of this reality. But they took
a step further to associate the Batutsi social class with rulers. On the one hand, many were
products of the cultural background. On the other, most of the missionaries were part of the
colonial project whose essence is: 'divide and rule'.
III.3.4. Physical Anthropology as Promoter of the Hamite
Theory
The caricatures and stereotypes have dominated the missionary literature in the region over
the years. These stereotypes operated on the imagery from the misconceptions designed by
the early explorers through a binary opposition between Bahutu and Batutsi.291.
Physical anthropology was called on to justify the theories. In 1902, Father Leon Classe
(future bishop) wrote that: "les Batutsi sont des hommes superbes, aux traits fins et reguliers,
avec quelque chose du type aryen et du type semitique". In 1917, Father Francois Menard
wrote that the "Mututsi est un europeen sous une peau noire"292, an assertion reiterating Dr
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In the 1920s and 1930s, the colonial authorities carried out studies which fixed the
populations into distinctive 'races' out of the metric measurements of the height, the nose, the
face, the weight. The procedure, however, did not work the way the authors wanted it
because in various regions of Burundi and Rwanda as well, people did not fit in the prototype
model of the Black man/woman. Hence, the conclusion was that the populations were
hybrids293. For the theoreticians of the Hamite myth physical characteristics were associated
with moral, civic, intellectual ability and mental capacities. Hamitic, "those who had good
physique", were supposed born-rulers. Dr. O.Bauman, the first European to sojourn in
Rwanda (1892), refers to such an idea as a white figure in a black skin. He put it as follows:
II y avait partout des Watutsi qui surprenaient par leur sveltesse et leur type presque europeen. Certains
etaient a peine bruns et ont sans doute ete a l'origine de la legende des Negres Blancs. Partout on
pouvait differencier tres nettement la population negre indigene des maitres Wahuma". dont la faijon de
s'habiller "rappelait les descriptions de figures royales de l'ancienne Assyrie 294.
Speaking on the matter, the editor of the Muyaga Mission in Burundi wrote in the mission
diary: "Seryamurungu who surely is less than 25 years old is a better-looking Negro, so good-
looking that it would be hard to find a single good looking man on earth. The German
emperor should be jealous. A tall, tall man, his traits would make a painter happier".
Equally, Mr. Ryckman, who has been Governor of Burundi, describe the Bahutu as offering
the classical physical description of the Black295.
The physical anthropology is truly a domain where Africa suffered a lot of prejudices. The
tendency was, when difference appeared, to categorize as being not Black all those who
presented a good-looking appearance but instead as hybrids Caucasian, even to subdivide the
African population into Nilotic, Hamites, Ethiopians, Somalis, Gallas, Bantu, Hottentos,
Boshmans, Peuls, 'True Negroes', 'semi-Negroes' and so-forth. These classifications were not
really substantiated. Prof. Ki-Zerbo is right to indicate that even the biological criteria which
has been a constant reference for centuries does not provide solid evidence. Many different
variables both internal and external intervene to influence the morphology of the body296.
III.3.5.The Hamite Theory and Ethnicising of Society
The meaning of the concepts of Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa have been central to the studies of
the forming of Rwandan ethnic identity. Neither the oral tradition sources and different
official and private literature to which most of the ethnologic studies relied, nor other sources
enlighten on the process which led to present day mixture of the population nor the formation
of the 'ethnic group'. What has been demonstrated however is that at the eve of colonisation,
the terms Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa meant social classes; that either 'ethny'; 'race', 'caste',
'Hamite' were known to Banyarwanda people. People identified themselves by clans. D'
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Hertefelt put it as follows: "Le probleme peut etre formule en termes mathematiques simples.
II y a 18 clans multi-classes; il y a 3 classes sociales qui constituent respectivement 83%
(Hutu); 16% (Tutsi) et 1% (Twa) de la population".297
D'Hertefelt unequalled survey showed, I have suggested, that even within the clans
habitually considered as mostly Batutsi dominance, the proportions were as follows:
Banyiginya: Bahutu= 57.50%, Batutsi= 42.27%; Bega, Bahutu= 78.22%, Batutsi= 21.36%298.
D'Hertefelt demonstrates that one of the major problem of Rwanda has been the 'ethnicising'
of the clans by ethnologists, including Father Kagame299.
Subscribing to the logic of the Hamite theory from his masters, the missionaries, in
particular, Classe, Schumacher, Canon de Lacger, Pages and Delmas, Father Kagame
developed three arguments defending a thesis according to which all the clans had a Batutsi
('Hamite') origin300. Firstly, Kagame resolves the intermarriage reality in affirming that the
pre-Banyiginya ('Hamite') clans were Batutsi because the Banyiginya -whom he asserts as
being Batutsi whilst the oral tradition to which he found his studies did make no distinction-
took for wives their daughters301.
After the assumption of the clans being of Batutsi background, Kagame developed a second
argument based on the military conquests. For him a country has opposed a strenuous
resistance to the Banyiginya conquest if it had a Hamite monarch. This, he applied to the
monarchy of the Babanda in Nduga302.
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31.1 D'Hertefelt shows that the marriages between the clans had always existed from Banyiginya Batutsi chiefs
espousing daughters of local groups which according to his information were Batutsi as the reciprocal was also
true. D'Hertefelt, 1971,p.29. In the same line, Father Muzungu shows with a degree of persuasiveness that the
mixing of the population is rooted in the Rwandan culture and that the exogamy is a rule between the clans and
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princes in the Court. On the other side, there were also ennobled Batwa who married among the Batutsi as in the
example of the vast community of the Basyete. Muzungu is right to say that today's population of Rwanda resulted
from a mixing to such an extent that it would be not realistic for anyone to claim to be of pure blood. Muzungu,
1995,p.24.
Some other people may have different views. Father A. Sibomana for example considers that there were many
resemblance but also differences between the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. A. Sibomana identifies as difference the
following aspects: each person belongs to an ethnic group and he/she knows it; the tradition of poetry in the royal
court and big courts did not exist among the Bahutu; there was a socialisation in the culture of difference with the
discourse like 'do not eat like the Muhutu'; the Batutsi had sexual exploits while the Bahutu were abstinent and
lastly, the Bahutu and Batutsi differ in physical characteristics! Sibomana, A., Gardons Espoir pour le Rwanda.
Paris: Descllee de Brouwer, 1997, pp.129-134. No one needs to be an anthropologist to see that what Sibomana
considers as differences are feelings and cultural dynamics of families which cannot be taken for factors of ethnic
boundaries.
31.2 To this supposed warrior superiority of the Batutsi which is also the thesis of Maquet and de Heusch,
D'Hertefelt wisely responded that the mountainous populations of the north, Buhoma, Bushiru, Mulera, Buberuka,
Rukiga, and in the south-west: Busozo, Bukunzi, known as Bahutu monarchies, would have been pure Batutsi
because their resistance was only ended by the German and Belgian colonial administration in the beginning of the
20th century. Mgr Bigirumwami in his intervention recounted in sections below says the same thing.
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Thirdly, for Kagame, the pre-Banyiginya groupings were Batutsi/Hamites because the
Banyiginya monarchs accorded a particular attention to them303. For example, to prove that
the Bagesera clan of the ancient Gisaka were Hamites, Kagame wrote:
etaient, et ils restent toujours des Hamites de premiere qualite. lis avaient un tambour dynastique
reconnu par les dynasties voisines, et son code esoterique (rituel) imposait le respect, meme a nos
monarques du Rwanda qui, apres l'annexion du Gisaka, tinrent a liquider ceremonieusement et
legalement le symbole d'une lignee hamitique vaincue. Aucun tambour dynastique des roitelets vraiment
autochtones ne preoccupa nos monarques, puisque ces dynasties purement Bantu n'avaient pas ce code
esoterique dont les Hamitess seuls possedaient le secret3"4.
The Bagesera was one of the 18 clans. Their land, Gisaka, was conquered by the central
kingdom of the Banyigiyna dynasty in the end of the last century. Among other explanations
advanced by Kagame, those clans had a royal ritual code in which the Banyiginya alone had a
monopoly. In fact, neither the possession of the royal symbols, rituals and chieftaincies were
the monopoly of the Hamites as proved in the interlacustrine ethnohistorical and sociological
literature. Rather, the facts show that most of the 'Hamite kingdoms' were build upon local
'Bantu groupings'305.
The presence in a same clan of the members of the three social classes enlightens the social
mobility factor and the fact that Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa concepts had originally a social
class meaning before acquiring an ethnic connotation. Unlike Kagame, other defenders of the
Hamite theory admitted that the three concepts had originally socio-classe meaning. Canon
de Lacger explains it as follows:
Mutusi et Muhutu sont des mots qui tendent a perdre leur sens proprement racial et a n'etre plus que des
qualificatifs des etiquettes sur lesquelles se rangent capitalistes et travailleurs, gouvernants et gouvernes,
sans toutefois que le prejuge de la naissance soit serieusement entame. Un 'petit Mututsi', n'ayant pas de
quoi satisfaire les exigences 'pecuniaires' d'un beau-pere eventuel de son monde, est oblige de se
rabattre sur le milieu de paysans. II y prendra femme; et si la gene de sa maison se prolonge, si ses fils et
petits-fils sont contraints d'en passer par les memes necessites mortifiantes, sa famille se verra
progressivement eliminee de la societe des gens 'comrae il faut'; elle tombera dans la roture. 'La
reciproque est non moins frequente'. Le Muhutu capable de fournir une vache a son beau-pere peut
trouver femme chez les Batutsi d'opulence mediocre; avec le temps et la prosperity croissante, sa
descendance sera tenue pour issue de la bonne maison.3"6
This passage reactivates the idea of Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa concepts having originally
been a socio-economical meaning or at least, that they experienced a social mobility at the
end of the last century. Nevertheless, Kagame pursued his theorising on the distinctiveness of
the Hamites supremacy. He extended his hypotheses to a group known in the oral tradition as
the Abarenge, and considered as anterior to the current population in Rwanda. According to
him, they lived in Rwanda, Burundi and East of Zaire (see same roots with Abanyamurenge).
They were, according to him, owners of cattle; they still have representatives of Batutsi
Nahimana studied the monarchies of the Mukungwa corridor identical to d'Hertefelt's list, founded , according to
Nahimana by the "Babanda of the Nduga kingdom who escaped from the genocide massacres of the Batutsi
Banyiginya". Nahimana, 1993, op.cit. p.83.
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background, the Abasinga-Abasangwabutaka (those who were found on the land) clan in the
current populations; they were invincible warriors307. With regard to his hypothesis he wrote.
La categorie de ces Hamites qui a laisse dans le Rwanda un souvenir de puissance inegalee est celui des
Abarenge, denomination calquee sur Rurenge, l'ancetre eponyme de leur dynastie. On attribue
regulierement a leur civilisation les houes, les marteaux et les autres objets forges que, fortuitement,
mettent au jour les cultivateurs de notre epoque, dans certaines zones du pays. Ces Hamites devaient etre
fortement outilles, beaucoup plus que ne l'etaient les Rwandais modernes....
L'empire des Abarenge debordait largement le Rwanda actuel. Leur dernier souverain legitime residait a
Gishari au Zaire (Rep.Dem.Congo), tandis que le Burwi, au sud du Rwanda, dernier lambeau separe du
tronc par les conquetes ulterieures, etaient gouvernes par une dynastie avertisse du meme groupe. Les
Abarenge etaient du clan des Abassinga= Vainqueurs, ayant le milan pour totem.3"8
For Kagame, the whole region owe cattle and technologies from these Hamites/ Abarenge of
unequal warrior superiority. Kagame's map of the Abarenge was much larger than the
Rwandan territory of the end of 19 century which extended to the east of present day
R.D.Congo. It is believed that Kagame aimed to reject the theory which took the Batutsi for
foreigners309. But then, he ended up in giving intellectual arms to the enemies of the same
Batutsi, the enemies of the social harmony. Father Muzungu, a prominent contemporary
theologian of inculturation questions Kagame's hypotheses as follows:
Kagame nous dit que les Abarenge sont des Hamites. D'ou lui vient cette information? On sait de par
ailleurs que Kagame a tendance a faire croire que tous les Basinga sont des Tutsi (Hamites) etant de ce
clan lui-meme.... Nous avons lui que le terme "abasinga"signifiait "vainqueur". Est-ce le nom qui
pousse a croire que ces "vainqueurs" sont Hamites, selon le prejuge qui fait de ceux-ci des
"envahisseurs". Nous savons que A. Kagame a accepte le prejuge des "races"( Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) en
vogue a son epoque. On peut le regretter, mais c'est ainsi.... Que ce soit pour les Bimanuka (those who
descended from sky), que ce soit pour les Barenge, que ce soit pour les autres groupes sociaux dit
"abasangwa-butaka" (les premiers habitants du pays, rien ne semble indiquer la ligne de demarcation
entre ethnie et clan.3"'
The importance given to Father Kagame in this work is meagre in comparison to the
implication of the ethnicising of society which developed out of his work and that of the
identical school to which this chapter and the two precedent consecrated so much attention.
Firstly, Kagame's scholarship had a considerable influence on most of the scholars who wrote
on Rwanda including d'Arianoff, Vansina, de Heusch. For decades his theses remained
unquestioned, even during a large part of the post- independence regimes311. Prof. d'Hertefelt
notes:
les travaux de Kagame... modifient substantiellement l'optique des premiers ethnohistoriens du Rwanda
et meme celle de traditions orales les plus officielles. Les conteurs et les commentateurs ruandais de
celles-ci, Tuutsi aussi bien que Huutu, qui servaient d'informateurs a Loupias, Pages, de Lacger,
Sandrart, Delmas ou Hiernaux, traduisaient l'opinion generate en admettant que certains clans avaient a
l'origine une base Hutu (ou tout au moins non-Tutsi) des groupements locaux organises en " royaume"
avant l'expansion des Nyiginya... tout a fait a l'encontre de cette interpretation traditionnelle (laquelle il
convient d'y insister ne favorisait pas systematiquement le prestige de la dynastie Tuutsi), Kagame va
postuler une origine ethnique Tuutsi pour tous les clans ruandais....312
Secondly, the negative implications of the ideological use of of the clan had been predicted in
the beginning of the century by Dr Johanssen. In a poignant assessment on the role the clans
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had in Rwandan society, Johanssen unequivocally and clearly stated the danger which
inevitably could result in the dissolution of the clans:
" Les clans n'ont pas de residences delimitees. II m'est impossible de dire si, outre la communion
sacrificielle, il existe encore d'autres interets collectifs. Mis il faut quand meme admettre que les
associations claniques transmettent d'une generation a l'autre les vieux usages et les vieilles coutumes, et
qu'ils conservent la specificite nationale contre le melange et le declin. Plus il est facile, par dissolution
du mariage et par la polygamie, de defaire le lien familial au sens strict du terme, plus on gagne en
importance - cela ne fait pas de doute - en [preservant] la communion ferme, indissoluble, orientee
religieusement que represente le clan. Avec la destruction de cette communion, tout le peuple croulerait
et se resoudrait en individus isoles qui seraient livres a n'importe quelle influence"313.
The influence of all sort predicted by Johanssen have come from overwhelmingly both
external and internal scholarships. First, as Rwandan society was built upon the federations
of the clans which were indistinctly made of Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa lineages, the process
of ethnisation has constituted an ideological time bomb that exploded and destroyed the
'national communion'. Second, with regard to Kagame's, Claudine Vidal is right to point out
that his work contributed to create the 'histoire ressentiment'. But as discussed in this thesis
he was only one link of the chain.
III.4. Catholic Missionaries and "Race" Considerations
III.4.1. The Legacy of Cardinal Lavigerie
The Catholics were the products of the movement of restoration of Christianity in North
Africa created by Lavigerie. The latter left his see in Nancy (France) and decided to re-
evangelise the north of Africa whose glorious Christianity was extinguished by the Muslim
th
conquests during the 7 century of our era. Later, Lavigerie was distressed by the misery of
the Black people enslaved by the traders in human beings. Out of the reports of the caravans
he had sent to Central Africa and also from the accounts of the first explorers, including
Smith, Speke and Livingstone, the cardinal formed his own idea for the foundation of the
"Christian Kingdom in the heart of Africa".
Despite his good will , the conception the cardinal had of the African populations was made
out of the short cut that characterised the analyses of African societies and peoples by the
explorers. Like many of his contemporaries, he was influenced by intolerant theologies. In
the first instance, he was persuaded that Africans had no idea of God. In 1879, Lavigerie
summarises his opinion with regard to Africans' religiosity:
D'apres les recits de voyageurs, il est douteux que les Negres de l'interieur aient, sur une autre vie et sur
l'immortalite de l'ame, des idees quelconques. Dans tous les cas, ils ne paraissent avoir aucune religion,
mais seulement des superstitions grossieres, sans forme quelconque de culture, et qui ressemblent a de la
sorcellerie. L'idee de Dieu elle-meme est aussi chez eux tellement vague, que certains explorateurs ont
pu dire qu'ils n'en avaient point ».314
The Cardinal's opinion changed over time due, in particular to different other views he
received. Among other nuanced views, Father Livinhac who evangelised Uganda had written
313 Johansses, op.cit. Book I, pp. 41/2.
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a relatively balanced report: "Les Baganda connaissent l'existence de Dieu, des demons, et
les grandes lois de 1'ordre naturel... Ces pauvres gens sont assurement moins mauvais que les
Romains et les musulmans". Then the cardinal adjusted his attitude and confessed his
misconception:
Je dois l'avouer, je suis profondement emu et surpris de cette delicate disposition religieuse que, d'apres
votre rapport, on peut constater chez vos neophytes. C'est en complete contradiction avec les idees de
tous les explorateurs sur les autres Africains et avec cedes qui furent les votres dans le passe »...Nous
savons tres bien, et nous l'affirmons avec force, que les Africains sont non seulement nos freres, mais
aussi que le tres grand nombre des peuples africains est extraordinairement receptif a la culture
spirituelle, religieuse et morale quoi que Ton puisse en dire 3I5.
The exploitation of the religious factor highlighted in the two precedent passages was part of
a system of conceptions and misconceptions under the process of 'humiliation' of Black
Africans. It reminds the Vatican I appeal for the alleviation of the "malediction weighting on
the shoulders of the Hamites inhabiting the Nigricy". Cardinal Lavigerie, in his instructions
to his missionaries for the evangelisation of the Black people316 maintained two core
principles which, apparently were motivated by the desire to face the supposed lawlessness
and the absence of "spiritual God or moral law" underlined in Hegel's passage: a. a
progressive teaching commencing with the essential truths ; b. a teaching structured on the
model of the primitive Church. In the first case, the cardinal believed that for "primitive
people attached to the traditional tales, there was no better method than the historical model".
The latter consists in "telling without deep reflection other than those which come by their
own, the history of religion and of the Church". As they (Black) "had miserable idea of God,
the soul and immortality and lower morals " noone would be admitted to baptism without a
four years persistent religious instruction.
With regard to the second principle, the missionaries had to apply the primitive discipline of
three different orders : the postulants to whom would be solely given the fundamental truths ;
the catechumens who would receive the essential truths of Christianity without referring to
sacraments nor baptism ; and lastly the believers from whom no secret would be kept317. In
the new instructions of 1879, Lavigerie endorsed the principle of keeping the young converts
designed to assist the missionaries in the stations to avoid them being influenced by
malpractice without however detaching them from their context i.e. sending them to Europe.
The cardinal who was influenced by the developments of the Church in Middle Age
estimated that Christianity was stable once adopted by the authorities. He would recommend
to his missionaries to first convert the ruling class who would bring the masses. In the
Rwandan perspective, the plan set up aimed to develop a social elite which would be the
highlight of the western civilisation. A man who is known for having imprinted his mark on
that process is Mgr Classe.
315 Ibid. p.66.
316 It must be remembered that by Africans, missionaries meant people of 'Bantou roots' Negroes as the Batutsi
were considered as Hamites.
317 Van der Meersch, op.cit. pp.64-73.
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III.4.2. The Influence ofMgr. Classe
Since 1908, Kabgayi, headquarters of the Vicariate became an unavoidable centre in the
decision-making of the colony.3l8One person who played a prominent role was Father Classe,
head of the Church from 1907 to 1945.319 Born in Metz, France, Classe arrived in Rwanda in
1901. In 1907 he became Vicar Delegate and from then started a career that mingled with the
mission of Rwanda. In 1922, he was appointed bishop and continued to head the Church up
to his death in 1945. A hard worker, Classe applied with a military rigor the instructions from
his superiors; he was determined to influence the decision-making bodies. In this last role, he
campaigned for the retrocession of the Gisaka district- as did Henri Anet, the General
Secretary of the SBMPC- to Belgium from the British empire. The district was reintegrated to
Rwanda in 1924. Classe participated in several other official missions including the removal
of King Musinga and his replacement by his son, Rudahigwa.
From the second half of 1920s as earlier said, the close links between the colonial authorities
and the missionaries were marked by the integration in the colonial administration report of
many sections comprising the "reports provided by their 'Grandeur' the Vicars of Rwanda
(Mgr.L. Classe) and Burundi ( Mgr J.Gorju), and pastors E.Durand (SBMPC) and Monnier
(Adventist) and the CMS".320 Hence, there was a formal co-operation between the
missionaries and the colonisers in promoting and propagating the ideas on 'race' identity and
other matters.
III.5. Protestants and "Race" Considerations
Like their contemporaries, the Catholics, Protestant missionaries had a similar Batutsi bias.
The 'Watutsi' (pastoralists), were described as a race superior to the Bahutu and the Batwa;
they impressed intellectually and spiritually. A marker figure in the implantation and the
development of Rwandan Protestantism has been Dr Johanssen of the Bethel mission.
III.5.1. Bethel Missionaries: Johanssen's Influence
Dr Johanssen, arrived in 1907 accompanied by Tanzanians from Bukoba (Tanzania), his first
field of mission. E. Johanssen worked in Tanzania and Rwanda and later became Head of the
Bethel Missionary work in Bukoba and Rwanda. According to Klaus Fiedler, his spiritual
background, like that of the Bethel mission was the Evangelical Revival which had a centre
in Bethel321. His Lutheran theology made it easier for Johanssen to see the values of African
318 Ibid. p.25. See also report of the colonial administration which described a 1928 visit of his highness, Leopold,
heir to the throne at Kabgayi, headquarters of the Vicariate as 'triumphant'.
319 Father , then Mgr Classe who carried out rigorously the idea of Cardinal Lavigerie was born in France, Metz.
He was ordained priest in 1900 in Carthage and spent a year as secretary to the superior of the White fathers, Mgr
Livinhac. He was then sent to Rwanda where he arrived in 1901.
Muvala: op.cit., p. 25/6.
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cultures; the first Reader he published in Kinyarwanda, contained many Rwandan tales and
stories, an initiative which pleased the King of Rwanda, Musinga.
For a long time the Bethel Mission could not separate its work from the German colonial
activities. In fact until 1891 the mission was confined to the coastal strip, spending much of
its energies for the Germans in that area. It is when Pastor Bodelschwingh took over and
combined the direction of the Bethel institutions and the Mission that the Evangelical spirit
of Bethel gained dominance at the same time buried its imperialistic character322.
As head of the mission in Bukoba and in Rwanda, Johanssen was quite willing to accept the
existing social order. This went so far that on 24 October 1891 he, together with his
colleague Wohlrab, went in to battle besides the warriors of Chief Kinyashi who had donated
a plot of land at Mlalo, Tanzania, against a supposed Teita attack. They justified their
alliance with the chief in saying that in Germany, they would not hesitate to follow a general
323
call up .
Johanssen was critical towards those among his colleagues and contemporaries who thought
the 'indigenous' were unable to understand Christian doctrine and became Christians. " Nous
devenons quelque peu retifs, lorsqu'on exige de nous que nous reconnaissions d'office le
bien-fonde de la phrase sur l'incapacite du Noir devant la comprehension du Christianisme,
surtout lorsque celui qui a emis cette affirmation n'a lui-meme pas compris le Christianisme
et sa force mysterieuse"324.
Johanssen declares that such an affirmation challenges him in one thing: to deply analyse
what was needed to become a Christian. He then set up the basic tenets of missionary
activities in six principles325. In these tenets, in particular the second, fourth and fifth, there
was no question of the Protestant mission questioning the existing socio-political order; in
fact he would stress the need for obedience to the established authorities even if judged from
the perspective of the Gospel there was a need to insist that the systems reflect more Love
and Justice of God for all inhabitants.
This leaves the feeling that Johanssen's positive comment about his conviction that the
indigenous were capable of understanding Christian doctrine was unlikely inclusive. It seems
that all the three communities of the Banyarwanda people were not concerned. In fact, his
approach in evangelisation and his understanding of social relations were, like his
contemporary Catholics, hierarchically oriented. In fact, in Rwanda, he did much to keep
good contacts with King Musinga, visiting him in the capital, Nyanza. He tried
unsuccessfully to convert the monarch and his entourage. During a session at Nyanza with
King Musinga and the members of his entourage, he was distressed when the Batutsi chiefs
refused to accept his idea of converting to Christianity, arguing that they knew God, Imana.
322 Ibid. p.66.
323 Ibid. p. 66.
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He became more confused when the Watutsi qualified Musinga, the King as 'Imana'
(divinity).
Then Johanssen confided his confusion to his fellow citizen, Dr Richard Kandt, the German
Resident. The latter was not surprised by the Batutsi chiefs' attitude and hesitation to
convert, as well as their reference to Imana. For him, the sense of the Watutsi's pride was due
to the fact that they came from a different nation which knew Imana (God!). For Dr Kandt,
there was a wrong impression which was given to Dr Johanssen that the Watutsi had
apparently forgotten Imana (God). That was due to the fact that the cultural, social and
religious life of the country were hugely and essentially marked more by Bantu cultural
values. The Watutsi had to descend lower themselves to mix with the Bantu (Bahutu!). Kandt
send the following comment to Johanssen:
J'ai 1'impression que les Watutsi ont apporte ce terme (Imana), dans sa purete, de leur patrie hamitique,
jusqu'a ce que, au cours des siecles, ce terme se soit corrompu sous l'influence des Bantou se trouvant a
un niveau plus bas; j'ai 1'impression aussi que, spirituellement parlant, les Watutsi ont descendu une
pente, lorsque leur langue et leur culture se sont meles a celle des Bahutu, ou plus exactement quand
elles ont sombre en eux sans laisser des traces326.
For the German Governor, the idea of God was brought in Rwanda from outside by the
Hamites ('Watutsi'). This confirms the observation of Sanders, ealier in this work, that
whatever was found valuable in Africa was attributed to the Hamites.
Johanssen came to espouse Kandt's view that the Batutsi were the "clan of Hamitic
pastoralists" who arrived from Asia and that they introduced not only the cow but religion
and socio-political organisations. In different sections of his Memoirs, Johanssen joined the
Catholic missionaries in perceiving a binary opposition between the "two races", in
manifesting an admiration of the Watutsi to whom he attributed, an Asian origin and the
notion of God. They had a "relatively high representation (of God) that the question arose of
knowing if, on this point, and on the mysteries that strangely refer to the cult of Mithras,
there was not a manifestation of some Asian influences".327
With regard to the socio-political and cultural life, Johanssen had not doubt about the
superiority of the 'pastoral race'. This, he expressed as follows:
La population du Ruanda se compose organiquement de trois races: les Watutsi, les Bahutu et les Batwa.
Les Watusi sont un clan de pasteurs hamitiques qui, par sa stature, par sa couleur et par ses possibilites
intellectuelles, se distingue fondamentalement des deux autres races, qu'elle a soumises a sa domination
bien qu'il ne repensent sans doute guere qu'un dixieme de la population. C'est de cette race que vient le
roi. Selon les apparences, les clans de pasteurs hamitiques ne se sont pas bornes a introduire d'Asie en
Afrique le betail a bosse, mais encore des valeurs intellectuelles de differentes natures. La ou ils ont
reussi a etablir leur domination' ils ont par leur legendes et par leur gradations, exerce une influence sur
le culte, on peut meme sans doute dire, sur toute la vie spirituelle de la population.328
Though he identified many common determinants such as the clan (which he used
interchangeably with 'Watutsi' (sic), Bahutu and Batwa) and many other cultural aspects:
proverbs, legends, oral literature, names expressing the notion of God, moral life and
tradition, the author admired what he called the "ideology of the Mututsi". There is a sense
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that in his positive approach to local cultures and to the life of the 'indigenous', Johanssen
gives less attention to those among the population were considered as 'inferior castes'.
Despite his being a man of vision, energy and influence, he used the same prism as his
contemporary Roman Catholic colleagues to unquestionably apply the theory of race
supremacy. His departure, in 1916, following the defeat of the Germans opened a new
chapter to the Societe Beige de Missions Protestantes au Congo (SBMPC).
III. 5.2. SBMPC and "Race" Considerations
The Belgian missionaries of the SBMPC329 arrived following the take over of the Bethel
mission stations in 1921 as Belgium was given part of the East African German colonies,
namely Ruanda-Urundi, under the 1919 Versailles Treaty. In fact, there have been many
different offers from the Anglo-saxon world for the take over of the German Protestant
missions. It must be remembered that Musinga had tried to balance the weight of the
Catholics in making alliance with the Protestants. The Belgian authorities in Rwanda
preferred the American Adventist missionaries to the British; in 1919, the Adventists were
then given authorisation to run the Bethel-Bielefield missionary stations. The field colonial
rulers were keen to avoid the inference of the British missionaries that the colonial
authorities would not respect scrupulously the principle of indirect rule330. In Brussels, the
opinion was different. They were opposed to the American Adventists perceived as
favourable to the promotion of the rights of the Black people331. In 1921, the Government, in
particular King Albert I who happened to be Protestant, asked the Belgian Protestant
Missions for Congo (SBMPC) to undertake the work.
Due to the state of minority of the Belgian Protestantism, the SBMPC was compelled to
recruit missionaries from Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Because of the different
missionaries' background the mission functioned in three independent stations with no
coherent theological bases, almost isolated one from another. This lasted up to 1956, when
the first national synod opted for a Presbyterian tradition332. According to the documentation
329 The Belgian society for Protestant missions in Congo (SBMPC) was created in November 1910 by the Union
of Evangelical Protestant Churches of Belgium and the Belgian missionary Christian Church. The aim was to
respond to the call for missionary activities in Congo. Due to the absence of missionary experience and resources
nobody was ready to go to Congo. The first person who showed the will to open the activities, was Pasteur Anet, a
member of the staff was ready to depart in August 1914 when the German troops entered Belgium. In 1921, Past.
Anet, visited Bethel and the two missions signed a convention of transfer. Twagirayesu, M & Butselaar, J (ed):
ibid, p. 78/9.
330 In fact, in Congo, the colonial authorities had been at open war with some of the British missionaries and
humanitarian campaigners. These took a firm stand against Slavery and tortures practised by the Belgian colonial
authorities over the local populations. The prominent among the British missionaries who were opposed to the
belgian slavery were Edmund Dene Morel, George Grenfell, Fox-Bourne and their ally, Alfred Emmott, MP were
among the prominent opponent to the arbitrary of the 'Congo Free State'. In 1908, the Foreign Secretary, Sir
Edward Grey had observed: " No external question for at least thirty years has moved the country so strongly and
so vehemently as this in regard to the Congo". Grant, K.,"Bringing Slavery Home: Missions, Radical Politics and
Imperialism". Research Forum, Cambridge, 6th-7th April 1998, p.26.
"'Administration Coloniale Ruanda-Urundi, Rapport 1927.P.51.
332 See the problematic is analysed in the section referring to the weaknesses of the missions. Absence of
missionary experience in Belgium as well as lack of human and material resources. E. Coniot, interview, Liege,
1996.
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consulted, the SBMPC had no clear outline of 'races' policies; but the 1927 colonial
administrative report indicates that the mission was keen to "support the civilising enterprise
started in the colony". Article one of the statutes of the SBMPC reads as follows:
Le but poursuivi et les methodes d'evangelisation employes par le Societe Beige des Missions
Protestantes au Congo sont definis dans Particle de son acte de constitution:'L'Association a pour but
essentiel la propagation de l'Evangile au Congo Beige par la creation de missions, la traduction et la
diffusion de Saintes Ecritures. Elle entend participer ainsi a l'oeuvre nationale de civilisation entreprise
dans la colonie'333.
The government policies which would be implemented after the Belgian take over were
stated by the Minister of the Colonies, J. Frank in his first visit to Rwanda in 1919: "II ne
s'agit pas, sous pretexte d'egalite, de toucher aux bases de l'institution politique; nous
trouvons les 'Watutzi' etablis d'ancienne date; intelligents et capables; nous respectons cette
situation"334. For the Minister, the Watutzi were the noble class par excellence. They were
probably from Asia and would have sojourned in the Pharaonic Egypt. With such a cultural
prestige, the Batutsi chiefs were credited with unrestricted possibilities and privileges. These
are the policies of the Belgian empire the SBMPC was clearly devoted to promote.
This devotion, however, would put the authorities of the Society in a trap. In 1935 Henri
Anet,General Secretary of the SBMPC, together with some other missionary agencies
including the CMS, signed a petition addressed to the League of Nations in Geneva
protesting against the discriminations facing Protestants from the colonial administration.
They accused the government of "terrorising and Catholicising" the Rwandan chiefs. Anet
was reprimanded by the board of his mission for not being loyal to his government335.
Like the Catholics and their own predecessors (the Bethel missionaries), the SBMPC
missionaries were admirers of the 'Watutsi' (nobles) as well as the structure of the society.
They were desperate to welcome the Batutsi in the missionary stations. This is expressed in a
note from pastor von der Hyden in 1925. The then head of the Kirinda station wrote:
Une grande joie m'attendait. D'apres les periscopes ecclesiastiques, c'etait le dimanche de " misericorde
Domini". Ce dimanche de " misericorde du Seigneur", trois Batutsi (nobles) se sont presentes a moi me
demandant le bapteme. II vous sera difficile de comprendre l'importance d'une telle demarche, ne
connaissant pas les Batutsi. lis adorent leur roi, Musinga, un etre surhumain qui leur a donne toute
richesse et tout bien-etre336.
The conversion of the Batutsi was the battlefield between the missionaries. However, the
Protestant missionaries had few means to compete with the Catholics; as indicated in this
passage, they were resigned to wait for the Batutsi chiefs to freely join the mission. Whether
the Batutsi who joined were all chiefs is questionable; there was a continuing unfortunate
association of the Batutsi with the chiefs. This association of the Batutsi, even those
exploited by the rulers and colonial system like the rest of the masses, concerns this thesis.
The 1929 SBMPC report presented to the synod assemblies (of the SBMPC tutors' Churches)
persisted in showing a high degree of expectations for the Batutsi conversion. The
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missionaries were eager to welcome and describe at length the conversion of a single Mututsi
notable in a missionary station. This is expressed in a note from the head of Rubengera
station:
A Rubengera, notre station la plus recente, l'oeuvre religieuse se developpe et s'affermit. Les cultes sont
suivi par plus ou moins 300 a 400 personnes. Des chefs Batutsi avec leurs fils viennent se meler a leurs
vassaux Bahutu pour entendre le message evangelique337.
Hence, in their objectives of evangelisation as well as in their attitudes towards the ruling
class, the SBMPC missionaries had no problem in believing in the supremacy of the Batutsi.
Whether their views were shared with the other Protestants missions, is what we will look at
in the next section.
III. 5.3. CMS- Rwanda Missionaries and 'Race' Considerations
The second influential Protestant mission in the land, after the Bethel-SBMPC was the
Church Missionary Society- 'Rwanda Mission'. But by the far most, its missionaries
have been attached to the Batutsi. They saw in the Batutsi of Rwanda, a key race for
the conversion of the central Africa region. Geoffrey Holmes, a former British army
officer who came to Uganda before joining Rwanda Mission in Kigeme wrote:
A race of gentlemen, with beautiful physique, undoubtedly as fine as the world produces, keen on games
and sports but proud, arrogant and cruel, scornful of anything that savours of manual labour, and yet so
superstitious and disappointing in spite of great latent mental abilities338.
Referring to the activities of the Church Missionary Society including the ongoing
work on the translation of the Bible under the co-ordination of Rev Gillebaud, the
1929 SBMPC report revealed that the team has moved to the centre of the country
"where the language of Rwanda is more pure". Another influential missionary of the
Church Missionary Society was Stanley Smith. He also reported on the translation of
the Bible which had started in 1925. 'The Gillebaud' family', he wrote, "have for
collaborator an excellent Mututsi nobleman of royal family, Samusoni Inyarubuga".339
The quote, surely does not provide enough material to draw particular conclusions,
but one perceives behind the qualifiers, and the decision to settle near the residence of
the royal court, an inclination to the ruling class. Even the standard of the language
adopted in the translation was the sophisticated Kinyarwanda of Kukarubanda (royal
court common ground square).
Later in 1940s, following the Protestant revival some chiefs were converted in the
Rwanda Mission stations. Smith notes that the "mission might have been tempted to
lower standards in order to win these intelligent and influential people"340. Clearly, the
Church Missionary Society missionaries were happy to compromise on some
Christian principles so as to welcome the Batutsi.
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Clearly, the competition in the converting of the Batutsi nobility as shown in these
lines hide a conflict of cultural imperialism founded on biology and imperialism.
According to Lamin Sanneh these two factors were inscribed in a political project
which claimed "natural advantage of racial superiority"341. The missionaries have
been allies of the architects of such a project; they provided instruments of its
effectiveness. It is in the framework of that cultural superiority project that some
missionaries in Rwanda claimed that Christianity must repose on the Hamites of
Caucasian origin, and at the same time, repudiated any suggestion that the populations
classified as inferior may have contributed to cultural and spiritual values.
Clearly, the method of evangelisation adopted the top to bottom, or the conversion of
the monarchy and the ruling class deliberately favoured the hierarchical stratification
of society. Put differently, the Gospel reinforced and justified the system and practices
of inequality and injustices.
Secondly, the Gospel as it was presented to Rwandans and to many other Africans has
became two-edged sword. On one side, it may have unveiled the God, the Creator of
the universe and of all cultures. Introduced with a cultural and colonial imperialism
that ignored many factors of local culture and social harmony 342, Christianity has
created a dualism between God of western Christianity and God of the Africans.
In refuting the idea of 'indigenous' contributing to the cultural and spiritual values,
both the Catholic and Protestant missions provided weapons to cultural and political
imperialism. As Lamin Sanneh notices cultural ideals lead to cultural superiority. As
we all know, a triumphant culture is by no stretch of imagination synonymous with
moral rectitude, nor is the historical failure of vanquished populations, evidence of
moral inferiority343.
That said, as in the case of the Anglican bishop, John Colenso, who received 'an
African transformation' among the Zulu, as he "saw that vernacular translations
opened the door into creative regions of the culture"344, some missionaries in Rwanda
slipped out of their scepticism to embrace the African confidence. Such a process
marked people like Mensching. In 1927, Mensching challenged his fellows Europeans
to change their attitudes so as to benefit the insights from other 'races'. He expressed
this opinion as fellows:
vivre avec des gens d'une autre race peut-etre d'un profit extraordinaire pour notre vie interieure. Mais
nous nous gachons cela par la discrimination raciale; c'est du plus mauvais effet sur notre vie interieure.
Ce sentiment faux et ridicule de superiorite nous fait deprecier ce qui vient des autres races, qu'il
s'agisse des formes de socialisation, de l'art ou meme de la religion345.
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Mensching's invitation to his fellow Europeans to be open to sharing experiences with
local peoples shows that in the midst of militancy for race and culture superiority,
there have been men and women of extreme cordiality and generosity. His attitude
reminds one of Father Livinhac mentioned above, or among the early colonial agents,
Captain Bethe who, amidst the exacerbation of caricatures and prejudices of explorers
and anthropologists described the Banyarwanda without 'ethnic' differentiation as
"generalement d'un type humain d'une beaute et d'une force remarquables"346.
What Mensching was defending as idea here is the principle that any encounter
between cultures can not remain neutral nor innocent. An encounter which avoid to
exhibit heroic exploits of self-assertion always opens the gate to ambivalence,
paradoxes, and other unintended factors; as such, it is as Lamin Sanneh put it
accurately "mutually harmful and beneficial". And that necessary risk, it has to be
admitted, is a crucial factor in human being encounter.
III.6. Reshaping Society
From the installation of colonisation and Christianity, Rwandan society has been
given a new shapes and new images. Catholic and Protestant were competing though
without equal means, to transform society with the help of education and evangelism.
III.6.1. Missionary Schools: Wombs of Racial Ideology
The primal objective of the missionary schools was to equip the Batutsi elite, the
'born-rulers' with the capacities to fulfil the function of auxiliaries to the missionaries
and colonial administration. In the terms of Mgr Classe, they aimed to form an elite
"capable of understanding and implementing progress". This idea rested on a number
of strategies such as the creation of schools exclusively reserved for the sons of
Batutsi chiefs and the conversion of the ruling class. This resulted from the desire,
firstly, to form Christians, catechists and seminarians imbued with the high ideal of
ethnic differences, capable of leading the masses to the path of conversion to
Catholicism so as to win competition against the Protestants and the Muslims. The
1927 colonial report highlighted the idea of having schools exclusively reserved for
the sons of Batutsi chiefs as presented to them by the missionaries as follows:
Par les Batutsi Chretiens, les missionnaires esperent arriver a former l'elite sociale pro-europeenne.
Cette elite sociale est necessaire. Le Christianisme la procure disent-ils. Le Cardinal Lavigerie declarait
qu'aux societes de l'Afrique il faut donner une base: 'celle sur laquelle repose notre civilisation
chretienne, c'est-a-dire le Christianisme, sinon la civilisation qui en decoule, les negres ne la
comprendront pas347.
The necessity of having schools exclusively reserved for the sons of the Batutsi was
explained in different letters addressed by the missionaries to the Superior General of
the Order. In 1910, Father Schumacher addressed a report to the Superior general in
which he demonstrated the necessity of "favouring the Mututsi of Rwanda" so as to
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stop the projects of the Protestants who wanted to establish their links with the royal
Court. Similarly, in his letter of 28 April 1911 as well as his long study (69 pages
manuscript), Father Classe reflected on what he considered as the "relations with the
Batutsi in the Mission of Rwanda". Despite the opposition from some of his
colleagues, the study's recommendations were implemented. Mgr Classe stated his
ambition on the matter as follows:
l'une des questions les plus graves qui doivent retenir notre attention, en raison des changements qui
vont survenir dans le Rwanda, est celle des ecoles. II s'agit de savoir si 1'elite dirigeante sera pour nous
ou contre nous; si les places importantes dans la societe indigene seront aux catholiques ou aux non
catholiques; si l'eglise aura, par l'education et la formation de la jeunesse, 1'influence preponderante
dans le Ruanda. Jusqu'a pressent, les moyens dont nous disposions nous incitaient a negliger un peu une
oeuvre a laquelle nous n'y attachons pas encore ne importance sufflsante. Le Gouvernement dont vous
connaissez le projet d'organiser l'enseignement scolaire par les Societes religieuses, veut nous assurer
des subsides, mais a la condition expresse qu'ils iront aux ecoles et aux instituteurs qui realisent ces
348
programmes.
The statement highlights not only the ambition but also the co-operation and the freedom the
Church enjoyed in forming an elite who would support' Christian civilisation '.
In 1905 the White Fathers created a school at the Capital, in Nyanza which had 26 pupils in
1908 all sons of Chiefs349. From July 1907, Father Dufays and Classe started the construction
of a school for the 'sons of the Nobles' (diary of Kabgayi) in Kabgayi; to "surely reach the
sons of the chiefs Batoutsi (Tutsi), there has been opened a special school for them", the
report reads. The project was then extended to other missionary stations, Nyanza (1912),
Kabgayi (1913), Rwaza (1913), Kigali (1914, 1916), Save (1917), Rwamagana (19 1 9)350 as
well as in Ruhengeri, Gatsibo, Shangugu. It culminated in the creation in 1929 of the Groupe
Scolaire d'Astrida (Butare) by the colonial authorities. The institution was then confided to
the Brothers for Charity of Gand (Belgium). The curriculum in this school would emphasise
the characteristics of being a chief. The laureates were later appointed chiefs, clerks,
agronomists or auxiliaries of the colonial administration.
This obsession of forming an elite from one 'group' was so rooted in the thinking of the
missionaries that in 1912, the White Fathers decided to displace the school which functioned
at the capital of the monarchy in Nyanza towards Kabgayi (headquarters of the Vacariate) on
the ground that, in Nyanza there were many sons of the Bahutu being recruited. The Fathers
then justified their decision:
Nous profiterons de ces circonstances pour creer une ecole pour les Batutsi a Kabgayi meme. La nous
aurons reellement les enfants de chefs que nous connaissons; tandis que, a la capitale, c'est plus ou
moins un ramassis d'origine douteuse, et en grande partie Bahutu351.
The pursuit of race purity was so dubious that even in the very royal family, the intermarriage
between Bahutu and Batutsi was evident at the time. Prof. Mbonimana, a former Roman
Catholic priest who based his study on missionary archives and diaries put it as follows:
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L'auteur de la citation precedente ignorait sans doute que meme le fils du roi Musinga, Rudahigwa qui
venait de naitre en 1911 ( ours: qui sera investi roi par la volonte des Missionnaires, en 1931), avait
pour grand-mere maternelle une femme du commun du nom de Nyiranteko. Celle-ci etait d'origine
'Hutu'352.
It is clear with such a policy that the Catholic Church posed the foundation of the racial
ideology which was discriminatory against the Bahutu and Batwa. In contrast, in Burundi,
education was much more liberal and open to the sons of the Bahutu353 in the early twenties.
However, although influenced by the developments in Rwanda, this tolerance did not last.
Towards 1945, the Bahutu were almost eliminated from schools and political positions.
Father L.Deprimoz354, in his report on education for 1927/1928, as confessional inspector in
the Rwandan schools, affirmed that he had to deal with f/ie"Mututsi element at the exclusion
of Muhutu"355.
III.6.2.Political Implications of Discriminations in Schools
One way to keep a dominant position in society which was favoured by the missionaries was
to have on their side, the ruling class. Mgr Classe was so adamant in defending such a line
that he worked hard to influence the colonial authorities as well as his fellow missionaries so
as to preserve the Batutsi's monopoly. Classe urged his subordinates to work hard to show
the authority that they were far from being close to the Bahutu. "Nous devons absolument
travailler a detruire 1'opinion des gouvernants que nous sommes les hommes des Bahutu"356.
Mgr Classe's position with regard to the 'ethnic' relations was as earlier indicated, part of the
White Fathers global strategy, obsessed by the idea of a top to bottom model.
In the summit of the colonial reforms which knew an apogee with Governor Voisin's
Programme, 1926-1931 consisting in grouping and enlarging the chieftaincies (from 200 they
were reduced to 40), it was decided to give preferential treatment to the Batutsi. Convergent
sources indicate that the radical position of Mgr Classe in favour of the Batutsi's monopoly
had the final say over the position of the colonial authorities357. In his letter of 21 September
1927 to Resident Mortehan (colonial Governor), Mgr Classe protested against the attempt
being made by the authorities to appoint beside the Batutsi, chiefs of Bahutu and Batwa
background. In his protest he said:
Si nous voulons nous placer au point de vue pratique et chercher l'interet vrai du pays, nous avons dans
la jeunesse Mututsi un element incomparable de progres ... Qu'on demande aux Bahutu s'ils preferent
etre commandes par les roturiers (sic) ou par les nobles, la reponse n'est pas douteuse; leur preference va
au Batutsi, et pour cause. Chefs-nes, ceux-ci ont le sens du commandement ... C'est le secret de leur
installation dans le pays et de leur main mise sur lui.
352 Mbonimana, G., op.cit. p.60.
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This plea was a crucial step in the reinforcement of the Batutsi nobility domination and the
exclusion of the Bahutu. Clearly the education sector has been a ground in which the
ideology of racial supremacy has been codified and implemented. Not sure that his message
was fully received, Mgr. Classe sent a categorical warning to the Governor in an article
published in l'Essor Colonial et Maritime:
Le Plus grand tort que le gouvernement (Beige?) pourrait se faire a lui-meme et au pays serait de
supprimer la caste Mututsi. Une revolution de ce genre conduira le pays tout droit a l'anarchie et au
communisme haineusement anti- europeen. En regie generale, nous n'aurons pas de chefs meilleurs, plus
intelligents, plus actifs, plus capables de comprendre le progres et meme plus acceptes du peuple que les
Batutsi 358.
Mgr Classe's defence of the Batutsi supremacy led to both the opposition against the law
proposed by Governor Mortehan and to the wiping out of all the Bahutu chiefs in formerly
autonomous regions including Ndorwa, Mutara, Mulera, Busozo, Bushiru, Bukunzi. The
move modified fundamentally the 'inter-ethnic' relations; it created a resentment among those
discriminated against whilst confirming those selected of having the natural rights on power.
Commenting on this episode, an ad-hoc Belgian Parliament Commission created to inquire
into the 1994 Rwandan tragedy and the position of Belgium, wrote: "the Tutsification of the
1930s gave to the Batutsi a political and administrative monopoly combined with the
abolition of the triple chieftaincies, the introduction of the identity card in 1933 came to fuel
the fire: each Rwandan was now classified on the basis of arbitrary criteria as being Hutu,
Tutsi and Twa"359. The period corresponded to another event, the conversion of the ruling
class.
III.6. 3. Suspect Conversions
The second strategy in the shaping of society, has been the recruiting of the ruling class for
being the inducers even the agents who used force and pressure for the converting of society.
The Batutsi, the missionaries believed, were the key factor for mass conversions that would
transform Rwanda into the 'Christian Kingdom' .
III.6.3.1. King Musinga: the 'Pagan' Monarch
In 1917, Musinga was constrained to sign a bill of the 'liberty of conscience'360. The move
had for consequence to release the ruling classes so as to participate in a culture which
opened the way to some material and political privileges. In fact, the signing of the decree
broke the barriers that weighed on the traditional authorities and allowed those sufficiently
intelligent to know that the only way to preserve their privileges was to join the Church and
358Classe,L., "Pour moderniser le Rwanda". In l'essor colonial no 489 .December 1930 quoted by Reyntjens, F,
Pouvoir et Droit, 1985, p. 105.
3513 Mahoux & Verhofstadt, Rapport du Parlement Beige sur les Evenements Tragiaues du Rwanda de 1994.
Bruxelles, 1997, p. 66.
36(1 Text of the bill of " Free Conscience" signed by King Musinga:
"Moi Musinga, mwami du Rwanda, je decide qu'a dater de ce jour, tout sujet de mon royaume sera libre de
pratiquer la religion vers laquelle il se sent incline. Tout chef ou sous-chef qui defendra a ses subordonnes.a ses
sujets et aux enfants de ceux-ci de pratiquer le culte de leur choix ou de suivre les lemons des ecoles pour y
recevoir l'instruction, sera puni, selon la coutume, comme tout chef qui oublie qu'il me doit respect et obeissance,
de 1 a 30 jours de reclusion". In Muvala, F., Introduction a PHistoire de l'Evangelisation. Kigali: Pallotti
Presse,1990, p. 16.
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to implement scrupulously the missionaries' injunctions. The chiefs were realising that the
power was slipping from the hands of the Mwami towards the Resident's and the
missionaries. They overwhelmingly accepted the authority of both. This was reinforced by
the fact that the King had no longer the authority to nominate nor to dismiss the chiefs and
sub-chiefs361.
Ironically, Musinga himself and his subjects were not allowed to enjoy a free choice
between converting or not converting. Hence despite his signing of the bill of liberty of
conscience, the King who never converted, was continuously regarded as threat to
evangelism and colonisation and was deposed in 1930. Looking at the insinuations contained
in the colonial administration reports, it seems certain that the deposing of Musinga was on
the agenda for a long time within the mission and the colonial administration offices.
Musinga was accused among other things, his closeness with the Protestants and the
Adventists. The King had opened the court to Protestants and Adventists for preaching; he
allowed Protestants to establish their first and third stations respectively in Kirinda and
Rubengera, two symbolic ritual areas. He also allowed the Adventists to establish their first
station in Gitwe, half an hour drive from Nyanza, the capital of the monarchy. This was too
much. Dismissed in the later 1930, he was exiled in Moba, Congo, where he died in 1943.
This episode illustrates beautifully, the alliance of the altar and the throne. In fact, to use the
words of Prof. Reyntjens, the missionaries, in particular bishop Classe had become the king¬
makers. Passing over the tradition which required the enthroning of the king to be made by
the ritualists abiru, it was Governor Voisin and Mgr Classe who enthroned the new King.
This was expressed in the account given by one of his clergymen with regard to the
revocation of Musinga. "C'est le gouverneur du Ruanda-Urundi, Charles Voisin, qui declara
au nouveau roi: 'Rudahigwa, par la designation du roi des Beiges, je te proclame roi du
Ruanda'. Et ce fut le tour de Mgr Classe d'indiquer le non dynastique: 'votre titre de regne est
Mutara, ainsi le veut la regie dynastique'"362.
The nomination of a catechumen King has been a central piece of the missionary game that
transformed Rwanda into the second 'Christian Kingdom' after that of 'Priest Jan'. It provoked
huge conversions whilst Musinga's departure was celebrated by the clergy. Mgr Classe used
a metaphor of a rock removed from where it was blocking the water:
...quoique de toute evidence le depart de Musinga et l'avenement d'un roi catechumene aient provoque,
surtout a Kabgayi, un afflux de catechumenes, le mouvement etait formidable. Le mot n'y est pas trop
fort. Le depart de Musinga agit a peu pres comme un gros rocher qui, obstruant un torrent, se trouve
soudainement emporte et livre passage aux eaux amoncelees et impatientes. Delivree de l'obstacle qui
s'y opposait a ses desirs, (la population) imagina des ordres venues du roi. Le nouveau roi eu la sagesse
de dementir lui-meme publiquement ces bruits et de declarer qu'il voulait seulement pour tout son
peuple, nobles et manants, la plus entiere liberte de conscience.363
361 Adm. Col. report, 1931, p.56
362 Van Overschelde, A., "Un audacieux pacifique. Monseigneur Leon Paul Classe, apotre du Ruanda". Namur :
Editions Grands Lacs, 1946, p. 156. Quoted in Revntiens. Pouvoir et Droit. 1985, p. 91.
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Mgr Classe, L., in Interview to Father A. Ruterandongozi, In Grands Lacs, no 135 Sept. 1950 cit. par van der
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In the words ofMgr Classe himself, the masses converted because they believed the King had
given an order of the kind. There was a sense of inducement and pressure, at least because
the population saw that King Musinga was dismissed without raising riots or protests from
the ruling class. This work is not concerned with whether Musinga's revocation was justified
or not, but rather with identifying the consequences of his revocation on socio-ethnic
relations and the destiny of Christianity in Rwandan society. The process initiated within the
Catholic Church would later be known as the Tornado, the mass conversions to which we
now turn.
III. 6.3.2. 'Tornado' : Presupposition of the ' Christian Kingdom '
The conversion to Catholicism of the young new King and the ruling class produced a
psychological impact on the masses who followed his example. No matter how genuine some
conversions might have been, many studies identified a number of pressures exerted on both
the chiefs and the population. The first pressure was indirect, more psychological and
cultural. In fact, there was a common perception that the King had ordered his subjects to
convert to Catholicism. The Banyarwanda called the movement Irivuze umwami, what the
king has said you must follow364. According to many views, the King never gave such an
order, but those concerned, the missionaries and the King let the confusion persist so as to
harvest a religious and political benefit.
It was known as 'Tornado' in the missionary literature following an article in "Revue des
Grands Lacs", 1936 commenting on it. Most of the literature in Rwanda and outside greeted
it as the greatest catholic missionary achievement on the continent, a 'miracle', "the hand of
God on earth discovered by Europeans". Others described the movement as "the spirit blew
in tornado" from above365.
The second pressure was the inculcation of the spirit of proselytism among the postulants and
in particular the chiefs. The missionaries would request those who wanted to be baptised to
present a given number of postulants to catechism. Hence the missionaries posed an act
which had heavy social and political implications. It must be remembered that baptism was
one of the criteria for holding the position as chief. The 1927 colonial administration report
shows that those among the chiefs who would not convert, were considered as sorcerers,
diviners and superstitious and were deposed366. Hence, for the chiefs, it became really both a
duty and a question of political survival to push the population to conversion.
The conversion of the ruling class was a crucial dimension in the apostolate; the Catholic
Church needed such a group of potential patriarchs who would be the interlocutors of the
Church hierarchy, thus offering a kind of bridge between the two institutions which
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political reforms, now the mission would forbid to criticise Christian chiefs now
'humanists367'.
If however, most of the chiefs converted, there must be a nuance in the affirmation of I.
Linden that "Having done away with Musinga, they (the chiefs) needed a new tradition to
legitimate their role as custodians of Rwanda culture and owners of its material wealth" 368.
Surely the chiefs wanted the protection of their privileges. But it was a situation they never
planned themselves; but one of a political survival and safety. In fact, those among the
visionary chiefs who converted or manifested independence in thinking and initiative were
rather suspected to develop a nationalist attitude. This is why one administrator wrote about
chief Rwubusisi as follows: "Chief like Lwabusisi (Rwubusisi) was entirely won over to our
way of thinking, and that he was sincerely devoted to us, I am willing to admit my doubt on
this. Lwabusisi works for his country and adopts every innovation he finds if it will be to
Rwanda's profit"369.
The zeal in converting the chiefs is best perceived through the use of force or in what can be
called the 'Huntzinger case'. Reporting some of the activities of the recruitment of
catechumens during which the missionaries would use guns, Mbonimana and Ntezimana
wrote. "Certains d'entre eux (missionnaires) se rendaient sur les collines en armes pour
recruter des catechumene. Les Peres-Blancs trouvaient des occasions pour faire eux-memes
des demonstrations avec les fusils, lors d'activites cynegetiques ou en randonnees
proselytiques"370.
On his side, Father J.Gorju who, in 1917, was sent in a canonical visit to Rwanda reported 36
cases of arrests, imprisonment of the chiefs and the population for more than a year as well as
the beating and expropriations made by Father Huntzinger of the Save mission. The later had
previously resigned from the leadership of the Nyundo missionary station where he behaved
identically. Rumiya recounts a reflection of the priest himself as he faced a dilemma after
most of those he recruited by force showed little stability. Confused, Father Huntzinger wrote
in the diary of the mission:
les Chretiens juges mauvais etaient passible de bastonnades ou d'emprisonnement. Le pere Huntzinger (a
Kabgayi) a simplement amplifie les methodes dont il se servait a Nyundo. Son successeur, le Pere
Schumacher fit etat de nombreuses constructions, des bastonnades, des coups de pieds, des dents
cassees, etc. Voici sa conclusion: "Des 3000 catechumenes au fouet, il reste a peu pres 300. Durant ce
trimestre, j'ai eu 5 (cinq!) recrues, malgre toutes les peines prises. Nos brigands de catechistes dans les
succursales ont forme des brigands de catechumenes dont on ne pourra baptiser un seul"371.
During the German colonial administration, the methods were criticised. Resident, Dr Kandt
lamented the fact that in Save, the predecessor of Huntzinger, Father Brard, reigned by terror,
imprisonment and beating:
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Le pere Brard pouvait ainsi regner sans gene, decourager en toute occasion les Watutsi contre lesquels il
avait conserve de ses activites a Ussuwi (Save) une forte haine, pousser leurs gens a ne plus leur obeir,
obliger grace a ses Waganda (Ugandans, Missionaries-aides) a suivre la classe, tenir prisonniers les chefs
et les Watutsi ou les relacher contre rangon, les condamner a des peines de coups de batons atteignant la
limite de l'horreur ou perpetrer des crimes encore plus graves372.
The same phenomenon happened in the Nyundo, Rwaza and Zaza missions. Father
Huntzinger went beyond the limits of his competence in investing himself in a political role ;
as he put it himself, he " took the command of the country " in assuming the direction of the
newly arrived Belgian troops in the taking over from the Germans. At the same time, he took
the decision to dismiss and replace the chiefs and subchiefs in his region without consulting
with the local and colonial authorities. It was precisely at that time that the canonical visit of
Father Gorju took place. The 'case 'Huntzinger' outraged the authorities. He was expelled and
left Rwanda on 25 April 19 1 8373.
So we see a combination of charm with political pressure towards the ruling class
complemented by the use of force against the population. Obviously, the geographical and
quantitative growth did not correspond with a qualitative result, due to the use of physical
constraints which, as we can see was no less than the manifestation of a method in the
apostolic mission. As a result of these processes, during the period 1933-1939, 90 % out of
1250 chiefs and sub-chiefs of Rwanda were converted to Catholicism374. The number of
Christian baptised increased by 235,118 new members, rising from 58,061 members to
289,179. Then E.Father Hurel, superior of the Save mission commented:
Notre Eglise est en marche, et, si Dieu la garde, en bonne voie. Les chefs et toute la jeunesse Mututsi ont
pris franchement la tete du mouvement. Les chefs de provinces sont, en majorite, Chretiens ou
catechumenes... D'ailleurs, sur les 9014 baptemes solennels de l'annee, plus du cinquiemement, 1984
sont des Batutsi. La caste dirigeante parait bien etre pour nous et a nous, et c'est elle qui entraine
maintenant le peuple qui l'avait precede, et cela simplement, chretiennement, puisque ces Batutsi, si fiers
de leur rang, ne dedaignent pas etre parrains de gens du peuple, pas meme de chercher parmi eux, a
l'occasion, leur propre parrain.375
Behind this comment of Father Hurel, who referred to what he saw as "un movement
vraiment extraordinaire de conversions", lies a form of Christianity in many cases imposed
by force and arms on the population and eventually, adopted for social and political
privileges by the ruling class.
Rwandan Christianity's growth, this thesis believes, was built upon artificial foundations.
The circumstances surrounding the mass conversions were rooted in the top to bottom
principle of Cardinal Lavigerie consisting in first converting the ruling class who then would
bring in the masses. Common people followed the rulers, but in the end, it seems to this
writer that they were not converted. They avoided colonial and missionary repression. As
consequence, it was a surrealistic phenomenon. The statistics were exaggerated, and the
quality was missing whilst the clergy slipped in triumphant attitude and laziness. Hence little
effort was spend to bridge Christian faith with the people's practices. This conviction was
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shared by many people from various domains. For example, some opponents of 'Tornado'
considered it as a campaign created by Mgr Classe, so as to claim the triumph of Catholicism.
For many among the clergy, in particular, Father P. Simoor of Zaza it never permitted
sufficient preparation for baptism, due to the absence of personnel to respond to the huge
needs. It thus opened a way to the return to traditional religious practices. For Simoor,
'Tornado' was no less than the "mediocrity of Rwandan Christianity" tolerated by its head,
Mgr Classe. The ligue of Nations in Geneva too warned on the quantity of conversions and
baptisms happening in Rwanda; it asked if there was a 'liberty of conscience'376. Despite
those questions, the missionaries accomplished the next step, the consecration of Rwanda and
its inhabitants to Christ the King and Virgin Mary by Mwami Mutara Rudahigwa.
III.6.3.3. King Rudahigwa: the Missionary Ally
The climax of 'Tornado' occurred with the consecration of Rwanda and its people to the
Virgin Mary and Christ the King. Mwami (king) Mutara accomplished the mission on 27
October 1946 in a memorable ceremony described by Muvala as a "significant move of the
Catholic Church" The text of consecration377 was a master piece of priestly writing. First, the
King recognised Mary the "queen of earth and heaven", and Jesus as Master of Rwanda,
source of authority and power, who gave to Rwanda a genealogy of kings and then in his
providence made himself known in sending his apostles to bring light and life. He interceded
for the fertility of the women and cattle of the country and committed himself to act in justice
and righteousness together with his household, his entourage and the chiefs of the country.
And lastly the Mwami of Rwanda joined with "all the Christian nations to proclaim publicly
that Christ, the King and His Virgin Mother reign over all men today and for ever" 378.The
316 Ibidem, p. 98.
377 Muvala: op.cit. p.35.
378 CONSECRATION DU RWANDA AU CHRIST-ROI. (Par le Mwami, le 27-10-1946), Full Text:
Seigneur Jesus, Roi de tous les hommes et de toutes les nations, moi, Mutara Charles-Leo-Pierre Rudahigwa, je
m'incline devant Vous, ainsi que devant votre Mere, la Vierge Marie, Reine de la terre et du Ciel. Je reconnais que
Vous etes le souverain MaTtre du Rwanda, la racine de laquelle sort tout pouvoir et toute puissance.
Seigneur Jesus, C'est Vous qui avez forme notre Pays. Vous lui avez donne une longue lignee de rois pour le
gouverner a Votre place, encore qu'ils ne Vous connaissaient pas. Quand le temps fixe par Votre Providence fut
arrive, Vous Vous etes fait connaitre, Vous nous avez envoye vos apotres. lis nous apporterent la Lumiere et la
Vie.
Maintenant que nous Vous connaissons, nous reconnaissons publiquement que Vous etes notre Maitre et notre
Roi. Seigneur, je Vous donne mon pays, mes compatriotes, ma personne.
Faites que les hommes du Rwanda aiment leur pays. Qu'ils s'appliquent a le faire progresser et y fassent regner
cette paix que Vous apportez au Monde. Qu'ils rejettent loin d'eux les erreurs et les vices du paganisme pour
suivre fidelement votre Voie.
Faites que toutes les femmes du Rwanda fassent honneur a leur maternite. Qu'elles soient fideles a leur epoux
comme Vous etes fidele a l'eglise, et ne forment avec eux qu'un seul corps. Puissent-elles former le coeur de leurs
enfants et y faire eclore le respect et 1'amour pour Vous et pour le pays.
Que tous les chefs du Rwanda gouvernent ce pays dans la justice. Que tous leurs jugements soient impartiaux.
Qu'ils ne tiennent compte d'aucune preference de sorte qu'aucun de mes sujets ne soit lese. Qu'ils abandonnent
toute tromperie, tout rancune et toute haine. Qu'entre eux, il n'y ait point de partis, mais que tous soient unis dans
la charite.
Aujourd'hui, au nom de mon peuple, je me joins a toutes les nations chretiennes pour proclamer publiquement:
Que le Christ-Roi et sa Sainte Mere regnent sur tous les hommes maintenant et toujours".
In Muvala, F, op.cit. p. 35.
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Catholic Church, writes Braeckman, estimated that it had found in Mutara Rudahigwa, 'a new
Constantine'. The feast during which Mutara was awarded the Highest decoration, "the
Commander of Saint Gregoire", lasted three days379.
III.6.4. The Protestant Revival: the Fire of Timidity
Tornado, the Catholic mass movement of conversions had its counter-part in the Protestant
missions, Revival, in the words of Osborn, the "fire in the hills, the Revival that spread from
Rwanda". The Revival arose in the 1930s from the stations of Rwandan Mission, namely
Gahini, and spread around Rwanda, south and east Africa and was even exported to Europe
and some other regions in the world. In the course of the revival process many converts
confessed and repented of their "ethnic group's attitudes", thus opening the way to
brotherhood in the missionary stations. A strong partnership arouse which allowed the
spreading of the Revival380.
The new converts had managed with little success to challenge the missionaries to accord
their deeds with their teachings. They felt that the missionaries should be the first to respect
the values of the Gospel, and not to teach love while practising discrimination against their
fellow Christian Africans. They also wanted missionaries to attack the feudal, social and
political injustices as well as colonialism. In that, the abaka (those who shine, name given to
the 'brethren') became dangerous for both the chiefs who abused peasantry, the Catholic
accused of being 'superficial' in their teaching and their own missionaries whom they judged
with the norms they set up.
For the missionaries who had thought the movement would be restricted to attack the 'pagan'
practices of prophetess Nyabingi, this enlargement of spiritual scale to the whole society was
unacceptable. Dr Church who was a leading figure of the pietist line in the Revival, put it as
follows: "Abaka (the new converts) were beginning to subject our lives to a searching light,
judging us by the standards we set for them".381 This enlargement of spiritual standards to the
whole society, according to Linden, was unacceptable to the CMS missionaries. They had
only meant evil to be treated in a private, individual, familial context382.
Considered in context, the absence of high stance for social justice from the Protestants has a
number of inner causes. First, the SBMPC which inherited the Bethel missions suffered two
major handicaps: on the one hand, the lack of material and human resources and, on the other
hand, the absence of missionary experience. In 1921 there was no single mission ready to
accept a position in Rwanda.Two or three persons from other different countries were being
sponsored in missionary positions in Congo (Zaire) with money collected directly from
179 Braeckman,C., Terreur Africaine. Burundi. Rwanda. Zaire. Les Racines de la Violence. Paris: Fayard, 1996, p.
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parishes among small workers, miners and peasants. Nobody was interested in overseas
action. All the ministers in the Protestant Church in Belgium were foreigners: French,
Swiss, Dutch.
In fact, Protestant evangelisation in Belgium was recent; it started from the second half
of the 19th century. Hence, the first volunteers to depart for Rwanda had completed their
primary school- Arthur Lestrade- Josue Honore383. The first graduate missionaries to join the
mission field work were pastor Edgard Durand, from Switzerland who arrived in 1924 and
later, pastor Huart from Belgium in 1932. This explains why as far as 1950s the education
system in the Protestant Churches, had not risen above its primary level384.
From the Church Missionary Society side, one can see two dimensions. In fact, Revival
emphasised two principles: First, the cross as the basis of Christian faith, the beginning of a
new fellowship where there is no White no Black. Second, it emphasised separateness from
the world together with the idea of holiness. According to Catherine Robin, fellowship was
the essential means for the group boundaries. In it the members shared their spiritual life
through personal testimonies; it was a condition for salvation extended to 'sanctification' after
personal holiness and release from sin, the very condition to receive the incorporation into a
fellowship of the 'saved', the brethren.385
This pietist theology caused open conflict between the 'brethren' and the 'un-saved', clergy
and laity. The second line of division was the emphasis on the withdrawal from economic
and social issues considered as the worldliness of the 'un-saved'386. This led many
missionaries to resist sharing a platform with some of their colleagues they considered as not
'born-again'(not brethren); to refuse co-operation with those they believed were not in
continuing "brokenness and daily repentance"; they also would firmly oppose what they
called 'modernism and ritualism'387.
For the whole Protestant family in Rwanda, another difficulty was the sectarian attitude
among the missionaries. According to Smith, the English missionaries (CMS-Ruanda
Mission) were regarded with strong suspicion by their colleagues for "being sacerdotal, self-
383 Butselaar & Twagirayesu. op.cit. P.86.
384 In comparison, the Catholics schools of the same level as Protestants were extremely impeccable, with new
buildings well maintained, update pedagogic material. All that was subsidised by the Belgian government. On the
national level, up to 1950s, there was a single public school, the Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida designed to train pupils
from the secondary school of level D3, D4 and D5 to upper level. Managed by the brothers of Charity, the
Protestants were discriminated against. The selection exam included some criteria that could be considered as
'not-cultural'. Protestants were excluded by the Fathers on the claim that their presence ruined the confessional
homogeneity of the school. The changes came following the visit of a Belgian inspector, Martial Faidherbe who
disclosed the violation of the liberty of conscience. Negotiations took place that persuaded the government to offer
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1996).
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sufficient and patronising". This was part of an iceberg of the divisions within the metropolis
of the mother-mission introduced in the new mission fields. Yet, the difficulty delayed the
organisation of ecumenical meetings of evangelisation which were planned with the intention
to perpetuate the spirit of the 1930s Revival388. Bowen pursues this line of thinking when he
recently admitted that the missionaries reproduced the division of the metropolis Church, the
lower and the High Church in the missionary field389.
Clearly, such a background of internal tensions and suspicions among Protestants did not not
leave room for credible witness in society. However, it may be too simplistic to draw a direct
parallel between this visible weakness of Rwandan Protestantism and the 1994 tragedy. In
fact, there have been thoughts on whether the Revival, if it had been an authentic Christian
movement, Churches should have stopped the 1994 Rwandan tragedy. Some people have
even drawn a comparison with the Churches of Uganda390 where they think, Christians had
stood firmly against the dictators like Idi Amin Dada (1971-1979).
Like in the case of the Jewish holocaust391 or other similar tragedies, the problem of
massacres and genocide wherever there happen are horrendous example of mass slaughter,
inhumanity and evil. They call on different factors: religico-mythic interpretation of social
reality; local or foreign conspiracy; estrangement of the population from each other. To stop
it, there must be a wider awareness and co-operation both locally and internationally which
has been missing in Rwandan Christianity.
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Churches. Geneva: WCC, 1997. A comparative study of the genocides of Armenians 1915, Jewish Holocaust,
Sudan, Rwanda, Palestine/Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka. A similar propaganda has been developed by the authors
of the Rwandan genocide as discussed in chapter five.
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Considered from the angle of pietist theology opposing aspects of life like formal theological
training, secular cultural activities, involvement in politics and public life, the Revival ethos
must be revisited so as to show what Christian life is all about. It seems, from the point of
view of this thesis that, a number of aspects drawn from the Bible ethos must be emphasised
as core principles of any Christian movement, even Revival:
a theology of Creation underlining the fact that human being is the very image of God; an
ethical code founded on the ten Commandments; the theology of the prophets who always
took position in favour of the poor and the oppressed; a Christological theology showing how
the compassionate Christ became servitor up to the cross; an ecclesiological theology which
call Christians to remember that they belong to a same organic body, social and spiritual and
ought to remain in solidarity whether in joy or suffering.
III.7. Church and State Relations
Though visited by European explorers in 1892, Rwanda was only evangelised from 1900.
From then on the two powers, the Catholic Church and the colonial powers (Germany and
later Belgium) had developed a close co-operation in various domains which, from the
perspective of this chapter and the precedent as well as the next, present the potential for a
double colonisation. Firstly, together, the two powers reinforced the power of King Musinga
against many revolts, in the north and east and put the political and economical institutions in
the hands of the social group, the Batutsi nobility392. The two powers collaborated in
ironically, deposing the same King Musinga and in naming his successor. Equally, they
collaborated in the recuperation of the Gisaka district from the British empire393.
In the distribution of roles the Church assumed the monopoly in the social services,
education, health with the full support of the colonial state. Then the two powers pursued a
close co-operation in urging the chiefs to convert to Catholicism, one of the criterion in the
selection of a chief or sub-chief. Equally, the Church and colonial power co-operated in
pushing the chiefs to execute unpopular measures such as the physical punishment, the
infamous ikiboko (chicot: number of lashes ascribed to persons who were beaten publicly
and sometimes being ascribed to undergo the same pain for several days).
The collaboration of the Church with State, both the Court and the colonial administration
was is an area through which we perceive the high influence of the clergy of the structures,
392
Mugesera,Antoine.,(no relations with Leon Mugesera, referred to in this work as author of the inflammatory
speech in Kabaya, November 1992). "Les Relations Eglises-Etat, Avant, Pendant et Apres le genocide", Lecture in
Conference The Role of the Churches in Conflict Prevention. Human Rights and Peace Keeping. Kigali,
September 1997.
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the policy decision-makers. For example, in early 1930's, Father Schumacher chaired a group
of chiefs and sub-chiefs who regularly discussed topics of a socio-political relevance with the
full support of King Rudahigwa who urged them to "work in union with missionaries"394.
Rudahigwa himself "often went to Kabgayi to consult the bishop and acted publicly in the
ways pleasing to the White Fathers". A letter of Governor Jungers to bishop Classe shows
clearly to what extend the Catholic Church has been assimilated not only as the Court's but
also the colonial power's religion: "car permettez-moi de vous le dire sans flagornerie, vous
etes pour moi un exemple de noblesse veritable et d'aimable distinction"395. For all these
reasons it is important not to dissociate the Catholic Church from its colonial environment.
De Heusch puts it as follows:
To tell the truth, the church was the main beneficiary of a colonisation which lacked an economic
advantage, Catholic mission proliferated on he hills together with a small number of Protestants from
their monopoly on an education which required conversion to Christianity as its Prince. It was the
church that imposed the choice of a young prince, strictly supervising his education to succeed King
Musinga, who was deposed in 1931 because he was hostile to colonisation. The Church rapidly became
a considerable moral and political force. It triumphed in 1946 when its pupil, enthroned under the name
of Mutara, dedicated Rwanda to Christ the king396.
As underlined in this passage, the Church earned a total freedom to evangelise or to install
various institutions. The Catholic Church had not only networks of social services, but a huge
influence vis-a-vis political power. Father Sibomana, director for ten years of the Weekly
Catholic Newspaper Kinyamateka, described the dominance of the Catholic Church in terms
of control of political power and resources, both in the pre and post-independence period.
'The Catholic Church', he said, "was the first beneficiary of the evolution. Under the authority
of Mgr Classe, it became the first Power in the land; the first employer, the first landowner,
the first purveyor in education and health care; as ecclesial institution, it developed in a
perfect harmony with the colonial authority. The Church in Rwanda, was beyond any
imaginable proportions in comparison with what was happening in other colonies, that
because Belgium is a Catholic monarchy"397.
This remark corresponds to the observation of Father Schonecke about the huge network of
institutions and services owned by the Church as well as the political influence it had during
the post-independence period (section 5.1.2.). Would that huge influence had been used to
promote justice and mercy that many inhuman acts of the dictatorial regime should have been
disclosed, even opposed. Instead, the Church's closeness with the structures of unjust
colonial and monarchical organisations deprived it of the means to be the Koinonia, the
community of sharing and communion.
393The activism of Mgr Classe in Belgium was "rewarded" by being appointed bishop (1922); he then returned to
Rwanda where he had been forced to leave in 1920, in particular, because of poor relations with his
colleagues.Rumiya,J., op.cit.p. 136.
394
Linden, I&J., op.cit. p. 195.
395 Ibid. p. 189
396 De Heusch, L, 1995, p.4.
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Sibomana,A., Gardons Espoir pour le Rwanda. Entretiens avec Laure Guilbert et Herve Deguine. Paris:
Descllee de Brouwer, 1997, p. 137.
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III.8. The Shifting of Alliances and Allegiances
During the 1950s following the awake for independence on the Africa continent, the political
developments tended towards polarisation. Many different forces present in the land, the
colonial authorities, the missionaries, the newly formed political parties, the United Nations,
intervened with different motives and strategies. The discussions in the precedent chapter
outlined the role of the UN and political groups. The following sections look at the position
of the Churches during that period.
III.8.1. The Catholic Hierarchy
The ethnicising of society under the theories of race supremacy dramatically affected the
mentalities of some local elite. The latter would interpret their history through that
prism.This tendency toward sectarianism continued in the period surrounding the
proclamation of the independence and after. This was expressed in the petition of the Bahutu
of March 1957 and the energetic reaction of the entourage of the Mwami published in May
1958. These counterattacked using the myth of ibimanuka (those who descended from sky)
which had been the core of Kagame's Hamite supremacy theory. As indicated in chapter two,
there is a corresponding moral between the Hamite myth and the myth of ibimanuka, founded
mainly on the justification of the fraud of any dominant group being local or expatriate398.
In response to this polarisation, the Catholic Church broke the silence. Mgr A. Bigirumwami,
in an article published in 1958 in Temoignage Chretien, acknowledged the foundation of the
Bahutu demands of reforms. He, however regretted that the Batutsi were made scape-goats of
the discrimination and exclusion of the Bahutu which were rather the fault of the colonial
administration. With examples, including his own case, he challenged whoever would be able
to distinguish "who was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa among the mixed populations of Buganza,
Gisaka, Gitarama, Nyanza, Kabagari, Butare, Gikongoro, Cyangugu".
On the other side, Mgr Perraudin, Primate of the Church from 1956, published a Pastoral in
Lent 1959 in which he affirmed that "there existed different races " in Rwanda and regretted
that privileges had been given or refused according to being member of one or another 'race
Constatons tout d'abord qu'il y a reellement au Rwanda plusieurs races assez nettement caracterisees
bien que des alliances entre elles aient eu lieu et ne permettent pas de dire toujours a quelle race tel
individu appartient. Cette diversite de races dans un meme pays est un fait normal contre lequel
d'ailleurs nous ne pouvons rien ... Dans notre Ruanda, les differences et les inegalites sociales sont pour
une grande part, liees aux differences de races, en ce sens que les riches d'une part, et le pouvoir
politique et meme judiciaire d'autre part, sont en realite en proportion considerable entre les mains de
gens d'une meme race... Cette loi demande que les institutions d'un pays soient telles qu'elles assurent
reellement a tous ses habitants et a tous les groupes sociaux legitimes, les memes droits fondamentaux et
les memes possibilites d'ascension humaine et de participation aux affaires publiques399.
Perraudin referred to the existence of 'races caracterisees' though the mixtures between the
populations prevent distinguishing who belongs to which race. He showed that privileges
have been accorded to one 'race'. However, he never regretted the past responsibility of the
398 See chapter two, section II.4.2.
399
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Church in shaping the differences and in imposing the monopoly of privileges in favour of
the Batutsi to the detriment of the Bahutu. It was clearly a discourse of Pilate.
In fact, Perraudin's position has been one of the most controversial episodes of the history of
the Church. But it must be remembered that many other members of the clergy including
Mgr. Deprimoz, Perraudin's predecessor in Kabgayi, S.Bourguet, Canon Ernote, Fathers
Dejemmeppe, JMV Rusingizandekwe400 were among those who directly or indirectly
participated in promoting the ideas of social and political reforms in favour of the Bahutu.
With a new leadership which was free from Mgr. Classe's Batutsi complex401, the Church
opened its social and religious movements to the Bahutu elite and facilitated their encounter
with external streams of thinking402. Commenting on the revolution, Colonel Logiest said that
Mgr Perraudin imprinted a militant vision to the Church in favour of the Bahutu cause; he
"restored dignity to the Bahutu people as children of God"403.
However, many other questions remained unanswered in that shift of alliance: Having
redesigned Rwandan society as inhabited by different" races" and at the same time belonged
to the side of the rulers, why did the Church leaders change their alliances without
apologising for their previous compromising relations? Why did the Church, after committing
itself to working for social justice, kept quiet when its former proteges became victims of the
new oppressors, the former oppressed. Finally, why did the Church uncritically sponsored the
new republican regime ?
Discussing the factors that led the Catholic Church to change its position in favour of the
Bahutu, Linden shows that the alliance of the Church with the Batutsi vanished gradually
from 1945 onwards. First with Mgr. Deprimoz from 1945 up to 1955, and then with Mgr
Perraudin who, from 1956, urged the Church and the missionaries to be committed to the
"obligation of social justice". Linden adds a poignant point : Perraudin himself was not a
radical reformer, nor a pro-Hutu who threw in hell the Church pro-Tutsi tendencides. The
400 Some accounts have suggested that either Canon Ernotte or Father Dejemmeppe, or all together were the true
authors of the 1957 Petition of the Bahutu leaders. I have raised the question with Professor D'Hertefelt who at the
time was observer of the changes taking plance as ethnologist and sociologist. He rejects the idea. However, he
does not deny a moral inspiration these ecclesial authorities should have played. D'Hertefelt underlined an
argument which the present writer shares: Kayibanda and others like Munyangaju had sufficient academic
credentials to write a paper of the kind and had proved from early 1950s to be intellectually sharper.
41,1 The dynamics generated by the arrival in early 1950s of a new generation of catholic clergy influenced by the
liberal syndicate and the socio-Christian movements in Europe was decisive in putting the Church in touch with
the reality of the masses. The era coincided with the designation of a local clergy including Mgr. Bigirumwami,
the first African bishop in the former Belgian colonies, ordained in 1952
402
Kayibanda, future president was leader of several catholic movements: JOC, Legion de Marie, AMR, AAS,
Trafipro. As president of Joe he participated in its world Congress in Brussels, in 1950. Editor of Ami (1953/54)
a newspaper created by the chancellor of Kabgayi diocese, father Boutry. Editor of Kinyamateka (beginning of
1955). September 1957 to November 1958 he sojourned in Belgium for a practice in 'Vers l'Avenir' Newspaper in
Tournai. In the same period, Munyangaju, leader of Aprosoma spent a year of practice in " La cite de Bruxelles".
They made friends who supported the independent Rwanda.
Paternostre de la Mairieu.B., Toute Ma Vie Pour Vous Mes Freres. Gregoire Kavibanda. Premier President du
Rwanda. Paris : Pierre Tequi, 1994. PP 84-118.
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divorce, he argues came really later with the political developments when in 1959, Mgr.
Perraudin issued the infamous message404.
But even there I.Linden rightly comments, "it would be easy to point to Perraudin's
consecration as inaugurating a volte-face in the Church handling of the Hutu -Tutsi conflict".
But then who is to be blamed for the brokenness of the relationships? I.Linden is inclined to
impute responsibility on the Batutsi ruling class: "the moment the ruling class realised, it
could no longer make use of the Churche's influence to defend its privileges, the conflict was
born"405.
Linden is right to underline the gradual erosion of the alliance. He is also right to underline
the strong reference on the need for social justice in the message of Mgr Perraudin. Yet, the
Pimate's communication needed a supplement which did not come: the self-criticism of the
Church about its past choices in favour of the ruling class as well as its role in the promoting
of race supremacy ideology. It seems, from the perspective of this thesis that in addition to
this petition for social justice, the Church hierarchy foresaw the necessity of anticipating the
events so as to keep its influence on political arena. In fact, if, after the Second World War,
the White Fathers paid more attention to the Bahutu evolues, there was a hierarcy's fear for
losing the dominant position in the inevitable forthcoming changes.
To accurately assess the motives of Mgr Perraudin's message, one must use the same
parameters of possession and control of power in society. Having described the Banyarwanda
in the missionary ethnography outlined before: the 'born-rulers', inclined to 'dominate', and
the 'docile vassals', there is a sense that firstly, the Catholic hierarchy's endorsement of the
Bahutu cause, was an attempt to find an alternative, much more flexible; and secondly, they
wanted to exorcise the conception and misconception they had adopted of Rwandan
society406. Actually, from then on the Catholic Church became the sponsor of the Republican
regimes, in a fractured society.
This argument can be pushed furthermore to explore {explain} the causes behind the change
of attitude of Mgr Perraudin, who, as Linden indicates, was not, in the first instance, a "man
of the Bahutu" under another angle: to adapt so as to remain in control. In fact, within the
Catholic Church, many voices were starting to attack its past ambivalent role. For Father P.
Mosmans, for example, in that beginning of political movements, the Church ought to have
manifested its total independence from temporal power. For him, these aspirations of the
404 In 1954, Mwami Rudahigwa attempted to abolish the Ubuhake institution, but was opposed by Belgians who
were "frightened of the effects of widespread dissolution of clientship ties". In the same year, the king clashed
with the Church on his idea of having a lay School which has been approved by the Superior Council of the
Country. The Church issued a pastoral letter "defending the Church's right and mandate to educate". The ecclesial
hierarchy hardened its position, i.e in dismissing and laicising Father T. Ngirumpatse seen as an advocate of the
king.
41,5
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Black people would provoke friction sooner or later against the established authorities. The
Church ought to be above these oppositions and possible conflicts407.
In fact, Perraudin's message was not an isolated act. To anticipate and contain the impact of
the stream of emancipation which was being supported by the UN and the non-aligned
movement408, the Catholic hierarchy from the Belgian Colonies met in Leopoldville (today
Kinshasa) in June 1956 to reflect on the future of the Church-state relations. In the following
year, a pastoral was published by the bishops of Ruanda-Urundi. The message was then
adapted and published in Rwanda at Lent by Archbishop, Perraudin409.
For those who suffered injustices, marginalisation and frustration, the Church move was
extraordinarily liberating. Yet a grey area, the absence of confession of guilt and repentance
remained an unresolved equation. Obviously, dealing with these concepts requires the
courage to humbly face up to the humiliation; it can not be a simple evocation of an incident.
Dealing with confession and repentance, is often an uncomfortable process that implies
radical change of behaviour and eventually loss of power, prestige and privileges in the
necessary process of restitution. The Church was not yet ready to depart from such a
dominant position. It even maintained it in the Republican regimes.
III.8.2. The Protestants
The dynamics for political and social change in the 1950s did not waken the Protestants from
their political apathy. Except for some few initiatives in the domain of humanitarian
assistance, Protestants have remained outside the political debate. Smith, Osborn, J.E.
Church, Patricia St John and others report the welcome that was extended to members of the
court and the ruling class in the Protestant missions of Gahini, Shyira and Kigeme during the
1959 revolution. They were sheltered, and even convoyed to the borders with Uganda and
Burundi whose governments manifested the intention to accept unarmed refugees410. In
general, the humanitarian assistance offered by the Protestant missionaries to the Batutsi
refugees and the displaced has been interpreted by the chroniclers of the spiritual revival not
as an expression of the theology of the Church but uniquely, as the result of the Revival
movement.
Unlike the Catholic hierarchy who attempted a reflection on the 'post-collaborationism1, the
Protestant remained politically inactive even making remarks in which they showed their
incapacity of reading the signs of times. In 1959, the CMS conceived no other future than the
Batutsi dominated rule: "they have an innate capacity to rule born of centuries of experience.
407 Ibid. p.97.
408
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41(1 St John, P.. Breath of Peace. The Story of Rwanda Mission. London: the Norfolk Press. 1971, pp. 200-212.
Cf. also Church, J., Forgive them. The story of an African Martyr. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966. This
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Will it be selfish, domineering, cruel and corrupt as in the past, or will it be in the highest
interests of all, enlightened and pure"4".
However, in this habitual low profile, a voice among the Protestants was raised by the young
Rwandan Synod of the Presbyterian Church. The latter sent a message of comfort and
sympathy to its believers. The authorities of the SBMPC (the mother mission which had
given the autonomy to the young Church some months earlier) were impressed by the
maturity and the consistency of the messages of the Synod which comforted the Christians
after the November 1959 uprisings. The authors of the 1959 SBMPC report commented:
Une vague d'epreuves et de tentation a deferle sur les Chretiens, et ses flots ont balaye ou assailli les
consciences. Alors que beaucoup etaient menaces de se laisse entrame par la haine, 1'esprit de rapine ou
de discorde, les Anciens ont rappele a tous, avec une fermete pas toujours apprecie de certains, que le
Christ est le seul chef des fideles, et que ceux-ci ne peuvent avoir qu'une preoccupation essentielle: lui
obeir412.
Such a message fed a powerful feeling among members of the young Church. Some other
aspects to consider include its impact due to the fact that as the then Belgian Governor,
colonel Logiest, has suggested, "the Catholic Church was the sole Church which really
counted", meaning that any other positions had little chance to impress the authorities and to
reach the majority of the population. Additionally, the message avoided clear condemnation
of past injustices and the system which generated them. The Church tried to avoid
confrontation with the authorities and public condemnation Obviously, most of the shame
falls on the missionaries who had the Church in their hands. Even the newly autonomous
Presbyterian Church office was still run by Pasteur Phildius from Switzerland413. The
missionaries had failed to prepare an African leadership capable of taking over in due time.
Dr Osborn who was missionary of CMS- Rwanda-Mission in Rwanda at the time put it as
follows:
There was not, however, a comparable public condemnation of ethnic discrimination and violence by
Rwanda church leaders. Was this a failure of the Church? Part of the explanation may be that the
leadership of the church was still in missionary hands. The condemnation and protest which was made,
was in the name of the mission and directed towards the Belgian authorities who appeared to allow, if
not actually support, the uprising. There were not, therefor, any Protestant Christian African in
sufficiently senior positions to be able to speak in the name of the Church to the African authorities.
Whatever may have been the reasons for this silence, many consider the Rwanda church to be the weaker
because of it414.
As it turned out, the Protestant missionaries who, at the time hold the destiny of the Churches
in their hands were the products of the 1930s Spiritual Revival. Many were laypersons, in
general medical or educationist practitioners while, as indicated in Osborn's passage, none
among the local Christian leaders was capable to assume a national and international
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the political problems to the ethical theology of the Church. As it has been always, they
remained absent in the debate of political changes.
III.8.3. Leadership Selection on Ethnic Lines
The absence of an outspoken Christian leadership during the 'transitional period' has
remained an outstanding issue in the post-independence period. While during the colonial
era, the leaders were Europeans working together with the Batutsi chiefs, towards the
autonomy of the churches and the country, there was a shift in favour of the Bahutu. Within
the Catholic Church, Mgr Aloys Bigirumwami, the first African bishop in the Belgian
colonies (1952), a highly respected personality in both communities, was not named
archbishop. Rather it was his youngest colleague whom he had ordained in 1956, Mgr
Perraudin, who was named archbishop, Primate of the Church. Though, Mgr Perraudin was a
very able leader, it seems that judged from the angle of 'indigenisation', this nomination was a
political coup repeting the 1922 Mgr Classe's precedent who was rewarded for his political
activism in favour of the colonial policies. Likewise, when new positions became available in
the Church with the gradual creation of new dioceses, many very able priests including
Father Kagame, who was regarded by the White Fathers as 'closer to Nyanza than to Rome',
were not selected, simply because they did not belong to the ethnic group of the new political
rulers.
Similarly, with the Anglican Church, when the first diocese covering Rwanda was
created, in 1965, though the Church had a few number of priests trained in Mukono
seminary (Uganda), it was the least competent of the three candidates, A.
Sebununguri, a former missionary-aide who was selected because of his Bahutu
background415. In the other Protestant denominations either, the leadership was
selected on ethnic line rather than competence. Hence, the Churches set up a model
which implicitly implied revenge and reinforced the fracture of society. There is a
sense that missionaries wanted to have 'successful collaboration' between Churches
and State in planning to hand the leadership to Church leaders 'ethnically' acceptable
in the eyes of the new rulers; but then, as discussed in section IV.5.2., such a strategy
produced unpleasant situation, the absence of credible hierarchy to challenge unjust
regime.
Conclusion: Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa
Offspring of Kanyarwanda, Children of God
The conception of society by Christian missions considered in this chapter has been
essentially marked by the Hamite theory. From the perspective of this thesis, the
Hamite theory must be questioned from all its assumptions. Firstly, it has been shown
that many scholars have dismissed the differentiation of the population based on
physical anthropology.
415 Gatwa,T.,& Karamaga., 1990
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Secondly, with regard to the Hamites considered by Seligman as the 'White
Caucasian'(Batutsi, Ethiopian, Nilotic), Ki-Zerbo is right to remark that, except for some pre-
historical mixtures, otherwise available in different other places like Spain or south Italy- and
otherwise overwhelmingly acknowledged by the Bible with regard to intermarriages between
Jewish people with Africans, particularly in ancient Egypt - nothing really distinguishes them
from the Negro-Africans. Scientific studies, have demonstrated that many somatic features
were exaggerated such as the blackness of the skin and the tightness of the waist or
brightness416.
Regarding the introduction of the socio-political institutions, it would be simplistic to
attribute the long process of their forming to a 'super-race', the Hamites (Pastoralists) who
would have brought them from Asia. De Lacger, and after him Vansina, have shown that the
core of these institutions, including the ritual esoteric code of the central Kingdom, was
borrowed from the 'Negro-Bantu' socio-political organisations. Ki-Zerbo may be right again
when, in an energetical rejection of the theory, says that the "Hamite hypothesis must be
classified into the museum of the prejudices fabricated by colonialists"417. Nevertheless, the
implications of the theory would not be exorcised until its victims were rehabilitated to enjoy
their rights as images of God.
Concerning the cows, many different archaeological discoveries, in particular the team of La
Roche and Doutrepont, have confirmed the researches of the 1930s and 1950s that the bovine
and diverse technologies existed in Rwanda in various places, 700 years before Christ,
th
compared to the Hamites who would have arrived after the 13 century of our era418. In
addition, unlike Maquet's affirmations, at the beginning of the century, many Batutsi were
tillers of the land and many Bahutu were cow herders.419
At this stage, this author is convinced that Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa were all social
categories, descendant of the same ancestor Kanyarwanda; that they spread in the
interlacustrine region moving away from a central point for different reasons; they would
have kept their common language, the cultural, religious and social organisation but
eventually adapted their political institutions? They all remained the children of God, created
in His image.
This chapter has also aimed at showing that there has been a meta-narrative common to the
explorers, colonial and missionary authorities which divinised the Hamites, fixed Rwandans
in stereotypes and estranged them from one another. That said, the geo-political
416Ki-Zerbo, op.cit. p.25.
417 Ibid. p.307.
418 The team of archaeologist comprised Marie-Claude van Brunderbeek, Emile Roche, Huges Doutrepont and van
Grunderbeek. The study showed that there existed in Rwanda an elaborated technique of casting iron in 7th
century before Christ; that the population practised agro-pastoral activities and had cattle and hoes (p.46). These
discoveries, in particular, confirmed the discoveries made by J. Boutakoff in 1936 at Ruhimandyarya; the
archaeological discoveries of Hiernaux at Ndora and Cyamakuza (Hiernaux, 1957); the discoveries of van Noten at
Kabuye and Gisagara (Van Noten, 1972). See Muzungu, B., 'Ethnies et Clans'. In Cahier du Centre ST
Dominique. Aout 1995, pp.19-51.
419 D' Hertefelt, 1971, p.75.
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developments which followed the collapse of the colonial empire have resuscitated the
Panafrican dream of the Fathers of the independence with possibilities of trans-nationality,
and the reinvention of a continent capable of sustaining responsibly its future. But at the
same time, the absence of a project of reconciliation and the attempt made by the refugees to
return by force have nurtured the old suspicions of Batutsi supremacy, or the 'Hamite empire'.
This leaves us with the potential to restart from where we were in 1900. The Hamite myth
has become an issue for Christian ethics and mission study. It raises the questions like how to
help people collect credible sources of history and interpret them accurately? There has been
an emphasis deliberately put on the ethnicising of the clan institution so as to clearly
highlight the problem of existence and life-history of the Rwandans. The clans with their
history and social significance were people's identity; there was no such thing as the history
or meaning of the 'Hamites' or 'ethnic groups' or 'race' or 'caste' in Rwandan common social
relations of Bahutu,Batutsi and Batwa. However, a question mark remains of knowing if the
world-wide Church as well as the Churches of Rwanda feel any form of guilt to confess and
repent for their responsibility in the promotion of the Hamite theory?
The ethnicising of society has reached a stage where it means for some that the Other is a
foreigner, a dangerous rival to be eliminated. How then to assert towards the political,
military and religious forces that the emergence of a human being on the planet was a project
essentially historical and divine, created in the image of God and called to participate in His
divine plan for Humanity?
How to ensure that during their temporal passage on earth, human beings put social, political
and cultural organisations and the ideologies on the service of other human beings, for their
life and dignity? God, the Bible says, instituted a fundamental principle of liberty and dignity
but also of responsibility and mutual interdependence. In our relations with others we earn
something absolutely new and indispensable for our existence for which we owe a debt
towards others and towards our Creator? Whether or not the post-independence leading
forces, including the Churches, took that seriously, is discussed in the next chapter.
117
Chapter IV: CHURCHES: A QUIESCENT PRESENCE
1960 TO 1990'S.
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have discussed the role of the Hamite myth in the shaping of
ethnicity in Rwanda during the colonial period. It has been shown that as ideology, it justified
the supremacy of the colonisers over the indigenous population and promoted the supremacy
of the Batutsi over the Bahutu420. As such, the ideology was a tool for domination in the
hands of the three powers, the colonisers, the Church and the monarch together with his
entourage, the akazu k'i bwami421. It has been suggested that following the political and
cultural developments in the 1950s, the colonisers and the missionaries abandoned their
former proteges, the Batutsi and promoted new masters, the Bahutu.
During the post-independence period, the myth of supremacy was kept alive in the first
instance, to hide the monopoly of power, and then, to overshadow nepotism, ethnic and
regionalist discriminations and human rights abuse. This continued through the promotion of
the 'Rubanda nyamwinshi' (the rule of the majority), a counter-version of the Batutsi-
supremacy ideology which, for almost thirty years, kept the Batutsi in a marginalised state,
often exhuming the 'undying Batutsi's domination' tendency to justify all forms of
discrimination and violence.
Another new phenomenon to look at is the emergence of a "divine monarch", President
Habyarimana who would claim to be the patriarch of all Rwandans, the « Father of the
Nation »('Umubyeyi w'i Gihugu') through his ruling party, the MRND. As in a feudal state,
his entourage, the so-called, akazu k'i Bushiru (the Bushiru's household) as opposed to akazu
k'i bwami (the monarchical household) became more powerful than any of the legal
institutions. Just as in pre-colonial Rwanda, this process of sacralisation and divination
together with the propaganda of the regime aimed to shape the image of a unique and
invincible ruler. This chapter hopes also to examine first of all, how the new mlers
perpetuated the ideology of race supremacy with the implicit support of the Church
hierarchies. In fact, the latter had became quiescent in the midst of this turbulent period.
Some of them remained silent; others colluded with the regime proclaiming 'peace', 'peace'
(Jer.6.11) and congratulating the government while Human rights were abused to a
considerable degree. Secondly, we will see how the policy of ethnic and regionalist
discrimination was perpetuated in different institutions including the army, education, the
ruling party and in administration. Lastly, the chapter will discuss how the Churches and
Christians were enrolled in the process of legitimising the regime and the factors which made
the Churches unable to confront the appalling record of human rights abuse.
420
Maquet, J., Power and Society in Africa , New York: McGrawan-Hill: World University Library, 1971
421
Louis, R., Rwanda-Burundi: 1884-1919, London: Oxford University Press/ Clarence Press, 1963
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IV.1. The Shadow of the Hamite Myth
Chapter One discussed the two predominant stands in analysing the rise of ethnicity as a tool
of violence on the Africa continent; the 'primordialist' hypothesis, i.e. the existence of ethnic
rivalry in pre-colonial state and the 'instrumentalist' hypothesis which claims that ethnic
rivalry was a creation of colonial and post-independence rulers. The perspective of this thesis
as expressed in Chapters two and three is based on the evidence offered that Rwandan
ethnicity emerged out of the passion for ethnicism and tribalism expressed by the
ethnologists and ethno - politicians against the aspirations for equality and dignity for all
human beings.422 Different actors, ancient and new have continued to manipulate the feelings
of the population through the use of new versions of race supremacy myth. This was used as
a diversion to hide the monopoly of power and to cover up diverse forms of discrimination
against a large fraction of the population. Representatives from both Bahutu and Batutsi
groups became alternatively oppressors; yesterday's oppressed became the oppressors of
today, perpetuating what L. Ntezimana described as the 'mother-violence' and the 'counter-
violence' 423.
According to Nkunzumwami the Rwandan conflict resulted from three factors: ethnic rivalry,
regional nepotism and poverty424. He rightly pointed out the fact that 'ethnic conflict' was an
artificial creation of the regimes to hide regionalist, political and economic egoism and greed.
The clique that clung on to power used to manipulate these regional rivalries and ethnicity to
counteract the consequences of the eventual reactions of the impoverished population. Yet, in
restricting the explosion of the conflict to three factors: poverty, ethnicity and regionalism
Nkunzumwami's analysis may fall prey to the Bayart's 'politics of the belly' thus failing to
draw the link between the national and international determinants of the crisis.
According to Claudine Vidal whose findings were based on a ten years in a field research in
the Butare region, the planting and cultivation of social antagonisms which exploded in
'racial hatred' during the civil war from 1959 onwards were less rife and ripe among the
422
Vidal, C., La Sociologie des Passions. Cote d'lvoire. Rwanda , Paris: Karthala, 1991. On Kagame influence,
see also d'Hertefelt, 1971, Les Clans du Rwanda Ancien. Elements d'Ethnohistoire et d'Ethnosociologie.
Tervuren: MRAC, 1971, p. 27/28.
423 Camara, H., Spiral of Violence. London, Sheed and Ward, 1975. Ntezimana proposes the reading of the
history of violence in the last three decades in Rwanda as follows:
-Up to 1959: Mother violence: the Hutu and petit Tutsi were oppressed
- 1959-1962: Counter-violence of the Hutu who confuse the oppressor with the Tutsi ethnic group despite the fact
that the Tutsi were oppressed like him
- 1963-1967: Counter-violence of the Tutsi which never reached its objective but never gave up
- 1962-1990: the oppressed Hutu became the oppressor and transformed his victorious counter-violence into the
mother-violence.
- 1.10.1990 to March 1994: counter-violence of the Tutsi and of the Hutu oppressed like him
-7.4.1994: The mother-violence reached the intolerable: the genocide.
- July 1994: the counter-violence of the Tutsi reached its objective. Ntezimana, L., "Appeler les Rwandais a la
Disenversion". In Dialogue nO 182. Bruxelles, Avril 1995, pp 21-35.
424
Nkunzumwami,E., La Tragedie Rwandaise. Historique et Perspective. Paris: l'Harmattan: 1996.
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Bahutu and Batutsi population in rural areas than among the elites. These constituted what
she called the "fourth ethnic group"425.
The perpetuation of such social antagonisms continued during the 1990's crises.
B.Ruhumuriza, author of a small pamphlet, published in 1993 and widely distributed by the
extremist circles, argues that the ideology generated by the 1959 social revolution was not
taken seriously by through the Parmehutu regime. They slipped in the Bakiga-Banyanduga
conflict, thus leaving the ground opened to the Batutsi to carefully prepare their revenge426.
There was also more intellectual analyses made by many academics who thoroughly
investigated the literature of the exiles and their mentality. They claimed to detect there the
remnants of the myth of supremacy427. According to this tendency, the exile's attack against
the Habyarimana's regime purported to be about a poor record of human rights or the absence
of democracy was viewed rather as their hatred against the Republican institutions and the
Bahutu's allies, Mgr Perraudin, Colonel Logiest and J.P. Harroy.428
The thought behind this tendency is best represented in a letter written by 42 Rwandan
intellectuals of both Bahutu and Batutsi background from the University of Rwanda to the
President of Uganda in 1990, accusing him of supporting the RPF so as to build up a Hamite-
Batutsi/Hima empire in the interlacustrine region of Africa. The letter reads:
Faut-il croire a ce qu'on raconte, Excellence Monsieur le President que depuis votre prise de pouvoir a
Kampala, aide par les refugies Rwandais, vous nourrissez les ambitions d'etablir un empire 'Hamite'(
Tutsi/Hima) en Afrique centrale qui engloberait, outre l'Ouganda, le Rwanda, le Burundi, une partie de
la Tanzanie et la partie orientale du Zaire et que pour cela, il fallait d'abord aider les refugies Rwandais a
installer a Kigali un regime minoritaire d'obedience Tutsi?...En fait, que feriez-vous des autres ethnies
typiquement bantoues de la region, tels que les Baganda, les Baciga du Kigezi, les Bahutu du Rwanda et
du Burundi, etc.? Pourriez-vous les asservir ou les exterminer?429
The accusation against a so-called Museveni plan for a Hamite- Batutsi empire hiding behind
the RPF war has been a constant argument exploited by the regime of Habyarimana so as to
reject a peacefully negotiated solution with the rebellion. It served their purposes to picture
the Batutsi as irreducible monarchists and to pursue the polarisation of society. It is less
probable that all the Batutsi and Bahutu signed the documents of their own free will430. This
writer strongly believes many signed to save their lives to avoid being labelled traitor as it so
often happened to many who would not co-operate with the propagandists of the regime.
425 For Claudine Vidal, the 'fourth ethnic group', in opposition to the existing three groups, is the category of the
educated and evolues who used to project the present in the past, reproducing a mixture of history and myth
against their supposed rival members of other ethnic groups so as to secure their positions. This phenomenon is
valid during the colonial and post-independence period.
426B. Ruhumuriza., Renaissance Rwandaise , Kigali (publisher not mentioned ): 1993.
427Rumiya,J., "La Guerre d'octobre, une Agression premeditee pour la Reconquete du Pouvoir". In Bangamwabo
& al.. Les Relations Interethniques au Rwanda a la Lumiere de l'Agression d'Octobre 1990. p. 221/222. See also.
Gasana, J., "La Guerre, la Paix et la Democratic au Rwanda". In Guichoua, A., Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et
au Rwanda ( 1993-94). Paris: Karthala/ Universite de Lille, 1995, pp. 211-237.
42R
Bangamwabo & al., op.cit. pp 236/7.
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Rwagasana, A. & al., "Lettre Ouverte a Son Excellence Monsieur Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President de la
Republique de 1'Ouganda et Preesident en Exercice de 1'OUA ( Kigali, Novembre 1990)". In Guichoua, A., op.cit.
p. 603-604..
430 A significant number of them have since been slaughtered during the genocide which left more than 600 dead
on the university campus in Butare.
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However, this is not to suggest that the defenders of the Hamite supremacy myth have given
up; the nostalgic and lyric writings of Del Peruggia , and in his feet, Omer Marchal a former
colonial Administrator reminds how virulent those merchants of race ideologies still are
active431. What I am saying is that the persistence of these theories, has had impact on the
mentality of the apologists of the regime which incriminated all the Batutsi.
IV.2. The Sacralisation of African dictatorships
To understand the reasons behind what this work considers as the Church leaders' links with
the regime and their complacency vis-a-vis many of the practices of the military 'divine rule',
it is best to emphasise the recent historical and political developments in Africa and in
Rwanda. Three important moments dominate the recent history of politics in Sub- Sahara
Africa: the period of passion for independence; the eruption of military rule and the re-
democratisation era in the 1990s. The first period was dominated by the leaders who truly
believed in the mobilisation and capitalisation of human and material resources to politically
and intellectually rehabilitate the African continent. During the second period, from the late
1960s, the army erupted and interfered in politics. Habyarimana came to power in the early
1970s and, like his colleagues, most notably, Mobutu of Zaire and Eyadema of Togo, he
installed a 'monolithical' regime which formulated the mechanisms of dictatorships
including the single ruling party, the networks of violence and the purchase of the conscience
of the intellectuals and even the religious leaders. The last era, the 're-democratisation' in the
1990s characterised by the struggle for political pluralism 432 generated a spark of hope which
was soon extinguished by the forces of the corrupt regimes.
In fact, the absence of reaction from the Churches against the process of violence which
constitutes the main body of this chapter connects with the arbitrary nature of the declining
colonial rule and the global imbalance in the control of knowledge and influence of opinion.
Like in many other regions, the colonial authorities had organised to counter-act the
campaign for independence in which some of the leaders were murdered. These included
King Rudahigwa of Rwanda who was accused of being under the influence of communism433,
Rwagasore of Burundi and Lumumba of Congo434. Similarly, in May 1973, when the ageing
431
Using the same themes and language as Del Perugia, but in a less intellectual caricature, Marchal argued that
the Batutsi arrived from Tibet via Mesopotamia; they settled in the David, Moses and Prophet's civilisation, then
into the Paranoiac palaces before moving to Ethiopia and dispersing towards the south where they stopped at the
sources of River Nile and created the 'southern Hamitic Kingdom'. The author draws parallels with the Bible even
consecrating part of the book comprising three chapters to what he considers as 'Old Testament' culture of the
monarchs of the Batutsi. Marchal,O., Afrique afrique. Paris: Fayard, 1983.
432 The political figures who marked that period included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Lumumba of Zaire,
Boganda, of the Central Africa Republic, Kenyatta of Kenya, Kaunda of Zambia, Nasser of Egypt, Houphout
Boigny of Ivory Cost. The intellectuals included L.S.Senghor, Cheik Anta Diop, Cheik Hamidou Kane. The
political category had a hard time with the 'neo-colonialists' and most of them paid with their lives in the struggle
that Nkrumah called 'consciencism' aiming to rehabilitate Africa politics, economics and cultures in the concert of
humanity. Glele, Ahahanzo.. Religion. Culture et Politique en Afrique Noire. Paris: Presence Africaine, 1981. See
also Ka Mana..Foi Chretienne et Reconstruction de 1'AfriQue. Sens et Enieux des Theologies Africaines
contemporaines. Nairobi: CETA/HAHO/CLE,1992.
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Kayibanda regime introduced constitutional reforms that marked a strong move towards
Socialism435, he signalled the end of his rule436. When the army took power, on 5 July 1973,
one of its first measures was to 'suspend' the ONACO considered as 'communist'437.
Subsequent events show that the Church naively endorsed the policies introduced by the
military rule. This raises the question- which goes beyond the scoop of this thesis- of
knowing how much the ongoing ideological division of the world due to the Cold War
affected the mentality of Church leaders and brought them to bless the eruption of military
dictatorships in the name of 'fighting communism'.
IV.2.1. Influence of African Dictatorships on Habyarimana
Contrary to customs of traditional society, some post-independence rulers who have
overthrown civilian leaders were lacking in suitable charisma and connections. Hence, they
invented a process of acquiring a national legitimisation in referring to a prestigious ancestor,
a famous dynasty or in creating and developing a panoply of personality cult. They, thus
stood as the elected of god, half-god themselves. A.GIele described the situation in Zaire,
Togo and Equatorial Guinea, where the political discourse revolved around the personality of
one man, the 'General- President'438.
When such a sacralisation was in its zenith in Zaire (R.D.Congo), in the early 1970s the
Catholic Church under the leadership of its primate, Cardinal Joseph Malula, resisted some
of Mobutu's decisions. For instance, Malula opposed the nationalising of the Church schools
and the replacement of Christian teaching by the so-called 'Mobutism', the policy of
Authenticity according to which 'Christian names' would be replaced by names of Zairian
background439. During the dispute, the government issued a communique criticising:
Burundi Ethnic conflict and Genocide, New York/ London: WW& Cambridge University Press,
1996,pp.52/55.
435
Reyntjens, F., Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda., p.505.
436 In June 1973 President Kayibanda signed a decree creating the "Office National du Commerce" (ONACO)
which was given the powers to control the trade of foreigners and nationals. At the same time, the government
introduced new curricula in schools making obligatory the study of Socialism with a particular reference to
Chinese and Tanzanian Socialism, "the national economy would be organised and oriented towards the principles
of socialism; the participation of the popular masses in the production and equal distribution of national income
with a view to ensuring social justice; the planing of the economy in associating the public and the private".
Equally, the constitution was changed so as to remove the limits to the mandates and allow the President represent
himself in the following elections.
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Reyntjens, F. op.cit.p. 505.
438In Zaire, Mobutu took several titles such as 'Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Waza Banga', President -
Fondateur du MPR; 'Marshal du Zaire'; 'Guide Supreme'; 'Le Guide Eclaire'; 'Le Pere de la Nation'; 'Le Sauveur et
Prophete de 30 millions de Zairois'. In Togo, Eyadema took the titles of le 'Grand Timonier', le 'Sarakawa',
TEclaireur de Pointe', le 'Heros National', le 'Grand Liberateur' du Togo, le 'Stratege', 'le Guide- Bien -Aime', 'le
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439 Glele, A, op. cit. p. 14.
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the missionaries who came to teach in the name of "Jewish son" the God not different from one of "our
ancestors" but refuse to recognise "our right to teach God in the name of a son of our country, Mobutu, a
"great prophet", our liberator and messiah, one who has come to make all things new in Zaire440.
The dispute ended in favour of Mobutu. Cardinal Malula was exiled in Rome for several
years. Mobutu's ideology of 'Authenticite' provoked an outrage from the Zairian Catholic
hierarchy who remained committed to Zairian society but opposed to Mobutu. Habyarimana
who was inspired by Authenticite1, exploited its political, economic and cultural dimensions
like Umuganda 441and the Animation'. He succeeded in co-opting the Churches into his
version of Authenticite' in contrast to Mobutu in Zaire who managed to alienate them.
In Rwanda, unlike the situations described by Glele Habyarimana was a charismatic figure,
who carefully cultivated his popularity by creating a vacuum of rival leadership in the army
forces and in politics. He was rightly described by Mitterrand as an 'eloquent and intelligent'
man. However, Habyarimana was deprived of a background of traditional social settings as
well as socio-political legitimacy442. He had no lineage links other than immediate members
of his father's household. Being born in a small household put him at the mercy of the clan of
his wife, Agathe Kanziga, a daughter of these large lineages of the former chiefs in the
regions whose autonomy was ended by the Belgian administration between 1924-1935. The
clan built up a family-group called akazu which was described by a former close ally of
Habyarimana, C. Mfizi, as 'Reseau Zero' (Zero network), 'Ikiguri-Nunga' which presided
over the official institutions443.
When he launched his ruling party, the MRND444 in 1975, into which all Rwandans were
necessarily enrolled, he made the party and its structures the machinery of a 'sacralisation'
and 'divination' process. He was referred to as the 'Father of the Nation' or 'Umubyeyi
w'igihugu', 'President-Fondateur' (of MRND), the 'man of Peace'.This influence which came
from Mobutu went far beyond simple references in political and cultural language. It
embraced the formulation of the dictatorial constitutions that would allow him to 'legally'
reign unconstrained. It concerned also diplomatic patronage vis-a-vis France as well as in
business relations445.
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There have been different interpretations of the root cause of the attempt to sacralise the post-
independence African rulers. Some argued that divination took place in traditional society
where the monarch was the chief of the executive, legislative and judiciary systems, the
armies and vital resources446. Others say that traditional society was rather participant,
consultative with checks and balances. The leader according to the defenders of this view,
was a charismatic figure447 who represented the lineages' and community's vision of
fellowship and solidarity and could not impose his will on people. He constituted the axis of
political relations, the symbol of unity, the incarnation of the essential values of his people
under the control of colleges of representatives of lineages, social groups and clans448.
Such a debate has emerged and continues to divide Rwandans today. On the one hand stand
those who consider that the monarch in pre-independence Rwanda was a symbol of unity and
social harmony and thus perceive the 1959 Revolution as irrelevant449. On the other side are
the proponents of a pre-independence inegalitarian society incarnated by the monarch and his
household which was maintained and systematised in the colonial policies450. J.Gasana
analyses the Rwandan regime that ended in the 1994 tragedy and suggests that
Habyarimana's system borrowed its practices of sacralisation from both the traditional
"Bahutu monarchies in the north", the central monarchical regime dominated by the
Banyiginya clan in the centre and the south. From this, it is best to understand the principle of
the sacralisation of power in Rwanda as inscribed in what Kodgo has considered as the
misunderstanding of the notion of authority which ends in the philosophy of its perpetuation
by violence and mystification451.
IV. 2.2. Sacralisation of Habyarimana
Habyarimana as the 'sacralized military ruler' become the sole reference of authority. All
forms of intellectual and cultural creativity had to revolve around the promotion of the
Habyarimana myth. He was presented as the incarnation of the unity and well-being of the
Banyarwanda. Many apologies were produced by both Rwandan and foreign educated elite to
446Radicliffe -Brown,A., 'Preface' to Fortes & Evans-Pritchard. Svstemes Politiques Africains. Paris:
Presse Universitaire de France, 1964 (English edition, 1944) p.XXI.
447Vincent, J., The African elite. New York/ London: Columbia University press, 1971.
448 Fortes & Evans-Pritchard,E., op.cit. p. 15.
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democratic restraints. For him, the royalty was even more essential than the King. The latter was designated by a
college of socio- pro fessionals representing the lineages. Thus, if the power of the king was the incarnation of the
primary ancestor and consequently of God, the custom and the forms of the delegation of functionaries, officers or
priests exerted control on the King. See De Gruchy. Op.cit.
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dismiss the discrimination against part of the population. Some would argue that Rwanda
was 'dignified', 'modernised' by a Bahutu regime after centuries of dark domination by the
Hamite-Batutsi invaders who now, through the war (the October 1990 RPF attack), were
attempting to harvest an undue benefit. One of the tools used to sacralise the Habyarimana
regime's authority was the anti-democratic constitutions and the forced enrolment of every
single Rwandan in the MRND ruling party.
IV.2.3. Enrolment in the MRND
The first Constitution of the military rule was approved by referendum on 20th December
1978. Its preamble affirms that the putsch, which was referred to as the 'moral coup of 5 July
1973, aimed to fulfil and safeguard the acquisitions of the 1959 revolution. According to
Reyntjens, the installation of the 1978 Constitution aimed at 'civilising' the military regime
to allow the country to return to 'normal institutional life' and at forming a government
including civilians while the army would continue to control the mechanisms of power452.
Inspired by the 1974 Constitution of Zaire that made Mobutu the unique reference point of
politics, the 1978 Rwandan Constitution announced the colours of a totalitarian dictatorship
in its article seven in imposing the "MRND in Rwanda as sole and unique cadre of reference
for political activities" as was the case for the MPR in Zaire453.
Nkunzumwami is right to point out that the compelling character of the enrolment in the
MRND is much better rendered in the Kinyarwanda text of the Constitution than in its French
version: "Uwitwa Umunyarwanda wese aba ali muri Mouvement Revolutionnaire Iharanira
Amajyambere y'u Rwanda" (whoever is Rwandan is member of the MRND)454. The
Constitution acknowledged the President as a unique "institution" in the land. He determines
the politics of the government, names all senior positions, civil, judiciary, military, in public
and private sectors. This control goes down even to recent university graduates whose
recruitment to public or private sectors required his authorisation. He named and revoked the
magistrates in his capacity of chairperson of Superior Council of the lawyers 455.
Another phenomenon was the institutionalisation of hierarchical inequalities. Habyarimana
made himself superior to the State-Party and the Constitution and the ruling-party, MRND,
superior to the Parliament, Government and other institutions (all emanating from the
MRND). He also made the North (his native region) superior to the centre and the south and
the soldiers superior to the civilians. Thereafter the regime developed a considerable number
of mechanisms designed to enrol the population by force into the MRND and to maintain
their 'loyalty' under strict control456.
452Reyntjens, F., "La Deuxieme Republique Rwandaise: Evolution, Bilan et Perspectives". In Africa Focus.
Vo.2.No 3-. 1986, pp 273-298.
453Nkunzumwami,E, op.cit. p, 141; Reyntjens, F, op.cit. p, 281.
454Nkunzumwami, Op.cit. p.283.
455 ibid. p. 142.
456 Ibid. p. 116. Both the 1978 Constitution of the Republic and the 1983 MRND ruling party statutes obliged any
Rwandan born or unborn to adhere to the ruling party, in the regime's terminology, 'militant du MRND', meaning
a blind obedience to the party. Article 7 of the 1978 constitution read: "le peuple rwandais est politiquement
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The population was forced to adopt the "symbols of the ruling party", to purchase and wear
the medal with the image of the President; to approve the unique electoral list presented by
the MRND Central Committee of which Habyarimana was chairperson. Lastly, not the least,
participating in the umuganda and the Animation457 became constitutional duties.
'An ideological tyranny', states Thielicke, "is a state which has a world view". This is an
attempt to subsume all cosmic phenomena under a single theme or formula from which every
other aspect of life, being history, culture, spirituality derives458. All are brought under a
same denominator, there is no sphere outside such a state. Citizens who sought freedom were
regarded as seditious. People are no longer related to one another individually and
communally, but rather relegated to a status of group functionaries. Such a state is not
something entrusted to man, but an expression of a man who claims to be the only giver of
the meaning to the world459.
With regard to the ideologies which marked Rwandan society, this perspective can be related,
on the one hand, to the Hamite theory under which every aspect of Rwandan life was
perceived as a product brought in from outside by "foreign conquerors". On the other hand,
the MRND system was a world view ideology as it subjugated society under a single view of
a 'super-man', Habyarimana, the "Father of the Nation".
The ascendancy of Habyarimana and the confirmation of his authority over the rest of the
institutions were endorsed and then supported by the intellectuals, mainly the Church who
were 'co-opted' in the political, administrative, diplomatic sectors at different levels. While
his immediate entourage controlled and manipulated the official services, like the execution
of state projects, the licences of import- export, national passports, the management of the
public and mixed companies and banks, the President was keen to retain personal control
over the system of co-opting and appointing individuals to the above positions. These
'privileges' were accorded to persons either for their belonging to the akazu region or for their
loyalty to the regime460.
IV. 3. Some Discriminatory Practices of the MRND Regime
The Habyarimana's strategy of control of power consisted in organising the process of his
divinisation as the incarnation of the unity of the country and in imitating the monarchical
control of knowledge (education, information, culture), political (unique reference of
political activities), resources (economy, state companies) and the army. The following
paragraphs analyse how from July 1973 when the army took power Habyarimana
organise au sein du Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le developpement, formation politique unique hors
du cadre de laquelle nulle activite politique ne peut s'exercer".
Article 6 of the 1983 statutes of the MRND ruling party reads: " conformement a Particle 7 de la Constitution de la
Republique Rwandiase, le Mouvement Revolutionnaire Nationale pour le Developpement constitue le cadre
politique unique en dehors duquel nulle activite politique ne peut s'exercer". Nkunzumwami.pp. 134 ff.
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institutionalised 'ethnic' discrimination in the administration, the ruling party, the army and in
schools.
IV .3.1. Perpetuation of Discrimination in Education
Many observers recognise the fact that the degradation of moral values which occurred in the
last two decades started in education. Education was under the control of one man, Colonel
Nsekarije, kin and colleague of the President in his army career and both from the same
village. The colonel assumed many Ministerial positions including that of Foreign Affairs
before moving to the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. Against any logic, he
attached admissions to universities to his department which until then was the responsibility
of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. He is believed to have
considerably developed corrupt practices in the education system.
The Akazu group, this writer suggests, aimed to get total control of this sensitive sector to
accelerate its perpetuation of power. The places were attributed not by merit but by a policy
of "ethnic and regional balance" and 'quotas' which attributed the places to regions and to
'ethnic groups' according to their proportional representation within the population. This
proved to be a strategy that rather favoured the Bushiru region of the Habyarimana family. F.
Reyntjens comment about this practice :
La selection des pouvant (sic) continuer du primaire au secondaire ou du secondaire a l'Universite est
done cruciale; or, si cette selection doit normalement s'effectuer a base des resultats obtenus par les
eleves aux examens de classement, le ministre de l'enseignement primaire et secondaire, le colonel
A.Nsekalije fut accuse & plusieurs reprises de favoriser les enfants originaires de sa prefecture, Gisenyi.
En effet, la ou la moyenne du passage au secondaire est de 7 a 8 % dans les autres prefectures, elle parait
etre de 15 % pour Gisenyi. Exacerbe par la critique a l'encontre de sa politique scolaire, le ministre
Nsekalije annonija meme publiquement, lors d'une reunion du conseil prefectoral de Butare dans le sud
qu'a l'avenir il n'admettrait plus que des enfants de Gisenyi a l'ecole secondaire. La dispute qui
s'ensuivit couta au ministre Gatabazi de Butare sa carriere politique461.
The controversy over the admission to schools grew because the regime controlled the
selection of every pupil from primary to secondary and university. On the other hand, in a
country where resources are limited, schools remain the only guaranty of the amelioration of
socio-economic conditions. Of the pupils finishing their primary schools, only 10% were
admitted in secondary school in 1990! The children were placed officially according to the
quotas policies, but in reality, the children whose parents had a few link with the barons of
the regime would rarely be selected even if they were brilliant.
During this period more suspect practices were introduced including inducement for the
teachers for the promotion of incapable' pupils from one level to another. This led
Nkunzumwami to write that the school was no longer the transmitter of civic and patriotic
values but a vast network of 'brothels' for the children of the population, the poor Bahutu and
Batutsi; the "centres of leisure and nursing for the children of the senior authorities"462.
"Education" he says, "existed as the cradle of political animators" designed to ensure that the
ideology of the dictatorship was planted. According to Nkunzumwami, there was a desperate
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need of visionary rulers and qualified educators to disencumber education from the ethnic
divide, regionalism, ethnicism and political influences463.
These practices were never denounced by the Churches but rather adopted widely throughout
the institutionalised and corrupt legislation. From 1985, the same Minister introduced a series
of legislations for the Reform of Education. Among other things, the Church hierarchies
whose institutions co-managed with the state almost 80 % of the primary and secondary
schools were allocated 10 % of the places which they would manage at their discretion464.
The practice angered many Christians who rightly perceived the practice as a traffic of
influence, a form of corruption. In a workshop organised by the Protestant Council (CPR) in
1992465 for both the staff and the leaders of the Churches, the present author was requested
by the CPR to reflect on its organisation as an external observer. He then suggested that the
Churches should reject the corrupt system of admission to secondary schools through
nepotism and learn how to manage the places allocated to them with a greater transparency:
Dans notre pays les problemes de l'education sont connus: un personnel d'encadrement insuffisant mais
surtout insuffisamment forme, les moyens limites ou tres mal utilises, les infrastructures d'accueil
extremement reduites, les options et les programmes qui ne repondent vraiment pas aux besoins du pays.
Les vingt annees que nous venons de passer ont ajoute a ceci plusieurs autres maux: corruption,
regionalisme, ethnicisme, recrutement des eleves et des enseignants au rabais, et un centralisme excessif
qui annihile toute creativite. Resultat, l'enseignement ruandais se meurt dans une mediocrite qui n'a
d'egal que les problemes de ce pays. A tous points de vue les ecoles dirigees par les eglises sont tombees
dans cette logique de la mediocrite ...suite aux innombrables injustices dont sont l'objet certaines regions
et groupes sociaux du pays ...II est temps que les eglises entreprennent une reflexion sur leurs ecoles ....
La gestion des places accordees aux eglises dans les ecoles libres subsidiees dans le cadre de la loi de
1985 ainsi que les possibilites des bourses dans l'enseignement superieur accordees par les partenaires
est un autre cas. Ne peut-on pas apporter la difference par rapport aux pratiques d'injustices en offrant
ces places aux meilleurs candidats protestants. En le faisant, on ouvrirait une fenetre par laquelle la
societe commencerait a se regarder et a se poser des questions466.
The above quote denounces the mediocrity evident in the education system due to corruption,
the ethnic and regional discrimination and the centralising system which annihilated
creativity. However, because of its partiality, the system provoked a social mobility. On the
one hand, many parents started to send their children to study outside the country in Uganda,
Zaire, Burundi or Kenya, where obviously, they encountered the ideas of the RPF. On the
other hand, from 1980, many parents created many different associations which promoted
education in private schools from primary to a higher degree467 and started to rival with the
state run education system.
IV .3.2. Ethnic and Regional Discrimination in the Army
From 1962 when he graduated from the first contingent of the 'Ecole des Officiers'(EO) in
Kigali, Habyarimana was named by President Kayibanda as second in command of the newly
463Ibid. pp. 131; 133;225;229.
464 The collection of these texts of laws were published in one volume by the Secretariat of the Presbyterian
Church in Rwanda under the title : Lois et Reglements Scolaires , Kigali, January 1987.
4<S5Gihindamuyaga, 9 to 11 September 1992 on the theme "Les Perspectives de Developpement du CPR et de ses
Membres". The present author was asked to bring an external assessment of the CPR institutions.
466 Gatwa.T.. Regard Critique sur le C.P.R. In Atelier sur le C.P.R. et ses Perspectives de Developpement.
Rapport de la Rencontre de Gihindamuvaga. 9 au 11 Septembre 1992, Kigali, 1992, Annexe III.pp. 15-16.
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formed 'Garde Nationale' to which he succeeded the Belgian Commandant, Lt-Colonel, F.
Vanderstraeten in 1963. When, in 1973, he overthrew Kayibanda and became President of
the Republic, he continued to hold the position of Minister of Defence till 1992 and only
gave up under the pressure of democratic opposition. He held all the chains of command
from the top as chief of staff of the army and the gendarmerie as well as of the intelligence
service. Recruitment for the positions of commanders of units and for the Military Academy
were exclusively reserved for Gisenyi, in particular, his Bushiru native region, and almost
excluding totally the Batutsi and Bahutu from the South.
It is best to notice that Habyarimana himself inherited the 'ethnisation' of the army from its
Belgian initiators, in particular, Colonel Logiest. The latter in his capacity of 'Military
Resident' initiated the 'Garde Nationale' (future Rwandan army) and designed its shape at the
twilight of Belgian colonisation in 1960. Logiest put it as follows: "J'estimais necessaire de
mettre rapidement sur pied une force autochtone composee, officiellement, de 14 % de Tutsi
et de 86 % de Hutu, mais pratiquement de pres de 100% de Hutu"468.
Habyarimana pursued the politization and ethnisation in incorporating the soldiers in the
'animation and umuganda', hence, he ensured that the control on them was based on their
adherence to the MRND ideology and not to military professionalism. He shaped the army in
his mould and referred to it as 'my soldiers'. Nkunzumwami accurately describes this
situation:
La repartition des cadres de commandement des regions militaires se fait selon des criteres regionaux,
d'affmite avec la haute hierarchie militaire dont il faut rappeler que huit de onze officiers superieurs qui
ont realise le coup d'etat du 5 Juillet 1973 etaient du Nord, proches du general-Major Habyarimana.L'on
constate que toutes Ies regions du pays envoient leurs enfants a la seule Ecole Superieure Militaire
(ESM) a Kigali, mais que toutes les regions ne sont guere representees a la sortie... le taux de
regionalisation s'accrott au fur et a mesure que les officiers montent en grades. Ces officiers sont
d'autant maintenus dans l'armee qu'ils maitrisent les liens et les pratiques du pouvoir: corruption,
fanatisme pour le MRND, particulierement aux " salons politiques du regime, respect absolu des
membres du cercle presidentiel, segregation ethnique active au depens des Batutsi, participation efficace
aux reseignements et la delation pour la survie du regime... Les obligations militaires proprement dit
sont volontairement ignorees ou laissees a ceux que le systeme reprouve. Pour les privileges de la
dictature et leurs amis, l'activite militaire disparait au profit des propagandes politiques pour le parti-
Etat469.
The option of politicising the army denounced by Nkunzumwami had two major negative
consequences. First, the army was above all a mono-ethnic dominated institution to the
detriment of the Batutsi and to some extent to the Bahutu of the Centre and the South.
During the 1990's crises many among the officers became engaged in the recruiting, training
and supplying of the militia which would later carry out the genocide.
Second, the army was also used to infiltrate the Churches. Soon after his coming to power,
Habyarimana opened the army chaplaincies (till then limited to Roman Catholic Church) to
the Protestants for one position fully financed by the Army. Hence, the position became
another factor of rivalry and quarrels among the Protestant Church leaders who competed to
send their own nominee. Connected to this, the first two successive Protestant chaplains
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within the army had been named bishops of the Episcopal Church470. Some observers made a
link between, on one the hand, what may have been the Chaplain's loyalty to the chief of
staff, Habyarimana, and on the other, the President's role in the nomination of the bishops.
IV .4. Human Rights Abuse.
Among other examples of apparent embarrassment which the Church leaders had in their
relations with the regime was their silence vis-a-vis violations of Human rights. Many abuses
occurred among which were the systematic killings, organised violence which followed the
refugees attacks in 1960s; the violence in schools in 1973 and massacres of the defenceless
populations which followed the RPF attack in October 1990. The second embarrassing
episode was the silence which lay behind the murder of the politicians of the first Republic,
Kayibanda and his collaborators and then the assassination of political, religious and military
personalities between 1974 and 1993.
IV .4.1. Reacting to Inyenzi'attacks
Following the 1959-1962 revolution many Rwandan refugees were installed in the
neighbouring countries from where some of them started to attack Rwanda in May 1962 in
what would be known as the "Inyenzi" attacks471. A dreadful attack was organised by
Christmas 1963 from Burundi, through Bugesera, stopping at 25 km of Kigali. There were
two reactions that affected irremediably 'ethnic' relations in Rwanda provoking the massacres
and the exile of many Batutsi. The most affected region was the Gikongoro Prefecture where
the local authority, Prefet, A.Nkeramugaba, called for mass murder. This left 5,000 to 8,000
dead, mainly Batutsi472. Other regions including Rusumo in Kibungo and Bugesera in Kigali
were sporadically affected.
For Reyntjens, the Inyenzi who carried out the attack, the Burundian authorities who did not
prevent them from attacking, and the Rwandan authorities who could not prevent the
Gikongoro massacres, share the responsibility for the tragedy. Although, both Segal and
Reyntjens refer to the UN report that discharged the Rwandan government of any
premeditation or acts of genocide473, it is worth noting that some of the local authorities who
were responsible for the tragedy safely pursued their political career. Nkeramugaba even
headed the next legislative elections in Gikongoro, in 1965. Moreover, the Inyenzi attacks
were taken as a pretext to harass, even to eliminate the internal legal opposition parties,
despite the fact that these collaborated with the new regime and had unequivocally
condemned the attacks. In 1965, the leaders of the opposition, some of whom were members
470 The two were Augustin Nshamihigo of Shyira and Norman Kayumba of Kigeme. Nshamihigo, a controversial
figure, Anglican Archbishop, was perceived as the right hand of the regime within the Protestant communities.
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of the Parliament, "were arrested under the orders of a Belgian officer, M. Pilate, summarily
tried and executed in the Ruhengeri prison"474. Many survivors of the massacres in the
Gikongoro region continue to describe them as true acts of genocide which left unhealed
wounds and link with the 1994 genocide475.
IV. 4.2. Seed of Hatred among Pupils: 1973
In 1973, a new round of violence directed against the Batutsi erupted in the secondary
schools, public offices and state companies. The Church schools including Kabgayi,
Shyogwe and Byimana as well as the National University and other schools were affected.
The targets, mainly the Batutsi were simply ordered to leave the institution to which they
were attached either as student or workers476. Unexpectedly, subsequent developments of the
violence overlooked any ethnic reference when the natives of the south and centre of the
country became the next victims. The army used this crisis as a pretext to make a putsch in
1973 against the regime of Kayibanda477.
In the Habyarimana regime, the abuse of human rights and particularly the dramatisation of
the tragedies and violence were a crucial element in his political strategy. This however,
never came to the surface until the 1990s crises. To illustrate this, two examples suffice, the
assassination of the politicians of the First Republic mentioned above and the violent
repression of the adherents of the Religious movements478.
IV .4.3. Murder of Kayibanda and his Collaborators
The most horrific assassinations occurred between 1974 and 1980: the former President,
Kayibanda, and his collaborators were arrested after the 1973 putsch; they were imprisoned
in Ruhengeri479. Except Kayibanda who was summarily tried, others disappeared, atrociously
murdered without being judged; their families were left in the dark about their fate. The
atrocious conditions under which they have been killed resemble strangely those of the
horrific massacres of 1994. Some were buried alive, other put in bags and beaten to death ;
others were attached to the hoods of running jeeps on the roads between Ruhengeri and
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Gisenyi480- What B.Shyirambere extensively described and called the "beginning of the
chapter of the violations of human rights by the Habyarimana dictatorship"- remained
unknown to national and international opinion481.
Then came the 1986 heavy repression against the religious movements' members. These were
arrested, tortured and imprisoned as described below, simply because they refused to wear
the medal of the President or pay the personality cult to him482.
IV .4.4.Violence in 1990s: Prelude to Apocalypse
In the 1990s, apart from the 1994 genocide, the human rights abuse developed in two
directions, the massive arrests of the so-called ibyitso among the Bahutu and Batutsi from the
South and the Centre following the RPF attack as well as the massacres of the Batutsi and
related groups and the campaign of violence around the country with the politically
motivated murder of different personalities. This was described in detail in two volumes by
the ADL, the first Rwandan Human rights organisation483.
To start with the mass arrests, following the RPF attack on 1 October 1990, in the night of 4
to 5 October, the army organised in the city of Kigali and other places a simulation of a RPF
attack with automatic arms and shootings. Taking this for a pretext, a curfew was imposed
the next morning. There followed arrests of more than 10,000 persons. Over several days
they were herded into the football stadiums and later detained under appalling conditions
without food or water. Whilst the RPF attack created a sort of 'solidarity' around
Habyarimana, the arbitrary and inhuman conditions under which the arrests were made and
the prisoners detained484 without any charge finally ended the credibility of the regime.
According to Reyntjens, more than 90% of those detained were Batutsi. The minister of
Justice, T. Mujyanama justified the regime discrimination against the Batutsi in the arrest as
follows: "pour preparer une attaque de telle envergure, il fallait qu'il y ait des gens de
480
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confiance. Les Rwandais de la meme ethnie offrent mieux cette possibilite"485. In the same
period, hundreds of Batutsi were massacred in various regions486.
In the late 1992, the campaign took a new turn. A large scale violence was inaugurated by an
inflammatory speech by Leon Mugesera, the vice-Chairman of the MRND in Gisenyi. At a
rally in Kabaya, on 22 November 1992, L. Mugesera blamed the Batutsi and the opposition
for the betrayal of the country in negotiating with the rebellion of the RPF487. He then
mobilised for the mass murder as follows:
qui veut la paix prepare la guerre. Ecoutez bien c'est la 4 ou 5 fois que je dis ceci dans notre prefecture
de Gisenyi...je disais dernierement a un militant du PL (a political party which was associated to Tutsi
and the RPF) que la faute que nous avons faite en 1959, c'est que j'etais enfant, c'est que nous les avons
laisse sortir sains et saufs. Je lui ai dis, Je t'apprends que votre (Tutsi) pays, c'est l'Ethiopie, et nous
allons vous expedier sous peu chez vous via Nyabarongo (ours: Nyabarongo river is the source of Nile
river) en voyage express. Voila je vous repete done que nous devons vite nous mettre a l'ouvrage (...).
Pour terminer, je vous rappelle l'essentiel de ce que j'ai dit: la vigilance au premier chef. Sachez que
celui a qui vous n'avez pas tranche la tete, c'est lui qui vous tranchera la votre488.
Kabaya where L.Mugesera's mobilisation took place was the native village of Habyarimana,
in the Bushiru region489. The most significant characteristics of L.Mugesera's appeal were
firstly, its reference to the theories which make of the Batutsi, foreigners from Ethiopia not
Rwandans: "Je lui ai dis, je t'apprends que votre pays, c'est l'Ethiopie"( I tell you, your
country is Ethiopia).
Secondly, Mugesera's speech also suggested that the genocide had been planned: "et nous
allons vous expedier sous peu chez vous via la Nyabarongo"(we are going to send you very
soon by the most direct route, the Nyabarongo River)490. In fact, Mugesera's speech bears a
strange resemblance to that previously delivered by President Habyarimana in Ruhengeri on
the 15 of November 1992491. During a meeting of his party, the MRND, Habyarimana
referred to the Amsha Protocols so far signed, as a 'scrap of paper'- a reference which recalls
Hitler when the Fiihrer characterised the 'Munich Agreement' as a 'scrap of paper'.
The response from the MRND- CDR extremist parties was immediate. They organised
massacres in December 1992 and January 1993 in which more than 1000 people were killed
485Reyntjens, 1994, p. 94.
486The massacres happened repeatetively, in particular in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri (Kibirira; October 1990; January-
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in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. This provided a pretext to the RPF which attacked the cities of
Ruhengeri and Ngarama on 8 February 1993 and stopped 25 miles from Kigali492.
Political observers characterised it as a "true project of destabilisation" planned so as to
prevent and hinder the democratic process. The monitoring undertaken in details by the ADL
and documented by international commissions and observers showed that the campaign was
carried out by a network of mechanisms including many violent groups within the army, the
MRND and allies set up by the regime to counter the dynamics of the newly created
opposition parties and civil society493. They were co-ordinated by the Akazu- group.
The members of these networks always got away with the crimes because they controlled and
had paralysed the judiciary system. The organisers and the executioners, the army, the
gendarmerie, the MRND's militia, the 'Interahamwe', the local administration were
dominated by the MRND bureaucrats (Prefets, Burgomasters, councillors) and were linked
together with some media networks, like the RTLM radio and the Kangura newspaper. In
fact, the President together with his entourage was the centre point of the groups of violence
as indicated by various international reports; he held the supreme authority over all other
influential powers such as Executive, Legislative, Judiciary as discussed above in section
4.4.2.
However, the concept of destabilisation of the regime was also utilised in the MRND camp
which accused the opposition of planning an insurrection or a putsch against Habyarimana.
For Gasana, all the activities of the opposition were deemed a project of insurrection
organised by the alliance of the RPF and the Opposition. The campaign failed, according to
him, because the MRND was the "sole political party prepared to challenge its opponents
through democratic elections"494.
Gasana, a member of the moderate wing within the MRND is certainly right to evoke the
naive alliance of the opposition with the RPF, but he may be one of these MRND civilians
who were driven to present a diversion to the public opinion so that the MRND system
pursue an agenda designed to cling on power. Actually, he later had to exile in August 1993
and leave his position as Minister of Defence following the threats of AMASASU, one of the
violent groups created by the army hierarchy to oppose the Arusha Peace talks.
This campaign was a prelude to the apocalypse. "It was a call for a genocide" wrote the then
Prime Minister of Rwanda, Dr Nsengiyaremye495. Despite all the evidence available, what the
observers, diplomats, journalists, opposition parties and the population deplored as an
invitation to mass murder through a racial mobilisation never urged the church hierarchies to
take any initiative. The Churches which participated in the initiation of the Arusha
negotiations appeared, really fearfully, managing to avoid condemning the clear sabotage of
492
Nsengiyaremye, D., op.cit. p. 256.
41,3
Reyntjens, F., 1994, 189; Reyntjens, F 'Akazu', 'Escadrons de la mort' et autres 'Reseau zero'; un historique des
resistances au changement politique depuis 1990". In Guichoua,A., op.cit. pp. 265-273, in particular, p. 270.
494
Gasana, J., "Guerre, Paix et Democratie au Rwanda. In Guichoua, A., op.cit. pp.223-227, particularly, p.223.
495
Nsengiyaremye,D., in Guichoua, 1996, p.256.
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the Peace Agreement by the MRND-CDR related to President Habyarimana. Between
questioning or legitimating this corrupt system, the Church, in general the hierarchy, chose
the latter.
IV.5. The Churches: Supportive Organs of the MRND Regime
During the Habyarimana reign; the adhesion to the MRND was the only option given to the
population. The Churches were left as the only organised forces capable of denouncing or
opposing any abuse496. The Church hierarchies were unable to play such a prominent role
because, they had entered into intimate relationship with the regime and they had not made a
theological assessment of the socio-political situation to prepare any effective responses.
The Church's legitimisation of the regime had two axes. First, the hierarchy accepted to
participate individually in the organs of the ruling- party from the Congress to the central
Committee and to various other levels such as the committees and councils of prefectures and
communes in which the local clergy were members. Second, to understand the deep character
of the Church hierarchy enrolment in the MRND structures, it is wise to underline the fact
that it went beyond the very public acknowledgement of the membership of the Catholic
archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumva in the MRND organs.
In fact, all the Church institutions and offices were integrated into the structures of the ruling
party. Any Church institutions 497 were considered as a Cellule, i.e. cell or the base organ of
the party. These institutions had for those in authority the members of the clergy, Bishops,
Priests, Pastors, Nuns, Brothers who automatically became their official representatives in
the MRND organs.
The Churches as supportive organ of the MRND must be understood in what we
described under sections IV.2.3. " the enrolment in the MRND" and in the following
sections. In summary, Habyarimana put himself above any other institution, above the
Constitution of the Republic and even above his ruling pary, the MRND.
In fact, by the force of law, each single Rwandan was obligatory member of the
MRND. Both the statutes of the MRND and the Constitution of the Republic
compelled all the Banyarwanda - from all ages, gender, ethnic group and religions
without exception - to belong to the MRND. They grouped in the cells, the basic
organ of the MRND ruled over by a committee of five elected through a list
elaborated by the Burgomaster, an appointee of the President of the MRND- Republic.
This was achieved in the base organs.
The MRND cell, the most elementary organ was made of 50 to 100 families in the
villages. In cities and agglomerations, the workers of the public and private sectors
belonged to a the so-called specialised cells ( "Cellules specialisees du MRND) which
96 There couldn't be a political, social, cultural, economical or judiciary activities outside the MRND state-party.
To adventure in Trade Unions, youth, women or liberal professions' associations outside the ruling party was anti-
constitutional.
497 These would include school, hospital, Church or bishop's offices, nuns' Covents, Church charity organisations
and so forth.
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corresponded to the institution they worked in. Such a cell of the MRND was ruled
over by the Senior Executive Officer who, being in public or private sector, was
obligatory appointed by the President of the MRND-Republic. The following keys
articles of the Statutes of the MRND (1983) and of the 1978 Constitution of the
Republic show clearly how the MRND world-view subsumed all the sectors of society
including the Churches and the clergy498.
Art.7 ( Constitution of Republic of 20 December 1978):
Le peuple Rwandais est politiquement organise au sein du Mouvement Revolutionnaire
National Pour le Developpement, formation politique unique hors du cadre de laquelle nulle
activite politique ne peut s'exercer.Tout Rwandais est de plein droit membre du Mouvement
Revolutionnaire pour le Developpement.
This alinea is much stronger in its Kinyarwanda version: Uwitwa Umunyarwanda
wese aba ari muri Mouvement Revolutionnaire Ihaanira Amajyambere y'U Rwanda:
whoever is Rwandan is obligatory member of the MRND.
Art. 12 ( Statuts du MRND): Les organes Centraux du MRND sont:
a. Presidence du Mouvement (MRND
b. Congres National
c. Comite Central
The presidency of the MRND, the presidency of the National Congress, that of the Central
Committee was a personal business of Habyarimana alone with a total ignorance of what
some would consider as a directorium to assist in any sense. In addition the majority of the
members of the Congress; all the members of the Central Commitee were appointed by
Habyarimana as were the members of his Governement and the Parliament whose unique list
was established by the Central Committee under his chairship. To make thinks much easier to
rule over the institutions, the President of the Republic appointed the Supreme Judiciary
Instititution, the Constitutional Court; he chaired its Superior Council of the Magistrature.
Art. 22 ( MRND Statutes'): Le Comite Central.
" Le Comite Central est compose du President du Mouvement et d'autres membres nommes
par Iui".
Art.23 ( statuts du MRND):
" Sous la conduite du President du Mouvement, assiste du Secretaire General, le Comite
Central:
-Contjoit et dirige la politique du Mouvement
- Controle tous les organes du Mouvement a l'exception de la Presidence du Mouvement et du
Congres National;
- Arrete les statuts des cadres et des organisations integrees au mouvement;
- Le Comite Central peut modifier, suspendre ou annuler toutes les decisions prises par les
organes qui lui sont inferieurs.
Art.25( statuts du MRND):





498 Sources: a. Constitution de la Republique Rwandaise de 1978;b. Les Statuts du Parti-Etat, le MRND de 1983.
In Nkunzumwami, E., La Tragedie Rwandaise. Historique et Perspectives. Paris: l'Harmattan, 1996. Annexes IX,
p. 279 a 320.
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- Commission de la Politique et de la Cooperation Internationale.
As indicated in these functions the Central Committee has a character which
subsumes the inferior organs including the Goverment, the Parliament and the
Judiciary. As a state party, the MRND's chart comprises the Part organs, the Executive
(Governement and Administration and Army and security forces), the Legislative and
the Judiciary, appointed by the president.
As stated above, the Public sphere as in the private institutions, companies, each school,
medical institution, each Ministry, each central office or any religious, charity,
governemental or non-governemental organisation was a cell of the MRND. These so-called
"cellules specialisees du MRND" were automatically under the authority of a committee of
five chaired by the Senior Executive Officer who was directly accountable to the president of
the MRND in the Prefecture, the Prefet. This was expressed in the statutes as follows:
Art.61 ( statuts du MRND):
Chaque colline, chaque quartier de ville comptant de 50 a 100 families, chaque service public,
chaque etablissement d'enseignement ou entreprise privee comportant au moins 30 militants -
name of the adherents to the MRND- constitue une cellule du Mouvement. Toutefois,
l'employeur, le travailleur, ou l'agent de l'etat [ ou du secteur prive] residant dans le quartier
urbain et inscrit d'office dans la cellule du centre d'activite de etablissement dans lequel il
travaille, est de surcroft membre de la cellule de sa residence.
Par derogation a Particle 41 des presents statuts ( Art.41 says: le Responsable du MRND dans
la commune est le Bourgoumestre], les cellules des services publics, des etablissements
d'enseignement ou des entreprises privees rendent compte au responsable du MRND dans la
prefecture. Les cellules de la Presidence de la Republique, de la Presidence du MRND et
celles des ministeres, de forces armees sont placees sous l'autorite directe du president du
MRND.
Art. 63 (statuts du MRND):
Cellule est dirigee par un comite de cinq membres elus pour un mandant de cinq ans
renouvelables... sur une liste des candidats dressee par le responsable du MRND dans le
secteur et approuvee par le comite communal. Tout militant qui dirige un service public, un
etablissement d'enseignement ou une entreprise privee est d'office responsable du comite de la
cellule de son ressort [ Italic ours].
Clearly, what happened during the MRND regime was a vicious circle which started
from Habyarimana and ended on him.
The shape of this MRND ideology had some similarity to the Roman imperial cult. The
Roman system in 4 BC rested on the deification of the Caesar, and the confusion of the
private household of 'Augustus' and the public domain499. The symbols in the process of
deification under Caesar included the introduction of coins which bore the image of Caesar
499Kee,A., "Imperial cult: unmasking of an ideology". Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, vol. VI, No 2,
Autumn 1985. pp. 112- 127. Ideology, according to Kee is understood as a "system of ideas and values which if
sufficiently extensive can constitute a world view and be present in society in the guise of something else, e.g. in
the form of religion. In presenting a picture of reality, the ideology offers an explanation of why things are as they
are". The Roman imperial cult which developed from the fourth century BCE starts with Alexander the Great and
his successors, Caesar and Augustus. They elaborated on the Hellenistic divine ruler. This process had three
functions: to unify social and national groups; to transfer to political figures an attitude of devotion and
commitment and to carry out a political test of loyalty. When Constantine converted to Christianity he
rehabilitated Christians devastated by persecutions when they were made scapegoats of different disasters that
affected the empire. He incorporated the enemy by guaranteeing a state status to Christian religion and used
Christianity as a tool of re-legitimatisation of the imperial ideology
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instead of the image of gods. In a long-run power struggle, Caesar succeeded to usurp a
decree from the Senate that made him god while several national events were changed to fit
in his agenda, for example the date of the July games.
Likewise the 'divinisation' and the 'imperial cult' of Habyarimana was reflected in the above
mentioned obligation to adopt the symbols of the regime, including wearing the medal
bearing his image, the so-called "medal of the party"(MRND); the uniforms and dresses with
the symbols of his party. Several other events like rallies, marches for the party, long queues
of the population including public and private sectors' workers to salute the 'President-
Fondateur' or prominent external visits, were regularly organised.
IV, 5.1. Roman Catholic Hierarchy: a Supportive Organ
Like his predecessor, President Habyarimana was a fervent Catholic member who made
himself known to the Pope; in addition to visiting Rome and to participating regularly at
mass, he persistently maintained the Papal Nuncio, as Dean of all the Diplomatic Missions in
Kigali. In 1976 V.Nsengiyumva then bishop of the Nyundo diocese in Gisenyi (stronghold of
the President) was appointed Archbishop of Kigali and Primate of the Church. According to
credible sources this nomination was influenced by the President500. In the same period, the
Archbishop was named a member of the Central Committee of the MRND up to 1990. The
primate was also named by the President as Chairman of the very influential Commission of
Social Affairs of the MRND that covered many governmental sectors including Education,
Health, Demography and Family Planning Programmes, Social development, Employment,
Sports, Religions Affairs, Church-State Relations, etc. As a member of the Central
Committeeof the MRND, the State-Party, he ranked second after the President, ahead of the
Cabinet members. He received official material privileges, a permanent official car and
driver501.
One domain in which the Catholic Church was not supportive of the MRND policies was the
Family Planning programmes. In his capacity as Head of the MRND Commission of 'Social
Affairs', tutor of the Government Department of demography and Family Planning Office,
ONAPO, Archbishop V.Nsengiyumva, together with his colleagues, blocked the deployment
of the programmes, particularly in the network of social services of the Church. In an attempt
to counteract this difficulty, the Government together with the Protestants, launched a
parallel organisation called, ARBEF. The organisation was created by individual members
and organisations, including various Cabinet departments under the umbrella of the ONAPO.
ARBEF was chaired from its creation in 1986 by the most influential Protestant Church
leader, Revd. M. Twagirayesu, the President of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda.
5(10
Mgr.V. Nsengiyumva replaced Mgr Perraudin as Primate of the Church. Perraudin's era was over following the
fall of his protege, Kayibanda.
501 This historical closeness from the Belgian colonial period when the Head of the Church, Mgr Classe was the
sponsor of both the Monarch and of the colonial administration was acknowledged in the 1994 Christmas
message by the Catholic bishops who justified it having had for their sole motivation the interest of the population.
Catholic bishops, Message of Christmas 1994. p. 6.
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IV. 5.1.1. Ethnic Practices in Church Institutions
Far from seeking the interest of the population, or being a moral guide, the Catholic hierarchy
has contributed to bringing a servile cult to the MRND regime and to reproducing the
regime's ethnic discriminatory policies. The Archbishop had not only been one of the central
pieces of the decision-making organs but also a consistent promoter of the MRND ideology
and featured in public gatherings and in the Church. It must be remembered that the
Habyarimana regime arrived after a short period of dispute between the Church and the
Kayibanda government recounted above502. Instead of bringing moral guidance in the various
daily problems of the population, such as demography control, spiritual renewal, ethnic
policies, the adherence of the hierarchy to the MRND system opened an era of uncritical
alignment on the politics of the regime. Such an alignment reached its zenith when the
archbishop insisted that some Catholic orders including the Benebikira Sisters's
Congregation should practise the politics of ethnic balance in naming a Hutu Superior.
Equally in 1988, Father Muvala was forced to renounce his ordination as bishop, officially
for 'personal reasons', but according to credible sources because of his Tutsi background503.
Erpicum and allies describe the episode as follows:
L'incapacite de l'eglise de depasser en son propre sein les problemes ethniques la rend incapable
d'apporter en cette matiere une reponse a la societe. L'affaire de la nomination rapportee de l'abbe
Muvara et sa coloration ethnique, et une serie d'autres faits moins connus montrent que cette eglise reste
bien humaine, trop humaine. Aussi, lorsqu'a l'occasion du voyage du pape, les eveques ont publie des
lettres pastorales communes concernant les problemes de la societe, ces propos ont ete ressentis comme
"theoriques" et n'apportant rien de concret. L'eglise Rwandaise ne pourra pas prononcer une parole
prophetique tant qu'elle ne fera pas la verite sur elle-meme.5"4
Having opted to align with the MRND politics, the Church hierarchy was incapable of
fulfilling a moral role in society. It was politically too closely linked to the MRND, whilst at
the same time the clergy were handicapped by a lack of creativity and courage so as to
challenge both their superiors and the regime. The Church became politically irrelevant for
the oppressed population because it was incapable of articulating a prophetic message.
Erpicum and allies rightly say:
L'eglise n'apparaissait plus tellement comme 'guide moral' de la Republique, mais plutot comme 'soutien
servile'. L'attitude des responsables de 1'eglise ne faisait pas 1'unanimite dans le clerge et chez les fideles
plus critiques. Aussi, beaucoup se sont rejoui quand, sous la pression du Vatican, 1'archeveque renonga a
son role politique.5"5
As indicated in the beginning of this section, all the segments of the Churches were enrolled
in the MRND system. To be fair to the Catholics it must be said that there was even a sharp
competition among the ordinary members of the Church and the clergy in the race to be co-
opted into the MRND organs. Both clergy and laity became more committed to MRND than
"^Nationalisation of the schools, expulsion of the director of Kinyamateka, Father Enzo Maida and the
imprisonment of the Rwandan journalist, F.Semusambi. Revntiens, Pouvoir et Droit. 1985,p.400/401.
5(l3Father Muvala was named coadjutor bishop of the Catholic diocese of Butare. An announcement regarding his
'resignation' was made a few days only before the date of the ordination. The official explanation given in the
announcement about the incident was 'for personal reason' but everyone in Rwanda knew that it was an ethnic
plot organised by the regime with the full co-operation of Archbishop.
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to the Gospel. Some members of the clergy would justify their involvement in MRND by
saying that it was instrumental in allowing them to fulfil a humanitarian role. With regard to
the Catholic Archbishop, the defenders of his engagement in MRND would say that he was
able to visit the prisons - which were his area of preference50 - and make many donations.
After all "Rwanda is not Chile, it is a tolerant regime, relatively clean".
These relations were constantly referred to by some missionaries as being an option of the
Church for the "camp of the oppressed"507. However, the argument does not stand up before
the criticism about his omission to take a critical distance vis-a-vis the abuse of human rights
by the regime. Hence the accuracy of the observation made by D. Forrester about the
necessary precaution to take when Christian leaders frequent the political powers. He put it
as follows: "The theologian should be close to the powerful and the experts, but not 'at home'
among them- familiar with the corridors of power, but not at ease with them. For theology is
both a speaking of truth to power and a voice for the powerless and marginalized, for the
victims, who have a special place in the Kingdom"508.
Similarly, Schonecke, the general secretary of the East Africa Conferences of Catholic
Bishops, assessed the relations of the Church with both the colonial administration and the
republican regimes. He pointed out the fact that after the government, the Catholic Church
was the single most powerful institution in the land through its network of social institutions.
He then noticed that the political involvement in favour of social justice was alienated by
closeness to the regimes to such an extent that their many "declarations during the genocide
were insignificant and inadequate". For Schonecke, the "events in Rwanda reinforce a lesson
of history: a Church too closely identified with a regime shares its fate"509. If the Church-
state relationships did not provide a moral and spiritual guidance, they had fulfilled other
functions very well as we shall see in the next paragraphs.
IV. 5.1.2. Extending the Church's Influence
The Church inherited a dominant position from the colonial administration in the sphere of
social services510. It is true that their coverage of the whole country lessened the shock of
some governmental insufficiencies. However, from an ethical perspective the contribution of
the Churches in bringing about the moral well-being of the population was not evident. These
services were not used to promote justice and mercy for example in questioning their raison
d'etre in an environment where human rights were abundantly violated; they were not used to
5<)6The Archbishop erected several chaplaincy buildings or expanded the prisons; he donated radios and other
things.
507 De Barrini, J., "L'Eglise, maitresse au Rwanda, servante au Burundi". Le Monde , August 1988
508 Forrester,D., Theology and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 163.
5"'J Schonecke,W., op.cit., p.2.
510 The Roman Catholic Church then promoted rural and urban projects, rent crops, coffee; reforestation and so
forth. In economics, it developed a network of printing companies, in Kabgayi, Kigali, Butare, Nyundo ; it ran a
network of supermarkets called 'Economat-Generaux' of import-export exempted from custom taxes in each
diocese; it had a parallel system of exchange of foreign currency, a practice that was an offence but tolerated by the
Governement in the case of the Catholic Church.
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serve the poor and the marginalised first; nor to oppose the institutional injustices. Father
Schonecke,511 expressed the same feeling as follows.
Above all, the Church as a body did not really engage itself in an effective struggle for justice and
reconciliation, the only long-term basis for true development. Having access to foreign currency for
projects, many Church leaders developed life styles that alienated them from the struggle of common
people and made them appear part of the exploitative upper class. The huge efforts of building up these
structures does not seem to have brought about a genuine evangelisation of people and of society. Strong
and well-organised social institutions do not guarantee either long-term development or the building up
of true faith communities. They can only be effective on condition that society is built on principles of
political and economic justice and respect for fundamental human rights "2.
The network of socio- economic institutions including schools, hospitals and health centres,
rural development projects and income generating activities like the industry of tourism in
Guest Houses or 'Economat Generaux' owned by the Churches made of them the most
influential institution after the State. That they were made to generate profit rather than being
a trampoline for addressing the burning issues of society so as to deepen evangelisation was
obvious. Truly, these institutions would have been the tools for peace if they were used to
initiate and sponsor peace and justice activities, to educate questioning generations on
Human rights. In the end, it was the regime which benefited from both this vast network of
the Churches' social and economic activities as well as from their absence of criticism. It also
exploited the pietistly mass conversions which proliferated in the 1980s/90s. But, in the end,
the absence of criticism was a trap of the regime as in any other system where the rulers have
silenced the prophets as it is well described in the Rwandan cultural based anecdote of the
'king of Bwidishyi'513.
IV. 5.1.3. Catechism in Place of Theology.
Theological activities in the Church have long been restricted to the catechism published
mostly by European missionaries514. Within Catholic Church, these catechisms had their
origin in Cardinal Lavigerie's instructions to his missionaries. As mentioned in Chapter
Three, Lavigerie wanted to recruit, form and equip local elites capable of inducing the
conversions of the population. In rare cases, the local clergy pioneered what they called the
indigenisation of the Church. However they did not initiate an authentic theological
stream515. Rwandan Christians were then nurtured in an intolerant form of catechism516.
'"General-Secretary of the AMECEA, the Association of the Roman Catholic Episcopal Conferences of East
Africa.
512 Schonecke, W., op.cit.p.4.
513 In a mythical kingdom of Bwidishyi, a young came on power. He nominated on the positions of responsibility
the young subjects and told them to applaud to whatever he would say or do. But before he had ordered his
subjects to kill all the old persons to avoid the overdue charges they imposed to his regime. A single young person
succeeded to hid his old father. One day he saw a zebra and appreciated its coloured skin. He hunted and killed the
zebra and ordered that his subjects dress him properly with the skin of the animal all over his body. But then, as
the skin started to dry it squeezed the king. He started crying and saying : Ndapfuye Bidishyi ("I am dying people
of Bwidishyi"). The young lads would respond, "Yes, you are dying Mwidishyi"! This went on till the young king
was agonising. Not only the young followers were afraid of opposing the orders of their lord, but also did not
know neither the consequences of the squeezing nor how to liberate him. When the young lad who had hide his
father recounted to his refugee the unpleasant story at the palace, the old person, realising the danger, offered to
give assistance. Freed, at the least, the young king ordered that the ignoble act be revoked.
514
Respectively, Brard , Arnoux, Delmas, Van der mersch; see Van der Meersch, op.cit. p. 110.
'"Van der Meersch (Father),J., Le catechumenat au Rwanda. De 1900 a nos jours, Kigali: Pallotti presses 1993.
The rare local theologians were involved in the inculturation theology: Mgr Aloys Bigirumwami (+ 1986); Father
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Further research can establish the link between this absence of articulated theology and
Christian teaching with the proliferation of diverse forms of spirituality such as the Kibeho
apparitions which occurred from 1981.
IV. 5.1.4. Kibeho's 'Apparitions': Filling in a Vacuum
From the 28 November 1981, in the Kibeho parish517 some young people claimed to have had
revelations from the Virgin Mary and Jesus. These children came from various educational
backgrounds: some were uneducated and illiterate, some were at Primary schools, and others
were at secondary schools. According to the children, the divine visitors would request
among other things that both the Church hierarchy and the public authorities518 as well as the
population repent and be devoted to the Virgin Mary. The authorities, including the
President, were requested "to work for both the nation and the Church and to never be
ashamed for manifesting publicly their faith while proclaiming the word of God"519. The
'visionaries' received also the message to adore, respect, love and revere the Mother of the
Word. Those who reject the Rosary, the images and statutes of the Virgin Mary had to amend
their ways520. Some among the 'visionaries' including Segatashya, a young illiterate lad,
claimed to have been called to spread the message outside Rwanda and went into Burundi
and the R.D.Congo521.
With few exceptions the children were from poor milieus, impoverished large families with
often separated parents, having difficulties in gaining access to schools. Their only possibility
of earning the basic minimum for a decent life in Rwanda ; many among the visionaries were
of lower performance and moral standards522 . Some commentators invoked these factors to
dismiss the genuine character of the revelations.
Kagame (+1982). Kagame translated the Roman Missel (oration and lectionary), the Psalms and the New
Testament with some books of the Old Testament; he published on the inculturation. But in refusing to apply the
principles of dynamic-equivalence, his Bible translation remained rigid and heavily accessible to most Christians.
Father B. Muzungu, who after being professor of theology in his exile in Kinshasa from 1960 returned in Rwanda
to pursue his work on the African theology. In his threefold volumes, "Le Dieu des Nos Peres" (Bujumbura, 1974-
1981). Outside these pioneers, little has been written.
516 There was only extracts of the Bible de Acker for schools which part was re-edited in 1947 under the title
"Bibliya Gatolika. Amateka ya Yezu Kristu" (Catholic Bible. The life of Jesus). Van der Meersch, op.cit. p.123.
M7Founded in 1934 and placed under the patronage of "Mary the Mother of God", Kibeho was then a parish of the
Catholic diocese of Butare. From 1992, Kibeho became part of the newly created diocese of Gikongoro.
518Misago, A (Mgr)., Les apparitions de Kibeho au Rwanda. Kinshasa: Facultes de theologie catholique, 1991. See




521A 15 years old boy who started illiterate, Segatashya was shortly baptised. He went in Burundi in early 1986,
ignoring the order of the Burundian authorities who had already cancelled his visa. He could not preach. He rather
sojourned in Congo (Zaire) from March 1986 to May 1988 where he learnt three major languages of the country in
a record time (Swahili, Lingala and Chiluba) and started to preach without translator. This brought Mgr. Misago to
say that "if that was not from a divine force, Segatashya was a genius". Ibid.p.
522Opened by Alphonsine Mumureka, 16 years old, a pupil is the first year of the girls' college, the presumed
apparitions then spread rapidly in the school and the environment. Anathalie Mukamazimpaka, from Tuesday 12
January 1982, Marie Claire Mukangango, from 2 March 1982. From the 18 August 1992, Valentine Nyiramukiza,
17 ans, a pupil in Primary School 8; Setephanie Mukamurenzi, 14 ans, primary 6, and from the 25 th May 1982,
Vestina Salima, 24 ans, who never could pass her primary school and was living at home; from July 1982,
Segatashya, a 15 years boy, illiterate and non Christian. From then on the number of the visionaries multiplied in
such way that on December 31, 1983, there were 33 Misago. Misago. op.cit. p. 292.
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Nonetheless, the events achieved a national and international notoriety which gathered
thousands of pilgrims. The apparitions lasted several months, sporadically from 1990
onwards. They also divided the Church and the country into the partisans and opponents
whilst the hierarchy, in particular, the local bishop, remained silent pretending to wait for the
conclusions of two ad-hoc commissions523.
The insistence upon using the devotional objects 524 emerged from a non ecumenical and
sustainable theology which contributed to a reinforcement of an attitude of rivalry between
the two Christian families, Catholic and Protestant. The apparitions hardened the religious
language and raised ecumenical problems in an already precarious context. According to
Misago, the 'visionaries' who were born in families and milieus marked with religious
syncretism, contributed by language to the deterioration of the already fragile relations
between Catholics and Protestants525. What Misago was saying implicitly was that the
apparitions exhumed the old quarrels marked with intolerance between Protestants and
Catholics in which the former accused the latter to be idolatrous whilst the latter accused
Protestants to be sectarians, even irreligious. The conflict was evoked by the late Mgr
Bigirumwami, emeritus bishop of Nyundo, in less than ecumenical language in his letter to
Father Maindron.
le dechainement diabolique contre la Mere de Dieu entre 1979 et 1981. Les iconoclastes endiables ont
enleve et casse les statues placees dans nos eglises et au carrefour des routes, a travers tout le Rwanda,
et les voix autorisees n'ont par alors proteste contre ces faits sacrileges526.
The apparitions also raised the issue of the political exploitation of religious pietism. It seems
that Habyarimana's religious fervour allowed him to infiltrate the movement. The emphasis
of the visionaries on obedience to the regime and to the co-operation between the ecclesial
and public authorities reinforced the idea that Rwandan Christianity was a religious opium.
Erpicum & al put it this way:
Ce phenomene religieux a ete mele d'un certain caractere politique (des proches du President etaient
parmi les plus fervents disciples de Kibeho) et nationaliste (les pretres etrangers qui avaient ose soulever
quelques questions a propos de Kibeho se sont vus accuses de collusion avec Voerster et l'Afrique du
Sud). A-t-on assiste a un authentique approfondissement spirituel Chretien porteur d'engagement? Ou
bien est-ce un mecanisme de 'fuite dans le religion-opium du peuple527.
Erpicum is right to underline the interference of the political authorities in the Kibeho
apparitions. Most of the time, there has been a pressure from political circles towards the
Catholic hierarchy and on the Vatican to officially recognise and proclaim Kibeho as an
authentic site of apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Though many signs indicate that the
523 Even the Pope infuriated the partisans when he refused to make any reference to them during his 1990 visit.
However, in 1988 the local bishop Mgr J.B. Gahamanyi authorised a "Public Cult of the Virgin" in Kibeho
without stating the official position of the Church.
524 The list non exhaustive, presented by Misago included the rosary, the salute of the saints and feast of the
Sacrament, the path of the cross, the devotion of the Sacred Heart la devotion au Sacred Heart, the months of S.
Joseph, and the St Virgin, the processions of Palm Sunday as described by Father Van der Meersch formed a
"mentality of the magic like the talismans used to appease".
525 Misago, op.cit. p.421.
526 Maindron,G., Les apparitions de Kibeho. In his letter to Father Maindron (August 1984), the later Mgr
Emeritus, Aloys Bigirumwami, felicitated the author for his initiative to write a book that would radiate the 'Mere
du Verbe' (the Mother of the Verb)".
527
Erpicum & al, op.cit. p.31.
143
Archbishop of Kigali (Primate of the Catholic Church) was sympathetic to the petitions528, he
could do little for he was not the bishop of the place.
But then, the hierarchy abandoned those among the members of the clergy who had serious
questions about the credibility of the assumed apparitions, alone to face the aggressive lobby
and attacks coming from outside and inside the Church. The Kibeho events raised
controversies because of the external interference suspected to be motivated by financial and
political interests. Mgr. Misago noticed that among the public authorities who interfered was
C. Mfizi, head of the Office of Information (ORINFOR) which was a sort of a Propagandist
agency for the President. Suspecting an eventual political manipulation, Misago also
remarked that one of the visionaries, Alphonsine, was regularly invited into the Mfizis and
even into the private residence of President Habyarimana in Gisenyi529.
It seems to this writer that the regime had tried to create an intimacy with the visionaries so
as to infiltrate the movement in giving to the teenagers its own version and perspective on
the Rwandan reality, in particular on issues of ethnic relations. Hence, in 1990 when the war
broke out, and later in 1993/4, during the blockage of the implementation of the Arusha
Peace Agreement, there were unbelievably large scale rumours spread about the inevitability
of bloodshed events on a large-scale because "the Kibeho visionaries predicted them"530. In
fact, the presumed apparitions played a significant part in the fatalism and inevitability of the
bloodshed conflict. This was recognised by Father Maindron.
Les voyants ont parfois pleure, claque les dents, ou tremble, se sont effondres plusieurs fois de tout le
poids de leur corps... Les enfants voyaient des images terrifiantes, un fleuve de sang, des gens qui
s'entre-tuent, des cadavres abandonnes sans quelqu'un pour les enterrer, un arbre tout en feu, un gouffre
beant, un monstre, des tetes decapitees. La foule, environ 20,000 personnes, a garde une impression de
peur, voir de panique et de tristesse.531
Surprised and unprepared, the hierarchy took time before it started to reflect on how to
provide moral and pastoral guidance. They created a medical and theological commissions
which pursued the monitoring of the apparitions. At the eve of the 1994 tragic events, the
commissions had not yet published their report.
Without pretending to interpret these events which root far beyond the scoop of this research,
it must however be noted that the Kibeho events occurred during a period of a vacuum in the
Church theology. They also occurred at a period Rwanda was experiencing social crises:
poverty, inaccessibility to education, hopelessness among the youths, absence of good
examples of fidelity to the Gospel and last but not least, political turmoil. It may be that
Kibeho was an expression from the grass-roots of a national outrage against moral, social and
521f The archbishop built a memorial of the Virgin Mary on the Mount Jari Hill, opposite to the capital, Kigali; he
organised several rallies and his sermons and public speeches versed abundantly into the Marylogy teaching
constantly referring to the presence of the Virgin in Rwanda.
529Misago, op.cit. p.366; 400.
530
Many people including two couples highly educated, known by the present author who were engaged in one of
the prayers groups which proliferated in the aftermath of the Kibeho 'apparitions' always referred to the crisis prior
to the 1994 tragedy as "the inevitable indication of the apocalypse announce by the Kibeho visionaries".
53llbid. 183.
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political decay532. Could it be that the Church lacked its touch with the reality of people, then
an effort must be done to rethink its ecclesiology. The Protestants to whom we turn now was
not in a better position with regard to deepening its theology into the real concerns of people.
IV. 5.2. Protestant hierarchy
Like their counterparts Catholic, the Protestant hierarchy, as stated earlier have adhered to
the MRND policies. The Roman Catholic drew its adhesion to the MRND system from both
its historical relationships with political power and its monarchical organisation. With regard
to Protestants, the history of adhesion to political power can be traced to the regime of
Habyarimana. Two particular aspects which might have contributed to push the Protestants in
the hands of the MRND system must be underlined.
Firstly, there was a dramatic absence of an adequate training of the leadership. With a few
exceptions, the generation which took over responsibility from the missionaries in the 1960s
had relatively low intellectual and theological background. Some were former missionary-
workers, others were former teachers or catechists who trained on the field. It seems that
because of that difference in intellectual capacities, the Protestant hierarchy was not taken
seriously by their Catholic counterparts. Consequently, the interest of President Habyarimana
towards Protestant leaders appeared to the later an act of rescue from religious and political
marginality to which they responded in keeping silence about the burning issues. It could be
also that the absence of a solid educational background prevented to articulate theologically
the connection needed between the Church teachings out of its identity of Word, Sacraments,
Prayer and Liturgy, on the one hand, and on the other, the problems of society, political,
economic, social impasses533.
Secondly, the Protestants struggled for their survival in the immediate aftermath of the
independence. In fact, they were pushed in the state of marginality. Despite the progress
made by Vatican II in the ecumenical matters, if Protestants were not simply ignored534, they
532
During the 1994 tragedy, horrific massacres were committed in the Churches in Kibeho where more than 8000
people were slain. During the so-called French Turquoise intervention which covered the Kibeho area, a camp of
more than 200,000 persons was built on the site. In 1995 it became a theatre of other tragic events. The Rwandan
Patriotic Army intervened on April 21 and dismantled the camps whose occupants were suspected to include the
Interahamwe militia. 380 people were left dead according to the governmental reports; for the humanitarian
organisations, there were more than 4000 victims.
533There existed from 1970 a school of theology in Butare for all the Protestant Churches. The first Faculty of
Theology started in 1990 in the same compound. At that time, the Protestant Churches had only two Doctors in
theology who for no elucidated reasons were teaching in the Faculty. During the inauguration of the first Faculty
of theology, the Chairman of the Board, Revd Twagirayesu made a triumphant assessment praising the School for
having graduated 80 laureates in its 20 years of existence! Distributed among the members of the institution (the
Presbyterian Church, the 8 dioceses of the Episcopal Church, the Methodist Church, the Baptist Church, the
Pentecost Church) the triumphalism is surprising. See Isangano, the Journal of the Protestant Faculty of theology
of Butare. no 2, 1991, pp. 6-9
534 For example, a brochure produced in 1968 by the Roman Catholic bishops of in Burundi, Congo and Rwanda
blankly presented Rwanda in two section, one showing the statistics of the Catholic population, and another
showing the percentage of pagans: Catholiques: 43 %; Catechumens: 9%; pagans: 48 % with the following
comment: In 1963 Burundi and Rwanda had : 5.368.399 inhabitants of whom : 2.351.711 Catholics; 430.4888
Catechumenes and 2.586.200 pagans. In 1968, the document indicated that Rwanda and Burundi would have 52
% of Catholics; 9 % Catechumens, 39 % Pagans.
Eglise Catholique, Plan quinquennal de developpement. Bujumbura et Kigali: Conference des Ordinaires du
Rwanda et du Burundi, 1968, pp.10 & 42.
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were merely suspected of being favourable to the inyenzi' .535 Thus, Protestants paid the bill
for the 'pro-monarchical' sympathies manifested at the eve of the 1959 Revolution. Instead of
focusing on promoting a leadership committed to being in solidarity with the poor, the
hierarchy constituted a clique of the so-called "Representants Legaux des Eglises" (legal
representatives), controlling the authority in the manner of a monarchical government. Many
of them introduced diverse symbols to manifest their control of power, such as the
phenomenon of flags on bishops' cars.536 Others would manipulate constitutions and
elections to continue as leaders537. Some would distribute privileges, recruit candidates to
scholarships and to different posts of responsibility with the procedures borrowed from
government. Many observers think that these practices were borrowed from the unique ruling
party system. H.H. Osborn accurately puts it as follows:
For the Churches, this dilemma was more acute than for the government. It was not difficult for political
leaders to be chosen on ethnic grounds. The majority ethnic group had triumphed in the revolution and
political justifications were understandable. It was a more difficult problem in the Church where spiritual
qualifications were held to be more important than ethnic or political ones. In practice, leaders were
chosen from the dominant ethnic grouping who were also considered to be spiritually fit for office538.
In all the Protestant denominations members of the Protestant Council539, (CPR) no single
Church Leader was from a Batutsi background. With the Catholic Church on the eve of the
1994 tragedy, 3 diocesans bishops out of 9 were associated with Batutsi background. This
absence of inclusiveness in the Churches might have had a political implication, the
unchallenged sympathy with the rulers of a same group identity540. But it would be too simple
to suggest that Church leaders of one ethnic background should have no bearing upon
repression and oppression affecting the other community, or that leaders of Batutsi would
have done better.
Osborn's accurate remark on Rwanda illustrates the ambiguous position of Christianity in
African political regimes where prophetic voices have been silenced as described by the
Camerounian Catholic theologian J-M.Ela: "In black Africa, the vast majority of the religious
authorities are chosen, admitted or tolerated only on the condition that they keep silent on the
essential problems of black life". In a dominated society, where structures have been
eternally imposed on people, where the "voice of the gospel is stifled in order to guarantee
the stability of unpopular regimes or the prosperity of foreign investments", a theology
535 Nkunzumwami, E. 1996.
536During an interview with a commission including the present author appointed by the Protestant Council to
identify the root cause of the conflict within the Anglican Church of Rwanda (inquiry realised in 1990), one
bishop said in jubilation his "pride to have been the first person to introduce for the first time in the Church, the
flags on the bishops' cars".
537In 1996, the General Synod of the Presbyterian Church ofRwanda, introduced a clause restricting the service to
two terms of four years for the President of the Church. "This, we hope will end the speculations of those who
have been manipulating the constitutions to last for ever" said the new president, Dr Karamaga, interview in
Kigali, March 1997.
538 Osborn, H.H., Fire in the hills. The revival that come from Rwanda. Crowborough, East Essex: Highland
books, 1991. p. 220
539 One Presbyterian Church, 8 episcopalian dioceses, one Seven Day Adventist; 2 Baptist Churches; 1 Methodist
Church and One Pentecostal Church.
54(1 See also Chapter III.8.3.
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cannot arise, nor it is "easy to do theology in countries where the churches almost seem to be
pillars of the neo-colonial state"541.
With regard to the relations between the Protestant hierarchy and the Habyarimana regime, it
must be noted that vis-a-vis the Protestant leaders, the President took a positive stance from
that of his predecessor. He would relieve the atmosphere by acceding to some of their
demands regarding, for example, authorisation for building schools, hospitals and health
centres and other projects. The President would participate in commemorative ceremonies
such as Church ordinations and make donations542. He would even mediate when some of
them quarrelled. During his 12 years in power, Kayibanda (Habyarimana's predecessor) did
not recruit any single Protestant, Habyarimana made a difference in eventually naming from
time to time a Protestant member in his Cabinet. Protestant Church leaders were also named
in the Party organs on various levels and as such were automatic members of the ruling party
Congress. The Church hierarchy was integrated in the state protocol together with their
Catholic counterparts and were given diplomatic consideration543. For the first time, the
Protestant hierarchy felt emancipated, representing institutions that counted in a society
where one Church had always been dominant. Thus they became blind to the practices of
injustices as they wittingly endorsed their incorporation into the ruling party.
IV. 5.2.1. Colluding with the MRND Regime
One of the manifestations of the collusion of the Protestant Church elite with the MRND
regime was the messages of congratulations and support sent regularly by different Church
bodies to the General-President. In these messages of unequivocal support there was no
single reference to the arbitrary measures and unjust policies that were practised by the
regime. As shown in the following example of Church P5 ., like its catholic counterpart, the
Protestant hierarchy was not only sympathising with the regime but even being its
loudspeaker.
Messages of the Church P. to 'General- President' of Rwanda
(1984-1993).
Meeting on July in R. July 21 - 25 1986, the Church.P. sent the following message:
Ce message de soutien et de solidarity pour les efforts combien louables avec lesquels vous ne cessez de
conduire inlassablement et efficacement le peuple Rwandais rassemble au sein du MRND vers son
developpement harmonieux dans la paix et l'unite nationale. ... A cet effet, 1' Eglise P. condamne
541
Ela,J-M, Mv Faith as an African, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis books, 1995, p. 176.
542 For example, during the ordination of the Anglican bishop of Shyira (the stronghold of the president) the
president gave to the donated a Car, solar telephone, electricity to bishop Nshamihigo, who would later become a
controversial Anglican Archbishop.
543 The official roll presented as follow: 'President-Fondateur'; 2. the General Secretary of the Ruling Party; 3. the
members of the "Junta: Comite Pour la Paix et l'Unite nationale" ; 4. the members of the Ruling Party Central
Committee; 5. the Speaker of the Parliament and the President of the Constitutional Court; 6. The ambassadors
and the Legal Representatives of the Churches.
544 Church P. The research in the archives of Church P. were authorised by the ecclesial authorities. However, the
issue regarding the handling of the material in the norms legally recognised, i.e. the period required before the
archive sources were publishable was not settled out. For that reason, that Church will be referred to as Church P.
but its full address is kept within the list of informants who requested anonymity.
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1'attitude anarchique fantaisiste et destructrice a certains egards des sectes qui s'infiltrent dans le pays en
interdisant la participation a la vie civique. Nous louons Dieu par Jesus-Christ du fait qu'aucun des
membres effectifs de l'eglise P. n'a ete emporte par ces fausses doctrines. Notre conviction fondamentale
qui determine notre enseignement est que ceux qui s'opposent a l'autorite sous pretexte quelconque
resiste a l'ordre de Dieu et attireront une condamnation sur eux -memes car l'autorite est au service de
Dieu pour le bien-etre de l'homme (Rom 13.2-4). La recherche de la prosperite pour notre pays et
l'intercession aupres du Seigneur de l'univers en sa faveur constitue les principes fondamentaux de notre
engagement Chretien. La prosperite de l'eglise dependra de la prosperite du peuple Rwandais (Jer
29.7).545
This unsolicited support was formulated during the crucial period of the repression of the
adherents of some religious movements as mentioned above. These included some tendencies
in the some Churches; the Jehovah Witnesses, Abantu b'Imana (God's people) et les
Abarokole(the born-again) in 1986. This message of Church P. clearly attacks the activities
of those religious movements described as developing an "attitude anarchique fantaisiste et
destructrice". The message uses Romans 13 to give a theological argument to a clear appeal
to the state repressive machinery to eventually violate the freedom of conscience and worship
which is a universal right.
Actually, this state repression left at least 15 dead and 300 arrested who were condemned for
up to 15 years of prison546. The repression stopped following international pressure. The
Church leaders have since then been unashamed of their position. An overseas worker in the
Protestant Churches commented on the complicity of the Churches with such a repressive
regime as follows:
...les adherents de ces sectes, venus de divers milieux et pour la vaste majorite de simples paysans,
mettent tout simplement en pratique la conviction classique de la Reforme. A savoir que chaque Chretien
a le droit et meme l'obligation de s'asseoir dans son coin, de lire la Bible et de trouver lui-meme la verite
de la foi, sans intermediate ecclesiastique qui lui dirait ce qu'il faut croire.Les autorites civiles ne
devraient-elles pas essayer de dechiffrer le message qu'expriment ces groupes d'une maniere
inconsciente, un message de mecontentent contre certains abus de pouvoir et du fosse existant entre les
paroles et les actes?... en entendant les discours, c'est I'etat qui accorde la liberte de religion et les
privileges aux Eglises eu egard a leur bon comportement en general et leur engagement pour le
developpement du pays en particulier. Que faire done de groupements religieux qui sont 'inutiles', meme
"
ingrats"? On les interdit, on leur retire le droit de liberte religieuse, Et ce peut-etre pour plaire aux
Eglises etablies qui craignent une certaine concurrence547.
The author ended with a warning borrowed from Niemoller's famous declaration about his
fellow Germans' indifference vis-a-vis the Nazi repression. He underlined the confession of
Niemoller who admitted that for having feared to speak out in favour of the various groups
like the Communists and the Jews on the grounds that he was neither Communist nor Jew,
when he himself was arrested, there was no-one left to speak on his behalf. "What happened
to those groups in Nazi Germany", H. said, "could happen to us in other circumstances".
Words of prophecy!
Irrespective of these warnings, the Church persisted in congratulating the dictator. They
would find superlatives like "you have sealed the pact of peace, unity and love with your
population". The Church leadership went to great lengths to admit that the President
545 Archives of the P. Church; Collection of the author.
546
Reyntjens.F, 1986. p.291
547K,hl 1., Sectes et Esprit Protestant. Dialogue, no 129, Juillet - Aout 1988, p. 117-121.
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challenged their incapacity to formulate a moral, spiritual and cultural education of the young
people as well as a Christian commitment to the poor.
1987: the Church P. meeting in R, 20 to 25 J. wrote:
Le pacte de paix et d'unite en vue du developpement de notre peuple dans la ligne des ideaux du MRND
nous interpelle encore. Votre amour du peuple Rwandais notamment des desherites que vous avez
encore tout recemment manifeste vis-a-vis des Impunyu et des Abanyambo nous plonge dans un soucis
permanent de formuler un message credible a l'attention des pauvres.
The P. Church congratulated the President for his humane attitudes in favour of the
promotion of democratic justice and human rights; according to them, the President
manifested such a humanness in releasing the "elements condemned for uncivil reasons". The
Church promised to join hands with the public authorities to educate those released both
morally and spiritually.
In June 1988 during a meeting of a governing body the Church P., reiterated its tendency to
perpetuate and even to sacralise the Habyarimana's rule. The message whose copy consulted
was only in Kinyarwanda, reads ( our translation):
Excellence, Father of the Nation, the S. rejoiced because of the supreme decision taken by the 6th
Congress of the MRND to re-elect you as president of the MRND for the next five years, thus we
"militants" find in you, a potential candidate in the presidential elections. We fully support the
confidence manifested in you by the participants to the Congress and we also have confidence in you.
Excellency, the President of Republic and Founder- President of our Movement, your policy of unity
and peace, pillars of development with which you command our country with fidelity and integrity, we
owe it many good things which you helped us to realise; we are grateful to you. Thus the members of the
Church P. will manifest their gratitude to you on the 19 of December 1988 in massively voting for you
100%548.
This position of Church P. with regard to assuring the President of 100% electoral support
illustrates the competition between the Church leaderships and the elite who both hoped to
gain the favours of the regime. Although Habyarimana was still popular within the confines
of the single-ruling party which maintained a strict control of the conscience of individuals
and society, the motives behind the Church P. leaders to promise such an electoral record
remain suspicious. A serious doubt has been expressed by many observers of Rwandan
politics over the willingness of all the population including the members of the Church. P. to
vote en masse for him549. Nevertheless, the Church P. message implicitly endorses all forms
of pressure and repression utilised by the MRND machinery to have the President elected
100%.
548 The original in Kinyarwanda reads: "Nyakubahwa mubyeyi w'igihugu, Itorero.P. yashimishijwe n'icyemezo
cy'imena cyafashwe na kongere ya 6 isanzwe ya MRND cyo kongera kubatorera kuba Prezida wa Muvoma muri
iyi myaka itanu iri imbere, bityo abamilitante n'abamilitant tukaba twarongeye kubabonamo umukandida mu Itora
rya Prezida wa Republika. Icyizere abakongresisita babagiriye, turagishyigikiye kandi natwe turakibafitiye.
Nyakubahwa prezida wa Republika na Prezida Fondateri wa Muvoma yacu, Politiki yanyu y'ubumwe n'amahoro
byo nkingi y'amajyambere muyoborana igihugu cyacu mu bwitonzi n'umurava, tuyikesha ibyiza byinshi
mwatugejejeho; turabibashimira. Ibyo ngibyo abagize Itorero P. mu Rwanda tuzabibagaragariza kuwa 19 ukuboza
1988 tubahundagazaho amajwi 100 %".
549
Nsengiyaremyeshows that like 1978 a significant section of the population and some regions did not respond
to such pre-arranged elections. The score in favour of Habyarimana during the presidential elections of 1978 was
so poor in some prefectures like Kibuye and Gikongoro achieving only 55 % (though the sole candidate authorises
to 'compete') that they were forced to organise a second round. When the second round ended, the Prefet of the
region, Dr Nyabyenda prevented the electoral jury to count the votes and announced on Radio Rwanda that the
"100% which were awaited is now there!". Nsengiyaremy,D., op.cit.
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It must be remembered that the elections of the President, the MPs and the councillors were
presented on the unique list compiled by the MRND Central Committee which was chaired
by none other than Habyarimana. The members of the Batutsi community and those
considered as dissidents by the regime- though the term dissident was not officially utilised-
were not allowed to present their candidature. Many questioned the raison-d'etre of such
elections if not the waste of energies and resources. Despite the era of passion for re-
democratisation, the Church hierarchy remained trustful of Habyarimana. They perceived the
process of redemocratisation as an intrusion in the fight for saving his rule. This is expressed
in the Church P. message of 1993.
The 1993 Church P. Message to the 'Father of the Nation'
Meeting five days after the signing of the aforementioned Arusha Agreement the Church sent
a message that had a reference to the recent political developments in the country. The
Church leaders congratulated the President, adding their "witness of unfailing support".550
The message referred particularly to the multi-party politics and the prospects generated by
the Arusha Agreement. But at the same time, it sounded a note of regret that the two
processes, the redemocratisation and the Peace Agreement were threatening the President's
authority. Additional editing was done by the authorities of the Church to dilute an initial
critical text proposed by an ad-hoc group. The text reflects the traditional criticism of the
religious establishment against the nascent opposition accused of a lack of loyalty to
Habyarimana. It reads:
Le S. G felicite le peuple Rwandais du nouveau panorama politique marque par le pluralisme politique,
reflet d'un equilibre social et politique dans notre pays. Le Synode regrette, neanmoins les deviations de
ce paysage marque par:
- le relachement de la cohesion des structures de l'etat; la destabilisation du pouvoir judiciaire;- les luttes
malveillantes du pouvoir; l'intolerance entre les partis politiques;- la violation des droits de l'homme
notamment, le droit a la vie; la degradation des structures socio-economiques du pays, resultat de
1'occupation du terrain social et politique par certains politiciens aux interets manifestement egoi'stes et
obscurs, visant la destabilisation du pouvoir executif et judiciaire provoquant ainsi la desobeissance
sociale551.
The history and origin of this practise of sending messages of congratulation to the President
remain a mystery according to information available. One thing which was clear, is the
absence of any state pressure or inducement to do so. In addition, the research in the archives
shows no single official acknowledgement of the Church P's messages from the office of the
state President. This leaves only one conclusion: the messages were an authentic initiative
from the Church. P. hierarchy wishing to please the ruler. If this was correct, then the
problem of exploitation of power by the hierarchy beyond their ecclesial mandate on the one
hand, and on the other, the relationships between public authorities and the Church elite is
raised.
55,1 The participants added a positive note about the Peace accord. They saw it as a source of hope that would end
the three years conflict, resolve the refugee problem and the displaced people problems, open the path for a
peaceful co-existence. Ibid. Message of P. Church. 9 to 14.A. 1993.
551 Church P. to President-Founder of MRND, President of the Republic of Rwanda. 1984-1990. Collection of the
author.
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The content of these messages did not represent a one-off initiative of course but a consistent
act of loyalty that accompanied the regime from its beginning to its tragic end in 1994. It
must be noted that this endorsement of the repressive system contrasted dramatically with
the process at the grass-roots where the 1990s outbreak for re-democratisation had generated
dynamics for energetic denunciation of human rights abuse; education in Human rights,
democracy and reconciliation as previously outlined552.
To obtain their credentials vis-a-vis the regime the ecclesial hierarchy sacrificed the rights of
the poor, the marginalised and the oppressed; they sacrificed the capacity to be detached, to
be able to offer a prophetic critique. As in Germany of the 1930 and 1940s, most of the
population professed some Christian affiliation and membership. To paraphrase Rubenstein
and Roth - who commented on the attitude of the German Churches vis-a-vis the persecution
of the Jews no doubt some among the Christians swore loyalty to Habyarimana "knowing
they had forsaken Christian principles, but the tragedy beyond is that in spite of Protestant
and Catholic dissent, so many did so with the slightest feelings that they had betrayed their
religious identity"553.
On the eve of the crisis, nearer 80 % of the 8,6 million Rwandans were still declaring
themselves as members of Catholic and Protestant Churches. Even the majority of the MRND
and CDR party members and the Interahamwe militia were attending the Sunday service and
taking the Eucharist.554 Clearly, had Rwandans of all denominations, their bishops and
leaders called Christians and the world-wide Christian family to rally together against the
massacres of the innocents, the genocide would have remained inconceivable.
Another area of difficulty which handicapped the capacity for a common initiative was the
quarrels within the Protestant denominations, particularly among the Anglican (Episcopal)
bishops.
IV. 5.2.2. Shameful Face of Protestantism
Quarrels and divisions have been one of the characteristics of some Protestant denominations
including the Episcopal Church and the Association of the Baptist Churches from Illinois
(USA). The Episcopal Church up to the 1970s was by far the largest Protestant Church. It
covered almost the whole geographical territory. Like the Presbyterians, it had a relatively
good number of social services and influence in evangelism resulting from the Revival which
started in Gahini in 1930s. On the eve of the 1994 tragedy, the Episcopal Church had twelve
bishops for eight dioceses. The first diocese was created in 1965 covering the whole country
with Adonia Sebununguri, a former missionary-aide, as its bishop. The second diocese was
formed in the early 1970s, in Butare, covering half of the country from the centre and the
south. Reverend Ndandari was nominated its bishop.
552 See chapter VI.
553
Roth, J & Rubenstein, R., Approaches to Auschwitz , Louisville.KY: Westminister John Knox Press, 1987.
554Matthew Ngirumpatse, the General secretary of the MRND and pioneer of the creation of the Interahamwe. A
Ph.D. in Law and musician, he was founder and director of a very important Christian choir at St Michael parish,
in Kigali.
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The quarrels between these two first bishops started at that period over the sharing of
patrimony between the dioceses. However, the conflict broke out publicly in early 1975
during the process of constituting a third diocese at Shyira. Each of the two bishops presented
his own candidate for the province's nominee separately. Finally, Sebununguri's candidate,
A. Nshamihigo, a former Army Chaplain, was elected555. Ndandari heavily resented his
defeat which was reinforced by his failure to secure a second mandate as Archbishop of
Rwanda, Burundi and Boga-Zaire Province. His successor, Samuel Sindamuka from Burundi
formed a partnership with Sebununguri of the Kigali diocese and Nshamihigo of Shyira.
These three urged Ndadari to hand over the Archbishop's office. When Ndadari (Butare)
resisted, they revoked him from being an Anglican bishop. The Rwandan Government got
involved in the conflict. The Minister of Justice signed a decree approving what the group
had called the "replacement of Bishop Ndandari by bishop Nshamihigo due to his mandate
which has ended"556.
The Justice Minister's decision raised a series of protestations in Ndandari's diocese of
Butare. An unprecedented event happened when 49 ministers organised a protest
demonstration wearing their pastoral robes, holding their Bibles and placards, from 13th to
19th May 1991 at the ministry of Justice in Kigali. Then to no avail, the other Protestant
Church leaders pleaded for reconciliation before the Minister, Bishops Sindamuka,
Sebununguri and Nshamihigo.557
There have been various interpretations of this decision, the most advanced being that
Nshamihigo wanted to move from the remote Shyira to a central diocese to fulfil his ambition
to become archbishop.558 Meanwhile, to anticipate the plan concocted by his rivals to create a
new Province limited to Rwanda in which he would be isolated, Bishop Ndandari divided his
diocese of Butare and ordained four bishops.559 The ordination was rejected by the Province's
group with the claim that the Anglican communion endorses ordination from at least three
active bishops acting collectively. Finally, the Anglican Communion started a mediation
which ended in 1992 with a new arrangement: A. Nshamihigo was elected archbishop of the
555Which was still including Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire.
556The decree was published in the Journal Official of the Republic of Rwanda, no 9, May 1991, p.473. In the
former Belgian colonies, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, each non-governmental organisation including the Churches
and their representatives must be agreed by a governmental decree.
557The four members of the Commission were appointed in May 1990 by the Executive of the Protestant Council
Church leaders. Outside the present author, the group included Bishop A. Ruhumuriza and Revd P. Munyagisaka
(Methodists), Revd I. Muzigamfizi (Presbyterian). In its report presented to the Protestant Council Church leaders
in February 1991, the commission recommended among other things not to interfere with each other matters and
to respect the constitutions of both the Province and the individual dioceses.
55R Ndandari rejected the decision. Consequently, a letter of 5 June 1990 from Archbishop Sindamuka, written at
Nairobi dismissed Ndandari as bishop in the Episcopal Church. Then Bishop Sebununguri and Nshamihigo, the
former acting as 'Dean of the Province' gathered a meeting of some elders, pastors and Christians in the parish of
Kigeme. In open air, this so-called "assembly of members of Butare diocese"- an organ which does not exist in
their constitutions decided to appoint Bishop Nshamihigo at the 'vacant seat' of Butare's diocese jointly with his
own of Shyira.
559Samuel Musabyimana for Shyogwe, Norman Kayumba for Kigeme, Alex Birindabagabo for Cyangugu, and
Venuste Mutiganda as Co-adjuteur in Butare.
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new Province of Rwanda; Ndandari was rehabilitated and his nominees re-ordained and re¬
appointed560. This resolved the crisis temporarily but there were other crises to come.
In fact, the next drama opposed for the first time, the two historical partners, both
unconditional allies of the Habyarimana regime, Sebununguri of Kigali diocese and
Nshamihigo of Shyira diocese, now archbishop of Rwanda. During the process of creating a
new diocese in Kibungo detached from that of Kigali, Sebununguri's Synod presented two
candidates as requested by the Provincial Constitution, Revd A. Mvunabandi, a Gahini
Secondary School director, and Revd. Karuhije561, secretary to the bishop, Dean of the Kigali
Cathedral. During the electoral proceedings in the Province, Sebununguri, backed by the
Shyogwe's diocese bishop, S. Musabyimana, supported Revd A. Karuhije, while the
Archbishop and the rest of his colleagues supported Mvunabandi.
This became an issue. Observers have remarked two elements that turned the process into an
ethnic conflict. First, Sebununguri camp argued that his candidate, Karuhije, a kin to his
wife, was being ejected because of his Batutsi background. Second, in Kibungo, a virtual
'Batutsi' inhabited land, Sebununguri had for a virulent opponent, Justin Mugenzi, an ethno-
politician native of the region, member of his Church and president of the PL political
party562. Mugenzi made no secret of the fact that if Karuhije was selected, he would not let
him go safe. It is on that timbre that the two camps, on the one hand, Sebununguri's and on
the other, Nshamihigo's (Archbishop) planned secret separate ceremonies of ordination. The
Archbishop's scored. Mvunabandi was ordained on 18 September 1993. But once the new
bishop was appointed he found a diocese split into two factions and had to mobilise his
clergy and Christians to bring about a peace settlement.563
There was a sense that both candidates, Karuhije and Mvunabandi were competent and good
men who were used and enmeshed in a dirty and bitter feud by their superiors. Meanwhile, in
South, in the former diocese of Butare now divided in four, the patriarch Bishop, Justin
Ndandari, entered into rivalry with one of his young nominees, the bishop of the Shyogwe
diocese, Samuel Musabyimana, for the possession of the Hanika parish near the town of
Nyanza.564 The conflict had not been resolved at the time of the 1994 tragedy.
56HDuring this reorganisation, a former assistant bishop to Ndandari, Mgr Nduhura who was relegated to a jobless
position was appointed bishop of the Cyangugu dioces. A. Birindabagabo, was appointed to Kigeme. As he was
not native of the region, and having a Tutsi identity, he underwent pressure and ended in being relegated to a
position of assistant bishop. He exchanged his position with his assistant, a man of the region, Norman Kayumba.
561 A kin to Sebununguri's family as a nephew to his wife. Actually, he was killed by the militia during the
genocide.
562
Mugenzi's party, PL was divided into two rival factions. His faction was close to the "Hutu power" base who
were the extremist group responsible for the genocide.
563 Interview with Bishop Mvunabandi, Kigali, April 5, 1997.
564Located in the administrative territory of Gitarama comprising the Shyogwe diocese, Hanika parish was
maintained in the Butare diocese during the creation of four new dioceses by ' the sponsoring' bishop, Ndadari, in
my view for three reasons: geographically (Hanika was nearer and easily covered by Butare); referential (unlike
Shyogwe a very important historical missionary station, the Butare diocese was created ex nihilo); financially and
ecumenically (Hanika was in partnership with the district of Ottoweiler, Church of Reinhland, Germany which
constituted a source of income). The new bishop of Shyogwe, Musabyimana was granted the occupation of the
parish by the intervention of the Gendarmerie in February 1994.
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Another series of conflicts occurred within another Protestant Church, Association of Baptist
Churches of Rwanda (AEBR). The poorly formed local pastors were opposed to the
Missionaries of the Conservative Baptist Mission from Illinois (USA) on the question of
managing the aid, and on other matters including the Church's leadership. Each time, the
conflict resulted in a break away and the creation of a fractional Church565.
Through quarrels, jealousy, loyalty to political power or mutual accusations over greed
among some of the Protestant denominations, people have perceived the most notorious
offences against elementary standards of the Church and society. The absence of community
discipline, of conciliation and forgiveness inside Rwandan Christian communities, has set up
a distressing example to society. While remaining tough on discipline, Paul advises patience
and kindness to congregations whose integrity was threatened by fractious offences resulting
from cultural diversity, divergent theologies, quarrels over wages of Church leaders. He
invites them to distinguish those offences, though not excusable, are subject to forgiveness,
and those considered as criminal, thus grounded for expulsion from community566.
As Shriver puts it, Paul's letters offer a picture of strong-willed people struggling with
definitions of moral norms, moral authority and their obligation to preserve their relations
with each other. The intercongregational ethic here was a restorative justice with room for on
the one hand, punishment, and on the other, forgiveness, as sober, patient virtue of people, a
factor of renewal of social relationship and an ingredient for the fabric of community
cohesion567.
The way leadership has been searched, exercised and understood in Rwandan Churches
reveals that it was taken for being synonymous of the control of power. Viewed from a
phenomenological point of view, power is considered from three angles: those who exercise
it; the means employed and its extreme forms.568 The Church leaders have perceived their
role not as servants of the community but as rulers. Hence, the definition which Max Weber
gave to power applied with regard to its control in Rwandan Churches: "Power is the
565
According to Revd F. Bashaka, current Legal Representative, the last crisis occurred in late 1991 between the
Church leaders and the missionaries. It resulted from a disagreement on the management of the financial aid from
the Mission. AEBR leaders felt they were being treated like children. The missionaries were not sure that the aid
would be used in accordance with their purposes.
The AEBR proposed that its 'mother-mission' mediate. There was no single response. Then they called on the
Protestant Council which appointed a commission. The later made recommendations which the missionaries
rejected. Instead, the later withdrew and created their own "Mission for a new Creation" led by Reverend Cheer,
who at the time was senior representative of the "Mother Mission" in Rwanda (currently missionary in Pakistan).
Another split took place in 1984/86, when Abel Serukato, a former leader of the Church who was paid a monthly
wage of $40 to be a 'puppet of the Missionaries', according to his rivals, tried to recuperate the leadership of the
Church with the assistance of the missionaries. Revoked by the Executive committee of the Church Serukato
moved two miles away and founded a fractional community, "the community of the Evangelical Churches in
Rwanda". Interview, Kigali, March 1995; CPR archives.
566
Ready in particular the following passages: Mt. 18:15-17; Mt. 6. 14-15; 1 Cor.l3:4; 2 Cor.12.20-21.
567 Shriver Jr,D., An Ethic for Enemies. Forgiveness in Politics. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
56S Thielicke, H., op.cit. p.171.
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probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests"569.
Consequently, instead of being the agencies of healing and reconciliation, the Protestant
Churches developed conflicts and divisions which completely ruined the credibility of the
Churches in their attempt to mediate in the political crisis. This absence of ethical, social and
spiritual maturity was reinforced by a 'born-againism' in their teachings to which we now
turn.
IV. 5.2.3. 'Born-again' Theology: Mariumu and Bonnke
a. Challenge from prophetess Mariamu
The prophetess Mariamu, a Zairian of Banyamurenge background, lived in Abela village, 120
km south of the Congolese (Zairian) city of Uvira, opposite Bujumbura (Burundi). Her
charismatic ministry started in early 1970s and has been since then a challenge to the
Rwandan Churches570. In the following paragraphs our aim is to examine the emergence of
the Mariamu phenomenon and its implications on the teaching of the Churches and the ethnic
issue in the Great lakes region.
Mariamu's ministry was popular among the Banyamurenge group but raised controversial
reactions among other ethnic groups of the area, particularly among the Bembe and
Bafulelo571. The fundamentalist Churches in the sub-region, exploited her charisma in
organising pilgrimages for Christians from Rwandan Churches and skilfully exploited her
indirect reference to baptism by immersion and by Holy Spirit to attract members from the
institutional denominations572. According to Eca, a lawyer, native of Mariamu's village from
the Bemba group, her charisma was promoted by some politicians from the region who lived
in Kinshasa and at the same time opposed by politicians of the other groups573. During the
war that followed the Banyamurenge uprisings in October 1996, Mariamu was wounded and
her sons killed. She was brought to Rwanda and died in the Pentecostal Parish Church of
Gitarama in December 1996
From the ethical point of view, Mariamu's phenomenon raises a series of questions. What is
the theological foundation and the place of her teachings in the proclamation of the Gospel.
569 Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic organisations, trans.A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons,
New York/ Oxford, 1947, p. 132, quoted in Thielicke, op.cit. p.172.
570 Mariamu came into her prophetic ministry through illness that left her physically disabled in the lower part of
her body. During the process of searching for healing the traditional healer consulted should have said that "your
last chance would be in God". Illiterate and not Christian, she then started to look at how to know God. She learnt
how to read the Bible on her own and then converted to Methodism.
571 Ms Eugenie Mukayiranga, a former member of the Rwanda University Bible study groups spent one month in
the Abela village in 1982. Giving her testimony about Mariamu's phenomenon, she said that most of Mariamu'
supposed teachings would be exaggerated by her visitors back home. Eca, a lawyer from the Mariamu village said
in the same meeting that her ministry was never questioned. Rather, the Church was looking at how to integrate it
fully in its life. E. M. Ngenzi at Bodenseehof house, May 1995.
572It has been assumed that the fundamentalist Churches are those which ignore formal liturgy, but rather put an
emphasis on baptism by immersion and in the Holy Spirit as well as the Speaking in tongues. This category we
found, the Pentecostals, the Baptists on one extreme and in another the Seven Day Adventist Church which
respects the Sabbath. Presbyterian, Anglican and Methodist were classified as historic Churches.
573Eca. Witness in Bodensehof house in May 1995.
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How relevant is a gift that divides instead of edifying and respecting the centrality of Christ
in the life of the Church; how could it be considered as from God? How can people be helped
to test the teachings of such kind in the light of the Scriptures?
Moreover, Mariamu's case leads any historian of Christianity and politics in the Great Lakes
region to reflect on the theological implications of the recent war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo which was started by the Banyamurenge people. They reacted against the ethnic
politics of Mobutu government. Like in Rwanda, the Banyamurenge in R.D.Congo,
associated to the Batutsi, have been considered as 'invaders' aiming to create a Hamite
empire in the interlacustrine region of Africa. As previously stated, Kagame has connected
the Rwandan 'mythico-history' about the Barenge to the Banyamurenge of Zaire, the Hamites
and the Batutsi. This, I have suggested, leaves the Hamite theory in the region, both an issue
for social science and missiology and ethics study so as to prevent a syncretism resulting
from a politico- ethnic and some form of Christian feelings. It is time now to look at another
form of teaching which affected the Rwandan Protestant engagement in society.
b. Reinhard Bonnke
A German Native, Reinhard Bonnke developed his Ministry in the Africa Continent and
became a specialist of 'born-again' and 'miracles' theology. He developed a style of teaching
that for many, impinged considerably on a faith rooted in the realities of changing contexts574.
Reinhard Bonnke came to Rwanda in June 1990 but some Rwandans knew him from having
visited his meetings in Mombasa, Nairobi (Kenya), Bujumbura (Burundi), Bukavu and Goma
(Zaire, both cities border with Rwanda). Bonnke's theology, in the words of Chipenda,
"provides easy answers to complex problems, leaving behind turmoil and religious riots in
the Churches "575.
Arriving two months before the widely advertised visit of the Pope (6-9 September 1990) at
the time when the Kibeho apparitions still had repercussions and at the crucial period of
reclamation for democracy, Bonnke's campaign was held up for scrutiny. On the whole, it
brought a religiously confusing message. He pronounced a blessing to the regime as he did
574 Gifford, Paul., New Dimension in African Christianity , Nairobi: All Africa Conference of Churches, 1992).
Gifford studied the role of the outsiders in initiating the theology of 'revivals and crusades' on the Africa continent.
The crusade as the author experienced it during the June 1990 crusade in Kigali, and as Gifford pointed it out
includes various stages:
a. His crusade, as I observed it during his visit to Rwanda, June 1990, is build upon the following line: a
dramatisation during which he fixes the public to himself as an extraordinary man of God. In his preaching
Bonnke claims to depends on the Bible alone to transmit the message of God, to make of the participants,
evangelists like Bonnke. Human beings are totally evil and depraved, worthless, valueless. The only thing that
matters is the conversion to Jesus. Bonnke attacks the 'bishop's dead church' in particular, the Catholic and other
religious beliefs, Islam, Hindu whose believers would be invited to convert from 'demon's power'. Bonnke rejects
en bloc the African cultural values perceived as 'satanic structures bearing witchcraft'. His teaching include
speaking in tongues. But the greatest moment is the healing of sick persons. Bonnke addresses by name different
diseases and promises immediate total healing. Bonnke's mission always praises the government, in particular the
state president; he would qualify as unchristian any blame put on the authorities for anything that goes wrong.
575Chipenda, J., "The Church of the Future". In Waruta (ed.). African Churches in the 21st century. Challenges and
Promises. Nairobi: AACC, 1995, pp. 19-36.
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before for many other dictatorships (Mobutu's in Zaire, Moi's in Kenya, Buyoya's in
Burundi; Babangida in Nigeria, Compaore's in Burkina Faso).
He called Rwandans to enjoy the freedom of religion, to pray and support a Christian
President. For many among the public present, this call was an implicit endorsement of
Habyarimana's regime from the Protestant Church leaders who had been present at all the
meetings. Bonnke's theology seemed to persistently legitimate a repressive dictatorial regime.
It was a disappointment for Christians who were seeking a more spiritual and Christian
guidance to help them engage more actively in a non-violent struggle for political changes.
However, even if the problems highlighted by Mariamu and Bonnke's theologies had been
addressed by the Churches it would not have been sufficient to deal with the haemorrhage
from the historical Churches and the decay in political morality. There were other causes for
the exodus. For Rutayisire, both the closeness of the politicians and the Church leaders, the
"Barokole heavenly influenced theology" and the 'bom-again' theologies versed in personal
testimonies aimed at a 'Christian babies level' teaching all became factors of indolence. They
prevented Christians from being united for a common purpose of speaking out truth and
denouncing the evil process, namely ethnic mobilisation576.
Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with examining how the Churches participated in the
shaping of acceptable images of the MRND regime at home and abroad. We saw that society
was left divided in the 1960s between the new Bahutu rulers and the Batutsi who were
discriminated against into the country or being sent into exile. The Church leaders had some
possibilities of choosing between being neutral and working for reconciliation, to advocate
for the repatriation and reintegration of the refugees or to cultivate loyalty to a regime that
hid its discriminatory ideology behind the divination and sacralisation of the ruler and its
claims of unity. The Church hierarchy chose to be loyal to the regime and in many cases
offered a powerful moral support to it.
The Church's incapacity to assume ethical responsibility with regard to the principles of
justice, democracy and reconciliation, had three root causes: first, the hierarchies were
enrolled in the MRND system that combined the distribution of privileges and honours with
the control of conscience; second, the Churches were vulnerable due, on the one hand, to the
absence of theological thinking that could orient their action with regard to assessing and
responding to evil in politics, and on the other hand, to the internal tensions within different
denominations. Lastly, the sacralisation of power in the African dictatorships needed to be
addressed as an ethical issue on a regional basis. The legitimisation of the regime as well as
the absence of prophetic theology substantially affected the mediation and interventions
Christians undertook in the 1990s crises as shown in the next chapter.
576Rutavisire.a.. Faith under Fire. Testimonies of Christian Bravery. Herts: African Enterprise, 1996, p.116.
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CHAPTER V: A Case Study:
ETHNIC IDEOLOGY AND MEDIA IN THE 1990'S
Introduction
The exploitation and the recurrence of ethnic feelings in the Rwandan conflict has taken on a
new dimension in the 1990s with the involvement of the media. Before, during and after the
genocide, some media have clearly adopted a policy of telling lies, inciting to animosity and
murder. The media became the instruments of mobilisation for the genocide. Long before the
tragedy, they participated in planting the culture of violence in launching a campaign of
ethnic hatred in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The best known was Radio-
Television Libre de Mille collines (RTLM), then some newspapers including Kangura577 and
other titles that formed what the Paris based international organisation 'Reporter Sans
Frontieres' (reporters without borders) called 'les media de la haine'(the media of hatred), a
title adapted by Chretien & al, for their book Les Media du Genocide.
During the period of the massacres and the genocide, the Church leaders persistently failed to
provide moral guidance, to acknowledge and condemn the genocide. An Observer of the
Churches of Rwanda and Burundi, Roger Bowen said: "while extremists used the media to
manipulate people, the church which " pioneered the written word have lagged behind in the
use of modern electronic media".578 The London based Human rights organisation African
Rights has estimated that it is not only the "nation as a whole, but the Church which stands
in need of truth-telling, justice, reconciliation and penance"579. Of course, the failure had less
to do with the competence of modern electronic media, although Bowen indicates that this
was part of the reality. It was more to do with the blind obedience paid by the Christian
leaders to the public authorities; and also, the fact that the Churches never developed any
theological ethic to question the media programmes which functioned as tools for an evil
political system.
For many including Chretien's group, the social revolution of 1959 had generated an
intellectual transformation which led to the emergence of a local elite who occupied positions
577 Both media Kangura News paper and RTLM radio were dominated by 'Hutu-hard-liners', in particular from the
entourage of president Habyarimana. Kangura was launched in June 1990 from Gisenyi, Habyarimana's fiefdom
and RTLM in April 1993.
578 Roger Bowen, General Secretary of Mid-African Ministry (former CMS-Rwanda-Mission. Bowen, R. C.Jones
lecture. London, 1995.
579 Omaar, R, & de Waal,A, Rwanda, death, despair, defiance (2d ed.). London: African Rights, 1995, p.531. The
authors mention the letter of 2 August 1994 from 29 Roman catholic priests in Goma to the Pope imputing the
whole responsibility to RPF and affirming that both Hutu and Tutsi were executioners in the massacres. They also
evoked the Anglican archbishop press conference in Nairobi, 4 June 1994 when he refused to condemn the militia
interahamwe and the interim government's responsibility in the massacres but condemned RPF for the war it
started.
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in different sectors. Such change did not happen in the media apart from a few exceptions580.
Consequently during the 1990's crises, the extremist media discovered their role as the
enemies of human rights; they developed a culture of violence that ended in the 1994
genocide.
In the course, of the crisis some sections of the media were able to speak out the truth and to
suggest responsible reporting on the activities of reconciliation. However, their message had
limited impact because the Church hierarchy which had considerable access to both public
and private media581 failed, on the one hand, to support these balanced reports and on the
other, to creatively use different channels to counteract the process of organised ethnic
mobilisation.
This chapter intends to examine the contexts of the genesis, development, ownership and
distribution of the media. The analysis of the media will focus on the culture of violence
initiated by the 'media of hatred', its sources; its approaches and the reason why those who
were involved in more responsible media reporting were not able to counteract the campaign
of violence. Lastly the reflection will identify the challenges to Churches and society posed
by the reporting of the 'media of hatred'.
V.l. Distribution and Ownership
The history of media in Rwanda is relatively new; it started with the written material for
catechism and evangelism in early 1910s. Then in 1933 Father Coubeau of the White Fathers
Missionary Society founded the first newspaper called Kinyamateka. The state media were
created from 1960 onwards during the years of struggle for independence582. For more than
six decades, the Rwandan media has been restricted to a few newspapers and one radio
station, Radio Rwanda. Television started in the 1990s. Attempts to publish daily newspapers
have failed. State and Churches have been the two major owners for a long time; they were
joined in the 1990s by the political parties and NGOs. But except for the radio which covered
more than 87 % of the country (evaluation CPR, 1988), circulation was low. Hence there has
been no media establishment which could have allowed society and its institutions to know
who is who in media.
In fact, the proliferation of the media in Rwanda started with the political and economic
speculation of the 1990's. Till then few independent newspapers existed. There was the
weekly Catholic Kinvamateka; the Roman Catholic monthly for children, Hobe, founded in
1954 by Bishop Bigirumwami; Dialogue in French founded in 1970 by Father Massion and
Umunvamurvango wa TRAFIPRO and some occasional papers of Churches, dioceses, states
and private companies. The essential components of the media, e.g. the press, audio-visual,
580 These include the in Kinyamateka (the weekly Roman Catholic launched in 1933), the Umunyamuryango wa
Trafipro (which disappeared).
581 Church broadcast on the national radio station week programmes and Sunday services ; in addition they were
owners of news papers and some were even about to set up their own radio stations.
159
Radio- television, films, photography were all under state control. From 1973, the
government was exerted through the Office of Information (ORINFOR) which managed
Radio Rwanda, Rwanda television, Imvaho and la Releve and a daily bulletin with a lower
distribution. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of 1990s, several newspapers were
created and many demands sent to the government for the launching of independent radios583.
During the 1990s, the political panorama had developed into four major groupings which
were reflected in the distribution of the media: the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF); the
MRND-CDR camp; the moderate Opposition camp and the 'Hutu- Power camp'. T.
Nsengiyaremye has suggested that the 1990's Rwandan media grouped on the basis of the
financial and political manipulator.584 In addition to this classification, there were some other
organs including Kinyamateka which belonged to the Catholic Church, Imbaga of the co¬
operative movement, Dialogue which belonged to individuals and Christian associations.
Unlike the Catholics, the Protestants had no newspaper since the disappearance in 1974 of
Inkoramutima. The attempt made by the CPR service of Communication to revitalise it in late
1980s failed. With regard to radio, both Catholics and Protestants had wide access to Radio
Rwanda. For a long time, the Catholics enjoyed all free of charge access to broadcast the
Sunday service and different programmes during week days on the state owned Radio
Rwanda. The Protestants joined in 1979 following heavy talks with the Rwandan
government.
The use of the Radio by the CPR Service of Communication ( SECOM) thus started in
1979s85 jn fact^ a riny mission, the C.M.M.L (Christian Mission in Many Lands) had at its
disposal very modest technical facilities. It retained an absolute monopoly over Protestant
broadcast known as Inkuru Nziza for 17 years (1962-1979).
Following a survey done in 1977 after the nationalisation of R.V.O.G (Radio Voice of the
Gospel) in Addis Ababa and Cordac in Bujumbura, a delegation of two, Dr Jayawira and
Pastor Marc Chambron persuaded both the WACC and the LWF to back the CPR in
information- communication. Then, the CPR tried but failed to obtain an authorisation from
the Rwandan government to install the technical equipment from Radio Cordac. Then the
CPR set up a commission on communication. It sent for training a producer who was later
appointed to the full-time staff. From the first of December 1979, CPR was taking over from
582
Logiest,G„ 1988.
583 A list of 80 titles mostly created between 1990 and 1994. Chretien & Al., Les Medias du Genocide. Paris:
Karthala, 1995, pp.383-386. See also Reporters sans Frontieres, Rapport de Mission. 16 au 24 Septembre 1994.
Paris, 1994,pp.9-19.
584 See Dialogue, no 175 Avril-Mai 1994, pp.59-70. For instance, Rwanda Rw'ejo, Kanguka, Le Flambeau, L'Ere
de Liberte, Le tribun du Peuple... belonged to the RPF camp; Rwanda Rushya of A. Kameya to PL-Lando, a pro-
RPF tendency; Interahamwt, Kamarampaka, Medaille Nyiramacibiri and RTLM Radio belonged to the MRND;
Kangura of Ngeze Hassan to CDR; Isibo of S. Musangamfura to the moderate MDR of Twagiramungu tendency;
Le Soleil to the Parti Socialist; Verites d'Afrique-Impamo of and Umurangi belonged to "MDR -Power".
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the C.M.M.L to produce the Protestant programs broadcast on Radio Rwanda. At the time of
the 1994 tragedy religious programmes on Radio Rwanda covered 200 minutes per week. Out
of these, the Roman Catholic Church had 80 minutes; the Protestant Churches, members of
the CPR had 70 minutes; other Protestants had 40 minutes and Islam 10 minutes-586.
Despite this substantial radio-broadcasting time, some people still think the Churches have
not succeeded in communicating with society, in particular with Christians. The President of
CPR, Rev. Hitimana see a technical problem. Firstly, the Sunday service is scheduled at the
hours people meet in the Churches, and in the case of an energising message, no one would
listen to it as the secular world is not interested. Secondly, programmes during the week lack
coherence and focus587.
Various initiatives have been taken including a Sunday consecrated to the service of
information. Donations were collected for the office of communication of the CPR, at the
same time a network of prayer for that service was initiated. Unquestionably, coming from a
certain sociological marginalisation, the service of Communication permitted the CPR to
gradually "became fair, mature, without complex, partner for local and continental
ecumenism: our presence on national radio has allowed us to get out of a ghetto in which we
had been confined by missionary and political history", CPR leaders told Paul Eberhard588.
I have raised the question with the former head of the Communication Department in the
CPR (now head of Africa and Middle East regions in WACC, London) of how these
opportunities were used to mobilise energies on national and ecumenical levels to resist the
evil in Rwanda. For Julienne N. Munyaneza, the CPR Communication benefited churches,
because "the Church leaders made their voices heard!" The service created a context of
religious messages throughout the country in which laypersons, women and youth
585 Eberhard, P., Evaluation Report of Rwanda project. Kigali: CPR, service of communication, 1988.
586 Exhibit of religious program schedule broadcast by ORINFOR (1994)
Day denomination time duration language
Monday CPR 17.20 10 min Kinyarwanda
Tuesday Pentecost 17.20 10 min Kinyarwanda
Wednesday Adventists 17.20 10 min Idem
Thursday Islam 15.00 10 min Kinyarwanda
Friday CPR 17.20 10 min idem
Pentecost 21.20 10 min French
Saturday Adventists 17.20 10 min Kinyarwanda
CPR 21.10 10 min French
Sunday CPR 10.00 40 min Kinyarwandaa
Catholics 11.00 1 hour Kinyarwanda
Catholics 17.20 10 min idem
Catholics 21.20 10 min French
Total: 200 minutes per week.
Comment: Both catholic and Protestant had substantial radio broadcasting time: more that three hours per week.
The Sundays services were listened to by a large majority of the population. The religious celebrations (Easter,
Christmas, Ramadan...) were broadcast in full broadcast as were any religious events attended by the head of state.
587
Hitimana.N., Interview. Butare, March 1977.
jss Evaluation report 1988. According to J. Nyirankusi the schedule was maintained up to January 1994
when she left the office to join the WACC, London.
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participated. Julienne said that during the 1990 crises, most of the programs produced
focused on love, reconciliation, forgiveness and apparently had some impact considering
Christians died trying to save others during the genocide.
However, we must underline two problems arising out of this interview: first, the absence of
trained journalists to connect theological ethics to issues of social responsibility for the
Churches and to monitor the crisis and help Church leaders to formulate a clear message.
From credible source, we have learnt that the staff attached to the Communication Service
were reluctant to penetrate the socio-political contexts and to enlighten the Church leaders
with accurate information.
In the second instance, there was still a heavy state control. The week-day programs were
recorded two days before and handed to the Government Office of Information (ORINFOR
under the direct control of the President). The Sunday service was broadcast live from the
Kigali Episcopal diocese cathedral589. The list of preachers was drawn up by the CPR
Communication service but the local bishop, a fervent defender of the regime, was keen to
withdraw from the list any preacher who did not fit his criteria. Some like Israel Havugimana
(Anglican laypreacher mentioned in memorial above) who were critical of the regime were
considered unsuitable. A subsequent problem not mentioned was the anti-ecumenical stance
adopted by the local bishop, which created a lot of disputes affecting the Protestant
credibility: the bishop preserved a purist ancient form of Anglican liturgy unfamiliar to other
Protestants. Equally, the week-day programmes elaborated by the CPR included biblical
messages, Christian testimonies, songs, dialogue, interviews and education, in a conservative
pietist form that reinforced the tradition of the C.M.M.L 'born-again' theology.
V.2. The Problems of the Rwandan Media
Having discussed the problems regarding the ownership of the media we now consider some
of the issues regarding the way the media operated. Professionally, there was no code of
ethics nor a legislation up to May 1991. This led to unprofessional practices and low
standards among journalists. Some became opportunists, served the interests of those who
paid them the most money. But lets look more closely at how journalists and those involved
in the media were compromised by their relationship with the political parties.
V.2.1. State Control
The extremist media which proliferated in the 1990s can not be separated from the changes
that took place in Rwanda in 1973. The military putsch further deteriorated the already
difficult relations between the northern Abakiga people and the southern Abanyanduga, a
polarisation that developed earlier during the imposition of Batutsi rulers described in
chapter II and III. The ideology developed by the regime which came into power during the
5
Later, the Service could be alternatively broadcast from the temple of the Presbyterian Church in Kigali.
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coup of 1973 was hostile to the Batutsi and Bahutu who lived in the south and centre. This
regime utilised the media as part of its strategy to control people's conscience.590
When Habyarimana came into power he suppressed the Ministry of Information and created
the 'Office of Information' (ORINFOR) integrating it into his Office. The mandate reiterated
was that media and journalists were the "transmitters of the orders from the rulers to the
ruled" ("les journalistes sont des courroix de transmission entre les dirigeants et les diriges").
The Office covered both public and private media. Hence, the media were hemmed in by the
restrictions placed on them, summarised in the phrase Humiriza Nkuyobore (close your eyes
so that I govern you) process. The consequence of this was to reduce the small minority of
learned Rwandan to a state of "functional illiteracy" by the political overlords. The sole
publications available were under government or Church control. These two institutions as
said in chapters three and four defended the same ideology and with the exception of a few
incidents, they avoided annoying each other. The media lacked the necessary resources to
investigate and bring the truth into the daylight. Adding to the misfurtune, without
professional publishing activity, book production was almost nil.
The director of ORINFOR named by the President was destined always to be a man devoted
to the ideology of the regime. His competence covered both public and private media sectors.
The last person who occupied the position during the last years of the monolithical regime
was F. Nahimana, a young lecturer in History. He had presented a thesis "Les Royaumes
Hutus du Rwanda pre-colonial", in 1986 in the University of Paris VI and proved to be
committed to promoting the image of Habyarimana than the media. For instance, in later
1980s he pioneered for the formulation of a philosophy of the regime of Habyarimana which
he called 'Umuganda'591 in reference to Habyarimana's policy of manual activities obligatory
to each Rwandan at least once per week.
V.2.2. Absence of Policies and Legislation
The second problem has been the government's failure to set up cultural policies. As a
consequence, there was no framework for the formation of journalists, nor any legislation or
code of ethics that would promote a responsible journalism. There was no single training
institution in journalism or communication.
It was into this chaotic context that several newspapers were born at the end of the 1980s.
This created the third category of problems. Some of the newspapers were started by
individuals, political parties or NGOs and also by the barons of the regime as a counterattack
in an attempt to cover up their political errors and criminal records. In the end, there were
two media groupings, one pro-regime with their associations and another made of
590
Actually, there was one radio station-Radio Rwanda, the Cine-photo service which did not produce any single
film; two weekly News papers, Imvaho and La Releve, respectively in Kinyarwanda and French; it was later added
a daily bulletin in French.
591
Leading figure in the extremist propaganda, Nahimana was sacked in April 1992 by the coalition government
led by Prime Minister D. Nsengiyaremye from the opposition for his role in spreading the massacres in the
Bugesera region in March 1992. Nahimana then was engaged in the creation of the RTLM.
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independent operators who cherished the moderate political parties and the NGOs's support.
The rivalry between the two media groupings developed. On the one hand, those supporting
the Habyarimana regime were openly anti-Tutsi claiming to be pro-Army forces and pro-
Interahamwe; but they were accused by the other camp of being anti-democratic. On the other
hand, the pro-RPF, many of them pro-democratic opposition would be constantly accused by
the regime of 'working for the enemy'. This was confusing in the mind of the population who
till then had believed that the message of the media came from the authorities.
V.2. 3. 'Puppet' Journalism
Among the major challenges was the fact that journalists had became propagandists of their
political parties, then according to Higiro, took orders from their political sponsors rather
than from the professional hierarchies. Hence they openly abused the very basic principles of
journalism: objectivity, exactitude, truth telling and balanced presentation of information.
Many among those newspapers apart from Kinyamateka, Imvaho, la Releve, Imbaga,
Dialogue and Isibo had no known regular frequency. They were published in the wake of a
major event or when a personality proposed to finance one or several issues, mostly to attack
their rivals592.
The occasional intervention from different foundations and embassies which organised
conferences and workshops from 1985 ( a German Foundation: Friederich Neumann as well
as the USA, Belgian and Swiss Embassies) was not enough to resolve the problem. From our
research, we have had evidence that inexperienced people, including the jobless or employees
sacked for absence of discipline from different administrations joined the ranks of the media
to earn money. They little cared for the principles of the profession. This category of
'journalists' became easy targets for the tycoons and merchants of racist propaganda.
T.Nsengiyaremye, accurately grouped the Rwandan media into three major poles: those
working as tools of 'political propaganda'; those motivated by the financial interests and the
non lucrative category. Rightly he pointed out that there were fewer non lucrative and no
political motivated newspapers, including Kinyamateka , Imbaga, Dialogue. Coming into
journalism with a pecuniary motivation, A1 Hester lamented, led to many among the media
and journalists overturning the duty of integrity and truth for money.593
V.3. Promoting the Culture of Violence
Kangura Newspaper and RTLM Radio were created by the tycoons of racist propaganda to
fulfil common functions. Firstly, in that new era wave of democratic reclamation they worked
592 In two papers presented in the conference on "Objectivite et honnetete dans l'information politique", Kigali
25-28 mars 1994, Thaddee Nsengiyaremye, director of Ikindi newspaper, Kigali, "Interets financiers, Honnetete et
Objectivite dans ('Information politique" and Rubbens , Agence Belga, Brussels, "Objectivite de ['Information et
Pressions foncieres". Dialogue no 175 April-May 1994.
593 Nsengiyaremye, suggested that the first and the second categories of media were the tools of political
propaganda and avoided to refer to 'ethnic ideology'. He mentioned his journal 'Ikindi', 'Le partisan' of A.Sibo,
'Ijambo' of Hangimana, 'Le messanger-Intumwa' of E. Mutsinzi and 'La voix des Grands Lacs' de Kajibwami
Ndjovu as motivated by financial interests. Kinyamateka, Dialogue, Imbaga qualified rightly as no lucrative.
Nsengiyaremye, op.cit. p.63
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as tools of the groups on power to obstruct the democratic process. Secondly, they were set
up to sabotage the peace negotiations process with the rebellion, the RPF camp perceived as
monarchists and nostalgic of the 'Batutsi domination'. The following section underscores the
link which existed between the most notorious of these media groups. There will also be
examined the extremist circles that created them; their functions and the tools they utilised to
sow and spread the seeds of the horrific genocide.
V.3.1. Kangura and RTLM: Cartels of Extremists
The constitutive act of RTLM, was signed on 8 April 1993 by a cartel of 50 shareholders
who invested a hundred million Rwanda francs (one million US dollars). The declared
objectives were to collect, treat and publish information; educate and inform the population
by the 'news', the advertising, the debates; to contribute to the reinforcement of the pluralistic
democracy and the republican institutions; to organise polls and promote the business and the
industry of media594.
Yet, the major objective was to promote the ideology of a discredited regime. The
relationship with the akazu of the Habyarimana and the MRNRD/CDR extremists was
evident. Among the shareholders beside F. Kabuga, a millionaire businessman whose
daughter has married one of the sons of President Habyarimana and F. Nahimana, a lecturer
of history at the National University who offered to became the Goebbels of the regime, were
members of the board of the Interahamwe and other influential Ministers from the MRND595
political party. From its early beginnings, the RTLM stood as a tool of the death squads, the
militia and other groups which were involved in most of the massacres.
The members of an international commission invited by the home based human rights
organisations (CLADHO) to an inquiry on the violation of human rights in Rwanda for the
period between October 1990 to January 1993596 outlined the role of the President and his
entourage in planning acts of violence and sabotage of the peace process.
The two media, Kangura and RTLM were media of the private sector. At the end of August
1993 only around 17 millions of shareholders were paid in the bank accounts of RTLM in
Kigali597. Obviously this sum was not enough to finance the preliminary elaboration of the
594 Reporter sans frontieres. Rapport de mission. Paris: 1994
595
Among the 50 members were members of cabinet: Dr Augustin Ngirabatware, Minister of Plans (son-in law of
the businessman, Felecian Kabuga, chairman of RTLM); Andre Ntagerura (dean of the Cabinet), Minister of
Transports and Communications; Alphonse Ntirivamunda, Director General of Public Works and Energy and son-
in law of president Habyarimana). There were board members of CDR, like J.B. Barayagwiza; businessmen like
Felecian Kabuga whose daughter espoused the son of President Habyarimana; Several MRND central committee
members like Jean Habyarimana; bankers (Pasteur Musabe, brother of colonel Bagosora, the supposed brain of
the genocide); intellectuals (F. Nahimana); cadres or practitioners of journalism (J.B. Bamwanga; E.
Ngirwanabagabo; J.M.V Mvurirwenande; R. Simba; J. Serugendo). See Reporters sans frontieres, Sept. 1994.
596 The Commission was invited by the Association of the Rwandese human rights organisations. The members of
the Commission included the Paris based International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), the New York /
Washington and London based, Africa Watch), The Ouagadougou based Inter-African Union of Human Rights
and peoples UIDH, the Montreal based Centre International of Human Rights and of Persons et Democratic
Development ( CIDPDD/IDHRDD) affirmed .The response from the government did not deny the existence of the
squad and death groups, but commented on the participation of the president.
597 Mahoux & Verhofstadt., Rapport de la Commission Parlementaire Beige Concernant les evenements du
Rwanda, Bruxelles, Decembre 1997, pp. 317-322.
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project as well as to purchase the technical equipment and to run the activities of a radio
station. In fact, the finances came from another source. According to the Belgian
Parliamentary Commission's report on the tragic events of Rwanda, RTLM has been
financed by the International Christian Democrat (ICD), through its networks of partners,
particularly the German 'Konrad Adenouer Foundation'. Actually this organisation has been
the generous supporter of the MRND as well as the larger giver to ICD. According to
Christian Terras, editor of the Magazine Golias, F. Nahimana, the promoter of the RTLD was
introduced to Konrad Adenouer by Prof. Molte, and M. Pristol (ndlr: two very influential
figures in German Politics with regard to Rwanda). It was with Konrad Adenouar that RTLM
transmitters were bought from the firm Van Rompaey, in Belgium598.
V.3. 2. The functions of the Racist Propaganda
RTLM radio was created to complement a network of extremist print media including the
Kangura newspaper. Obviously, Kangura and RTLM fulfilled a number of common functions
such as to picture the RPF- Inkotanyithe Batutsi and Bahutu ibyitso (the accomplices) inside
Rwanda and abroad as a clique of monarchists bloodthirsty for power, with the intention of
reinstating old-fashioned institutions. They sought to present Habyarimana as the sole asset
for the 'miracle' (development) of Rwanda which would guarantee the survival of the Bahutu;
consequently, they would discredit the Arusha Peace talks described as a plot against him.
They also would appeal to the deep feelings of the Bahutu in attributing the RPF-Inkotanyi's
rebellious activities to the whole Batutsi group. In so doing they watered down resistance to
the process of ethnocide.
V.3.2.1. Promoting an Anti-Batutsi Culture
The impact created by the hard-liners in selling their idea of hatred through the media, in
particular, the RTLM and Kangura newspaper resulted in a number of factors. First, the
determination of the regime to resist democratic changes. Secondly, moral forces failed to
address such a campaign by not challenging various groups to work for social harmony.
Thirdly, the programmes had opted, deliberately or by necessity, for the use of a populist
approach to channel their hatred against the Batutsi.
The populist approach attracted a very large audience among young people. Using the
exciting music of Zairian artists, Congolese, Camerounian and Caribbean, they also
deliberately broadcast set pieces laced with lies delivered in very simplistic ways, laughter,
jokes, 'personal witnesses', 'hot reporting' (inkuru ishushe) and so forth. These included things
like invented attacks of Inyenzi in the Butare, or Kigali cities, arms cache, supposed
misconduct of the Prime Minister, Mrs Uwiringiyimana, and moderate members of her
Cabinet. In such programmes the sources were never mentioned. Rather, an impersonal form
'on' or 'one' occurred extensively as in the following article of Ngeze Hassan telling of
supposed riots and attacks of 'inyenzi' in Kigali and Butare in early Febmary 1994.
5tf8 Mahoux & Verhofstadt., Ibid. p. 322.
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On dit que les cafards (Inyenzi) s'etaient prepares pour attaquer la ville de Kigali le ler mars 1994. Cette
attaque a ete empechee par ce qui se passe a Butare, ou il faut savoir qu'il y a 52 inkotanyi partis du
CND qui s'efforcent de collaborer avec les jeunesses du PSD 599pour provoquer une emeute dans la ville
de Butare. Nous avons d'autres indices que bientot il y aura d'autres attaques du FPR qui vont etre
lances de tous cotes a Kigali. La on voudrait dire qu'a Biryogo, dans beaucoup de families sont
actuellement heberges des cafards qui sont revenus du front. Nous demandons a ceux qui sont concernes
par ce probleme de rester tous vigilants. Nous ne perirons pas a petit feu. La ou sont maintenant les
cafards, on le sait. S'ils nous cherchent, qu'ils fassent attention 6H0.
To explain why a previous 'reporting', actually a lie did not happen, Kangura must find
another fabricated story incriminating the same " Inyenzi" and allies: " cette attaque a ete
empeche par ce qui se passe a Butare ou 52 Inkotanyi ("equivalent of inyenzi") collaborent
avec les jeunes PSD (an opposition political party youth). This supposed attack in the Butare,
the second largest city of the country in the south, known both for being the stronghold of the
opposition to Habyarimana, and to have high intensity of mixture of the populations was
apparently made to sow the doubt and to break the very reputable true solidarity among the
populations. This was part of the resistance of the dictatorship to the aspiration to democracy
described in chapter six, section three.
The language was identical in both the Kangura newspaper and on the RTLM radio: "Who is
the enemy of the Majority; of the Republican institutions? Majority, you are going to be
subjugated again! Some Bahutu have become subjects of the 'cockroaches' through Batutsi
women, the political parties, or human rights organisations, and media. You will wake up too
late when they would have put you where you ought to put them". This seems to have been
the regime's constant message from the beginning of the war in October 1990.601
Two other popular tools were utilised, songs and cartoons. Many singers known for being
apologists of the regime were called on, among them Bikindi, a drama group's creator. Two
particular songs of Bikindi were played repeatedly on RTLM, Nanga Abahutu (I hate the
Bahutu) and Benesebahinzi (sons of labourers). The first denounced the betrayal of the
moderates Bahutu while the second appealed to the ascriptions and stereotypes of the past
emphasising domination and subjugation "planned by the Batutsi".
More cynically, caricatures and cartoons were used extensively in the extremist newspaper to
portray the return of the monarchists assisted by their Bahutu accomplices602; they would try
to prove that the RPF, the Batutsi and 'their Karinga drum' were bloodthirsty for power; they
would present images of mutilated Bahutu whose flesh and blood were being consumed by
their Batutsi executioners. Lastly, the caricatures and cartoons on many occasions appealed
599CND: Conseil National pour le Developpement (name of the Rwandan parliament under Habyarimana). The
600 members of the RPF battalion and some of the officials of the movement arrived in Kigali, December 1993
were accommodated there. Abakombozi: the social democrat party youth, essentially based in the south.
600
Ngeze Hassan, 'Igitero simusiga'. In Kangura no 57, February 1994, II, p.4.
601 In a declaration by the minister of Foreign affairs to international opinion it is said:
"le Rwanda a fait l'objet d'une agression exterieure par les assaillants comprenant des refugies rwandais
appartenant a 1'organisation, RPF-Inkotanyi, terroriste qui n'a d'autres visees que l'instauration d'un regime
minoritaire, incarnant un feodalisme a visage moderne. Le peuple rwandais n'acceptera pas une marche arriere de
l'histoire, ramenant les forces vives de la nation": Rwanda has been attacked by a minority group of monarchists.
The people of Rwanda will not accept a reversal of the history. Communaute Rwandaise de France, Memorandum
sur la Crise Politique Actuelle au Rwanda. Paris, 1990,p.l3.
602 Chretien. & al., op.cit. p. 144.
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to the religious feelings of their audience, showing that the religious and generous hearted
Habyarimana, has been betrayed and would be killed by his proteges; that the Kibeho
visionaries had predicted the bloody events603.
These already had their political organisations, the MRND and the CDR; they reinforced
them with two major loudspeakers: the militia Interahamwe " which were the right armed
hand of the MRND and at the same time were engaged in cultural activities; and the RTLM
radio which was created by the MRND and CDR parties but became an organ of the 'Hutu-
Power' ideology of the extremists from various political parties. The leaders of these
institutions would daily brain-storm together to elaborate the themes for false and biased
messages in which the 'enemy' was bombarded systematically through the Kangura
newspaper and RTLM radio. These media were an instrument to ensure Habyarimana's
monopoly of power and to counteract the attacks of Radio Muhabura, the organ of the RPF
and occasionally Radio-Rwanda604.
In fact, the campaigners appealed to a process in which broadcasting and relaying images of
blood shed events and carnage was central. In Kangura no 53, December 1993, p.3. Ngeze
Hassan announced the death of Habyarimana for March 1994 (he died on 6 April 1994); the
President would be assassinated not by a "Tutsi but by a Hutu paid by the Tutsi". The fate of
the Bahutu betrayers, it must be remembered, was equal to that of the Batutsi. Hence the
ironic question of Kangura in its issue of February 1994: "the fate of Batutsi is known, what
about their Bahutu accomplices"?
It is clear here that this destructive culture of violence created an ethno-grahy of Rwandan
human beings with, on the one hand, the good, generous but naive Bahutu victims of the
Batutsi manipulation and predictions, and on the other the Batutsi, full of bad intention,
planning the violent elimination of the Bahutu. The culture had two other essential functions:
resisting democratisation and opposing power sharing.
V.3.2. 2. Resisting Democratisation
To understand the negative role played by Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM) and all the print media which belonged to the extremist factions605, one has to
examine the political evolution of Africa in 1990s. Following the end of the cold war, many
of the African dictatorships marked by a failure in the management of the institutions were
submitted to intense internal and external pressure. Some of them accepted political changes
but at the same time took away with one hand what they were offering with the other. The
'National Conference', one of the innovations in the attempt to force the dictators to share
power, was organised with more or less favourable results in Benin, Gabon, in the two
603 Chretien.& al., pp.160; 263; RTL programme of 20 May 1994.
6(14 From April 1992 to April 1993, Radio Rwanda which had the monopoly in broadcasting was under the
tutorship of a Minister from the opposition to Habyarimana, in what was known as the coalition government of
five major political parties including the MRND but without the RPF. This period was considered by the hard¬
liners of the regime as the control of the enemy over national media.
6(15
Kangura, Umurwanashyaka, Intera, Impanda, Medaille Nyiramacibiri, Umurava, Kamarampaka.
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Congo, Niger, Chad, Zaire606. The experience raised a great amount of hope within civil
society in the rest of the countries of Africa. A significant number of party politics,
syndicates, human rights organisations, independent media developed in Rwanda from the
end of 1980s. They started to monitor human rights abuse and to question the silence of the
established institutions including the churches.
However, despite the impetus flowing from the stream of these political changes, many
observers, at least in Rwanda, predicted that three dictatorships would be difficult to
eradicate: Mobutu's in Zaire, Eyadema's in Togo and Habyarimana's in Rwanda. These were
built on the model of the former north-Korean Kim-Il-Sung607 highly orientated towards the
cult of a personality, corruption of the political surrogates, ideological and divisive
propaganda, brain washing, the network of secret police and last but not least the
determination to kill any potential opponent.
V.3.2.3. Opposing Power Sharing
The new constitution of the 10 June 1991608 opened the country to multi-party politics and a
multi-party government committed to negotiating a peace accord with the RPF. A new
political vision of sharing power was written into the Arusha Peace Agreement of the 4
August 1993 which ended the three year war between the RPF and the Rwandan army609. It
was considered by many as the beginning of a process of reconciliation among Rwandans.
But the extremists saw it the other way round: a "putsch against Habyarimana and republican
institutions". They then invented the mechanisms of resistance including racist propaganda
through media, e.g. Kangura, and RTLM. Parallel to the media campaign, they created the
CDR (Coalition for the Defence of the Republic),610 an extremist political party which
became the ally of the MRNDbn(Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le
Developpement), the former ruling party.
The main targets of this agenda of violence were in the first instance, the key figures due to
implement the Arusha Peace Agreement. These were accused of betraying the Bahutu cause,
606
Gatwa,Th, "Ethnic conflict and the media: the case of Rwanda". In Media development. London: WACC,
3/1995. Vol XLII pp 18-20. On the role of the Churches in the recent political changes in Africa, in particular
during the National Conference see Bulanga, E., Les conferences nationales en Afriaue. Une affaire a suivre.
Paris: Karhala, 1993.
607 The propagandists of the ruling party were trained in North Korea whilst most of the symbols of the party were
produced there, for example the effigy of Habyarimana called the medal of the party.
608 Cf. chapter 3.4.3.
609 The Arusha Peace Accord signed on the 4 August 1993 between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda
Patriotic Front(RPF) to end the four years war, was a collection of six different protocols negotiated at various
steps:
- the Protocol of the cease-fire of the 29 March 1991 renewed on the 12 July 1992; the Protocol on a state of
rights of the 18 August 1992; the Protocol on sharing power of the 30 September 1992 and 9 January 1993; the
Protocol on the repatriation of refugees of the 9 June 1993; the Protocol on the fusion of two armies of the 3
August 1993 and the Protocol on diverse questions of the same date. Republique Rwandaise. Journal Officiel.
Annee 32, Vol. 16, 15 aout 1993.
610 Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
611 Movement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement.
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of organising a putsch against the republican and democratic institutions612, and were
represented as usurpers or accomplices in attempting to remove power from President
Habyarimana. In a programme broadcast on the 14 February 1994 and called "La paix
d'Arusha n'existe pas", RTLM rejected totally the Arusha Agreement and the team chosen
for its implementation.
...Nos politiciens, surtout ceux qui ont interet a ce que le peuple accepte sans broncher cet acte
antidemocratique et consacrent le pouvoir de certains obtenu par la force ou les magouilles, nos
politiciens done, nous demandent d'attendre les institutions de la transition et la paix d'Arusha
Mensonge, triple mensonge.Peut-on penser que le premier ministre designe qui ne sait toujours pas
obtenir des partis la mise sur pied des institutions de la transition saura diriger le gouvernement... ? Au
lieu de se situer en retrait du jeu politique ... il s'est volontairement place l'etiquette de suppot du FPR et
negocie la mise en place de son gouvernement en etroite concertation avec ce FPR. Ainsi, le General
Dallaire (commandant des forces de l'ONU) deguise en inspecteur pompon, tonne ses instructions a une
troupe d'otaries qui applaudissent mais font exactement le contraire. Tel semble etre la MINUAR. On
dirait une troupe de pingouins et d'otaraires qui desobeissent a leur dompteur, plutot qu'un groupe de
militaires charges de retablir l'ordre et la securite, Surrealisme done. Surrealisme releve du jeu des
gendarmes et des voleurs. Car e'est bien ainsi qu'il faut qualifier les Major Kagame, Lizinde,
Bizimungu, Kajeguhakwa,... bref des voleurs, bandits, escrocs deguises en defenseurs de la veuve et de
l'orphelin qui vont jour les gendarmes613.
Early in 1993, with the ultimate step toward the signing of the protocol concerning the power
sharing fast approaching, it became clear that Habyarimana would no longer have a
monopoly on power including control of the army forces. Moreover, the Arusha Agreement
included clauses that would allow the new government to bring to trial those members of the
administration and the army who would be found guilty of human rights abuse614. These
clauses of the protocols have been exploited by the MRND leaders and militants to create a
climate of suspicion between, on the one hand, the agents of the administration and the army
forces members who might be targeted in these clean up of the administration in the
forthcoming government, and on the other, the negotiators of the Peace Agreement615. They
would accuse them of having planned the reduction of the army and offered the country to
the 'enemies'.
612 The list of enemies of the 'Hutu people' to be killed were primarily Prime Minister, Mrs Agathe
Uwiringiyimana, Mr. Twagiramungu designated as Prime Minister in the Arusha Accord, the Tutsi, the moderate
political, social and religious forces ; some of the UN peace corps force, particularly the Belgians, and their
commandant, the Canadian General, Romeo Dallaire
613 RTLM. Programme broadcast 14 February 1994. The reference to the police as defenders of widow, orphans
had for background the fact that in the Arusha Protocol on power sharing the command of the police was
attributed to RPF seconded by an officer from the former Rwanda police force. The reverse would happen in the
command of the army. Collection Bartel.B., Ma Foi en Crise, Saarbroken, 1994.
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Ibid., "Protocole sur l'lntegration des Forces Armees des Deux Parties" , articles 147-163, in particular articles
147 (number of figures maintained: 19000), article 149 (the process starts with the publication of the lists of
demobilised men), pp. 1419-1423. Article 46 says that:
De fafon urgente et prioritaire, le Gouvernement de Transition a Base Elargie ecartera de
1'administration territoriale les elements incompetents ainsi que les autorites qui ont trempe dans les
troubles sociaux ou dont les actions constituent un obstacle au processus democratique et a la
reconciliation nationale.^'
This article had its equivalent in the protocols regarding the Army. A demobilisation of soldiers apart from the
19000 soldiers required for the new army from both sides were to return to civil life. Several thousand people
were concerned because during the war, a massive recruitment was organised on both sides
615 In fact the governmental delegation was led by the Foreign Affairs Minister, the late Boniface Ngurinzira, who
was member of the opposition party, the MDR, one of the five political parties which made what was known as the
Coalition Cabinet dominated by the MRND. The protagonist in the negotiations was the RPF, the rebellion whose
delegation was led by the present-day president, Pasteur Bizimungu, at the time Commissioner to Information and
Propaganda of the RPF.
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The accord was characterised as lies and the pursuit of the peace process as a surrealism. The
programme was full of anti-professional practices like personal insults and attacks. The
absence of a code of practice in Journalism had left a vacuum for such things to happen, but
it is not certain that, even if the code existed, it would be respected. The convention signed
both by the RTLM chairman and the Minister of Information forbade incitement to "ethnic
hatred and violence", but the Minister was the first to complain about his incapacity to stop
the violation of the convention and even became one of the first victims of the genocide
campaign on 7th April, 1994616.
In a programme broadcast on March 10 1994 the attack of RTLM on the Peace Agreement
was much clearer. The radio appealed to the solidarity of the population to turn their back on
the Peace Agreement and to prepare for war.
Le peuple doit le savoir et les residents etrangers le comprendre. Fini de se servir des arguments factices
des accords d'Arusha pour masquer une realite aveuglante... Vous tous habitants du Rwanda tournez la
page d'Arusha car elle est terminee... Une nouvelle page de l'histoire du Rwanda debute, a nous de
l'ecrire ensemble mais le titre n'est plus Arusha... Arusha est mort et enterre; meme si la MINUAR pour
preserver sa position privilegiee s'y accroche. II n'y a pas d'accord de paix d'Arusha car il n'y a pas de
paix d'Arusha. Retenons cette maxime: "civis pacem par Bellum" (qui veut la paix prepare la guerre).
Ouvrons les yeux preparons-nous. Rien ne nous empechera d'esperer la paix, mais pas comme des
moutons que l'on egorge sur l'autel du dieu FPR. Le sang de Melchior Ndadaye n'est pas encore froid.
Son sang repandu pour la democratic de tout un peuple aura-t-il coule en vain? De combien de victimes
l'holocauste du F.P.R se repaitra-t-elle pour ses mwamis sanguinaires617?
A double invitation was made to the population in this programme, firstly, to turn their back
on the Peace Agreement, secondly to prepare for war: "qui veut la paix prepare la guerre".
The Burundi crisis - October 1993 coup attempt during which the newly elected President
Ndadaye and his collaborators were murdered- was still fresh in the memories and being used
as a powerful reference. The points to raise here are twofold. Firstly, the impact of radio on
the illiterate rural people whose means of information were limited either to immediate
neighbours, rumours or radio was enormous. In Africa where the majority of the population
are illiterate, people believe what the radio says as if it was the 'Gospel'.
In 1983, a survey which covered 94 % of Rwanda showed that for the population interviewed
the belief was that "the radio tells the truth".618 The second survey carried out in 1987
interviewed 100 persons per prefecture, in all more than 1000 people. It confirmed this
unchanged attitude regarding the 'truth' carrying power of the radio programmes619. Clearly,
for the majority of the population, the voice of the radio is the voice of the authorities, and
the voice of the authorities is an order to accept and execute unquestionably. This survey
616 Faustin Rucogoza was murdered together witht his family by the Presidential Guard ealy in the morning of 7
April 1994.
617 R.T.L.M Programme broadcast on 10 March 1994. Recorded by B.B. The reference to the death of Ndadaye
(Hutu elected democratically President in Burundi in June 1993 and killed on 21 October of the same year by a
Tutsi dominated army brought the extremists to officially launch the " Hutu power ideology" in a rally calling for
solidarity with the Hutu of Burundi, October 25.
The reference to the snake (serpent) and infiltration reminds us of the cynical misconceptions of the Hutu hard¬
liners on the Tutsi.
618 Eberhard,P, "Evaluation report of Rwanda project" (communication). Kigali: CPR, 1988.
619 Ibid. p.4. The authors mentioned an official survey carried out by Rwanda government with the technical help
of Deutch Well (a relay station of Radio Cologne for Africa) based in Kigali.
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implicitly invokes illiteracy and ignorance, but in the end, there is also the history of
authoritarian regimes which have proved to be violent against the population.
Secondly, the absence of objectivity and honesty in media broadcasts was acknowledged in
both camps by the opposition and the journalists of the extremist media. Intervening in the
conference on "Objectivity and honesty in political information", in Kigali, in late March
1994, the new Minister of Information (tutor of the public and private Media), Faustin
Rucogoza who belonged to the opposition, strongly criticised anti-professional practice in
Rwandan journalism.
Ces journalistes, ou soi-disant journalistes, ne se genent pas d'utiliser des calomnies, des accusations
sans preuve, des alterations de documents, des deformations des faits ou du mensonge, alors que tout
cela constitue les plus graves fautes dont un journaliste peut se rendre coupable... on a vu des
journalistes animer des debats radiodiffuses ou televises, non pas en journalistes integres, honnetes et
objectifs, mais en militants acharnes et passionnes de partis politiques ou de leurs factions.62"
Speaking at the same conference, Gahigi, chief editor of RTLM, recognised the influence of
radio which covered the whole country. He criticised energetically the Rwandan press for
being partial, versed in the propaganda of political leaders who financed them.
L'objectivite a ete deliberement faussee et la critique des journalistes ne se resume qu'a une enumeration
de defauts souvent inventees de toute piece; l'objectif etant de ternir l'image de marque d'un opposant
ou d'un adversaire politique"... Elle (la presse) n'a pu ni apporter les faits averes de fagon fidele et
honnete, ni mettre au grand jour la verite cachee derriere les faits par un commentaire juste et
pertinent621.
The overwhelming responsibility of a journalist who turns into militant of an ideology to the
detriment of truth cannot be otherwise highlighted as in these two passages. The assessment
of the responsibility of media in inviting to violence was identical in the three camps, the
'democratic' camp represented by the free media and the 'anti-democratic' represented by
RTLM and Kangura; and finally the Government represented by the Minister of Information.
It must be remembered that the media of hatred were under the control of the Akazu group
evoked before which was beyond any legal system.
V.3.2.4. Creating the Phantasm of Genocide
Having shown the extent of the venom and hatred inherent in radio broadcasts and
programmes, and having considered the role of media as transmitters of genocide
propaganda, it must be added that media alone would not have succeeded in the crime
without the involvement of political and military machinery. Beyond the 'stimulus-response'
theory or 'magic bullet theory' 622 of the 1940s, other factors such as educational, religious,
620
Rucogoza, F., "Allocution d'ouverture" du Symposium sur Honnetete et obiectivite dans rinformation
politique. Kigali du 16-18 mars 1994. In Dialogue, No 175, April-May 1994, p.36/7.
621
Gahigi, Contribution in a panel "la Presse dans le Processus Democratique", Kigali, 15 mars 1994. In Dialogue
no 175. Avril-Mai 1994, p.17/18). Gahigi's presentation was certainly designated to promote his image and that
of his Radio before an international parterre of diplomats and journalists, politicians, religious leaders, conveyed
to the meeting. Then, the minister Rucogoza commented in private, "on ne reconnait pas l'homme Gahigi,
redacteur en chef de RTLM dans Gahigi le conferencier" (translation: one does not recognise Gahigi, editor in
chief of RTLM and Gahigi of the Conference).
622
According to that theory, people who are exposed to a message spread by media produce the same effects,
direct and uniform. Experiences have shown that it was with additional factors such as famine in the south, the
economic crisis, the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF/WB, the erosion of the Habyarimana regime,
the war and resistance to democracy were factors that corroborated ethnic propaganda. Higiro, J.M.V, op.cit,
p.170.
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economic and social values discussed in chapter six also had additional impact; they have
corroborated the ethnic propaganda in Rwanda. What this section of work tries to explore
here is how the hard-liners who happened to be among the major actors of the crisis exploited
the impact of these factors through media to justify their choice of the Batutsi people as their
scapegoats so as to create the phantasm of genocide.
According to Charny a genocide cannot happen if the population does not adhere to its
mechanisms. Hence, the organisers must abolish the law of 'animal ethnology' (la loi de
l'ethiologie animale) according to which the species of the same family do not kill each other
except in particular circumstances like over-population. In Rwanda, the barriers of
repugnance were annihilated to weaken the socio-cultural and moral inhibitions in the
demonising and the 'instrumentalising' of the enemy. The genocide propaganda would
broadcast supposed plans through which the Batutsi were about to exterminate the Bahutu. It
ridiculed the Batutsi and their 'accomplices' at such a extent that even the vocabulary utilised
applied to wild animals and insects. This process generated a syndrome of fear exploited by
the hard-liners to create a solidarity in crime. For example, the latter encouraged the
phenomenon of mobs that ensures anonymity and the 'deculpabilisation' of individuals.
I. Charny623 argues that genocide comes as a result of successive events developing in an
exponential order. The genocide happens in societies where the communitarian, religious,
ethnic, tribal and classical sense of belonging have precedence over that of individuals. The
chronology of the events unfolded as follows: installation of the societal forces for the
destruction of life, a major historical, economic, political hegemony, social events which
form the ideology; the catalyst factors; the mobilisation of the means to carry out the
genocide and their legitimisation; the execution of the genocide and subsequent denial of its
reality. If safeguards and preventatives were not put in place, the processes may commence
with innocuous events, such as martial law, the suppression of freedom of speech and
movement and curfews. A virtual event exploited by a leader or an elite to serve their own
purposes can also become a prelude to genocide624.
In that sense, an example that has similarities to the pre-genocide period in Rwanda is the
Nazi system. As Tschuy recalls, Hitler emerged from among ordinary people, led and
electrified them. He took for pretext the vengeful features of the Versailles Treaty and
blamed capitalists and Communists, nobility, and above all Jews for the lost war and the
lamentable state of Germany. 'Little people', youths, discharged soldiers, college and
623
Deschamps, Philip and Elisabeth., "Le modele d'Israel W. Charny. How can we commit the unthinkable?
Genocide, the human cancer". Boulder co, Wesvie, 1982. In Dialogue no 190. Avril-Mai 1996, pp 10-32. Charny
is a Professor of Psychology and therapy in the Hebraic University of Jerusalem, I.W. Charny and his ally Canon
Rapoport.
624 Economic degradation like in Germany of 1930 : in the case of Rwanda, the RPF attack, October 1990 and the
death of president Habyarimana, 6 April 1994.
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University students felt humiliated and impoverished by the lost war and they saw no
future625.
Likewise, in Rwanda as indicated above through a few of the RTLM programmes, the
August 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement was presented in the racist propaganda as a vengeful
strategy of the Batutsi. These, claimed the propaganda, lost power over 1959 social
revolution. They were now taking their revenge helped by the accomplices and naive Bahutu.
The propaganda was facilitated by some features of the Agreement, i.e. the demobilisation of
more than 75 % of the army so as to create a new army integrated with their counterparts of
the RPF; and the fact that the bureaucrats of the MRND state-party who have been involved
in the human rights abuse would be dismissed and presented to justice by the new
administration resulting in the Peace Agreement.
Equally, the extremists worked out a strategy designed to connect ethnic rivalry with other
ethno-politicians operating within the whole central Africa region. This strategy which
sought to obtain the cohesion of the 'Bantu' people in the region and its theological ethics
implications are examined in detail in further sections.
V.4. Sources of Ethnic Mobilisation
The ethnic mobilisation was oriented towards, on the one hand, the rooting of an anti-Batutsi
culture evoked above, and on the other hand, the enthronement of Habyarimana as the only
asset and saviour of the Bahutu. A typical argument and justification was as follows: if we
lose him - and that could happen only by a putsch instigated by the Batutsi and their
accomplices - not only would the Bahutu lose their natural rights to power but also most of
them would end up being exterminated..
V. 4.1. The 1959 Social Revolution
The 1959 revolution during which the Bahutu reversed the monarchy was then introduced,
re-actualised with a heavy campaign to appeal to the Bahutu of Rwanda and their kin in the
region to awake so as to resist the re-emerging Batutsi-domination. The campaigners would
brandish the example of the Burundi crises in which they identified several genocides and
offer it as proof of what the Bahutu of the region would experience. Let look now to some
other axes of the ethnic mobilisation.
For J.P. Chretien and his allies, the 1994 genocide was a continuation of a racial ideology
initiated in the 1950s by means of the 'Bahutu manifesto' and kept alive in a breviary of
ethnically motivated accusations against the Batutsi by the hard-liners like the 'ten
commandments' of the 'Hutu power' ideology. Chretien's group adds that there has been a
religious mobilisation for ethnic ideology from the time of the consecration of Rwanda to
Christ the king; the support offered by bishop Perraudin to the leaders of the 1959 Revolution
as well as the participation of Archbishop Nsengiyumva in the MRND ruling party. The
625 Tschuv.T.. Ethnic Conflict and Religion. Geneva: WCC, 1997,p,17.
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outline of the genocide, they said, was announced between 1990 and 1994 but the Churches,
the human rights organisations and the media failed to address it626.
Chretien and allies are right to indicate that 1990 to 1994 was the crucial steps in the
preparation of the genocide. However, Chretien's led study omitted among other things to
link the roots of the ethnic ideology with its shoots in the political, administrative colonial
administration measures as indicated in chapters two, three and four of the present work
Firstly, from 1900 a sum of constellations including the race supremacy theories propagated
by the triple coalition, colonisers, missionaries, the ruling class, the heavy burden against the
peasantry, had all infected the mentalities and entrenched some of the elite in both
communities in ethnic analysis of Rwandan reality.
Secondly, it is indisputable to say that this ethnic polarisation of the 50s early 60s seemed to
have settled down in the 70s and 80s. As shown in chapter four, the dual character of
Rwandan society is entangled in ethnic tensions, but in fact, the northern Bahutu faction in
power was polarised against the rest of the country. The Regional not ethnic duality was far
more important in Rwanda politics prior to the 1990s. Bahutu-Batutsi antagonism was
revived in 90s, particularly following the RPF attack and when the multiparty system was
restored in 1991; it was accelerated towards the end of 1993 by unscrupulous ethno-
politicians in power straggle. Nkiko and Gasana accurately put it as follows:
Ethnicity in Rwanda is therefore an organising factor for access to power and resources, two ends that
are not related to ethnic differences as such. On the local basis, it is an undisputed truism that Hutu and
Tutsi lived together in full harmony and peace. There was no issue opposing them along the ethnic lines.
Social interactions including intermarriages were more a general rule that an exception. Even
competition for scarce land resources was not at all described in ethnic terms. On the national level, it is
the educated elites competing for power and national resources who artificially created the ethnic
conflict627.
These authors are right to underline the fact that the Banyarwanda people lived in harmony.
This was not necessarily the achievement of the Habyarimana regime, but an internal social
dynamic resulting from the fact that Bahutu and Batutsi share every single aspect of the daily
reality, social, spiritual, cultural, provided the ethno-politician do not intervene to inject the
venom. To undermine such a harmony, the anti-peace circles have worked hard, using the
'media of hatred' and other tools, combining psychological pressure to physical threats
against both the victims and those suspected to oppose their cynical project.
The past stereotypes, the resentment and policies of scapegoats were called on to divide
society to fit their selfish gains. The best illustration of the source and aim of the ethnic
mobilisation being the gain of power and resource rather than 'secular hatred' were the attacks
broadcast or published against personalities- other than Batutsi or Rwandan- or institutions
and countries which had manifested their interested to help Rwanda in the implementation of
the Arasha Peace Agreement, particularly Belgium, UN, the UN troops' Commander so as to
force them pull out as indicated in section 3.2.3.
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Ibid., p.382.
627 Gasana,J& Nkiko,N., Breaking Hutu-Tutsi enmity in Rwanda Through Reconcilication. Can there be Hope
again? Lausanne, 1997, P.6.
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Surprisingly, the most virulent anti-Belgian attack came from a Belgian native, Georges
Ruggiu who joined the RTLM as journalist in its early beginning. General Dallaire
acknowledges the fact, though as diplomat and soldier, he tried to dilute the harm on the
morale of his troops in saying that the campaign was not "of such a scale as to render the
presence of UNAMIR, as neutral force, compromised or ineffective".628
The destructive role of the RTLM and other media and their shareholders who participated in
the spread of racist propaganda was highlighted by many observers629. The ambassador of
Belgium in Rwanda sent many letters to his government requesting international pressure on
Habyarimana to stop the RTLM harmful activities. Reporting the visit in Rwanda of J.
Delcroix, then Minister for Defence of Belgium, in the late March 1994, Ambassador J.
Swinnen wrote:
On promit au Ministre que Ton veillerait a ce que la RTLM modere le ton de ses emissions. La Premiere
Ministre Agathe partageait son inquietude au sujet de RTLM. Elle etait d'avis que Habyarimana avait
une part de responsabilite dans les evenements. Elle insista pour que la communaute internationale
intensifie ses pressions sur le President. Le Ministre Delcroix mit l'accent sur les "echeances
importantes.630
The divisive character of the RTLM ethnic mobilisation has gone beyond the Rwandan
borders and affected the former colonial power in the very heart of its Cabinet which was
divided on which position to take. The Ambassador in Kigali, John Swinnen was in favour of
a diplomatic and political pressure to be put on Habyarimana and his entourage, while some
members of the Cabinet in Brussels, including Minister J.Delcroix were openly sympathetic
to the Habyarimana camp. Hence, the reports sent to Brussels by Ambassador Swinnen and
other warnings, from media or independent observers were kept dead letter. This led Mrs.
Alice de Forge to say that: "The international community has missed the opportunity from
1992 to exercise pressure on Habyarimana so as to stop the genocide"631. RTLM continued its
evil campaign against what it considered as the threats against the "rule of the majority", the
Batutsi and the democratic opposition.
V.4.2. Resourcing in History Resentment
The racist propaganda would dig also into the repertoire of legends, myths, and into the
collective representations that project the present into a recent or distant past as shown in
chapter one. The authors, the ideologues of the regime, aimed to reproduce a hierarchical,
unopposed oral, feudal, esoteric and non verified culture of communication for a
monolithical exercise of power. The top to bottom culture which shaped social life through
what Rukebesha has called the 'esoteric' communication was built upon a number of
principles: first, a tendency to divinise the ruler whose word would be unopposed. The
62S Mahoux & Verhofstadt., Rapport de la Commission Parlementaire Beige sur les Evenements du Rwanda,
Bruxelles, December 1997, p. 308.
629
Twagiramungu, F., then Prime Minister in the RPF government called the "government of National unity":
Conference de Presse a Kigali, 23 Mars 1995, diffuse par Radio Rwanda, 24 Mars 1995 a 6.45. He said: "we
thought that extremism has gone with RTLM, Kangura and all the chain. Today, the influence of Radio is equally
becoming more destructive than constructive".
630 Mahoux & Verhoftstadt, op.cit. p.311.
631 Ibid. p. 129.
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sheepish obedience before, during and after colonial periods had root causes not in the
culture of untruth in Rwanda but rather in the fear of repression and state violence, an aspect
discussed in further sections.
The second principle was intolerance. Political activities had gradually degenerated into a
situation where once in power, the ruler wanted to remain there for ever. Habyarimana
characterised the situation well in calling himself, ikinani, the invincible (or the irremovable)
who reigns by ubwiru (esoterism, an official function assumed by the ritualists called abiru,
keepers of the monarchical constitution with a small group of the entourage-family, the akazu
(household).
Thus, the akazu k' I bwami ( the household of the court) would mean the small group in the
Abahindiro/Banyiginya and Bega clans who competed to control the system of privileges.
During the last decade of the Habyarimana reign, akazu symbolised influential members of
his entourage and from the family of his wife who, as throughout the monarchical period,
earned their positions not because of competence but on account of being born in the native
region of the President's family.
This group became the true centre of power who overturned most of the administrative
decisions which did not safeguard their interests. In his letter of resignation from the MRND,
the former director of ORINFOR, C. Mfizi characterised the Akazu- entourage of
Habyarimana as the 'Reseau-Zero', 'Ikiguri-Nunga' (the zero network), and called them
destructive parasites632. The Akazu members were the organisers of all the acts of violence,
assassination, mass killings and genocide; they symbolised all the attitudes of nepotism and
egoism in the Churches and political parties633. When the hard-liners within the MRND
founded the CDR to oppose "politically and militarily the RPF by mobilising the Hutu", the
Batutsi and democrat Bahutu who yearned the political changes had no other destiny but to
be crushed, systematically eliminated. The Kinyarwanda expression used was:
Gutsembatsemba inyenzi n'ibyitso, literally, to eliminate the cockroaches and the betrayals.
The logic behind this was to ridicule the enemy to the status of an insignificant animal and to
sow into the conscience of the masses that killing the Batutsi or their supporters was not a
crime. Several mobs of killers and militia would circulate the streets and villages with arms,
grenades, nailed sticks in what they called 'guhumbahumba ibyitso' (collecting for killing the
632 Mfizi, C., Letter to President Habyarimana resigning from the MRND, Paris, July, 1992. In Guichoua, op.cit.
p.617.
633 The Belgian Ambassador to Kigali, J.Swinnen described the 'general staff of the Akazu group in charge of the
extermination of the Tutsi and the crush the Hutu internal opposition so as to resolve the Rwandan problem on
their manner', as including: the three brothers-in - law of Habyarimana (P. Zigiranyirazo, chairman; Col. E.
Sagatwa; S. Rwabukumba); Capt. P. Simbikangwa; Col. Serubuga; F. Karera; Cdt Gacinya; Col. A. Nsengiyumva
and Col. T. Renzaho, then Prefet of Kigali. Mahoux and Verhofstadt, op.cit. p.257. R. Lemarchand has the same
view. He estimates that the machinery of genocide was installed from 1992. It includes, on the top, a) the members
of Akazu in which he adds on the list of Ambassador Swinnen, the Wife of Habyarimana; J. Nzirorera, a member
of the Habyarimana cabinet, close to his family, J. Gashumba, a Habyarimana's nephew; b) organisations in
Communes and rural areas ( 200 to 300 people per commune); c ) the militia Interahamwe (more or less 30,000
members);d) the Presidential-Guard army members recruited exclusively in the northern stronghold of
Habyarimana. Mahoux and Verhofstadt, op.cit. p. 248.
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last traitors). This was an appeal repetitively made in the 'media of hatred', RMLM, Kangura
newspaper and the alike.
This led the opposition to say that ingoma zirasa fall the drums: all the regimes were
identical). During the 1990s struggle for political changes, they invented the term Kubohoza,
to liberate people from the Ubuhake of Habyarimana and MRND (liberating from the
bondage of Habyarimana and MRND). Yet, the MRND old guards were still calling their
party, Ishyaka ry'amahoro n'ubumwe (the party of peace and unity), regardless of all the
killings and assassinations of which they were being accused. The MDR activists would call
theirs, ishyaka ry'umucyo (a party of lights); PSD: ishyaka ry'amizero ya rubanda (the party
of hope for people), and the extremist CDR militants would call themselves: ishyaka rya
rubanda nyamwinshi (the party of the vast majority).
This propaganda founded on myths and lies exploited by extremists and political bigotry has
led some superficial analysts to confuse verbal and political violence with the culture of
untrue in Rwanda. P. Erny and Overdulve drew a bizarre conclusion from Maquet's study
(particularly his famous theorems of inequality in Rwanda) that truth was not what mattered
in Rwandan communication but the relations with the superior. Overdulve634 suggests that
communication is biased in Rwanda because unlike European society, Rwanda was not
penetrated by the "Judeo-Christian tradition which penetrated profoundly the 'Euro-
american'635 culture and influenced and transformed it".
However a counterculture of the hierarchical esoteric communication existed and dismisses
the Maquet's study. Ukuri guca mu iziko ntigushya (the truth crosses the fire without
burning) or aho kunigwa ni ijambo wanigwa n 'uwo uribwiye (instead of being strangled by a
word/truth, better being strangled by the one to whom you tell it). With regard to the culture
of blind obedience spread by the clique that controlled power, Rwandan had umwami yicara
ku ntebe udi abajisha iye (the king sits on a chair/see whilst his successor prepares his own),
meaning that the attempt to monopolise power was an illusion. Equally, in Rwandan society
the true umugabo (being a true human being) is a man or a woman who lives upon the truth
(umunyakuri).
We must then distinguish the entire culture of sitting room developed in the monolithic
systems and the social culture of people. In the former, the elite thirsty for privileges owe
their promotion not to their competence, nor to their desire for transparency in
communication but to their loyal and blind worship of the ruler. In the events of daily life,
activities such as marriages, socio-economic relationships and other forms of solidarity,
conflict resolving, the community rely on men and women of integrity who command respect
above the lineages, clans and social classes because they are known to be truthful.
634 Overdulve,C.M., "Fonction de la Langue et de la Communication au Rwanda". In Neue Zeitschrift fur
Missionswissenschft (Nouvelle Revue de Science Missionnaire). Separat-Abdruck, 53-1997/4,P.283.
635 The author precises that American notion here refers to those Americans of European extraction. Ibid.p.271.
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Overdulve and Erny's ideological remarks have been misled by the fact that these
counterculture mechanisms did not work during the crises. The reasons why these
mechanisms did not work in Rwanda may be the same as elsewhere where predominant
forces have erupted, violated moral principles and ruled out the pact between the leader and
the nation in reigning by terror. Here, the population would approve what seems to be
realistic for their safety whatever society they belong to as proved in the example of the
NAZI regime or the Serbo-Yugoslavia case suggested by Cerovic below in section 4.5.
That said, Overdulve's argument points to another reality: the hypocrisy of past and present
missionaries, expatriate and local who have not been transformed by the Gospel but put the
mask so as to profess Christian faith to Rwandans. This resembles the story of an ape
recounted by Gregory of Nyssa. A travelling showman trained an ape so that it could appear
with dancing girls behind a mask like a human being. The act which was warmly applauded
everywhere was once ended by a knavish spectator. He threw nuts on the stage. The ape
pulled out the mask and started eating the nuts636!
The mask as it has been shown in chapter three can be the christianising of society by the
same people who bore the Hamite theory of supremacy and the Churches invested in a
civilising role; it can also be, as shown in chapter four, a hierarchy which because it was
blinded by the so-called "Church-state good relations" continued to legitimate the MRND
dreadful system.
V. 4.3. Habyarimana and Kayibanda, Similar Goals?
In the final attempt of the extremists to mobilise the unity of the Bahutu, they sought to show
Habyarimana as the man who would pursue and fulfil the aspirations and ideals in the spirit
of PARMEHUTU leadership, the party that led the country to its independence. In issue no
12 of Kangura, February 1991, Habyarimana was presented as the spouse of the Rwandans
on his 55th birthday, and some journalists who do not share the ideas of the hard-liners were
accused of being in the Inkotanyi trap.
Many observers acknowledged the fact that the first ten years of the Habyarimana regime
were successful in bringing about economic and social development. This was recognised by
many organisations, both local and international. However, the defenders of the regime
behaved as if the credit for the achievements of the nation, like the Umuganda, belonged to
Habyarimana alone or to a band of the rulers not to the population.
The campaign of the regime extended to the co-ordination of the extremist groups around the
President's family and to the leaders of the extremist factions within the political parties.
There was a deliberate policy designed to exploit the image of Gregoire Kayibanda, the
leader of independence, in the 'Bahutu Unite project'. A desperate attempt to recuperate
Kayibanda's thinking and legacy was undertaken in Kangura no 31 and 32 , February 1992.
636 Thielicke.H., Theological Ethics. Tome II. Politics. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1969,p.70.
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The late President made a post-mortem visit to his political moderate heirs (the MDR,
opposition to the MRND) whom he blamed for having made an alliance with the Batutsi of
the RPF. To the sadness of the partisans of the former President, his image was exploited in
the most indecent way. In Kangura no 40 of March 1993 and again its special magazine of 26
December 1993 the newspaper presented Kayibanda on the cover, with a machete beside him
asking if the founder of Parmehutu party would be happy with the alliance between his
renovated party and the Batutsi. But in such a volatile political climate there was little room
for protest for those who were concerned for the misinterpretation of his thought and actions.
There was then a mobilisation to execute what the hard-liners called the "unfinished agenda
of the 1959 revolution". Such a call was made in February 1993 in Bugesera by Justin
Mugenzi, president of the Liberal Party (the extremist faction) during a meeting of his party.
RTLM and Kangura created a space for debate appealing to the remnants among the 1959
politicians or their children to boast of the bravery of the revolution and how they perceived
that the 'remaining task' could be accomplished. Actually the discussions always revolved
around the themes of the generosity of the Bahutu and of Habyarimana who left the Batutsi
to prosper, or the fact that the present troubles arrived because the Batutsi had escaped alive
towards their exile; this, it must be remembered, was the theme of Leon Mugesera in the
Kabaya " call for genocide massacres".
V.4.4. Control of Conscience
The system initiated from 1973 by Habyarimana was a process of 'the control of conscience'
described in chapter four as 'Humiriza nkuyobore'637 . Extracts of the President speeches were
reproduced for meetings or for any particular political, social event and were treated with the
same reverence. In the media, the 'divine words' of the President preceded and closed the
news on Radio and Television several time each day. They were taken as conclusions and
decisions, more than any parliamentary law. They were never questioned or debated in any
organ. B. Habimana, then Secretary General of the MRND, would repeat that the wish of the
President was equivalent to the law. Thus, "it was no surprise", says J.M.V. Higiro, "that
during the multi-party government period, decision- making authorities would dig through
the extracts of the President's speeches to use them as reference of authority and repeat key
passages from them religiously as a clergyperson consulting the Bible during the preparation
n It638of a sermon
The President was so committed to maintaining his dominance over the system of
information that when the Minister of Information in the multi-party coalition government, P.
Ndengejeho from the opposition, decided to suppress the presidential slogans on the national
radio and Television during the first year of the political coexistence, a governmental crisis
arose. All the nine MRND ministers (half of the Cabinet) refused to participate anymore in
637 Literally: Close your eyes to let me guide / command you. See also the process of divinising the ruler in chapter
four.
638
Dialogue, no 147. JMV. Higiro was head of the State Office of Information (ORINFOR)
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the cabinet meetings unless the slogans were reinstated. The crisis ended temporarily when
the two parties agreed to relocate the presidential slogans somewhere else in the radio and
television schedules639.
V.4.5. Manipulating Emotions for Ethnic Solidarity
The extremist media carried out other functions: they called forth nationalist feelings,
justified the ethnocide and violence against the Batutsi and Bahutu victims using the pretext
of 'secular rivalry'; they strove to eradicate any traces of guilt surrounding various organised
640
massacres
In a tentative move to force the blind adhesion of all the Cabinet members to the hard-line
ideology during the period prior to the political changes, Kangura issue no 13 of April 1991
showed on its front page photographs of six members of the cabinet hanged by one of their
colleagues641. The victims were accused of being either Batutsi who falsified their identity
cards or accomplices of the Inkotanyi. Then the newspaper wrote: "President Habyarimana
said that there are some whose views (in the crisis) are false. Would these people be of any
help to him"? Some days after, all of the ministers who were shown 'hanged' were revoked
from the Cabinet. There might be two possible interpretations here: either a decision to sack
the undesirable had been taken and a psychological preparation of public opinion was seen as
necessary; or a psychological pressure was urging them to sell their spirit and conscience to
hard-liners642.
From its first year of existence in 1990 to the first half of 1993, Kangura' s effects were
contained in particular due to some valuable anti-hatred campaign taken by the NGOs,
Human rights organisations, 'democrat media' and the political opposition. But in late 1991,
the violent groups including the death squads within the army (Amasasu), the interahamwe
militia of MRND, the Abahuzamugambi militia of CDR party politics and the 'media of
hatred' started to co-ordinate their activities. In March 1992 the massacres of the Batutsi in
Bugesera were preceded by a set of combined actions engineered by the extremists. In
November 1991, Ngeze Hassan, the editor of the Kangura news paper circulated anti-Batutsi
639 Ibid., p. 102/3.
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Nsengiyumva,F., Ingoma v'amaraso (the bloodshed regime). Editions CLACHO, Kigali, 1995: pp 24-86.
641 The six victims were: B. Habimana, General -Secretary of MRND; T. Mujyanama, Minister of Justice; J.M.V.
Mugemana, Minister of Interior; A. Ntashamaje, Minister of Relationship between the Institutions; F. Habiyakare,
Minister of Public services and Employment; A.M. Nkubito, Attorney general. The hunger was D. Mbangura,
Minister of Education.
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Mbangura, a former Deputy- Chancellor of the National University of Rwanda, Principal of the Ruhengeri's
Campus. Member of the Central Committee of MRND, he was from the south, Gikongoro, he was appointed
Minister of Education and made his popularity in giving primacy to intellectual capacity over nepotism . He then
became the target of Kangura Newspaper. He was the one who was hanging his colleagues; he ended in the cabinet
of the genocidal interim government. Mujyanama, from south-west, Kibuye,Minister of Justice, tried
unsuccessfully to issue false and biased declarations concerning arbitrary arrests of the so-called October 1990
'ibyitso' extending even among children, at the beginning of the war. Yet, that could not save his position in a
cabinet from which he was sacked and replaced by M. Ngirumpatse, later general Secretary of the MRND and
initiator of the Interahamwe militia. Mujyanama later joined the opposition before being killed at Murindi, then
the stronghold of RPF.
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tracts in the region and began to supply petrol to local relays including local authorities
which later served to burn Batutsi houses643.
The plan took a crucial turn in early December 1991 when President Habyarimana himself
chaired a meeting of the senior officers of the army to plan how to win the war against the
RPF using the media, diplomacy and politics. As an outcome of the meeting, a working group
was set up to continue the strategy. They later extended the definition of the concept of the
'enemy' to the Batutsi, their 'accomplices' in the country and those in international
644
organisations .
On 2nd of March 1992, J.B. Bamwanga, Director of Programs on Rwanda Radio, and a very
famous extremist (one of the founder members of the RTLM) repeatedly spread a false
communique attributed to a so-called 'organisation of non-violence' supposedly based in
Nairobi. The communique called the 'patriots' to resist the RPF's plan to eliminate Bahutu
politicians regardless of their political tendency. However, it was proved that what the
communique called the "direction of the military operation" did not exist in the Rwandan
military organisation. Nevertheless, two days later, on 4 March the Bugesera region was
immersed in 'fire and blood'; more than 500 people were killed645.
A plan including the recruiting and arming of the Interahamwe militia was confirmed as part
of the strategy following a proposal made by Colonel Nsabimana, then commander of the
Mutara sector (border with Uganda). He suggested heavy military recruitment, training and
the distribution of arms to young people in the communes within the region646. This campaign
of violence was denounced by two senior army officers, colonels Rusatira and Rutayisire in
a letter addressed on 3rd December 1993 to the UN General secretary representative in
Kigali. The officers unveiled Habyarimana's plan to massacre some key personalities of the
opposition as part of sabotage of the peace accord 647.
The systematic control of information combined with a campaign of violence applied at
various levels, government, ruling party institutions, the state administration, the army, the
media. This seems to be true for most other dictatorships. First, the regime has to ensure that
it has the elite on its side who share the ideal of nationalist feelings. Second, the totalitarian
and authoritarian regimes use these elite to enrol the population. S.Cerovic, a Montenegrin
journalist says that in a regime of ethnic purification 'professionalism' means a ferocious
643 Our interview in Maranyundo ( Anglican) and Nyamata (Catholic) parishes, in March 1992 with the priests
and hundreds of the Tutsi exiled in the parishes.
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Among many other communiques broadcast by ORINFOR was a so-called "Message of the direction of the
military operations" warning the population on the strategies of the enemy supposed manipulating the opposition
and also a so-called letter from a Nairobi based organisation on the no-violence. The latter message charged the
RPF to have planned to kill several personalities of Hutu background from different political parties. In one of
the program 22 names were diffused. See Guichoua, A. op. cit. p. 611 ff.
645 ADL. Rapport sur les Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda de Sentembre 1991 a Septembre 1992 . See also
Guichoua,A, Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda 1993-1994. Paris: Karthala, pp. 610 ff. And also
Reyntjens ,F, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs ( Rwanda-Burundi) en Crise (1988-1993.
646 See letter of colonel Nsabimana of 29/9/1991 in Guichoua, A,op.cit. p.651. Later, Col. D. Nsabimana was
promoted General and chief of the staff. He died in same plane that killed president Habyarimana.
647 Guichoua, A, o.p.cit, p. 653.
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propaganda. During the Hitler period, what mattered was not to inform objectively but to win
the war even as journalist. Hence neutral and objective information becomes impossible.
In a totalitarian society, where the dominant regime controls the media and sells its ideology,
everyone has a single channel of information and interpretation of the reality, i.e. the
dominant ideology. On the one hand, the population listens because it is the only way to
survive; on the other hand, people who have not known 'liberty' for a long period are not
able to demythologise the regime and its worth. In the whole process remarks Cerovic, the
role of the intelligentsia in particular in determining the ideological models is enormous;
without them, no totalitarian system can survive648.
Cerovic's analysis applies accurately to Rwanda. In spite of the so-called plurality of media
and attempts by some of the newly formed political parties and NGO efforts to give more
accurate and honest information to the population, as stated earlier, the information remained
under the control of the regime, apart from the few independent analyses in newspaper with
insignificant circulation of 1000 to 2000 copies irregularly produced. This reinforced the
phenomenon of 'intellectual illiteracy' evoked before and carefully planned by the regime.
The elite were moulded in one way of thinking and reasoning. Secondly, the academics
including Leon Mugesera, Ferdinand Nahimana, Maniragabe Baributsa and others played a
negative role if not as organisers but as early theoreticians and activists in RTLM radio. The
massacres in the University campuses left 400 students, 50 professors and 150 staff of the
Rwanda National University dead649'
V.4.6. Mobilising Hatred Nationally and Internationally
Another axis of the genocide campaign was the mobilisation on national and international
levels. Following the attack of the RPF (October 1990), Kangura launched a heavy home and
abroad anti-Batutsi campaign with documentation whose authenticity was not proved. From
its issue no 4, November 1990, the newspaper published what it called the "Tutsi Plan for
the colonisation of the Kivu region (Zaire) and of the Central region of Africa". The editor,
Ngeze Hassan, published the photocopy of the so-called plan affirming that it was contained
in a "letter of August 1962 discovered during the events of 1959-1962 in the north Kivu
region" (Congo-Zaire).
The plan whose dates recalled the events of Rwandan history that pushed some of the Batutsi
nobility to move to the Kivu (Congo- Zaire) region, outlined in 19 points a number of
principles. In brief, the authors estimate that because the Batutsi were few in number, to
achieve the colonising of the region, they ought to develop a friendship with the
Bahutu/Bantu in different levels of their administration by offering presents, in particular in
648
Cerovic, S, "L'information est-elle Possible face a la Propagande"? In Moucharafief, C. (ed.), Experiences et
Reflexions sur la Reconstruction Nationale et la Paix (Actes de la Conference Internationale sur la Reconstruction
du Rwanda, Kigali 22-28 Octobre 1994.), Paris: Fondation pour le Progres de l'homme (FPH), dph No 64,
pp. 189-192.
Nsengimana, J, Speech on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the National University of Rwanda, a on 2
April 1995 a year after the genocide. Broadcast by Rwanda Radio on 3 April 1995.
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giving their daughters in marriage and in dividing those among the Bahutu who would
attempt to promote an eventual ethnic conscience.
Following the death of R. Bisengimana, a prominent personality in the Government of
Mobutu whose origin was traced to Banyarwanda,650 Kangura issue 18 of July 1991
announced that the Batutsi of the Kivu-Zaire region would be exterminated. 'Prophecy'! In
March-May 1993, more than 10.000 people of Kinyarwanda speakers established in the Kivu
region for centuries or installed by the colonial powers during the first half of the 20th
century were massacred in horrific conditions by the militia and Mobutu's army651.
In December 1990, Kangura no 6 published what it called 'les dix commandements', "a
breviary of hatred against the Tutsi" which it urged the Bahutu to apply. The rules
criminalised any Hutu who would employ or continue to intermarry with the Tutsi; that
would be a betrayal of republican institutions. The paper requested that all the positions in
administration, schools, business, army be reserved for the Bahutu. It would consider any
Hutu who would marry a Tutsi girl or recruit them for a job as a betrayal. The breviary had a
striking resemblance to the Protocol of the elders of Zion, an anti-Jewish document which
was published by the Nazis to manipulate the world opinions against the Jewish which in
fact, provided the motivation for the sending of thousands of Jews into pogroms652.
The paper pursued its international call for Bahutu solidarity and the rule of the majority.
Those in high positions who refused to apply the proposed cynical actions were accused of
collaborating with the enemy653. The theme of Bahutu ethnic solidarity was maintained in
issue number nine. The paper not only argued for the maintenance of the ethnic definition in
the identity card but urged the Bahutu to "rediscover their ethnic identity to which could
belong 15 million individuals, because the Batutsi had taught them to ignore it"; it sought to
"promote their Gihutu language" (sic). It proposed a so-called Bahutu cultural centre to be
installed in Kigali and to have its branches in Bujumbura where they would help their 'kin'
victims of a fifth genocide since 24 December 199 1 654. Additionally, the 'Bahutu nation'
would have for its organ of expression, the Kangura newspaper itself to be edited from
Goma655. The newspaper requested from its readers the extermination of the Inkotanyi and
their accomplices.
650 An influential director of the Mobutu cabinet who was from the Zairians of Banyarwanda background. See
Jeune Afrique, no 1870. Paris: Groupe Jeune Afrique, 6 to 12 November 1996, p23.
651 On the historical considerations regarding the installation of the population of Kinyarwanda expression in
Zaire, see a documented article of Ndeshyo Rurihose, dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Kinshasa in
Dialogue no 192. Ndeshyo, Rurihose, "La Nationality de la Population ZaTroise d'Expression Kinyarwanda au
Regard de la Loi du 29 Juin 1981". In Dialogue no 192. Bruxelles. pp. 3-32. See also Tegera, Aloys "La
Reconciliation Communautaire. Le Cas des Massacres du Nord-Kivu". In Guichoua, A. Les Crises Politiques au
Burundi et au Rwanda ( 1993-1994. Paris: Karhala/Universite de Lille, 1995.
652 Rubenstein.,R., "The Uniqueness of the Holocaust". In Rosenbaum. Is Holocaust unique? P. 14.
653
Alphonse Marie Nkubito , then Attorney General who was charged to chair the Commission of trial of 10.000
Tutsi and 'accomplices' arrested from the 4th October 1990 and who manifested integrity as he was leader of
human rights activities.
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Reporters Sans Frontieres, op. cit. appendixes 4.
6j5 Goma is the capital-city of the Kivu provinces of Zaire (Rep.Dem.Congo
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The accomplices of Inkotanyi are still among us and continue to threaten the institutions of justice; The
30 year- old democracy is nailed by the accomplices of Inkotanyi, if we are not vigilant they will
exterminate us". On page four it read "Why do we curb our necks to be dominated in silence"?
Kangura number ten became even more specific on the plan under preparation:
'Tumenye imigambi y' inkotanyi tubonereho kuzirikana uko tuzazitsemba (beware of Inkotanyi plans so
that we can organise how to completely eliminate them656.
The prevalent theme of elimination of 'Inkotanyi ( RPF troops) n'ibyitso' (traitors) loomed a
metaphor to kill the Batutsi and the pacifist Bahutu. The impact of such a campaign outside
Rwanda is difficult to measure. However, in such mobilisation, the Burundi crises would
become the oil that fuelled the fire in the region. Some events in Burundi and Congo might
have resulted from a dragging effect. In Burundi, for example, a document containing "17
rules of Batutsi" which has a virulent anti-Bahutu tone has been circulated in Bujumbura.
The document exhumed the devil of ethnic purification. According to Guichoua, the message
was the pursuit of the 21st October 1993 putsch657 in which died President Ndadaye and
prevented a President of Hutu background from to ruling over Burundi658.
Equally, in Kivu- Zaire during the recent conflicts, the local elite have exhumed the above
document published by Kangura about the "1959-1962 Batutsi's plan for the domination of
the Kivu". There was one difference: the authors of the discovery in the 1990s Zairian
conflict referred to the "Munyarwanda plan for the occupation of Kivu"659 instead of
restricting it to the Batutsi.
Above all, the campaign would show a paranoia regarding the potential threat of an
international plot against Rwanda. This country was considered as a model of success that
was envied by its neighbours plus Belgium. The latter wanted to repay its bill to the Batutsi
from whom it withdrew support in the 1950s while the United States of America came in as
sponsor of the President of Uganda, Museveni as leader of the Hima empire in the region.
Logically, the campaign was extended to the countries of the region with a pathetic appeal to
form a "coalition of the Bantu for the defence of democracy". The name proposed sadly
recalled the Coalition for the Defence of Democracy (CDR), responsible for the violent
activities.
Such a campaign incites one to ask what happens on the other side, among the members of
the RPF and the Batutsi community. For the Batutsi inside the country, there was no way
they could express openly and publicly their feelings due to the prevalence of the
monolithical system. In theory, most of the observers and researchers consulted have not
been able to find evidence of direct invitation to hatred, either in the political and social
organisations and the media created by the Batutsi. Rutazibwa, a priest who, after being
656
Kangura no 8 and 9.
657 Guichoua, A., op.cit. p.567.
658 The exploitation of the Burundi crisis by the campaigners took a new turn with the official launching of the
'Hutu Power' ideology on 25 October 1993 in the Nyamirambo stadium, Kigali. The Meeting during a rally in
which the extremist defectors from the political parties of the opposition joined the MRND and the CDR to
manifest their solidarity with the Bahutu of Burundi following the military putsch mentioned before. See details,
chapter VI, the immediate factors of the genocide.
659 Willame, J-C. Banvarwanda and Banvamurenge, Paris/Bruxelles: L'Harmattan/CEDAF, 1997, p.56.
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ordained by the pope during his visit in September 1990 in Rwanda, joined the RPF
rebellion, rejects any suggestion of ethnic hatred within the Batutsi' organisations660. But it
has been assumed that there exist extremists within their community too, though most of the
material we studied, like the RPF literature and ideologues emphasise the need for the unity
of the three communities, Inyabutatu Nyarwanda (the Rwandan tripartite). It equally appears
certain that some fractions within the RPF would express in provocative language what is
now considered to be sectarian attitudes. For example, the mobilisation of the 'Tutsi' youth to
join the rebellion was perceived by the hard-liners in the other group as a war against the
Bahutu' institutions. According to former Prime Minister, F. Twagiramungu, the Muhabura's
language (Radio of the RPF) was non-violent but insidious. It appealed to arming to resist the
attacks of their antagonist661 .
V.5. Churches Failed to Address Ethnic Mobilisation
The challenge raised by the ethnic mobilisation through media surprised the Churches which
could do little. We may find the reasons for such a failure in the fact that the extremist groups
behind the media of hatred prepared and co-ordinated their actions while none in the Church
media and among the ecclesial hierarchies were available or willing to work on an anti-
violence campaign.
V.5.1. The Churches did not Exorcise Hatred
Both Catholic and Protestant Churches had a considerable access to the media, both public
and private as indicated in section V.l. In addition, unlike the local NGOs and Human rights
organisations, the Churches were the oldest and most influential institutions but failed to
harness the potential of this prominence by being persuasive and decisive in then resisting
against evil.
Keith Clements, a member of an ecumenical team from the Churches of Britain who visited
Rwanda and Burundi in 1995, accurately remarked that, "confronted with the question of the
truth, the political and religious leaders retreated in an evasive flight into fatalism, and the
inevitability of the conflict instead of developing a mature social and political analysis of the
events"662.
66H Rutazibwa.P., "Un pas vers !a Reconciliation ou Pietinement dans le Racisme". In Dialogue no 197,
Bruxelles, Mars-Avril 1997, p.43
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Twagiramungu,F., Temoignage devant la Commission Parlementaire Beige, le 30 mai 1997. In Mahoux and
Verhofstadt, op.cit. 1997,p.20.
f'62 The reports and publications of the CPR (Conseil Protestant du Rwanda ) during the 1990-1993 period show an
attempt to tackle the issue of 'Reconciliation'. Yet, there was still a long way to go. For example, it was only during
1993 that for the first time the CPR assembly reflected on its mandate of unity (August 1993) as it is taken from
John 17:21.
Equally, the Communication department reports recounted the first ever visit of the CPR leaders in November
1993 to the regions conquered by the RPF in the north. The visit was a desperate attempt to respond to the remarks
made by a delegation of WCC and AACC which came in Rwanda prior to the visit of the General Secretaries of
the World Council of Churches (WCC), and the AACC, respectively Dr Konrad Raiser and Rev Jose Chipenda662.
The delegation including Ambassador Kiplagat from Kenya deplored the fact that the Church leaders had never
tried to meet the spiritual needs of the populations living in the areas occupied since 1991 by the rebellion.
CPR/Communication, Rapport, 1993, p.3. It seems plausible that this apathy, resulted from the incapacity to
overcome the continuos dehumanising of the " enemy", the RPF, by the regime's propaganda.
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Similarly, in the Burundi case, observes Clements, the tragedies have always been the
outcome of political power being sought and clung on to as an end in itself and at all costs663.
The Church leaders would repeat stereotypes of 'secular hatred' and become versed in the
inevitability of war. Thus, they reproduced the manipulation of the ethno-politicians and
nailed people into resignation and fatalism. However, without underestimating the
resignation which affected most of the moral forces leaders, we must acknowledge that the
situation needed a high degree of discernment. In an interview given to Robert Menard, of
'Reporters sans Frontieres', Father Andre Sibomana, then director of the Roman Catholic
Weekly, Kinyamateka, activist of Human rights associations, showed how difficult it was to
discern the danger in perspective; he said "we all have underestimated the force that RTLM
represented. That has been a lethal error"664.
V.5.2. Brief Chronology of Kinyamateka and Kangura.
The following section proposes a chronology of the leading articles in Kinyamateka, the
Catholic official voice in print media, and Kangura Newspapers, the leading print organ of
the extremist groups665 from June/July 1993 to January 1994. This period was choisen to
outline the attitude of both bi-monthly, at a turning point in the history of the country, the
signature of the Peace Agreement and the installation of the transitional political and military
institutions. Equally, the period corresponds to the arrival of the UN peace force and the 600
RPF soldiers who were due to supervise the 22 months transition period and to look after the
security of officials of the rebellion.
The leading article of Kinyamateka issue no 1398 of July 1993 refers to the political leaders
planning to delay the democratic elections while enjoying themselves in senior positions.
The same issue reports the bishop's message of July 30 1993 congratulating the negotiators
of the Arusha Agreement and appealing to the Banyarwanda to avoid any thing that could
sabotage it. On the other side, Kangura's leading article in the same month calls for the unity
of the Bahutu in the sub-region (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania). It
makes two other significant declarations, one that "Nous Republicans declarons que Arusha
ne sera applique excepte par la petite minorite qu'il avantage"; second, it announces the birth
of the RTLM as "the fruit of the Bahutu unity with many thanks to the billionaire F.
Kabuga".
Clements, K, "Africa Reflections 1995". A 17 pages reflection made after the visit to Rwanda June to July
1995. Collection of the author.
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Sibomana, A (Father), interview given to Reporters sans Frontieres in Rwanda: media de la haine ou presse
democratique. Rapport de mission. Paris: rapport de mission financee par l'Union Europeenne. Septembre 1994,
annexe 3,p 6.
665 In fact from its number eleven, Kangura had adopted a motto: "ijwi rigamije gukangura no kurengera rubanda
nyamwinshi" (The voice that would awake and represent the majority of the nation). It claimed to be an agency
who would help the legitimate services to identify the accomplices of Inkotanyi and to assist in the task of
uncovering hidden arms and munitions. It declared that there was no "no ransom for the enemy" (nta mpongano
y'umwanzi. The word Ntampongano(literally: no ransom for the enemy), later became later the name of a big
nailed stick used by "Interahamwe" in the mass killings.
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In Kinyamateka no 1399 of August 1993, the director, Father Sibomana signed the leading
article criticising those who 'sing' reconciliation and still violate human rights, and never
repent to seek for forgiveness for their deeds. In the second issue of August, Sibomana insists
on the fact that much has still to be done to obtain from the rulers, freedom, civil rights and
justice. Rwagahirima reported on the two days meeting organised in Kabgayi by bishop
Thaddee Nsengiyumva for the youths from thirteen political parties. The deputy-editor of the
Newspaper, the late S. Nkubiri commenting on the 60th anniversary of the newspapers
complained that although the Newspaper has been "struggling for democracy and acting as
the voice for the voiceless and the victims of violence", it had often been abandoned by its
sponsors, the bishops. In the same month, Kangura issue 48, published the CDR (the
extremist party)'s communique reiterating its rejection of the peace accord and what they
called the impossibility of reconciling the Bahutu and Batutsi.
Kinyamateka no 1402, September 1993, recounted the Kabusunzu conference of journalists
including a RPF delegation which reflected on the "role of the media in resolving the
conflicts". The newspaper published a message from bishop Misago, chairman of the
Commission on Peace and Justice urging the population to back the accord which for him
was the "first step after the 1959 revolution in resolving Rwandan disputes". Meanwhile
Kangura no 49 and 50 of October 1993 recalled the interviews given by the newly elected
President of Burundi, M. Ndadaye who was urged to give to the Bahutu the privileges that
were refused to them by the Batutsi. In addition, Kangura asked President Ndadaye to
organise 'Arusha' (reference to the Tanzanian city where the inter-Rwandan peace talks took
place) to rehabilitate the 'Palipehutu'- a political party considered by the Burundian
authorities as extremist- as Habyarimana did for Inyenzi.
Kinyamateka no 1404 of October 1993 reported the death of President Ndadaye of Burundi
and asked its readers not to weep for him but for their children and themselves because fear
was occurring within the region where the murderers of Ndadaye and other dictators opposed
democracy. The newspaper attacked the Burundian bishops for their misinterpretation of the
death of Ndadaye when they attributed it to a small group within the army.
In the leading article of Kinyamateka no 1407, December 1993, Father Sibomana invited the
grassroots to awaken so as to stop the 'carnage' of Rwanda which was looming, to save the
country from destruction. The newspaper recounted the three day Mombasa Symposium in
which the political forces, the RPF and the churches discussed "lasting peace in Rwanda" 666.
It also reported two other events the arrival in the capital for the 600 RPF troops and their
officials and recounted the Duharanre Amahoro (Peace in Walking, ecumenical) peace rally
on 1-1-1994.
666 With regard to the Burundi crisis and the Mombasa Symposium, the reader will refer to chapter VII, the
Church in mediation.
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At the same time, Kangura special no 52 December 1993 commented on the death of
Ndadaye as salutary to the Bahutu because it exposed the 'demonic plan of the Batutsi'
plotting to take power by force in Burundi and Rwanda. With regard to the arrival of the RPF
troops ('Inyenzi') in Kigali, it called on the majority "who have been told what to do" to
remain vigilant. In its issue no 55, January 1994, Kangura newspaper declared: "those who
believe that the war is over have their eyes and ears for decoration. RPF has an army that can
be fatal for the Bahutu".
These reporting point out two perspectives even a landmark between Kinyamateka and
Kangura. On one side, Kinyamateka, though at moments seems to slip into pessimism and
ambivalence, raises the awareness of the population to the forthcoming bloodshed events; it
reported efforts being made to enhance peace and hope. On the other, Kangura clearly
mobilised for widespread massacres. It seems from the point of view of this thesis that
Kinyamateka's reporting, was not sufficiently relayed by moral forces while Kangura was
relayed by large networks of extremist groups.
V.5.3. Cases of Isano and Gatenga Centres
Following the murder in early 1994 of some political personalities including Felecien
Gatabazi, leader of PSD and Minister of Public works and Energy from Butare (21 March
1994), the population of his region retaliated in lynching the CDR extremist party leader,
Martin Bucyana in Butare (22 March 1994). Then Impuzamugambi - those who have the
same goal- and Interahamwe- those who attack together- militia of the CDR and MRND
retaliated in organising massacres in the city of Kigali and murdering more than a hundred
civilians including some Church workers.
At that time, many people gathered in the Church centres including the Catholic youth
Centre in Gatenga, and at a Presbyterian socio-pastoral centre, Isano, in Gikondo. Then
RTLM broadcast several programs calling the two centres indiri y'Inyenzi n'ibyitso (the
bunkers of the cockroaches and accomplices). The social worker in charge of the AIDS
programme in Isano centre, Mrs Margaret Mukandamage was hacked to pieces together with
her husband and their six months old baby. The head of the centre, a Minister from Germany
feared for the security of his family and left his residence in the compound for a safer lodging
in the city. The silence of the hierarchies, both Catholic and Protestant to speak out against
such an attack was felt by many Christians as an omission that left these centres at the mercy
of these brutal killers. Duharanire Amahoro, a newly created ecumenical peace organisation
sent a letter and delegations to both the Presidents of the Catholic Episcopal conference and
the Protestant Council protesting against their absence of action against the continuing
invitation from the RTLM to massacre innocents. The group received no reply.
V.6. Credible Media did Responsible Reporting But...
Having shown the occurrence of the virus of hatred in the extremist media, it must be made
clear that considered in context, the global accusations that the NGO, human rights
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organisations or political parties had failed to denounce the "chronicle of the genocide" seem
to be somewhat exaggerated667' Apart from being handicapped by a harsh dictatorship, they
lacked experience (their existence was only authorised in the June 10 1991 Constitution and
then by the November 1991 law)668. From then on they produced a sum of joint declarations,
letters, messages and reports which were repeatedly addressed to various authorities from the
President of the Republic to the UN general secretary and western influential powers heads
of states to denounce the campaign of violence. One Human rights Organisation, the ADL
published two volumes of annual reports, 1991/2 and 1992/3 on appalling human rights
violation in Rwanda, a meticulous daily record of every single violation in the land with visit
on the ground, photographs and witnesses669.
Responsible media too did exist such as Kinyamateka, Imbaga and Dialogue and Rwanda
Rushya (of the late Andre Kameya). Though, the latter was politically aligned and even
adopted clearly an editorial line defending the Batutsi670, it would have good accounts of the
burning issues of the day. This category of newspapers would analyse the motivation behind
the massacres that preceded the 1994 tragedy. They did it with some achievement. In fact, it
is when both the NGOs, the 'democrat' journalists and politicians as well as some diplomats
combined their effort and put pressure on Habyarimana that he accepted the decision taken
by the Prime Minister from the Opposition, Dr Nsengiyaremye, to sack the Director General
of the Office of Information, F. Nahimana due to his responsibility in the March-April 1992
massacres of the Batutsi in the Bugesera area. But the light of hope soon switched off when
the same Nahimana and many other barons of the entourage of Habyariamana, in 1993,
launched the RTLM radio which started to broadcast in the following July671.
According to JB. Nkuriyingoma, former Minister of Information in the first post-genocide
government (July 1994-August 1995), the democratic media had denounced the genocide
propaganda. Despite the intensity of state machinery against the 'democratic media' good
accounts were written and published that made people aware of the political, economic and
social crisis; they denounced the ethnic propaganda that consisted in creating further enmity
between the 'Bahutu majority' and the 'Batutsi minority' (with the pretext of fighting the
enemy, RPF). Although, many journalists of the democratic press worked in poor conditions,
in risking their lives, they regularly reported various massacres of the target groups.
Moreover, if the 'democratic media' had any achievement, it was because there was mutual
667 Chretien & al, op. cit. p. 382.
668 Law on the Presse no 54/91 of 15 November 1991. See Reporters sans frontiers, appendixes no 4.
669
September 1991 to September 1992: 354 and October 1992 to October 1993.
67(1
Nkuriyingoma, J.B. "Les media democratiques avaient denonce la propagande genocidaire". In Dialogue no
190. Bruxelles: Avril-Mai 1996, pp. 151-153.
671 Head of the Office of Information (ORINFOR) both Television, Audio-visual and Print media, this senior
lecturer of history at the National University of Rwanda was entirely devoted to the Habyarimana regime. His
doctoral thesis in Paris -VI University comprised congratulations to his 'friend', Jean-Pierre, one of the sons of
the President. He inspired a group of intellectuals from the northern area of the President who were elaborating the
Habyarimana's regime ideology in what he called: 'Umuganda ideology'. The thesis was published under the title:
Rwanda. Emergence d'un Etat, Paris: l'Harmattan, 1993.
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support between them and the civic society, human rights organisations and the "democratic
political party members". Members of these organisations would help reporters to hide in
what was known as the 'maquis' and they reported each single aggression against those
tracked down by the regime672. I have distinguished the tremendous work done by these
young organisations, from the Church's failure to address ethically, politically, theologically
and ecumenically the issue of ethnocide as a challenge to confront.
Not Enough to Challenge Ethnic Manipulation
Having shown how the RTLM and Kangura channelled the venom of genocide, it is best to
look at how the MRND/CDR ideologies which sponsored these media manipulated and
deprived the word of its primary meaning. In ideologies, suggests H.Thielicke, word
degenerates. For the word draws its life from being first, a medium of confession. As such, it
informs, thus relates to ultimate truth; it expresses judgement, thus relates to righteousness;
and it gives shape, so it relates to ultimo being. Secondly, the word establishes and expresses-
or put an end to - communication between persons673. When a word has lost its reference to
norms and persons, and is no longer a medium of communication, then it becomes a power of
suggestion, a smite; it becomes a slogan, proper for propaganda; it then ends in becoming a
tool for depersonalisation and dehumanisation. Thielicke points out that ideologies are not
controlled by men whereas truth controls men. A statement made in ideologies, he says, is
not shaped by the truth, even if it resembles it, but proclaims a programme as a will to
power674. The one who manipulates the word in ideologies captures the other and either,
integrates them or destroys them as a hostile power. That is what the MRND/CDR system
and their media were about. They integrated some of the leaders from the opposition675 who
were applauded at length in political party rallies, for their virulent opposition to
Habyarimana but who, from the late 1993 became close allies of the genocide ideology; they
called on the feelings of the masses; then they slaughtered those who refused to adhere to
their dreadful ideology.
V.7. An Agenda for Churches: Challenging Media
Churches have decided that media should constitute an important domain to help them
evangelise the world; hence they cannot remain indifferent before the perversion and misuse
of media made intentionally by evil people. Such a dehumanising and degrading of human
672 See for example ADL. 1991/1992 report, pp. 133 protest against the "genocide" of the Bagogwe group
(concept is from the international commission); denunciation and protest against the massacres of the Tutsi in
Kibirira in October 1990 (109) and letters to the prime Minister and the Prefect of Gisenyi (129-131) protest
against the massacres of Bugesera from the day following the outbreak (Guichoua, p.613) and the demand of
inquiry on Burgomasters Rwanbuka of Kanzenze/Bugesera; Gatete/ Murambi; report on Mbogo massacres (267-
275); City of Kigali in May 1992 (277); Bicumbi (280); see also defence in favour of imprisoned journalists, pp.
331-347.
673 Thielicke,H., op.cit. p. 48.
674 Ibid. p.36.
675These include J. Mugenzi, Mrs. A. Ntamabyariro and S. Mbonampeka, leaders of the P.L party, MM. Karamira,
Murego and Kambanda, leaders of the MDR party.
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beings process has been exposed in this work as the grave malady of the Rwandan media.
These estranged human being from each other and reduced them to 'things'. It is best now to
discuss alternative solutions to the existing approach in media based on the continuing
polarisation of society.
V.7.1. Professionalism and Telling the Truth
Christian Ethics in communication, this author believes, requires honesty in persuasiveness
and assessing the possibility of the impact of the reporting on the audience with freedom and
responsibility. To be ethical, the media must not use falsehood, emotions, fabricated or
distorted arguments or irrelevant appeals to divert the audience. A responsible journalism
takes necessarily into account the use of the language in publishing reliable news presenting
many different points of view. The insistence of the chief editor for example on rewriting any
news that could cost lives and the elimination of deliberate bias, are of paramount
importance. The option for caring journalism seems the best instrument for a profession that
is part of the humanities.
The practice of journalism rests on another fundamental principle: telling the truth. Telling
the truth so that people who have no access either to sources of information or to knowledge
can be empowered to deliberate in private and public about the matters that concern their
society. Important characteristics of truth-telling are honesty, perception, objectivity,
integrity and professionalism.
If reporting the truth is at the heart of journalism, then, what took place in Rwanda with the
RTLM and Kangura newspapers and suchlike was not journalism, but the fabrication of
extremist groups in the process of spreading chaos and violence in order to monopolise
power. For this particular reason, people of faith in Rwanda, especially Christians, as moral
forces, are challenged by this word of the Gospel: "Then you will know the truth, and the
truth will set you free"(Jn 8,32). But how one can be sure that people know the truth so that
they become free remain at the heart of these problematic issues.
The issue of communication in an ecclesial community must be given an attention so that all
both the clergy and the faithful empower each other in challenging propaganda and lies in
society. Henrici's analysis may be useful in any attempt to link an ethic of communications
and the teaching of the Church. He suggests to relate both truth and power to three concepts:
Word, Sacrament and Communion676. In Word, the communicator must remember that Jesus
Christ is the message, the truth, the one who is life and the way. A reporter must be a person
converted to the necessity of building up a community of faith and communion. Such a
reporter knows that she/he counts and depends on God, the Father, through Jesus Christ to
found the strength for telling and interpreting the stories and the daily realities in
transparency (showing their sources and accepting human limitations). A reporter who is
676 Henrici,S.J.P., "Truth and Power in Ecclesial Communication". In Granfield,P.(ed), The Church and
Communication. Communication. Culture and Theology. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1996,pp.40-60.
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persuaded that Jesus-Christ has broken the walls of separation and estrangement is able to
avoid globalising and simplifying reporting.
Secondly, through Sacrament the minister empowers the community but is also empowered
both in receiving and in sharing with the laity, the faithful in the word of God and through the
sacraments. Such an interdependence develops a communion between the hierarchy and the
loving generosity of the faithful. This analysis is important to Christian communities like
Rwanda during the times of crises. Because violent groups may monopolise the public media
and means of communications as part of their violent strategy to cling on power, both the
clergy and the faithful must sit together, meditate the Word of God and find strength in the
source of life through sacraments, sharing information, analyses and prospects. In this sense,
the self-criticism of the Presbytery of the Kabgayi diocese and the commitment of the Ukuri
Kubaka igihugu Group of EPR to be available in the case the Church hierarchy needed them
to intervene in the crises and human rights violations were a clear genuine beginning of a
Christian community determination to stand for the truth. The experience disappeared with
the democratic process677.
V.7.2. Dialogue as Means of Communicating Faith
The establishment of a responsible journalism enables the liberation of society from the
corrupt system. Okwuniba Nnoli suggests some practical solutions from which I draw for the
re-establishment of a harmonious, caring journalism. First, to set up a clear policy, based on
consistent and democratic principles, which is able to appraise each concrete question by
removing inequalities, privileges and exclusiveness; second, to allow full rights such as
equality of opportunity, justice and progress to all the population regardless of their social,
ethnic and gender background; third, to establish the mechanisms of unambiguous demand
for inter-ethnic unity of masses through a free dialogue with the diverse social and cultural
organisations without state interference678.
Therefore, this thesis suggests that Christians be empowered to study the exploitation of the
ethnic feelings by the media and corrupt politicians; to understand the relationship existing
between mission and media, then initiate other alternatives based on mutual trust,
transparency, love, faith and truth between the members of the community. Rwandan
Christians will have to fundamentally reform the ecclesial monarchical form of
communication which goes from top to bottom. They will also have to encourage all the
sections of the community to fully participate, criticise, conceive and evaluate the ecclesial
initiatives.
Such a process requires that be formed a questioning generation capable of challenging the
authoritative approach to Christian teaching and the enslaving spirituality that focuses on
minor sins (lying, stealing, adultery drunkenness) while omitting those horrific acts like racial
677 Diosese de Kabgayi., Convertissez-vous et Vivez en Paix. Kabgayi, Decembre 1991; EPR, Ukuri Kubaka
Igihugu. Kigali: Urwego, 1992. See chapter VI.
678 Okwunuba Nnoli., Ethnic Politics in Africa. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, serie,no 1, 1989, pp76-77.
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ideology which always ends in massacre of thousands. They will need to initiate a dialogue
with the present and past teachings on ideologies as well as their history to detect and
exorcise the mechanisms that led to the genocide.
To counteract a racial mobilisation, Christian communication must have some goals: first,
promoting the belonging to Christ' s identity over the clan's or ethnic group's identity;
second, developing Christian teachings on the values of communicating for human dignity;
third to establish the link between communication, mission, truth and the power of powerless;
fourth, calling communities to repentance, forgiveness, reconciliation and tolerance. With
these goals which need further discussion, Christian communication will sustain people's
faith during the times of great national or worldly stress.
V.7.3. Resourcing Media Industry
In a pluralistic society, how can we address the issue of ethnic mobilisation? Would it be
appropriate for the Churches to run their media industry? In other words can the ownership of
the media industry (production and distribution of media products) be a way the Church can
use to raise moral standards and make media leadership accountable for justice and
righteousness in society? Referring to what he has called "Dealing with the media as a
community of pagan people", Larry Poland679 dismisses such an idea. For him 'Christian
media industry' has not proved dent in the power, values and content; they perpetuated
irrelevant subculturally distinctive stereotypes of Christianity. In the USA, for example, 4 %
of the population have been touched by Church media industry. In addition, Christian media
have been involved in scandals and mismanagement which made them rather became
ridiculous than helping to raise up moral standards.
While in western societies big multimedia companies with huge finances compete with
Churches for the production and the distribution of media to secular societies less attracted
by the Church activities, the Churches in Rwanda remain the sole institution interested in
raising literacy and moral standards. Despite or perhaps because of the relatively high level
of illiteracy and the low purchase capability, media industry can be a powerful tool in
evangelism. This however will depends on the professional and skilful capacity to co¬
ordinate with other sectors. For example, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation
conferences can be matters of production for media accounts and stories; in the future,
remembrance and healing activities could constitute the source of stories of Christian
mission.
As indicated by both Linden and Lemarchand newspapers, in particular Kinyamateka,
canvassed for the 'revolution' in the 1950s and the transformation of Rwanda society680.This,
67y
Poland, L., "Christ and Culture. The Christian and the Media". In Carson, D.A., God in Culture, pp.255-274.
f,s" See Linden, Ian. Church and Revolution in Rwanda. Manchester: Manchester University press, 1977, pp 230-
247. Among other titles that served to propagate the reclamation for social justice were: a. La voix du Congolais, a
small catholic magazine from Leopoldville;b. L'ami, designated for French-speaking Africans in Rwanda, Burundi
and eastern Congo (some 1000 copies of which 400 distributed in Rwanda); c. Servir, of the brothers of Charity,
designated to the alumni of the Groupe Scolaire of Astrida; d. Kinyamateka in Kinyarwanda. The reading of
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it must be said, was part of a global strategy set up by the hierarchy to ensure the control of
the ongoing changes as discussed in chapter three. It has been the spring board used by the
Church to promote the ideas of the revolution in particular when, G.Kayibanda, the future
President of independent Rwanda, was appointed its chief editor in early 1955. The latter
attacked on the one hand, the conservative illiterate peasantry who blindly would have not
easily given up their psychological dependence and the sense of inferiority which limited
their creativity; and on the other, he attacked the ruling elite arrogance.681
The intoxication of the population by violent state groups through media is a phenomenon the
Church cannot ignore. Though the Churches have lost the monopoly compared to the pre-
independence period, the media still are an instrument for evangelism, education and the
forming of people's conscience. To surmount the propaganda, lies and rumours, Christians
will have to equip its communicators to be able to produce good reporting and analyses but
subsequently to exploit all the networks of relations and communication within the Church.
In fact, if Kinyamateka's impact was minimal compared to the 1950s, it is not because it had
no longer the monopoly but because in the 1990s, the Churches failed to take a leading line
in raising the morals of society. If the hierarchy had been fully committed to justice and the
rights of the oppressed, the voice of the voiceless, then, the 200 minutes of weekly
programmes would have been a strong complement to good print reporting.
V.7.4. Equipping Committed Christian Professionals
In Les Autres Chretiens Rwandais: Presence Protestante,682 we dedicated a chapter to the
challenge of the media in which we criticised the decline of quality and quantity in the
various areas. We reminded people that despite the fact that the Churches had pioneered in
the domain of media, in translating and printing the biblical texts, literacy material and
newspapers, their aura had disappeared683. Ethnic mobilisation as the manifestation of a
dehumanising system was not directly confronted. However, in the end two aspects were
reflected in our study: questioning a dehumanising system and encouraging Churches to
challenge the imbalance in the control of the techniques of information. In that sense, it was
clear for us that Christian communication might question a system of information that
transmits the orders of minorities and elites which ignore totally the needs of the oppressed
and of victims. We invited the media to offer their microphones and columns to peasantry
and working classes instead of leaving them under the monopoly of an elite whose corruption
compromised the chances of the future of thousands684.
Kinyamateka became obligatory to catchiests and catholic teachers in after 1955. It rose from 22.000 copies in
1954 to 24.500 during the period, Gregoire Kayibanda ( the future president of Rwanda) was appointed chief
editor.
681 Ibid. p.234.
682Gatwa, Th. & Karamaga ,A, Les Autres Chretiens Rwandais. Presence Protestante, Kigali: urwego, 1990, p.l 16.
683
Ibid.p.l 17.
684 Ibid., pp. 117/118.
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Media, we suggested, were not tools to earn money or commodities, but the instruments of
the Christian community on the one hand, to fulfil their social responsibility, and on the
other, to manifest what the Church is about. Church media should help to bring the good
news of liberation and deliverance to those threatened and abused by injustices, repression,
marginality and victimisation. Christian communication, I suggested, must function both
from bottom towards the top and from top to bottom. This principle suggests a combination
of the listening and the teaching ecclesiologies. Church media should oppose whatever
dehumanises or alienates human beings from being God's image bearers.
In dismissing the idea of having a Church media industry, Poland suggests instead a four
points manifesto to evangelise the media world which I seem to be relevant but not
incompatible to the existence of Church media: 1. a mobilising specific prayer for media
leaders; 2. evangelising media professionals at every level; 3. equipping professionals in
media for being good witnesses of the Gospel; 4. creating a network for the mobilisation of
committed believers in media for significant spiritual impact685.
As we have seen there is no such thing as media establishment in Rwanda. The proliferating
media were mainly set up as 'puppet journalism' for the destruction of the political enemies.
But it must be added that these media proliferated to fulfil an ideological role whose older
institutions such as the Churches, government, political parties, schools could or would not
fulfil. In fact, there was a breakdown of values over several decades.
There is then a need to have good people to evangelise professionals; but above all these
ought to be equipped to become a questioning generation which help society to emancipate
from a blind obedience to authorities who have no democratic nor ethical ideals but madness.
The Church people should be able and courageous enough to identify major manipulators of
media and politics and general opinion and evangelise them. This will include helping
Christian leaders to break the long moments of silence before the clamour of the persecuted,
the imprisoned and the poor but to tell publicly, consistently and repetitively what the Gospel
is about: Love, justice and solidarity with the victims of injustices and tyranny. This will
reinforce the sense of belonging to a nation; it will involve restoring the social harmony and
bring people to accept what the Church stands for.
685
Poland, op.cit. p. 274
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CHAPTER VI: THE CHURCHES' RESPONSES
TO THE 1990'S CRISES
Introduction
The preceding chapter assessed diverse reasons which prevented the Church leaders from
undertaking initiative to counteract the moral degradation and the human rights abuse in the
period 1960 to 1990. From 1990, Rwanda entered a period of turmoil with a series of violent
events. These included the failure of the regime to be in touch with the reality of the suffering
population. The war started in October 1990 by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in the
northern borders caused several thousand people to live as internal refugees. There was also
increasing violence accompanied by political murders. The immaturity of the new opposition
leaders, who were involved in internal quarrels and fractures, was coupled with the political
blockage that prevented the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Lastly, the October
1993 military putsch attempt in Burundi in which President Ndadaye died. All these factors
fuelled the 1990s crisis that led to the 1994 genocide.
In February 1992, both Roman Catholic and Protestant created a so-called "committee of
Contacts of the Churches" to mediate in the crisis. Together with the Nairobi based All
Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the Churches of Rwanda initiated contacts between
the Rwanda Patriotic Front and the Rwandan Government. But as soon as the Christians
leaders had brought the protagonists to the negotiating table, they withdrew, hence had little
influence on the course as well as the political, moral and ethical implications of the outcome
of the peace talks.
During the negotiations, the two antagonist groups, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the
then governmental army maintained a high intensity of suspicion that broke regularly into
hostilities, while the former ruling party, the MRND and its allies, the CDR extremist
political party, developed an anti-peace accord campaign.
When this thesis refers to mediation, it means many various efforts attempted to bring the
belligerents into dialogue; it means also the process of education for non-violence and
reconciliation which took place before the tragedy. The initiatives for dialogue include, many
different circles in Europe and Africa, Church leaders and Christians at the grass-roots
through a nascent non-violent movement. So the Churches were one actor among many
others which rarely co-ordinated their efforts. This chapter investigates the content and the
initiatives of Christians in developing a culture of peace at the grass-roots, the Churches
leaders pastoral messages and political mediation as well the limitations.
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VI. 1. Global Context of the Crisis
V.l.l. A Regime out of Touch with a Suffering Population
In the late 1980s the socio-economic situation had deteriorated considerably. In fact,
traditionally Rwanda has been considered an agro- pastoral country686. The republican regime
generated by the 1959 social revolution had distributed to the agriculturists the lands and
pasture that belonged to the monarchical regime barons. The re-deployment on the new lands
made possible the exploitation that prevented a dramatic food deficit. However, a national
agriculture poll in 1984 showed that more than 50 % of the families lived on a piece of land
estimated between 0,25 and 1 acre687.
Despite the initiation of a demographic programme, in particular the creation of the National
Office of the Population, ONAPO in 1981, the growth of the population at 3,7 % per annum
remained one of the major preoccupations688. With a surface of 26,338 square km, Rwanda
was the most densely populated country on the Africa continent. The implications of such a
rapid increase are considerable. For example, the demographic pressure led to the
exploitation of the margin lands while the inheritance system requires a continuing cutting of
the family land into pieces distributed to the male children. This contraction of the
exploitation and the decline of productivity affected the environment689.
One of the serious consequence of the demographic explosion and the distribution of the
pastures has been the gradual decrease of the cattle690. The most optimistic estimate the
animal proteins available to cover the nutritional needs for the whole population at 50 %.
686 95 % of the population live in rural area. The rate of urbanisation is one of the lowest: 5 % against 20 % in
Kenya, 30 % Nigeria, 39 % Zaire, 48 % Zambia.
687
Actually the poll shows that:
6.8 % families exploited less than 0.25 acres.
18.2 % families exploited between 0.25 - 0,50
16.1% " " " 0.50-0.75
15.9% " " " 0.75-1.00
15.7% " " " 1.00-1.50
11.00 " " " 1.50-2.00
16.3 " " " more than 2.00 acres
See Eripicum, R., and al, Le Rwanda et maintenance. Brussels: Coopibos/Fos/NCOS/ Vredeseilanden, 1990, p.
6.
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According to the World Bank's 1986 report, Rwanda detained the world record in the synthetic index 8
children per woman. The population increased from 2.876.053 in 1962 to 4.831.527 in 1978 and would double
from 7,4 millions in 1990 to 15 millions in 2010 even with the best hypothesis.
689
According to the National Commission ofAgriculture, the surface needed to nurture an average family of 5
persons was estimated to 1 acre. On the level of Agriculture, 57 % of the population live under a chronic sub-
alimentation. 43 % of the population possessed only 15 % of the land. In 1990 there were 1.11.897 families
exploiting 1.250.00 acres. In such conditions more than 43 % of active labour was unused. The country had a
deficit of 74 % of the production of fertilisers.
Gasana, J., Rapport de la CNA ( Commission Nationale d'Agriculture), Resume. Appuis a la Production Agricole.
Kigali, Avril 1991, p. 1/2.
690 Gasana, ibid. p.9. The commission observed the increase of the other species (goats, sheep, pork, rabbits,
poultry. However, their observed a animal proteins' malnutrition which risked to aggravate. In the minimal
conditions, the daily animal proteins needed were 6 gr., the production o milk should have been of 147,000 tones,
60,000 tones of meat while the real production was: 64,000 tones of milk and 25,000 tones of meat corresponding
to 3 gr. per day.
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Regardless of the improvements in health conditions, life expectation remained at 50 years in
1985. More than 50 % of the children under 5 years suffered from malnutrition.
In the 1970s, the economics which depended mainly on the exportation of the coffee 691knew
a sustainable rate of growth with an average of 5 % due to the increases in the prices on the
international market and a relatively prudent management which stabilised the finances and
inflation. In the beginning of the 1980s however, there were signs of weakness resulting from
the disadvantageous terms of world trade. In 1987, the fall in the international prices of
coffee combined with bad climate conditions led to a deficit equivalent to 6,2 % of the GPI
which increased to 10,7 % in 1987592. To fund this deficit the government had to contract
internal bank debts and to reduce by up to 20 % the price of a kg habitually paid to the
producer during the coffee campaign of 1990/91.
Following this inability to pay the producers a reasonable price, the peasants began to dig up
coffee plantations and quinine. Automatically the production fell and expanded the gap in the
deficit of the public budget created by the collapse in 1985 of the mining sector which
habitually would bring in 15 % of the income in exports693. This degradation of the economy
impoverished the population and left thousands of young jobless persons to accept
recruitment by the extremist groups for dirty jobs.
While the financial situation deteriorated due to the fall of the price of coffee- the major
source of 'hard currency'- on the international market, the Breton-Wood Institutions imposed
a drastic Structural Adjustment Programme. This forced the government to withdraw the
subsidies to the coffee planters and to food supplied to secondary schools. The vulnerable
populations in different regions were dramatically affected 694. At the same time, almost half
of the country was undergoing famine, in particular in the southern prefectures. For a long
time, the regime refused to recognise the reality and even condemned the independent media
report till late 1989. At that time, on the eve of his visit to France, President Habyarimana
made a public relations visit to Maraba (Butare), Karama (Gikongoro) and Bwakira ( Kibuye)
which he ended in 'blaming' the local authorities and the Intelligence Service for having
failed to inform him of the disaster.
691 The coffee represented 72 % of the income of exportation , tea ( 15 %). There were also pyrethrum, quinine
and some mines.
692 In 1990, the structure of the internal row product remained as 36 % from the primary sector (agriculture and
mines), 24.5% from the secondary sector industry) and 39.5% from the territory.
693 World bank/IMF/ Republic of Rwanda., Document cadre de politique economique et financiere a moyen terme
(Structural Ajustement Programme). Kigali, Octobre 1990- Septembre 1993.
694Marysse & al, Rwanda. Appauvrissement et Aiustement Structurel. Paris, l'Harmattan, 1994, pp. 48/49. In a
survey carried out in the Kirarambogo area with regard to the writing of this book comparing the consequences of
the Structural Adjustment Programme in Mali and Rwanda, the authors show that in 1992 the income of the coffee
producer growth was -0.36 in 1992 vis-a-vis 1990, and -1.92 for the agricuralists. In 1992 the growth was - 5.72
for the coffee producers and -34.94 for the agricuralists. In their conclusion, they argued that the Structural
Adjustment programme never took into consideration the problem of poverty and cannot be an efficient means to
stop it.
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Compared to the chaos reigning in "Uganda of Idi Amin"; the "Tutsi apartheid of Burundi",
the "bankruptcy of the Tanzanian Socialism" and the "cleptocratic dictatorship of Mobutu",
the economic situation of Rwanda in the 1980s had remained relatively performing,
commented once a German native, H.Keiner695. However, as Prunier accurately observed,
underneath the surface, the ideological foundation of that regime was the Bahutu version of
the Rwandan cultural mythology about the Hamite/Batutsi supremacy. Such an ideology
provoked the violence of 1959 and 1964 and was still alive596. The social peace was kept at
the price of financial fuelling of the elite; hence the deterioration of the financial situation
was a major concern for the regime. All this rested on a mechanical hypocrisy, meticulously
orchestrated and controlled by the regime with the Church hierarchy playing the role of
engineer.
VI. 1.2. Moral Decline in Politics and Economics
Many different reports have described the increasing monopoly by the presidential family
clique, the "akazu-family group"697, of the economy and the state companies which led almost
to bankruptcy698. The moral decline was pictured by Gasimba in his 74 pages poem Isiha
Rusahuzi699 (the mongoose looter). Gasimba portrayed the corruption and the egoism that
characterised the MRND leaders. The poem describes how a mangoose looter dressed in
millions of hard currency notes erupted in the hall where the MRND Central Committee and
Government were holding a joint meeting. The participants under the chairmanship of
Father-Founder and Muvoma100 struggled to explain the phenomenon, discoursed on how to
recollect and to use the money. Each participant would ask the "Father of the Nation" that the
money be allocated to their own department whilst army units were deployed on the borders
with neighbouring countries to prevent the mongoose to escape with the money. Isiha
Rusahuzi poem has probably no direct reference to ethnic mobilisation. It shows however the
ascendancy of the divine ruler, Ilabyarimana, the sole master of the vessel, over the prevalent
institutions, the army, the MRND and its offspring including the government and the Central
Committee.
In this fiction, Gasimba described the "Father of the Nation" as the guarantee of serenity and
confidence against the illness of the regime, corruption and political monolithism but who
remained completely inefficient. What is behind the event of all the MRND tenors' meeting
695 Prunier,G., op.cit. p.97.
696 Prunier,G., Witness to the Belgian Parliament Commission, in Mahoux and Verhofstadt, op.cit. p. 80.
697 The Akazu-group family referred to the ancient monarchical court, the Akazu k'i bwami. Its descriptions was
made by C. Mfizi, the former director of Information of Habyarimana, in his letter of resignation from the MRND.
Guichoua, op.cit. pp.617; 765. See also Lemarchand in Igwaro.O., Ethnic Hatred; Genocide in Rwanda, London:
ASEN, 1995, p. 65; see also witnesses of Ambassador Johan Swinnen in Mahoux and Verhofstadt, op.cit. 257.
698Gasanain Guichaoua, 1995.
699 Gasimba,F-X., Isiha Rusahuzi. Kigali: Printer set,1987.
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was an inefficiency in recouping the public funds from the intermingled politico-economical
banditry. In fact, the link which Gasimba had implicitly in mind is that the criminals, the
perpetrators and the executioners of violence were directly linked to the akazu-family group.
Those responsible for the 1990 gorilla exhibition fiasco were the same who carried out
several murders of political, religious, senior army officers; they were the same people who
were responsible for drug and gorilla traffics, gold smuggling and the 'acts of genocide'
701
against the Bagogwe, Bahima and other target groups .
In the same period, the regime faced a sharp international criticism referring notably to its
continuing poor record in human rights which, as indicated above, and excellently analysed
by Nicholas Gordon had an organic link between the corruption of the regime, the political
murders and the entourage of the President702.
VI. 1.3. Pressure for Political Reforms
From the end of the 1980s, a national and international pressure for political reforms
generated the dynamics of freedom associated with politics, trade unionism and the freedom
of speech. For the first time, the political parties were able to organise public manifestations
which involved resistance to the regime's intimidation.
Actually, the opposition pressure followed the publication of a so-called "manifesto of 33
intellectuals" asking for a true democratic system founded on multi-party politics.703 This
initiative was counter-attacked by the regime which, on the one hand, intimidated some of
those involved and on the other, introduced what President Habyarimana called the political
aggiarnemento. On 21 September, the President appointed a so-called Commission Nationale
des Syntheses assigned to undertake consultations and to propose changes within the ruling
700Muvoma or the simplification of MRND and nickname of its long-life serving General Secretary, Bonaventure
Habimana.
701 Gordon, N., Op.cit. See also, ADL. op.cit. See also CLADHO: Rapport de la Commission International sur les
violations des Droits de l'Homme. Octobre 1990 a Janvier 1993. Bruxelles and Kigali, Mars 1993.
7(l2Gordon, N., Murder in Mist. Hodder, London 1993. Gordon arguably attributed the murder of Ms Fossey to
Protais Zigiranyirazo, known as 'Z', brother - in - law of Habyarimana who was then Prefet of Ruhengeri.
According to the author, the murder has connections with the international traffic of gorillas, arms, smuggled gold
from Zaire and drug into which the Habyarimana family was involved in, with in particular, 150 acres of
plantation of Indian hemp in the Nyungwe forest. The long list of the victims included political, army officers,
journalist and religious independent figures: Father Silvio Sindambiwe, former director of Kinyamateka; M.P
Fercula Nyiramutarambirwa, initiator of various Catholic charity foundations; S. Byabagamba, head of Roman
Catholic programs on Radio-Rwanda stabbed in 1992 broad daylight time in his house by CDR militants; Brother
F. Cardenal from Canada and Ms Antonia Locatelli from Italy assassinated by armed soldiers respectively in the
Butamwa youth centre and in Bugesera in the middle of the Tutsi displaced by the organised violence, March 1992
by a commando of soldiers.
On the role of Akazu-family group in the political murders, see the accurate analysis of G. Prunier, The Rwanda
crisis. History of a genocide. 1959-1994. pp 84-90. See also, on the traffic of arms, drugs, gorillas, Braeckman, C.
Rwanda. Histoire d'un genocide. Paris: Hayez, 1994, pp. 104-109.
7H3Erpicum, Le Rwanda et Maintenant. p. 33. The preparation and the publication of the manifesto in which the
author of the present work was involved took several months in secrecy. Once published in the second half of
1990, the authors became targets of threats, particularly those among them suspected to have a plan of founding a
political party.
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party, the MRND 704. However, this did not impress the population which rather responded to
the opposition's mobilisation. In fact, the real motive behind the appointment of this totally
MRND Commission, observers noticed, was to slow down the international criticism against
the monolithic regime rather than to reform itself. All the appointees in the Commission
including the clergymen, belonged to the ruling party. They failed to make radical proposals
to resolve the crisis; in fact, they made no suggestion to modify the basic foundations of the
anti- democratic system nor found a solution to the refugees' equation and its corollary, the
RPF attack.
VI. 1.4. RPF's attack: Did the Regime Know?
Among the determinants of the 1990's crises, the war started by the RPF705 on the 1 October
1990 from Uganda indisputably occupies a basic position. The attack was conducted by
some of the Rwandan refugees or their descendants who, as earlier said, settled in many
foreign countries following the 1959 revolution and subsequent violent events. Those who
lived in Uganda had acquired lengthy experience with the Ugandan army and rebellions in
which they served local leaders in their power struggle. Indeed, out of 15000 NRA (National
Resistance Army) soldiers who took power in Kampala in 1986 with Yoweri Museveni,
almost four thousand were of Rwandan background706. Many of them held senior positions in
the Ugandan administration and army707.
Many different hypotheses on the reasons behind the RPF attack have been advanced by
analysts and the Habyarimana regime. One of these referred to the so-called Museveni
(President of Uganda)'s plan to set up a Bahima/ Tutsi empire in the Great Lakes Africa
region discussed in section IV. 1. For the regime in Kigali, it was clear, the war was a
manifestation of the undying attitude of domination among the Batutsi helped by Museveni
and the former colonial ruler, Belgium.
The defenders of this official line founded their argument on the fact that a bilateral
commission set up by Rwanda and Uganda assisted by the UN Refugee High commission
was about to publish its first report, proposing how to resolve the refugee crisis. But
according to the rebellion which displayed a political programme in eight points, the
commission was another of the regime's strategy to delay their repatriation.
704Erpicum, op.cit. p. 36.
A Roman Catholic priest, Father (present-day bishop of Gikongoro diocese), Augustin Misago, Recteur of the
Senior Seminar Nyakibanda and a Protestant Minister, Pastor Twagirayesu, president of the Presbyterian Church
and Chair of the Protestant Council were appointed members of the Commission. According to credible sources in
the hands of the authors, other Protestant leaders were associated with the Commission but did not want their
names to appear publicly. These included the head of the Pentecost Church, Revd. J. Nsanzurwimo.
7(15 RPF: Rwanda Patriotic Front.
706Kamukama, op.cit. p. 41.
7<l7Major-General Fred Rwigema, commander of RPF was Deputy- Defence Minister and commander of the NRA,
as such, he was second to the president of Uganda, Museveni; Major Paul Kagame, who took over the RPF
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The regime in Kigali continued to incriminate the Inyenzi (the 1960s monarchist rebels)
putting the accent on the Khaddafi-Museveni-Bagaza (Tripoli- Kampala-Kigali-Bujumbura)
axis so as to attract the sympathy of the Western countries. In fact, there existed a relation
between the 1960's rebels (inyenzi) and the 1990s attackers (the RPF/Inkotanyi The later
were descendants of second or third generation of the 1959 refugees. Yet, there were major
differences: at the beginning of the 1990s, the president of the historical UNAR, C.Rukeba,
denounced the attack and stated that he still considered his party as the only representative of
the refugees. He also reconfirmed the monarchist tendency of his party.708 On the reverse,
the leaders of the RPF claimed to aim for the end of the 30 years stateless exile as well as to
install a state of rights and democracy and declared a willingness to share power within the
republican institutions.
According to Rene Lemarchand, the assumption, fed through rumour and self-induced
optimism, was that the Habyarimana regime was a pushover, and would quickly collapse in
the wake of the invasion". RPF grossly overestimated the strength of the internal opposition
to Habyarimana; it did not anticipate the determination of hard-liners within government to
manipulate ethnic hatred for political advantage; nor the massive military support that
Habyarimana was to receive from France which saw in the attack an intolerable Anglo-Saxon
threat to their chasse gardee; nor did they foresee the catalytic effect of the invasion on
Bahutu solidarities709.
Gerard Prunier pursues the same line of thinking. He suggests that the determining factor of
the attack was the information received in the movement from people who deserted the
regime describing it as nearly collapsing. RPF then wanted to score in overthrowing the
dictatorship. According to G.Prunier, some other elements precipitated the action: if the
bilateral commission Rwanda-Uganda on refugees had presented a substantially acceptable
report as announced, for the beginning of 1991, the RPF would have lost its support. Equally,
the nascent internal democratic process risked weakening the rebellion's claim of being a
spearhead in the fighting against the dictatorship. And lastly, the already unfavourable
refugees' environment in Uganda was deteriorating710.
Some analysts including Nsengiyaremye7" believe that the Kigali regime was fully informed
of the attack. This line of reasoning is corroborated by some military analyses. Colonel
command after the death of Rwigema on the front in the early stages of the attack, was chief of intelligence of the
Uganda Army; Peter Bunyenyezi who also died in the attack was commander of an army Brigade, and others.
708
Reyntjens,F., 1994, p. 149. King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa himself who live in exil in USA never approved the
attack. According to credible sources, when he was still lived in Nairobi, Kenya, he was met in early beginning of
the war by emissaries send by the regime in Kigali who persuaded him to condemn the attack.
709 Lemarchand, R., "Rwanda: The Rationality of Genocide". In Igwara.O.(ed). Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in
Rwanda. London: ASEN, 1995, pp 59-70, particularly p.61.
71l)Prunier, G., Rwanda crisis 1959-1994. History of the genocide. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995, p.90/1.
71'Prime Minister of Rwanda of the so-called coalition governement, April 1992 to April 1993.
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Rusatira then Director of the Cabinet of President Habyarimana (the President was equally
Minister of Defence), reflected on what he calls the 'war of the weak'. Rusatira brought
together some elements which throw some serious supposition that the regime knew about
the forthcoming attack. He analyses the history and the strategies of the masters in warfare
tactics712 and concluded that Rwanda also had several guerrillas of 'Inyenzi' (considered as
parents of the RPF) which failed to overthrow the regime.
He presents the causes of that failure as being, on one side, the fact that the attackers lacked
cohesion, and on the other, the population inside the country was united. He then concludes
that it would be a mistake for the country to naively rest on its laurels713. This seems to
indicate that some senior officials including colonel Rusatira, expected an attack at any time.
This, however raises a question of knowing why the army was unprepared in such a way that
the regime survived because of Mobutu's special army and the French's intervention.
Meanwhile, the Churches were surprised in their complicity with the regime for they never
had sought to be concerned by the appalling refugee problem. In fact, as Lemarchand put it,
the 'Hamite' frame of reference added yet another ominous dimension to the counter¬
revolutionary image protected by the invaders. This was the legacy of the missionary
historiography evolving on the speculation about the cultural affinities between Hamites and
Coptic Christianity to political dogma about the Ethiopian origin of the Tutsi referred to as
'feudo-Hamitic' by the hard-liners714.
The Church leaders rushed to "extinguish the fire"; they walked in the beaten paths of the
positions taken by the government, sending awkward messages in different directions to
rescue the regime. The meeting in which the Church leaders met the refugees for the first
time in 30 years was held in Nairobi in August 1991 under the sponsorship of the All Africa
Conference of Churches. Representatives of refugees, Churches, a delegate of the Rwandan
presidency and representatives of the rebellion, debated their respective role in the crisis
opened by the attack715.
However, with the illusion of having stopped, even crushed the attack, the Kigali regime,
instead of seeking a negotiated solution, adopted a hard-line position that ended in
considerable loss of human and material resources. Among other factors that certainly
influenced the hard-line position of Kigali was the Burundi crisis.
'^Including the Chinese Lu sun Tzu, and his disciple Mao Zedong, the Belgian Henri Bernard, the Austrian Karl
von Clausewitz, the Sudanese Col. Garang and the Ugandan, Yoweri Museveni. Rusatira
713Rusatira,L., L'armee pourauoi faire? Kigali : Pallotti presse, October 1989.
714 Lemarchand, R., 1995, P.61.
715See joint report of the Catholic and Protestant delegations of August 1991. The conference met in Safari Park
Hotel, Nairobi, 17 to 21 August 1991. The participants who met the RPF delegation came from the Protestant
Churches, the Protestant Council; the Catholic Church ; a representative of the Rwandan President's office.
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VI. 1.5. THE Burundi Crisis
The history and politics, in the twin countries, in particular the syndrome of violence, has had
a mutual influence on the internal politics of one side and the other of the river Akanyaru
(natural border). As described in Chapter Five, the fragile political equilibrium in Burundi
collapsed with the murder on 21 October 1993 of the first democratically elected President,
Melchior Ndadaye (who happened to be of a Bahutu background). He was assassinated
together with several other members of his government by a Tutsi dominated army. This
nurtured Rwanda extremism in the former ruling party, the MRND and its allies of the CDR
as well as the dissidents from other political parities.
In fact, as shown in chapter one and three, the mutual influence of Rwanda and Burundi on
each other's political developments go back to the colonial period and particularly to the
years of the revolution. For Lemarchand, the 1959 Rwanda revolution nurtured the
predictions of the Bahutu and the fears of the Batutsi elite, in Burundi, particularly through
the vast community of the Rwandan Batutsi refugees who arrived between 1959 and 19647'6.
Unlike Rwanda, in Burundi the victorious political party during the September 1961
elections, the UPRONA was, 'ethnically' mixed. Unfortunately, its leader, Prince L.
Rwagasore - a Ganwa (royal family probably of Bahutu origin) prince married to a Hutu girl-
was assassinated one month after the elections. On independence in 1962, the two countries
which were ruled under a centralised colonial administration, split into two political units;
Rwanda adopted a republican regime led by the Bahutu majority while Burundi remained a
monarchy under the predominant Batutsi aristocracy and up to 1966 when the army took
power and proclaimed the Republic.
The syndrome of violence in the two countries as we have said, has had enormous
consequences on both sides. The 1959 social revolution, the 1964 and 1972/3 massacres of
Batutsi in Rwanda, the selected massacres of 1990s; and lastly the 1994 genocide were each
time felt as national catastrophes in Burundi. Lemarchand's study indicates that these events
caused the deterioration of the ethnic relations in Burundi to a considerable degree717. On the
other side, tragic events in Burundi including the 1965/1966 massacres, the 1972 "acts of
genocide" against the Bahutu718, the 1988 massacres of Ntega and Marangara, and most
716Lemarchand, R., Burundi, discourse and ethnocide. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996.
7l7Ibidem. p.
7l8Mbonimpa, M., Hutu, Tutsi. Twa. Pour une Societe sans Caste au Burundi. Paris: L'harmattan, 1993.
Mbonimpa argues that the castes in Burundi were not a colonial creation, but of the Tutsi feeling of a natural
ambition to dominate has been the source of the Bahutu tragedies in which at least 200.000 people mostly 'Hutu'
were killed and more than 300,000 made refugees during the 1972 'genocide'.
According to Lemarchand, op. cit. p. in 1988, the Ntega and Marangara tragedy made 30,000 victims (5,000
according to official statistics) and 60,000 refugees. The 6 April 1994 the successor of Ndadaye, Cyprian
Ntaryamira was killed together with the president of Rwanda.
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dramatically, the 1993 murder of President Ndadaye had fuelled the predictions of the
Rwanda extremists719. In both cases the Church leaders failed to speak for the truth, justice
and the victims of the cynical murders. Writing on the 1972 genocide of the Bahutu in
Burundi, Hastings says that "at no point did the bishops criticise the actions of government or
suggest that the Bahutu uprising was a consequence of the intolerable injustice to which the
majority in the country was being subjected"720.
Similarly, the international community dramatically omitted to speak out. The US
ambassador to Burundi in 1972, Thomas Melady, left in the midst of the horror to take
another appointment in Kampala. His personal account of the horror is a kind of secret
diplomacy in which he affirms that US did more than other Western Powers towards Captain
Micombero's regime and the OAU. There was however, no real impact of that 'effort'721. The
silence of the international community vis-a-vis the suffering of the Bahutu in Burundi had
resuscitated among their counterparts in Rwanda the memories of the pre-independence
oppression722. As Prof. Reyntjens rightly said the death of President Ndadaye had probably
initiated the death of the Arusha Agreement in Rwanda. It made some among the moderate
Bahutu doubt, and gave the extremists arguments to pursue their blockage with the pretext
that no-one can have confidence in the RPF and by extension, the Batutsi723.
VI. 1.6. New Opposition : Fragile and Immature
The new opposition was born in the second half of 1991. Most of the political leaders aimed
at challenging the dictatorship in various sectors including the violation of human rights.
P. Melady, former ambassador of USA during the 1972 tragedy estimates the victims at 80,000 to 150,000. He
gives two reasons for the permanent crises of Burundi: fear and the 1959 Rwandan social revolution that brought
refugees and nourished the pretext for further massacres.
719Tutsi dominated support for the Rwanda Tutsi extremists and giving the massacres of Hutu in Burundi as reason
to slaughter the Rwandan Tutsi for the Hutu extremists. In 1972 during the massacres of the Bahutu organised by
the Micombero regime, the open confrontation between Kigali and Bujumbura were about to end in war. The
Kayibanda government accused Micombero's Tutsi-Hima regime of exterminating the Bahutu/Bantu people and
emotionally called upon Mobutu, from Bantu like the later to intervene in their side. The crisis between the two
countries stopped when Major-General Habyarimana seized power and then normalised the relations with his
counterpart, Captain Micombero without questioning the massacres of the population in Burundi. He needed the
regional support to consolidate his illegitimate act.
72l>Hastings, A. A History of African Christianity, 1950-1975,p.200.
72lMelady, T, Burundi the Tragic Years. Maryknoll/NY: Orbis books,1974. His failure to manifest a public
concern about Burundi and through him, the US says Lemarchand is appalling. Lemarchand,R, Burundi, ethnic
conflict and genocide. Cambridge & Wilson: Cambridge Univeristy Press &Woodrow Wilson International
Center, 1966, p. XXVII.
722The campaign of what became known as 'Hutu power' ideology was launched on October 23th 1993 during the
rally called for the solidarity with the Hutu of Burundi after the assassination of President Ndadaye. A
businessman, Froduald Karamira, vice-president of the MDR dissident faction played a key role through his
inflammatory speech claiming repetitively slogans 'Hutu Power'. The 'Hutu Power' group was a caolition made of
the MRND/CDR extremist parties and dissidents from other political parties. They had no official plate-form,
except a virulent anti-Tutsi hatred and the rejection of power sharing, the core of the Arusha Agreement.
723
Reyntjens, F., Witness to Commission Parlementaire Beige sur les Evenements Tragiques du Rwanda, le 14
Mai 1997. In Mahoux and Verhofstadt,op.cit., pp. 126-129. Reytjnes is however not right to consider the refusal
of the Tutsi to participate in the Nyamirambo manifestation, 23 October 1995 as a refusal to be in solidarity with
the Burundi people. In fact many Bahutu too refused to participate to this gathering which was called by the hard¬
liners of the MRND/CDR and other dissidents within the opposition parties to launch the 'Hutu Power Ideology'.
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Realising their weakness before a 20 years old dictatorship, they grouped under the
'Committee of Concertations'724 from late 1991. They defined their objectives among others:
to eradicate the pillars of dictatorship; to negotiate the end of the war and to work for the
'National Conference' during which the population would address the burning issues such as
the inter-ethnic relations, regionalism, injustice and human rights abuse725.
The 'Committee of Concertations' of political parties carried out several actions, such as
denouncing organised massacres and pressuring for peace talks as well as the forming of a
multi-party government. However, in the second half of 1993, the unity of the opposition
disintegrated due to a combination of factors, in particular the absence of a strong alternative
political leadership to counterbalance the monolithic system.
In fact, from 1973 the Batutsi and the Bahutu from the south were subject to frustrations,
bullying and discrimination. The nascent multi-party system did little to improve the
relationships between the native of the two sub-cultures: "the northerners and the
southerners". Instead of initiating political forces, with leaders credible enough to challenge a
corrupt and authoritarian regime, the political parties were formed by people much more
interested in revenge against their former allies in the state-party726.
The second challenge to the opposition came from the MRND/Akazu. The latter installed an
'armada' designed to spread violence, intimidation and fears and succeeded in overturning the
political discourse against the nascent moderate opposition, accusing them of being the
puppets of the rebellion.
The third difficulty of the opposition resulted from its frustrating alliance with the RPF727. In
the perspective of implementing the peace accord, the RPF never stopped exerting pressure
against the government army. On 7 February, 1993 RPF attacked the government held
positions in Ruhengeri, Byumba and Rulindo in retaliation to the massacres of the population
of Batutsi background in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri by the regime whilst the peace talks were in
process. There is a sense that in organising the massacres of the population, the MRND block
arrived at their aim of putting the opposition in a dilemma: they were accused of supporting a
RPF which shoot at the population in its retaliation.
Hence some milieus of the opposition were affected by fears of not knowing what was behind
the RPF calculations. In fact, the opposition was overshadowed by both the Habyarimana and
R.P.F camps who then became the two major poles of power interfering constantly in the
724 The 'Comite des Concertations' of the Opposition was made of four major opposition parties: MDR:
Mouvement Democratique Republicain; P.L: Parti Liberal; PSD: Parti Social Democrate and PDC: Parti
Democrate Chretien and several small parties.
725Nsengiyaremye in Guichaoua, p. 251.
726Nkunzumwami, op.cit., p, 184.
727
Though there was no formal plat-form between the opposition and the RPF, officials of both camps would
assert that their primal common aim was to remove die dictatoiial legime of Habyaiiuiaim.
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internal organisation and affairs of the political allies. Fourth, the climate was additionally
polluted by the leaders of the main opposition parties, the MDR and the PL quarrelling
among themselves for power and positions in the forthcoming government of post-
negotiations. The disunity of the opposition fractured the democratic enterprise and left the
ground to the extremists. The virus of disunity also infected the UN peace contingent. Both
the UN civilians and soldiers divided into two camps, the pro-Habyarimana, and the pro-
• • 728
opposition .
VI. 1.7. The Despair of the Displaced People
The outbreak of the conflict that followed the December 1992 and January 1993 massacres of
civilians of Batutsi background in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi provoked the RPF retaliation.
The number of displaced people increased from 350.000 to almost a 1 million whose
conditions gradually deteriorated. First the camps in which they were sheltered were
regularly attacked by the belligerents who would disperse the occupants. Second, the
humanitarian organisations faced the disruption of stocks due to the obstruction of the supply
routes from Kampala, Uganda729. People had to wait for several days to receive 4 KGs of
beans and maize allocated for 10 days. The life in the camps continued to degenerate. For
example, in early 1993, 80.000 persons lived in the Nyacyonga camp, 15 km from Kigali. In
mid March 1993, 600 huts were burned with the animals and belongings
The population of the camps were held as hostages for political purpose. They were
subjected to propaganda from both sides in view to confuse them on who has the
responsibility of their trouble730. When in August 1993, the A. Uwiringiyimana's731 Cabinet
728 Confidence made to the author by the Vatican Ambassador, Mgr Bertello, in an informal conversation, in early
1994. See also Nshimiyimana, V, Prelude du genocide. Enquete sur les circonstances politiaues et militaires du
meurtre du President Habvarimana. Bruxelles: Editions Quorum, 11995. Nshimyimana, then journalist attached to
the MINUAR (the UN contingent) asserts that the contingent itself was divided in two camps. On the one hand a
camp close to Boh-Boh (Camerounian,UN general Secretary special civil envoy) known for his sympathy with
Habyarimana and another close to General Dallaire (Canadian, Commandant of the troops) accused of sympathy
with the RPF.
7 For unknown reasons, most of the humanitarian organisations, UNHCR, World Food Program (WFP), Red
Cross held their stocks in Kampala, Uganda.
730 Meanwhile, in politics, president Habyarimana continued to blow hot and cold. After attempting
unsuccessfully to suspend the activities of political parties with the pretext of allowing the administration to plan
for reconciliation, he resigned from the presidency of his party, the MRND in March 1993. This followed the
publication in Brussels of the report of an international commission on the abuse of Human rights accusing him,
his family and his party, the MRND with its Interahamwe militia, of being behind the organised massacres'
On 3 March 1993, the two co-chairpersons of the Committee ofContacts of the Churches met with the President of
RPF, col. A. Kanyarengwe in Bujumbura where he had just ended his meeting with the leaders of four major
opposition parties. Following these talks, the Prime Minister of Rwanda, D. Nengiyaremye met the RPF leader in
Dar-es-Salem 4 to 7 March 1993 and they signed a joint declaration resolving to resume the negotiations. At the
end of the term of the Nsengiyaremye Cabinet, on April 16th Mrs Agathe Uwiringiyimana took over
73lFrom the MDR opposition party like her predecessor, Mrs Uwiringiyimana was proposed by the chairman of the
Party, F. Twagiramungu but opposed by the hard-liner's faction headed by the two vice-presidents: Karamira and
Nsengiyaremye and the Executive Secretary, Dr D. Murego. In a subsequent meeting of the hard-liner fraction of
her party in which she accepted to meet the delegates, in Kabusunzu/Kigali, June 1993 Mrs Uwiringiyimana was
sequestered and forced to resign as Prime Minister in favour of the candidate of the hard-liners, J.Kambanda; her
trouble ended in being forced by her own camp to withdraw her resignation the following morning.
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which had succeeded to the Nsengiyaremye's concluded the General Peace Agreement with
the RPF, then the displaced population returned to their farms without waiting for an order
from the authorities. Their hope for a peaceful life was again extinguished by the April 1994
tragedy.
VI. 1.8 The French and Belgian Flavour in the Tragedy
French military and civil aid, in particular the presence of its troops in Rwanda has been in
the centre of the dispute between the block RPF-Opposition on one hand, and on the other the
Habyarimana system. It is believed that the unconditional French military and diplomatic aid
to President J.Habyarimana made the two camps harden their positions in the peace
negotiations. The French troops beside the government army brought Habyarimana and the
extremists of his regime to resist the idea of power sharing, the leitmotiv of the Arusha Peace
Accord while the RPF and opposition insisted on their repatriation.
France was neither in Zaire nor in Rwanda and Burundi when those countries recovered their
independence from Belgium in 1960 and 1962. For F-X Verschave, it replaced the former
colonial power through business, commercial and economic interests, francophony, personal
relations and its internal politics732. France, Verschave argues, participated directly in the
genocide alongside the Habyarimana machinery. French officers trained and equipped the
army, the Interahamwe militia and the Presidential Guard elements on Mobutu's and
Eyadema's style from January 1991 to the end of 1993. It provided economic, political and
international diplomatic support to the Habyarimana regime (and to its extension, the interim
government: April to June 1994), before, during and after the genocide though it is believed
that President Mitterrand himself fully knew that widespread massacres were under
733
preparation "'.
But why France insisted to stay in Rwanda? George Moose considers that France, for the
West, plays a gendarme role to preserve Western interests in Africa734.To understand the
accent being put on the French presence in this research, it is best to consider how
Habyarimana came to power and how France's interference between 1990 and 1994 became
a factor of internal politics never addressed by the Church's mediation.
732 Verschave, F-X., Complicite de Genocide? La Politique Francaise au Rwanda. Paris: Decouvertes, 1994, pp.
lOff.
733
Chipman considers that in addition to the factors proper to its internal politics, France pursues three major
objectives: military defence, French cultural and linguistical, political and economical influence. See Chipman, J.,
French power in Africa. Cambridge, Massachussets: Basil Blackwell: 198.
734
According to George Moose, a former US Under Secretary of State for Africa in the Clinton Administration,
France represents and extends the global and historical hegemony of the Western powers on the Africa continent.
For him the great powers attribute to Africa five traditional major roles: an obstacle against Islam and
Communism; sea-lines for the protection of the commercial goods; the launching pad; the strategic resource store
land and finally the material and human resources reserves; and finally, Africa fulfils the surrogate field role.
According to Moose, during the first war 188.000 African men fight beside France and Britain mobilised 470.000
during the second war of whom 100.000 for its Burma campaign. Moose, G, "The French Military Policy in
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In fact, Habyarimana's military putsch in 1973 was officially presented as the result of a
power struggle between the centre and the north. However, below the surface, it must be
remembered that the putsch happened when the Kayibanda's regime turned to the Chinese
and its African ally, Tanzania, to initiate socialism735. A year after his putsch, Habyarimana
was integrated into the 'syndicate' of the head of the French speaking countries through the
OCAM (a Common Organisation for Africa and Madagascar) of which, he took the
chairmanship from the poet, author and philosopher Leopold-Sedar Senghor, then President
of Senegal736.
Then in 1975 France signed with Rwanda a convention for military co-operation. It was
under that accord that more than 500 French soldiers were sent in Rwanda after the RPF
attack; this contingent was even increased up to 750 men and they stayed during the crisis.
They were constantly referred to by the opposition as backing Habyarimana in repressing the
opposition; both French and Habyarimana camps were unhappy when they had to withdraw
to leave the ground to UNAMIR in December 1993. According to Jean Carbonare, a French
member of an International Commission on Human rights abuse mentioned earlier, French
officers were present in many military barracks like Bigogwe (Gisenyi-Ruhengeri region),
Gako in Bugesera, Gabiro in Mutara. where many Tutsi and opponents were convoyed,
tortured and killed737.
Earlier in 1992, France detached Lt Colonel Chollet who then was appointed to a new but
key position as "Councillor of the supreme chief of armies" (President Habyarimana) for the
"organisation of the defence and the functioning of the military institution"738. It is because
this project was interpreted and denounced by the opposition as a support aiming to strangle
the democratic process that the French officer's nomination was suspended739.
When, in June 1994, the defeat of the genocidal government became obvious, France
organised the 'Turquoise' to rescue the whole machinery of the regime, including the army
and the interahamwe militia in a so-called 'natural vocation' in the 'French- speaking
countries'740. This brought the organisation, "Observatoire Permanent of French Co-
Africa". In Foltz, J& Bienen, H, S. (ed.). Arms and the Africa. Military influences on Africa's international
relations. Yale University Press. New Haven/ London: 1985.
735 At the time all the curriculum of moral and civic education in schools focused on Tanzania and Chinese
socialism. French presence and disturbance on the Africa continent is also often interpreted vis-a-vis its historical
rivalries with the Anglo-Saxon world known as the Fachoda syndrome,Verschave,p. 6.
736
Unusually for a foreigner, from early 1980s, Is. Senghor was elected member of the French Academy.
737 Ibid., p. 22; see also Verschave, op.cit. pp. 37-3.
738 Verschave, op.cit. p.40.
739 Verschave, p.l 14-117. In April France set up a system of arms' supply and assistance to commandment from
Paris. Several tones of arms were sent via Goma in Zaire. France sought for an international backing and had to
elaborate its own mandate from UN. The time it get it in midst of June it was to late to save the interim
government but it succeeded to protect its departure in exile through the so-called 'zone humanitaire neutre' in the
western prefectures of Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu, border with Zaire.
740
Although, France claimed a disputable number of rescues, 10.000 Tutsi! (which is not our argument since we
praise God for even one life rescued ), various authors including Verschave and Braeckman identify rather other
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operation", to say accurately that in protecting the militaro-political system, author and
executor of the genocide, France has nipped the democratic renewal in the bud 741.
At the opposite extreme, Belgium was the target of the Bahutu hard-liners. Because it
immediately withdrew its citizens and repatriated its troops at the beginning of the war, in
October 1990, the former colonial power was accused of having plotted the putsch against
the regime to pay its bill to the Batutsi whom it abandoned in the 1950s/1960s. The litany of
accusations included the refusal of the Belgian Government to deliver arms to Kigali which
were ordered and paid before the attack of the RPF (a charge not denied by the Belgian
government). The suspicion over Belgian intention mounted over its decision to provide the
UN Peace keeping force (the most significant contingent, 600 men out of 2500) needed to
implement the Arusha Peace Agreement perceived by the barons of the regime as anti-
Habyarimana. The hard-liners thus pursued their campaign, presenting the Belgian UN troops
as an occupation force designed to offer power to RPF and the opposition742.
VI. 1.9 Dictatorship and Aspirations to Democracy.
The former ruling party, the MRND and its president were forced to open society to
democracy and dialogue with the rebellion; they were forced to liberalise political and
economic sectors. Obviously, they gave on one hand what they wanted to take on the other.
As he called himself Ikinani (the Invincible), Habyarimana left no doubt about his
determination to fight to the last bullet. Nicholas Gordon has described the situation as
follows:
The war had forced this on the president. Now that the FPR had formed a well-equipped and highly
undisciplined army capable of taking and looting Ruhengeri, and now that the balance of world politics
had shifted away from the cold war, the president had been forced to make concessions. Multi-party
politics were allowed, a semblance of democracy took root in the country, and news-papers, most of
them critical of the regime, started to flourish. Opposition politicians were given cabinet portfolios, not
the crucial posts like Minister of the Interior or Defence, but even so, it appeared that there was no way
that this president was going to be able to stifle the spirit of reform.743
As Gordon indicates, it was a mixture of events, both nationally and internationally including
the 1990 war, the stream of re-democratisation on the continent following the end of the Cold
War, the rise of a more questioning Civil Society and opposition which led the President to
accept changes in the Constitution to allow political parties to exist outside the MRND. He
made some concessions but at the same time, put underway the mechanisms for sabotaging
the democratic process as earlier discussed in chapter four. In fact, from the very beginning
objectives: first, to rehabilitate Mobutu, thus to reassure French speaking 'friend leaders'. Second, to re-exercise
their influence - in the framework of Fachoda syndrome- for the control of the plateau of Maniema rich in strategic
mineral resources. Third, a televisual show around the exodus of refugees to be able to brandish the humanitarian
crisis with hundred deaths of cholera so as to hide its responsibility in the tragedy. Cf. Verschave, op.cit. p.137;
Braeckman,op.cit. and Obs. Perm. Coop. Fr. p.50ff.
741 Observatoire Permanent de la cooperation francaise, op. cit. p. 5.
742 Mahoux and Verhofstadt, op.cit. pp.312 f.
743Gordon. N., Murder in mist. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993,p. 1
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of the war, Habyarimana and his entourage have feared to be isolated by an alliance between
the RPF and the internal opposition leading to a wider coalition of the marginalised Bahutu
of the centre, south and east.
His entourage then decided to exacerbate ethnic tensions to reinforce their position with the
help of the population; this was also a strategy to hide other problems created by 20 years of
the regime such as political murders and economic corruption. The repetitive character of the
massacres relayed by ceaseless accusations about alleged arm caches held by the Batutsi and
the attacks by the Inkotanyi against the military barracks, all this inflamed the social climate
and increased fear of the population744.
And A. des Forges rightly said : "apres chaque massacre, des excuses officielles etaient
presentees, on assurait que les attaques n'etaient que le resultat d'une colere spontanee et que
les autorites locales etaient debordees. En resume, le genocide etait le fait d'un peuple
litteralement terrorise qui ne faisait que se defendre"745.
Far from being an isolated incident, the 1990 crisis was linked to interwoven political,
military, social, religious contexts created by the rupture of society out of the legacy of the
past in which foreign powers, nationals and expatriate elite had participated. Nkunzumwami
accurately describes this episode as follows:
Le Rwanda a traverse des series de ruptures socio-politiques qui ont marque des fractures sociales. Du
royaume autonome a la colonisation allemande, avec l'introduction d'une dimension economique et
culturelle a l'image de l'occident, notamment avec l'aide de l'eglise Catholique; de la colonisation
Allemande a l'intrusion des beiges avec leur plan de purification ethnique dans l'appareil du pouvoir
monarchique, conduisant aux conflits ouverts entre des Bahutu ecartes de tous les pouvoirs et les Batutsi
occupant tous les postes de responsabilite dans tous les secteurs; de la colonisation Beige a la
Republique Ruandaise, avec d'horribles massacres accompagnant la revolution socio-politique de 1959-
1961; une derniere rupture tragique de 1990-1994, accompagnee d'une guerre civile pour le pouvoir, des
massacres et du genocide, les Rwandais sont completement desorientes aujourd'hui. Le seul lien entre
les Bahutu, les Batutsi et les generations futures, - c'est- a- dire l'identite nationale Rwandaise, la culture
et l'histoire communes-, est alors remplace par des luttes regionalistes d'hegemonie engendrant des
micro-cultures. La haine ethnique est devenue une arme contre l'identite nationale pour tous. Quelques
intellectuels Rwandais et etrangers, profitant de leur notoriete universitaire, amplifient cette haine par
des vagues explications sur les origines diverses et les pratiques ancestrales des Bahutu et des Batutsi au
Rwanda, lis nient violemment 1'identite culturelle nationale Rwandaise que les Rwandais eux-memes
ont totalement integre dans leur vie quotidienne et dans leurs echanges746.
This sharp analysis identifies the key moments in the development of the fracture of
Rwandan society: the westernising of society and the organisation of the monopoly for the
Batutsi elite with the help of the Church; the massacres which accompanied the 1959-1961
social revolution; then the 1990-1992 tragic events. Except during the 1990s crisis in which
the Rwandan Church hierarchies and Christians were requested to mediate, the elite of the
744 See section V.3.2.4. In many occasions, during the Umuganda weekly manual activities, the population was
regularly called on to find caches of arms and to dislodge accomplices hiding among their neighbourhoods. This
created a climate of suspicion: at various occasions, crowds reacted hysterically at rumours and misinformation on
which nobody was allowed to conduct serious inquiry
745 Des Forges, A. Witness of 26/2/1997 to the Belgian Parliament, Brussels, 1997, p. 25.
746 Nkunzumwami,E, op. cit. p.231.
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Churches has been not beside the poor and oppressed but beside the holders of political
power.
The issue here is how the theology of the Churches of Rwanda could have been a prophetic
voice, a mediator between the weak and voiceless and the powerful, the decision-makers?
'Theology', says D.Forrester, "must point steadily towards individual responsibility. Political,
economic, scientific and strategic decisions are made and implemented by men and women,
and affect men and women. Neither the market with its 'invisible hand' nor the state should
be reverenced as powers following their own principles and effectively beyond human
control"747.
But what kind of Christian commitment was needed in mediation? It is best to underline the
fact that the Churches in the 1990's were comprised of three tendencies: the first group was
made up of Christians struggling to inform national and international opinion of the suffering
of the people; a second tendency was made of what Violet748 calls the 'refugees of heaven',
indifferent to the socio-political fractures and conflicts as they only care for their ticket to
heaven; and lastly the hierarchy imprisoned in the 'ethnic divide', working either to acquire or
to preserve a political endorsement. There was a special category made of external
interventionists, the 'Prayer-breakfast' group.
VI. 2. Responses of the Churches to the Crises
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, during the period of turmoil which intensified
in 1990 and after, the intervention of the Church hierarchies had consisted of the pastorals
and messages largely advertised and distributed in the parishes for the Roman Catholic
Church749 and within the Protestant Churches some letters reacting to the outside inquiries.
When the war broke out in the north, Protestant joined their Catholic colleagues and made an
attempt to mediate in the crisis. However that attempt, it seems from the perspective of this
thesis was not founded on any sustainable reflection with regard to the root causes, the socio-
historical and political developments and the theological implications of that crisis. This
explains why some forms of the Church leaders' intervention was perceived by observers as a
reflex of self-preservation.
VI. 2.1. Catholic Hierarchy: disseminating the State Message
There has been three major categories of the messages of the Catholic bishops. Firstly, the
messages published prior to the pope's visit, 7-9 September 1990 and focused on unity.
Secondly, the messages which responded to the emergency raised by the beginning of the
747
Forrester, D., 1988,p. 16.
748
Nyirarukundo.V., Informal discussions , Kigali, March 19
749 In our study, we have used the booklets of the message printed by Pallotti Presse, Kigali, in French and
Kinyarwanda. We have adopted the list published by the Secretariat of the Bishops's Conference, "Lettres et
Messages des Eveques Catholiques du Rwanda depuis la guerre dite 'd'Octobre 1990' (1990-1993)". In Bulletin de
la Conference Catholique du Rwanda. No 2/Mars, 1994, p.l.
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war, 1 October 1990. Thirdly, other messages various letters and joint intervention with their
counter-parts, Protestants.
In the first message, February 1990, Christ our unity, the bishops evoked the question of
unity among Rwandans, referring to the myth of the common origin of the Banyarwanda,
they wrote: "We learned, from our ancestors that Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa were all
descendants of a same ancestor, Kanyarwanda. The Church for its part had never ceased to
preach the unity and the good understanding between the children of God, even if they were
ethnically, ideologically and religiously different"750.
The myth of brotherhood between Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa has been undermined at various
epochs. In endorsing publicly the 'ethnic and regionalist' balance policies with an attempt to
minimise its negative impact on those discriminated against, the hierarchy failed to call the
nation-state to assume the exigency of unity and well-being for all. Clearly, their public
support to the MRND policies was unequivocal:
On entend parfois des gens se plaindre que, pour des raisons d'origine ethnique, on leur a refuse un
emploi ou une place a l'ecole, on les a prives d'un avantage, ou que la justice n' a pas ete impartiale a
leur egard. vous n'ignorez pas que la politique de l'equilibre ethnique sur les lieux de travail et dans les
ecoles est destinee a corriger cette inegalite qui a pu favoriser les uns au detriment des autres Les
dirigeants font leur possible pour aider les habitants du Rwanda a bien s'entendre: ils nous donnent des
routes, des journaux, toutes sortes de lieux de rencontre, les institutions du MRND, les associations des
travailleurs et celles de la promotion feminine75'.
The negative impact of these policies whether in the public or confessional schools has been
debated in Chapter Four. The fact that the hierarchy felt it necessary to publicly bring their
support to the regime, shows simply how far they were from the reality of the common
people. The second message, May 1990 concerned, "Christ our unity, as the foundation of
Justice for every Human". For the bishops, the struggle for development was inseparable
from Justice and the respect for fundamental human rights. For that very reason the bishops
congratulated the Rwanda government which "did not hesitate to sign the UN Declaration of
Human rights and work hard to implement it"... in such a way that, "Rwanda in Africa is a
state of Rights which try, in loyalty, to apply the laws meticulously studied"752.
The bishops made also some more meaningless remarks on what they considered as obstacles
to Justice such as "banditry, family planning; lies and the absence of truth in media; the
prisoners whose presumption of innocence was not respected; the mismanagement of public
spending including the illicit transfer of funds outside; the crisis in education attributable to
75(1 Conference des Eveques Catholiques. Christ Notre Unite. Premiere Partie: Unite. Kigali: Pallotti Presse, Avril,
1990, p.5.
751 Ibid. p.5/6; p. 1.
752 Conference des Eveques Catholiques. Christ notre Unite. Deuxieme Partie: Justice pour tout Homme. Kigali:
Pallotti Presse, Mai 1990, p.3.
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families and teachers; the accumulation of land"753. The text was a litany of moral
instructions in imperative form without edifying stories of personal engagement:
don't sell the services or employment; don't reserve them for the members of your family, your friends,
or members of your ethnic group, your region or the richer. Be strong against the viruses such as
dishonesty, corruption, favouritism, nepotism. It is in that way we make appeal to your vigilance during
the preparation of the visit of Pope, Jean-Paul II.
The third message was published on the 15 August under the title; "Christ, our unity as
foundation of the word of God in the life of a Christian". It introduced a number of initiatives
for the promotion of the first Catholic version of the Bible in Kinyarwanda which was
expected to arrive from Spain where it had been printed. The Bishops admitted their shame
for not having a Kinyarwanda version of the Bible whilst the Protestants (numerically one
third of the Catholics) had a NT from 1931 and the whole Bible from 1957754.The bishops
insisted on the prominent role of the magisterium, the Pope and the bishops in the
interpretation of the Bible "because they represent the apostles"755.
In conclusion, the aim of the 1990 category of messages was, for the bishops, to advertise the
Pope's visit, "he in whom is the link that unites the people of God and the Church, One and
indivisible of which the Christ is the Head". They were equally keen to save their face against
all the criticism about the tensions and divisions within the Church and its complacency vis-
a-vis the regime. They referred to human rights but kept a blackout on the mass killings and
assassinations that affected the country, at the very heart of the Church.
Second, there was a feeling that the hierarchy was struggling hard to rehabilitate its moral
and spiritual authority undermined by the publicity surrounding Kibeho's "apparitions of the
Virgin Mary" among schools and unschooled pupils who then started to interpret the
Scriptures and Church's teachings and attracted thousands of pilgrims. In the end, they failed
to spiritually and theologically interpret the elements of the crisis past and those announced
by the visionaries756.
VI. 2.1.1. Against the War, for the Status Quo
The second category of the Roman Catholic bishops' messages concerned their reaction
against the RPF attack. They sent letters to some of the colleagues of the Episcopal
conferences and published pastoral messages largely distributed and read in the Churches. In
these messages, the bishops focused on the issues of truth (May 1991); Reconciliation (New
Year 1992); the conditions for peace: Truth, Justice and Love (Advent 1993). They
753 It left open the charge against the Church, 'the far largest landowner in the land'. Mbonimana's study shows
that the average of parish properties in 1930 was over 200 acres per parish.
754
Surprisingly the bishops made no reference to the painful and long common project initiated in 1981 by the
Bible society of Rwanda between Protestants and Catholics for the translation of the Bbible in Kinyarwanda
which had been repetitively delayed by the absence of stability of the Catholic nominees in the translation team.
Bishop Perraudin, then archbishop of Kabgayi, head of the Commission on Bible and Liturgy repeatedly made
clear to the Bible Society that they were ashamed for the failure to offer a proper version to their churchgoer.
755 Conference des Eveques Catholiques, Kristu. Bumwe Bwacu. Igice cva gatatu: Iiambo rv'Imana mu mibereho
v'umukristu. Kigali: Pallotti press, 1990, p. 1.
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introduced a number of burning issues without however analysing the real roots nor
proposing a solution. There were two exceptions to this, the Kabgayi diocese and the
Presbyterian Church of Rwanda reflections to which we will come back later.
In their reflection, the bishops expressed their anxiety about the deterioration of unity and
peace, the greatest achievements of the Habyarimana regime. For them the mounting ethnic
tensions, the abuse of human rights and the organised violence in the country were the logical
consequence of a population, keen to stop the reinstallation of the monarchy that represented
the attackers, the Rwanda Patriotic Front. On 7 November 1990 in the message "Fleureux les
artisans de la paix, car ils seront appeles fils de Dieu" (Mt. 5,9), they emphasised the unity
being undermined by the attack and the 'enemy's infiltration' as follows:
Comme chacun le sait, le ler Octobre dernier, dans la region du Nord en Prefecture de Byumba, notre
cher Pays a ete victime d'une agression armee venue de 1'Uganda, et d'infiltrations complices a
l'interieur du Pays jusque dans la capitale Kigali. Cette epreuve souleve a nouveau le probleme des
refugies et remet douloureusement en question l'unite nationale757.
The bishops appealed to the population of each category and gender to show a Christian
solidarity, understanding and tolerance. They invited the population to avoid ethnic and
regionalist oppositions that could lead to civil war. They condemned vengeance,
denunciation, slanders, looting, the burning of habitations and murders. However, the
unfortunate association in this letter, of the aggression from the north and the 'infiltration of
accomplices inside the country'(which was not proved) espoused the discourse used in the
propaganda of the regime to justify the arrests, tortures and even killings of potential
opponents, 10,000 of them were languishing in prisons without any charge. The time chosen
by the bishops to make their public declaration was the same as the local government
organised massacres in Kibirira region (Gisenyi) which left more than 500 dead ( ADL).
Yet, the hierarchy omitted to make any reference but rather congratulated the authorities for
keeping the population calm:
Malgre les ecarts et les complicites qui ont ete detectes a l'interieur du pays, nous nous felicitons de
l'esprit de cohesion qui caracterise le comportement de notre peuple des le debut des evenements qui
affectent notre pays758.
The leitmotiv in the November 1990 message was the pacification of the country. The
bishops searched for it by any means and at all costs. First, they called Christians, population,
youth, intellectuals, functionaries, and priests to be loyal to the authorities and to the bishops.
Furthermore, there was a sense that the faults of the regime were being put in the future as
errors to avoid; giving the impression that the authorities were totally free from any mistake.
This was particularly transparent in their letter of 5 December 1990 to their colleagues in
France:
756
Maindron,G, Les apparitions a Kibeho. Paris:QE.I.L,1984.
757 Conference des Eveques Catholiques, Heureux les Artisans de la Paix, car il Seront Appeles fds de Dieu.
Kigali: Pallotti Presse/ Secretariat de la Conference Episcopale, Novembre 1990.
758 Ibid. p. p.
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Rwanda has been attacked by refugees and Uganda soldiers. Apart from loss of human lives, the whole
region is sacked. The union between the ethnic groups and the regions is checked. A campaign of
misinformation has been meticulously organised by the attackers to tarnish the image of the country. The
country faced the ambitions of a feudal and monarchical group determined to reinstate a regime ejected
by 80 % of the population759..
The bishops suggested that the refugees problem can be resolved on the condition
that, Rwanda, a small land overwhelmed by its population be assisted and that the
refugees dissociated themselves from the "suicidal group. Like many major organs of
the MRND system, the discourse of Church hierarchy denounces the campaign of
misinformation against the regime, and the dislocation of the unity between the 'ethnic
groups'. The bishops evoked the attack as the feudo-monarchists' plan to reinstate "a regime
rejected by 80 % of the population". The problem of the refugees referred to in the message
however raised the question whether the Church hierarchies did not omit deliberately, or
because of political pressure to speak out in favour of them. What is certain however, is that
this continuing link between the causes of the 1959 revolution, the reclamations of the
refugees and the 1990's rebellion does not serve the unity among the Banyarwanda. It was
instead an implicit discourse scape-goating some sections of the population.
Reacting to the message, the Switzerland based Rwandan community, mainly refugees,
blamed the Catholic hierarchy for defending a mysterious "unity realised by Habyarimana
while most of people were excluded from participating, like millions outside the country".
They accused the Church of compromise with a 'corrupt regime' which murdered many
including Church workers and clergy; they annexed the Kangura' 10 commandments and
accused the bishops of adopting 'Hitler's ideology'. The group dismissed the argument of
overpopulation advanced by the Catholic hierarchy in naming some small countries of much
bigger density, Porto Rico, Barbade, Guadeloupe which resolved their demographic problems
without exiling their populations760.
In the message of 2 March 1991, entitled "As I have loved you, so you must love one
another"(Jn 13,34), the bishops discussed four themes: Reconciliation; Dialogue intra-
Rwandan on different levels; Peace and Solidarity. They singled out some categories like the
authorities, politicians, army forces, religious people, intellectuals, parents and educators,
media and gave them specific instructions to work for peace and to choose Justice over the
abuse of power and wealth. In the end they indirectly evoked in a single line what they
considered as human dignity with reference to the refugees issue: "without ignoring the rights
759 Roman Catholic Episcopal Conference, Kigali. Letter of 5 December 1990 to their colleagues of France
Collection and Translation of the present author.
76(1 Communaute Rwandaise de Suisse. Lettre du 14,2.1991 a la Conference Episcopate du Rwanda in reaction to
their letter of 5 December 1990 to their colleagues of France. Collection of the present author.
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of our brethren, the refugees"; and called "to their brethren to stop fighting and seek
dialogue"761.
On March 31 1991, the pastoral message762 focused on the forthcoming multiparty politics
which Christians were encouraged to embrace so as to work for "truth, tolerance, and to
oppose the oppression of political parties that disturb justice and peace". The bishops
remembered the pitfalls of the multiparty political experience prior to independence and
invited Christians to behave responsibly in a new political and democratic system763. Most of
the text quoted the encyclical letter of pope John Paul II that addressed the monopoly of
power by a minority; human rights and justice for all, the role of the state and the laity.
Referring to article 285.3 and 287, 1 &2 of the Canon law, they reminded the clergy and
other religious members not to participate in politics nor to have any role in the structures of
a political party, organisation or syndicate though they were encouraged to "pursue
constructive political thoughts and plans"764.
This reflection was an exciting introduction to the issue of the relation existing between
Church, Christians, clergy and politics. It arrived in a fertile period of political changes.
There was much to say about all the propaganda of the established single ruling party which
linked multiparty politics with the war, the ethnic divide and treason. Many of the people
suspected of planning the formation of political parties were intimidated, even assassinated to
the indifference of the Church hierarchy. There was equally much to say about the new
political forces which were disturbing the population without proposing concrete project of
building up society. Yet, the bishops' message was quite silent on those issues.
VI. 2.1.2. Ubwiyunge Mbere ya Byose765
This was the message of the New Year, 1992. The Bishops asked the government and the
Rwanda Patriotic Front to put an end to the war and repatriate the refugees. In return, the
refugees were urged to recognise that the history of the country had not stopped during their
exile. The political parties were called to form a transitional government to prepare to give
political direction to the country, to prepare the elections, reconcile people and to organise
the National Conference if requested by the population.
761 Conference des eveques Catholiques, Mukundane nkuko nabakunze (Yh 13,34),Kigali: Pallotti
Presse/Secretariat de la Conference Episcopale, 1991,p. 12/1.
762 Conference des eveques, Ukuri kuzabaha kwigenga (Jn 8,32). Kigali, 199
763 Ibid. p.
764Ibid. p. 14, paragraph 23 & 2
765 Ubwiyunge Mbere va bvose: Reconciliation before everything; Umusaserdoti. Umuhanva wa Kristu: the priest,
witness of Chris
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Umusaserdoti, Umuhamya wa Kristu766
This message was published in September 1992. It reflected on the 75th anniversary of the
priesthood in Rwanda - the first two Rwandan priests, Donat Leberaho, and Balthazar Gafuku
were ordained on 7 October 1917- the bishops recalled the meaning of jubilee in the Jewish
tradition: the prisoners must be liberated, the oppressed released (Leviticus 25.8-17).They
then reported what they considered as extraordinary expansion of the Church though there
was still a long way to go to contextualise Rwandan Christianity767.
our liturgy still is imported; one would say that Christianity and Rwandese culture are two irreconcilable
things; many Rwandans have not yet heard of the Gospel and even those baptised were not really
converted: some go to the mass and after are involved in killings of their neighbours, looting and other
acts of hatred and of violence768.
The Priest in a new Rwanda, according to the bishops, must be responsible for the
sanctification of others, a witness of the mystery of God. He would have to proclaim the
truth, to condemn injustices and to publicly defend human rights. The content of the message
refers to some aspects of the December 1991 Kabgayi diocese document discussed in section
VI. 3.1. which strongly criticised the absence of a prophetic role of the Church and invited it
to convert to remain truthful to the Gospel. This unusual move highlights the exigency of
serenity and commitment needed for the priest to face the challenges of a society where
violence becomes widespread.
Yet, once again, the Church hierarchy omitted to pay tribute to those among the clergy and
lay people have been assassinated for their courage to speak out the truth. Nor was evoked
the withdrawal of the candidature of Father F. Muvala to be ordained bishop two days before
the event, an incident considered by many as ethnically motivated769. In the end, there was no
vision that could help to discover the meaning of the jubilee in the Rwanda society at the
time minority was clinging on power through manipulation of all form of frustrations of the
population.
VI. 2.1.3. Inzira y'Amahoro: Ukuri, Ubutabera n'Urukundo770
The last message assessed in this series was published in Advent 1993. The bishops called
for a new Rwandan society in which the Peace Accord would be implemented. The accord
was presented by the hierarchy as the beginning of a new era demanding from all, mutual
respect, tolerance and forgiveness. They invited the population to overcome egoism, thirst for
766 Translation: The Clergyman, Witness of Christ in Today Rwanda. Conference des eveques catholiques,
Umusaserdoti. umuhamva wa Kristu mu Rwanda rw'iki gihe. Kigali: Pallotti Presse/Secretariat des eveques,
September 199.
767
Starting in 1900 in Save, the Church was implanted in all the regions of the country three years later. From the
first baptism in 1901, it had 15000 Christians in 1917, and 3,099,609 Christians through 123 parishes in 1991; 90
religious congregations, inferior seminars in Kansi, Kabgayi, Nyundo, Rwesero, Butare, Zaza, Ndera and Nkumba;
and superior seminars in Rutongo (Propeudetic), Kabgayi (Philosophy) and Nyakibanda (Theology).
768 Ibid. p.
769 See interview with Father Muzungu in chapter V
7711 Translation: The Path of Peace: Truth, Justice and Love. Message of Advent, 1993.
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power, lies, arrogance, rancour and killings. Peace was described as being generated by
justice, the very fundamental right for life, education, employment, expression of opinion and
religious freedom.
Due to the fact that Rwanda was a country torn apart, reconstruction needed courage,
repentance and forgiveness. A particular word was addressed to every category of population
including the "magistrates who would heal the illnesses of suspicion and mismanagement"771
the army forces who "would be open to integrating with the rebels' troops and to accepting
the demobilisation of some of their colleagues". The rest of the message were moralising and
peremptory admonitions to the soldiers the refugees, politicians, journalists772.
Published at the crucial period of the political blockage, the message tackled some relevant
issues. Yet, it omitted to mention some fundamental issues like repentance for the collective
and institutional sin of discrimination and exclusion, violence and massacres that affected the
history of the country.
Kierkegaard characterises the Churches' presence in each society which accurately applies to
the Rwandan situation. For him each commitment of the Church that does not please the
authorities arouses marginalisation, persecution, rejection. A reverse situation occurs when
the Church lives in peace within the established order, when it lives in the sphere of power,
and can not formulate a direct message against evil. In that case, the Church has ceased to be
the salt in the world, Christianity is reduced to folklore773.
Like Kierkegaard, Andre Dumas has described three situations into which the Church could
find itself in any society774. First, Church and state are in "symphony" through a mutual co¬
operation. Consequently, this Church is not free in its movements and acts. Second, the
Church is free and keeps the temporal power to the laity. The danger here is marginalisation
because any position of the Church remains private. Third, the confessing Church always
questions its own deeds and those of political power. Such a Church is actively persecuted;
but that is to remind Christians that it is not right to rest on their laurels.
In Rwanda, due to various mutual convergences discussed in Chapter Four, there was, on one
hand fidelity and harmony with the state policies, and on the other, a competition among
Church leaders for obtaining donations or favour from the state. Some have found in this
competition one of the causes of the total absence of criticism against the unjust policies.
771 Ibid. p. 1.
772 The case of the soldiers needed tactful approach. According to the Peace accord, the majority of them were to
be demobilised. A small number of 19000 for both the army and the gendarmerie was to be kept. Many felt they
have been abused by the politicians who recruited them to be killed into a war of an intra- Rwandan before those
who survived would be left unemployed.
773
Kierkegaard, S. Training in Christianity. London:SCM,194.
774
Dumans, A.. Political Theology and the spiritual life of the Church. Paris: Chollet, 197.
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But if the Church leaders were comfortably installed in complacency why did they publish
the message? Firstly, the hierarchy had certainly a sense of history. As it happened in the end
of the 1950s during the stream of independence on the African continent pushed by the Non-
Aligned Movement and the eastern block during the Cold War, there was, in the 1980s and
early 1990s a strong stream of re-democratisation following the end of the Cold War. Once
again, the hierarchy was keen to adapt so as to remain the major partner of the political
power.
Secondly, it must be remembered that during the period of political and social changes in
Africa some Church leaders were called to lead the National Conferences which were seen
as a forum to gather all the home forces in the task of creating a better future. In Rwanda, the
1990 crisis left the Church as the only institution that had the necessary means to intervene.
The Catholic bishops struggled to make their voice heard through their pastoral letters.
Instead they became a sort of loudspeaker of the regime. At the same time, some Protestant
leaders were suspected to take stance that would make them eligible to play a key role in the
National Conference which was being evoked in the national opinion. Both camps enrolled in
the game without a theological and ethical preparation.
VI. 2.2. Protestant Hierarchy: Seduced by State Misinformation
The attitude of the Protestant Churches towards the 1990 crises, in particular, the RPF attack,
bore the lack of a theological reflection as well as a coherent methodological approach in
addressing burning public issues. As seen before, the RPF attack was followed by massive
repression of the civilian population. In general their reactions consisted of explaining
governmental policies in condemning the 'irreducible monarchists' who started the war.
Responding to the 10 October, 1990 World Council of Churches General Secretary's fax in
which, Dr E. Castro expressed to the Protestant Council of Rwanda his "concern about the
repression against the refugees returning to their country", the Church leaders regretted that
"the information currently published on Rwanda, was deformed, distorted by badly
intentioned people, thus false"775. They rejected the idea of a civil war or mass of refugees
returning as well as any human rights violation. They rather located the refugees problem in
the "pre-colonial period, in the power struggle within the monarchical ruling families; in the
colonial period when many fled to avoid forced labour ; in the abuse of power by the ruling
class during the monarchical era; and finally to the 1959-1961 social revolution which ended
400 years of a feudal system tolerated by the two successive colonial administrations"776.
775 CPR, Letter of 17 October 1990 to the heads of states of Rwanda, France, Belgium neighbouring countries to
Rwanda, UN and OAU General secretaries, the Embassies in Kigali, other Churches in Rwanda and neighbouring
countries.
776
CPR, "Appel des Eglises Protestantes a ceux qui sont Engages dans la Guerre du Rwanda. Kigali, 17 October
1990. Archives of the Author.
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For Protestants, the arrival of Habyarimana to power opened an era of unity, peace and of
participation of all 'ethnic' and religious groups. The Church leaders then reiterated their
support of government policy concerning the refugee problem. They took the opportunity to
reveal the January 1989 results of a regional Conference on refugee called by the All Africa
Conference in Nairobi. They ended by asking neighbouring countries to cease backing the
'attackers'778.
The Protestant theological seminary also got engaged in the polemic. In a reaction to the
WCC general secretary's letter (which was published in SOEPI, a WCC bulletin) mentioned
above, the academic staff of the Protestant Faculty of Theology in Butare regretted that he
was 'wrongly informed'... For them, the attackers wanted to reinstate the monarchy. They
provoked fighting on 4 October 1990 in the capital, Kigali and elsewhere. A government
commission, they said, was touring the world to counterbalance misinformation779.
Nevertheless, the WCC persistently requested more information about "disturbing news of
summary trials, executions and arrests"780. Having obtained little co-operation from the
Church hierarchy, the director of CCI/WCC in his letter of 30 January 1991 communicated
the 'vigorous protests' to the President of the Republic regarding the "arbitrary arrests,
tortures and deaths of the detained". A particular case of Canon A. Cyafubire, former
secretary of the Kigali Anglican Diocese, then director of a secondary school in Gahini, who
was killed by the security detectives in the Rwanagana prison, was mentioned. The WCC
then requested that the detained be either released or brought to justice. According to credible
sources, none among Cyafubire's hierarchical superiors felt challenged to pursue the case
before the Rwandan authorities.
The Church hierarchy managed to visit the prisoners, meet the chairman of the ad-hoc
Commission due to charge or to release those detained, General Prosecutor, A.M. Nkubito as
well as the Minister of Justice, T.Mujyanama. At the time, the Church leaders were still
convinced that the major step needed was to help the government overcome the aggression
from Uganda and to appease the international negative campaigning. In the first letter ever
written to their counterparts of Uganda, the Protestant leaders invited them to approach
President Museveni to ask him to cease any support he was giving to the RPF/Inkotanyi.
The Protestant hierarchy then seized the occasion to congratulate the Ugandan Churches for
the hospitality extended to the Rwandan refugees. They regretted that the attack happened
778 CPR, "Appel des Eglises Protestantes" Kigali, October 1990. Collection of the author.
119
Faculty of Theology academic staff, open letter to the General Secretary of WCC, 21 November 1990 in
reaction to his letter of 12 October 1990 to the president and General Secretary of CPR, published in SOEPI No
33. Collection of the author.
78H Clement Janda, fax of 13 December 1990.
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whilst a bilateral commission on refugees as about to find the solution781. According to
credible source, the letter was never answered.
Once more, the RPF exploited these arguments to dismiss the eventual neutral stance of the
authors. For the Swiss based Rwandan Community, the authors of the messages, particularly
the Faculty of Theology were defending the "apartheid regime of Kigali" which gave them
unmerited privileges through the "ethnic and regionalist equilibrium" policy. Clearly, the
earlier position of the Church leaders was misinformed by government propaganda. The
absence of any genuine programme in the area of human rights as well as the fact that they
had made no previous contact with the refugees made their position look like a speculative
advocacy of a discriminatory regime.
The absence of clear stance from the Protestants may find its manifestation in the stamping of
the Christian Council in mediocrity. As a body that should have empowered the Church
members to adapt to social changes the Council "excelled by its lack of initiative" and of
maturity in addressing national burning issues. In 1991 a commission was appointed to
propose a reflection concerning the guidelines for the Council's engagement in society. The
report, called the "prophetic role of the Protestant Council" was presented by the commission
to the Church leaders. But the members of the commission clashed with Church leaders.
Most of the critical aspects of the paper with regard to the Church absence of clear stance in
the social matters were rejected. Rather, the members of the commission were accused of
failing to reflect on issues that were relevant to the Churches like evangelism, 'sheep fishing',
education782.
In February 1992, the Protestant Council organised another workshop in Gihindamuyaga
Monastery called: the "CPR and its perspectives of development". Participants including
Church leaders, the CPR and Churches staff spent three days with some externals reflecting
and trying to define the content of the mission of the Council in a changing Rwanda. For
them, there was much to do with the search for unity among Church members; to help the
Churches adapt on the national level to the universal experience of ecumenism, justice and
peace, diakonia and human rights issues through a concrete commitment. The conference
drew up a proposed job description for each department of the Council and suggested the
necessary link and procedures for co-operation between the Council, the Churches and
Society.
As the meeting took place during a period of growing violence and political blockage, the
participants proposed the creation of a new desk for human rights, justice and peace. The
781 CPR Church leaders, "La Guerre, la Mission de Paix et de Reconciliation de l'Eglise". Letter of 18 February
1991 to the Churches of Uganda (Church of Uganda, Anglican; Catholic Church of Uganda, Other Protestant
Churches and Seven Day Adventist Church of Uganda.
782 Interview with the former chairman of the commission, Revd M. Munyaneza, March 1995.
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idea was strongly resisted by some senior executives of the Council and was finally
abandoned. Instead, a commission for "Justice, Peace and Reconciliation" was created in
1993, but as far as this writer knows, it had little influence783.
The main handicaps of the CPR could be summarised in two points: First, the co-ordination
of the activities by a staff much more interested in working for their own denomination than
promoting an ecumenical experience and co-operation between the denominations. The
second handicap was in the institutional one that transformed the CPR into a machine of
bureaucracy and competition for privileges, posts and leadership influence. The council
attributed much importance to the Church leaders for every initiative through a plethora of
bodies while the General Secretariat enjoyed a second plan role instead of being a think tank
of the organisation784.
VI. 2.3. Dynamic forces in Mediation.
VI. 2.3.1. Formation of a 'Committee of Contacts'
Following two visits to Rwanda of Revd Chipenda, the General Secretary of the All Africa
Conference of Churches (AACC), the Rwandan Churches agreed to set up an ecumenical
body, the 'Committee of Contacts'- a title perhaps copied from the opposition grouping:
Comite de Concertation- to mediate efficiently in the crisis mentioned in the introduction to
this chapter785.
One of the committee's co-chairpersons, M. Twagirayesu has collected and published all the
messages and agreements between the political parties concluded up to the end of 1992786.
The author of the collection invited Christians and people of good will to "pray for peace
and reconciliation and also to disapprove whatever departed from the agreement between the
committee and the party leaders". In the introduction, Twagirayesu presents the creation of
the 'Comit'e des Contacts' as having been motivated by the challenge addressed to the
Churches by the disputes on the formation of a coalition government, the violent
783 In one of its two meetings the General Secretary announced the existence of a substantial loan provided by the
German Brot Fur die Welt (Bread for the World) for the activities of Human Rights, Peace, Justice, and
Reconciliation. In reality, none of the proposed actions would be realised.
784 Outside the General assembly, there was the President and vice-president; the legal representative and deputy
legal representative; the executive committee; the meeting of the legal representatives of Churches; the meetings of
the commissions in which the Church leaders were massively present...all the chiefs competed to have a visible
role.
785 T. Nsengiyumva, bishop of the Catholic diocese of Kabgayi and M. Twagirayesu, President of the Presbyterian
Church of Rwanda, respectively chairperson of the Roman Catholic Episcopal Conference and the Protestant
Council in Rwanda, co-chaired the Committee.
The Committee succeeded in bringing the two protagonists, the RPF and the Kigali government to the table of
negotiations. It mediated in the internal crisis following the birth of the political parties, a mediation which ended
in the formation of the multi-party government of five main political parties in which the former ruling party, the
MRND was guaranteed fifty per cent of the posts. They chaired other meetings including the November 1993
Symposium held in Mombassa.
786Twagirayesu, M., Inzira v'Amahoro mu Rwanda (the Peace Process in Rwanda). Kigali: CPR/CEPR, December
1992,48p.
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manifestations and civil disobedience that followed the birth of new multi-party politics. The
'le Comite des Contacts' made of 10 Church leaders, he wrote, was given as mission: "to
meet with the leaders of the party politics and the authorities and to examine what could help
Rwanda to walk in peace and true Democracy"788.
Subsequent activities not reported in the collection include the November 1993 Mombassa
Symposium, and an attempt to reconcile the different factions within the MDR and PL
political parties whose divisions and quarrels from the second half of 1993 gave a pretext to
the President's camp to delay the implementation of the peace accord789.
The Mombasa Symposium, 27 to 29 November 1993, Towards a lasting peace for Rwanda
was organised under the sponsorship of the Nairobi-based continental Council of Churches,
the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) which was then chaired by the South Africa
Anglican Archbishop, Desmond Tutu (who was not present at Mombasa). The meeting in
which a hundred representatives of Churches, political parties, government, RPF, NGOs and
ecumenical organisations had discussions on the "National Reconciliation, the
implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord; the type of democracy for Rwanda"790 was
convened when the internal climate was extremely tense. The Arusha Peace Accord was
facing many obstacles; the political parties were quarrelling and splitting into divisions,
whilst the United Nations was delaying sending 2500 men of the contingent required to
supervise the 22 months period of transition.
Prior to the meeting some influential Church leaders showed their reluctance to participate in
the Mombasa meeting 'without the MRND'791. Finally, when these leaders became persuaded
that participation was the only way to walk towards peace, once in Mombassa, some were
instrumental in insisting the MRND send a delegate. The insistence paid off when a second
category functionary792 arrived a day before the end of the meeting.
During the symposium, two introductions on the political and Christian perspectives in
reconciliation were made by the AACC general Secretary, and Prof. Hezekias Asefa. Then
the participants identified the common factors among the Rwandan people; they reflected
788 The texte in Kinyarwanda reads: kubonana n'abatware b'amashyaka ya politiki n'abategetsi b'igihugu kugira
ngo niba bishobotse babafashe kurebera hamwe icyatuma u Rwanda rugendera mu nzira y'amahoro muri
Demokarasi isesuye. Ibid. p.l.
789 Declarations du 24 Decembre 1993 et du 7 Janvier 1994. In Bulletin de la Conference Episcopale, Kigali, No
2/Mars 1994, pp. 38-4.
790 Ibid. pp. 36-3.
791 In the so-called CPR 'Justice Peace and Reconciliation' commission above mentioned, some members including
the present author raised the question to know if the Church leaders would choose to be with those opposed to
peace process or if they would back those acting for peace regardless eventually their fragility. Meanwhile, the
AACC called from Nairobi to announce that some among sponsors from Europe were already in Nairobi, this to
make clear that an postponement of the meeting would cost not only resources but credibility to Churches.
792 While all the party politics and the Churches were represented by their top leaders, the delegate of MRND was
Augustin Habinshuti, responsible for the information of the MRND political party. However, the MRND delegate
missed no opportunity to raise cynical attacks against RPF and the opposition.
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together and sent a message of last hope to the Rwandan government, the politicians, the
Churches and the international community requesting them to accompany the peace process
by installing the institutions proposed in the Arusha Accord793. The Churches were requested
to organise a follow-up of the meeting inside Rwanda, widely open to Rwandans of the
Diaspora. The hierarchy was invited to open their 'Comite des Contacts' to new blood
including laity and members of the NGOs. By April, 7th nothing of the kind had happened.
VI. 2.3.2. Church Mediation in Party Factions
Another burning issue in which Church leaders were called to mediate was the divisions and
quarrels among some opposition political parties due to form the institutions planned in the
peace accord, in particular, the MDR and the PL. As suggested earlier, some observers have
advanced different causes for the divisions including the interference of the two poles of
power, the MRND and RPF in the internal organisation of the political parties, in their
competition to gain more influence. The next paragraphs is to briefly assess the character of
the divisions and their implications for the political crisis that required the Church to
intervene.
The MDR party was the renewed historical MDR-PARMEHUTU of Kayibanda which was
dissolved in 1973 after the military coup of Habyarimana. During the 1991 multi-party
politics, the party was resuscitated by, among other of its leaders, the children and the sons-
in-laws of Kayibanda794. Two factions rivalled. On the one hand, the faction of 'reformers' led
by its president, F.Twagiramungu argued for abandoning the PARMEHUTU reference.
According to Twagiramungu and his partisans, social relations were no longer based on the
"Batutsi domination over the Bahutu" but on the Akazu, the nucleus of the Habyarimana
dictatorship against the rest of the population. The rival faction led by its second vice-
president, the businessman, Frodouard Karamira and its Executive Secretary, Dr Donat
Murego would argue that the 1959 Revolution remained an unfinished agenda. For them, the
RPF attack was the manifestation of the Batutsi ambition to reinstate their domination. In
such conditions, according to them, the duty of the Bahutu was to join together to oppose the
Batutsi. Later, in 1993 this group joined the MDR/CDR and formed the 'Hutu power' ethnic
ideology that carried out the genocide.
In the PL, one faction led by the president of the party, Justin Mugenzi, together with his first
deputy, Stan Mbonampeka and the General Secretary, Mrs Agnes Ntamabyariro defended the
793 AACC, report of the Mombasa Svnposium. Towards a lasting peace. Nairobi, January, 1994. See also Bulletin
de la Conference des Eveques Catholiques du Rwanda, No 2, Mars 1994, pp. 36-3.
794
Including Faustin Twagiramungu and Emmanuel Gapyisi. Twagiramungu was designated Prime Minister by the
Arusha Peace Accord, escaped miraculously during the massacres conducted by the Presidential guard soldiers
and latter, became Prime Minister for one year, of the government formed by the RPF. Gapyisi was assassinated in
May 1993 in the entrance of his residence in Kicukiro, Kigali. Professor Guichoua who dedicated his scholarly
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theses of the MDR/CDR 'Hutu power'. The second faction led by the second vice-president,
Lando Ndasingwa, a successful businessman from a Tutsi background, owner of 'Hotel Chez
Lando', who was Minister of Social Affairs in the Mrs Uwiringiyimana Cabinet, was pro-
RPF. Each faction in both parties claimed to be legitimate.
The divisions became a national issue because people wanted to know whose faction would
inherit the positions allocated by the Peace Accord in the Cabinet, Parliament and other
institutions during the transition period.
On 7 January 1994, the 'Comite des Contacts' of the Churches suggested a reconciling
solution: first, for the MDR, they proposed that M. Twagiramungu, who was already
recorded by the negotiators of the peace treaty as Premier for the transitional period, be
accepted by the rival faction which in return would give him the three candidates of his party
in the Cabinet. For the PL, they proposed an arrangement of 1/2 and 6/5 meaning that one
faction would have one member out of three allocated tot heir party by the accord in the
Cabinet and 6 MPs, whilst the second faction would have 2 Cabinet members and 5 MPs795.
The proposition was overwhelmingly backed by the conglomerate of NGO and civil society,
most of the diplomatic representatives but energetically criticised and rejected by the two
factions of each concerned political party. Both accused the Church of an "unacceptable
interference in politics". On 20 January 1994, the Roman Catholic bishops retaliated
reaffirming their rights as "citizens of the country to express their opinion and to advocate for
the concerns of the population" against irresponsible politicians who quarrel for power on the
back of a starving population796.
As they were accused of being manipulated by the regime, both hierarchies collectively or
individually had a problem of making their mediation accepted by the opposition and the
rebellion797.
Clearly, the 'Comite des Contacts' mediation was desperately needed. However, the long
absence of the clergy during the socio-political developments which preceded the 1990 crisis
had alienated the influence they could have had on the different actors in the crises.
VI. 2.3.3. The 'Prayer-Breakfast' Mediation
During the course of the crisis several internal and external mediations were attempted from
within or outside Africa. A particular initiative was made by a Germano-American team
book Les Crises Politiaues au Burundi et au Rwanda. 1993. Paris: Karthala, 1995, discusses the hypothesis of the
beneficiary of the Gapyisi's murder, the President Habyarimana camp or the RPF and gives preference to the first.
795 Comite des Contacts, Declarations (24/12/1993) des representants des Eglises Catholiques et Protestantes au
Rwanda au sujet de leur mediation en vue de la Reconciliation au sein du Parti M.D.R. In Bulletin de la
Conference des Eveques Catholiques du Rwanda, p.38/9; Declaration du 7 Janvier 1994 (Bulletin, p. 40; et
declaration de la Societe Civile, Ibid. p.43).
796
Eglise Catholique., Communique de Presse des Eveques Catholiques au Rwanda, Kigali, 21 January 1994. In
Bulletin de la Conference des Eveques Catholiques du Rwanda no 2/Mars 1994, p. 15.
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comprising two Germans, a Frankfurt banker and a former MP in the Bundestag, a US retired
colonel and diplomat working as co-ordinator of the aid to former USSR countries for the
White House, and a former US diplomat in Somalia who represented his country in the
Arusha inter-Rwandan negotiations. The team tried under the so-called 'Prayer Breakfast'
movement to bring together President Habyarimana of Rwanda, Museveni of Uganda and
Buyoya of Burundi and their families to read a passage of the Bible and pray and eventually
to become friends through this Christian fellowship initiated by American Senators.
The team leader (Decker, a former German MP) tells the diary of his experience with diverse
political personalities in a 240 pages book798. Due to the excitement of the project, this writer
asked for a translation from two persons, a German native and a Rwandan who ministered in
Germany for more than five years799. The book shows the Habyarimana's entourage trying to
attract international compassion to "the small Rwanda, victim of Ugandan aggression". It
identifies the major actors, including the RPF, playing hide-and-seek in the conflict. Finally,
the book shows how the author's effort became a naive diplomacy manipulated by the
Habyarimana family with whom he developed a firm friendship.
Decker argues that his relations with his friend Bernard, a former diplomat then politician
encouraged him to undertake the mediation when the Rwandan war broke out in the northern
part of the country. The author made several visits to the region with a view to bringing both
the Presidents of Rwanda and of Uganda to cease their mutual accusations about the
responsibility of the war. They met with the Presidents of Burundi, Buyoya and then of
Tanzanian, Hassan Mwinyi with their families. They started a prayer meeting together where
they could exchange views on the crisis. Decker was later introduced in the bush, by the
President of Uganda to the Commander of the RPF (the Rebellion). According to Decker, the
Commander made clear to the mediator that the best way to resolve the conflict was to invite
Habyarimana put the end to the 30 years stateless refugee situation. Time after time, Decker
motivated the two major protagonists to reopen the negotiations after a period of blockage.
After the signature of the Peace Accord, early in August 1993, he arranged a visit of the
President of Rwanda to Uganda; the Church hierarchies in Rwanda and Uganda participated
and expressed their satisfaction for the peace treaty.
However, in March 1994, the accord was not implemented. The President and Bernard were
concerned: the Batutsi would take their revenge. The team restarted their mediating
797 Some influential members of the opposition parties to whom this author talked to rejected the mediation of the
Church hierarchies on the ground that even the Church hierarchy proposal was drafted by the President's office.
798
Anonymous, Ruanda: Tod und Hoffnung im Land der tausend Hugel (Ruanda: the invisible in the land of
thousand hills). Stuttgart, Friedrich Hanssler, 1995. The names of the author' interlocutors are presented in the
beginning of the book in pseudonym.
799 Both persons live in Germany and know the present author.
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pilgrimage consulting with the US and German diplomats in Kigali. The effort was shortened
by the death on April, 6 1994, of Habyarimana800.
Two weeks after the RPF victory, a member of the Uganda Cabinet invited the author to visit
Rwanda. He met the RPF commander, now vice-President. In September the new President of
Rwanda was in Germany and spoke on the urgent priorities including Justice, Reconstruction
and Reconciliation and International aid801.
Although written from the point of view of Bernard and the late President of Rwanda's
friendship, the book gives some sketches of information on the conflict. First, it enlightens on
the regional and international implications in the conflict, including the Ugandan and
Burundian links with the rebellion. It brings out the Habyarimana's camp crucial role in the
blockage of the accord due to their fear of the RPF revenge. Second, the question arises as
what sense does friendship means for the author. After the death of the President and
Bernard, he was excited to enter into new relationship with their former enemies, now rulers
without showing at what extent the 'biblical diplomacy' had contributed or failed to resolve
the conflict.
Thirdly, the author's original intention was to dismantle the enmity between the Presidents
and to inculcate in them the sense of responsibility before God and men through a simple
strategy of reading an extract of the Bible. There are two levels of uncertainty left by such a
demarche. One, this spiritual political naivete risks being manipulated by politicians who
would take advantage of the Christian or religious moral authority to rehabilitate their
credibility without moving an inch from their own agenda. The second question unanswered
in the book is how such a demarche which combines secret diplomacy with a 'Biblicist
theology' outside the participation for more criticism and guidance of the faithful can bring
about reconciliation. Phrased differently, in the absence of the Church discipline and
theology, have Christians have no other resource to exert pressure on political protagonists to
consent to achieve political peace?
Lastly, if this naive spiritual mediation failed to bring about mediation it is because, like
others of the kind, the experience had to deal with an administrative elite, Christian in name,
but highly secularised, who do not believe any more in the transforming power of prayer but
who see rather in such international moral action a means to secure their own cause.
VI. 2.3.4. Individual groups and Parishes
Many Christian individuals, associations and parishes have tried to work for reconciliation.
These include human rights organisations and peace movements which like LIPREDOR,
8II<>
Actually, this author suspects that Bernard too, died in the presidential plane shot down by unidentified
elements.
801 End of the story dedicated to all the abandoned children from the Rwanda tragedy. Anonymous, Ruanda: Tod
und Hoffnung im Land der tausend Hugel. Stuttgart: Hanssler,199.
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ADL, RDES-TABARA, DUHARANIRE AMAHORO; Umukristo mu Mjyambere group
were created early in 1990s. Other existing institutions of Christian background such as
Oxfam Rwanda, Iwacu Centre; AEE, ARTC... were encouraged by the democratic
liberalisation to start the non-violence and reconciliation campaigns. Some individuals,
Bahutu and Batutsi, known by the present author, worked hard together, pressuring the
Church leaders to contribute to resolving the conflicts.
Many produced valuable work in monitoring human rights abuse and educating for
reconciliation and peace; contrary to some ill-informed remarks802, they worked under
restrictive conditions but proclaimed prophetic messages. Among others remembered by the
present author were Father J-C. Mahame, chairman of LIPREDHOR and Israel Havugimana,
AEE (see 5.3.5.) Francophone Executive who were killed early on 7 April 1994.
Secondly, different parishes and some Roman Catholic dioceses have tried to introduce
justice and human rights issue in their teaching803. On the 21st March 1993, for the first time
in the history of Rwandan Christianity, the Presbyterian Church Kigali parish, initiated a
peace rally, a 4 miles trip which gathered at a roundabout of the Capital city centre. A service
of repentance according to the biblical book of Daniel chapter 9 was organised. The
messages expressed the regret and repentance for the apathy of Christians which prevented
them from condemning energetically violence, heartlessness and massacres804.
The event opened an era of great awareness of the rising violence. During the massacres that
broke out at the end of the same month in the Bugesera region and left for dead more than
500 people805, some groups of Christians from Kigali organised visits of comfort and
solidarity to the affected communities. The motto: "Christ is our Peace, ethnic coexistence is
possible" was repeated in different congregations and in large agglomerations.
This expression of solidarity with the victims of massacres has been regarded inside and
outside the country as Christian witness against the evil. Now, looking at the initiative from a
distance and from the point of view of an organiser, this author is aware of an unfinished
agenda due to the absence of preliminary preparations. A group of elite from Kigali visited,
talked and learnt about the manipulation of the tensions but left Christians alone without
reflecting together how to equip them with the capacity to challenge the structural
mechanisms of violence. In the last instance this turned out to be another evangelistic
monologue from the Kigali elite which went on to proclaim the biblical truths but then left
8(12 ChretienJ-P & al, Rwanda, les media du genocide. Paris: Karthala, p.36.
81,3 See specimen of a three days session on human rights and democracy organised jointly by the Iwacu centre;
ADL, Oxfam in Gisenyi Prefecture with the collaboration of Mr. J.P. Godding, a Holland native councillor on co¬
operative movement. A similar programme was held almost simultaneously in the parishes of Nyundo diocese.
81)4 Documents of the rallye, see archives of the Kigali Presbyterian Parish, and the collection of the present author
as organiser of the rallye.
8(15
ADL, Rapport des droits de 1'homme au Rwanda, Septembre 1992 a Septembre 1993.
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the local people without leaders committed to a very responsible follow-up. The massacres
were planned nationally and executed locally in a wider plan aiming to resist changes806. The
initiative was so fragmented and so small that it could not address the structural mechanisms
that sustained the crisis.
VI. 2.3.4.1. 'Umukrisito mu Majyambere'807
Initiated by father Blanchard, former head of the White Fathers in Rwanda , Priest of the
Nyamirambo Roman Catholic parish, the group reflected and produced publications in
Kinyarwanda and initiated a political education of the population on different public issues:
the Gospel and Human rights, youth' problems, their rights and democracy, the Bible and the
Church teachings; political parties in relation to the Bible and the episcopate teachings; the
free choice according to the Bible; the role of a soldier in a democratic society. The last
issue, No 9 Ubutegetsi ni ubwacu (People's Power) as indicated earlier in this work was an
ecumenical publication from the present author, reflecting on the principles, the models and
forms of government, Christian in public life; it presented and commented on the 1991 new
constitution which opened the country to multi-party politics as well as the manifestos of
seven major political parties808.
VI. 2.3.4.2. AEE : the Cost of Courage
The Africa Evangelistic Enterprise (AEE) is one of the few truly African missionary societies
created in the 1960s by some products of the Protestant Revival, including a South African,
Michael Cassidy, and a Ugandan Bishop, the late Festo Kivengere. It has its headquarters in
Nairobi where it held its two International Missionary Conferences in 1976 and 1994809.
The Africa Evangelistic Enterprise organised from December 1990 various meetings on
reconciliation in co-operation with some other Christian organisations and the Protestant
81)6 The late Olivier Iyakaremye who convoyed the team that went in the Gashora area witnessed to me how he
confronted some people he knew in the mobs holding the machetes. Confused one of them said, let arranged this
issue first, and them we will read the Bible after. In Ngeruka Presbyterian Church where the present author
preached on the " secular symbiosis, in daily basis among the Rwandans", during the Sunday Service on 29 March
1993, the team was told publicly by the late Revd Mugemanyi of Ngeruka and his congregation a moving
testimony how the elders protected his family, strongly resisting the attacks organised by the local authorities, the
councillor, the Burgomaster and the Deputy Prefet. Then they told how they were incapable of opposing armed
soldiers who tortured innocents including the same Minister and his family and killed nine people in the village.
This was early 1993. During 1994 the tragedy was planned in such a manner peace safari of such kind would not
work. Those who were committed to reconciliation were either dead or in hiding.
8(,7Umukristo mu Majyambere:Christian in development Group.
™ Umukristo Mu majyambere, Ivangili n'Uburenganzira bw'ikiremwa muntu. Kagali: Pallotti Presse, 1991, 96 p.
First edition 3000 copies; Umukristo mu Majyambere, Nta giti cvera kitabanie kurabva. Kigali: Pallotti Presse,
1991, 82 p. First edition, 1500 copies; Umukristio mu Majyambere, Duharanire demokarasi. Kigali:Pallotti Presse,
1991, 38; Umukristo mu Majyambere, Amashvaka va politiki. Kigali: Pallotti Presse. 1991: Twitegure Amatora.
Kigali: Pallotti Presse, 1992, 38; Umukristo mu Majyambere. Musirikare Tuganire. Kigali:Pallotti Presse,
1992,78.p; Th, Ubutegetsi ni Ubwacu. Kigali: Umukristo mu Majyambere/Pallotti Presse, 1993,144 p. First
edition, 3000 copies.
80') In 1981 the organisation opened an office in Kigali to serve the Central Africa French speaking countries. The
first assembly to which the present author participated in 1976 as steward was called PACLA I, Pana-african
Christian Leadership Assembly. This thesis also documented from the PACLA II material and from the formal co¬
operation between the AEE for the seminars of Reconciliation and the Bible Society of Rwanda of which the
present author was Secretary.
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Churches. A typical campaign would include a week's conference for ministers and Christian
leaders whilst public meetings were held on a daily basis in the city stadiums. The messages
for reconciliation were proclaimed in the administration offices,810 schools, hospitals,
prisons. For example in the Kigali City Hall, December 1993, Revd Munyaneza, a
Presbyterian minister, compared the Rwandan situation to Amos's epoch. He challenged
those who had built their wealth on the blood of innocents and injustices to repent and work
for justice and peace. In the parliament on the 14 December 1993 a similar message prepared
mainly by a team of lay people involved in political changes was presented to members of
cabinet and parliament by a panel of some Christian leaders811.
Obviously, few hard-liners of the regime were present in the halls. This led some participants
to think that the campaign was preaching to the already converted. However, the discussions
pointed out another reality: the fact that the Church leaders have been and remained
incapable of articulating the truth of violence however obvious and widespread it was.
A challenging message in the same campaign was delivered in the National stadium,
AMAHORO, on the 19 December 1993 by Israel Havugimana to almost 10.000 people.
Havugimana affirmed that the country was losing its direction and was moving towards
darkness. To get rid of the misadventures, Israel suggested, the country needed a leader like
Moses who would put forward not their own interests but the people's; a clever leader,
patient, credible before people and fearing God had to emerge if Rwanda was to survive as a
nation812.
VI. 3. Autopsy of the Church
VI. 3.1. The Catholic Diocese of Kabgayi
During the 1990s socio-political changes, an original initiative was undertaken by the newly
nominated Roman Catholic bishop of Kabgayi, Thaddee Nsengiyuma813. In December 1991,
he signed a revolutionary document from the presbytery of his diocese affirming that the
Church was sick of lies, sick of working under the shadow of the state, sick of working
without transparency. The document analysed and proposed solutions to crucial problems
81l)
During two meetings chaired by the present author in the Capital -City hall and in the parliament palace at
Kimihurura for members of the cabinet and parliament, the speakers included, Revd Munyaneza, a Presbyterian,
and Joseph Nsanzurwimo, Legal Representative of the Pentecost Church , with bishop Rwaje (Episcopal) and
Ruhumuriza ( Methodist) and Revd Twagirayesu (President, Presbyterian Church) on the panels. They commented
on the abuse of power by the elite from any of the two communities in our history.
811 The Church leaders were asked to challenge a system with which they co-operated. They also had before them
a divided audience with members of the cabinet and parliament surely expecting the Church leaders advocacy
whilst the second category of the audience included both conservative and reformer Christians who wanted true
political reforms and those opposed to any involvement in politics such as the members of the very popular
Hosiana Choir of the Pentecost Church present to sing in the meeting.
812
Havugimana,I., Recorded message. December,19 1993. Collected by the present author.
813 No parenthood with his homonym, the Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumva.
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including the war, multiparty politics and education and urged the Church to accept Jesus
Christ's liberation from its compromising alliances and to commit itself to telling the truth814.
The bishop undertook more initiatives such as opening the parishes of his diocese to the
conferences and workshops on human rights, democracy and reconciliation organised by
different non governmental organisations like OXFAM Rwanda, Centre Iwacu, ADL. In the
beginning of 1994, he hosted a seminar of political youth organisations including the RPF.
The RPF delegation arrived at Kabgayi from their Mulindi (near Uganda) stronghold under
UN escort. These initiatives made him not only friends but enemies, in particular within the
regime which certainly expected a blind 'clan co-operation', as he was kin to the presidential
family. Many witnesses had observed the deterioration of his relations with the Archbishop,
his homonymous, V. Nsengiyumva. Both succumbed under the bullets of a RPF commando
in Kabgayi, in early June 1994
VI. 3.2. The Presbyterian Church of Rwanda
Likewise, meeting in January 1992 in the new guest house of the Church in the Kibuye city,
a 12 member commission nominated by the Executive board (Conseil Synodal) of the
Presbyterian Church produced an assessment of the Church and society and made
recommendations for the future815. Members from various professions, including the
president of the Church, reflected on Church relations with politics, the challenge to
evangelisation at different epochs; the current burning issues including rural area difficulties,
refugees, human rights, war, political reforms, regionalism and ethnism. The participants
affirmed that one way among others to redefine the political reforms was to organise a
'National Conference' (see chapter VII about the concept). In the 24 page document the
Commission reaffirmed its conviction that when fulfilling its mission the Church must be
confident in the strength not only from its broad range of ecumenical partners but also from
its Head, Jesus-Christ. They made them available to assist the Church leaders and bodies
(Presidency, General Synod, Synod Council) where an intervention to prevent human rights
abuse would be needed816. Unfortunately, the distribution of the booklet was entrusted to the
Church Service of theology which delayed it until the April 1994 tragedy.817
814 Diocese de Kabgayi, Twivugurure tubane mu mahoro (let reform ourselves to co-exist peacefully.
Kabgayi/Gitarama, decembre 1991.
815 The present author was nominated chair of the ad-hoc Commission.
816 EPR, Ukuri kubaka igihugu. Kigali: Urwego, March 1992.
817 In a seminar held in Hotel des Diplomates on the "role of the Protestant Church and its members in politics and
reconciliation", early in December 1993 with Dr Konrad Raiser, Secretary General of WCC, Jose Chipenda,
Secretary General of the All Africa Conference of Churches, and Michael Twagirayesu, Chairman of CPR as
lecturers, the latter was asked to explain why the Churches were so slow in promoting concrete actions on human
rights and democracy. He illustrated his answer in saying that they had difficulties in distributing the 'Ukuri
kubaka igihugu' document, whilst another document of a religious tone. Impamvu z'ibvingiro Bvacu (the reasons
for our hope) met success. For him, Christians were manifesting tiredness about politics. Like many observers,
this author has suspected that the Church leadership which was still sympathetic to the views of the Habyarimana
has been embarrassed by the overwhelming welcome many among the opposition activists and the RPF
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Another initiative interrupted by the tragedy was an inter-church campaign aiming to develop
awareness of Christians on social changes and democratisation, human rights and peace, to
emphasise the need of reconciliation, to challenge regionalism, sectarianism and ethnic
feelings manipulations. Elaborated by the Francophone partner Churches of UEM in Rwanda
and R.D. Congo, the campaign was unable to start as planned in January 1994 due to
problems of communication between the three partners in Rwanda and former Zaire. The
programme was postponed until the end of April 1994818.
VI. 4.1994, the Lost Hope!
1994 was declared 'Year of Peace' by a network of Christian individuals and organisations.
With the intention of launching a non-violent Christian movement an ecumenical group
comprising lay people some priests and pastors started to organise rallies and prayer meetings
for peace in various areas in the country late in 1993. In January 1994 a rally was organised
in various places of the country. It was preceded by several meetings of prayer and fasting in
parishes819. From 6.00 a.m. to midnight on the 31 December 1993. According to the
manifesto signed by 100 personalities of various professions, the initiators intended to "take
our responsibility and stop violence by peaceful means, to promote political, social justice
and to root a democratic culture in Rwandan life and to promote human and Christian
values"820.
The march, one of the rare public ecumenical manifestation of political character, was
enthusiastically greeted around the country and in the world. 8000 people participated in
Kigali, 5000 in Butare, 5000 in Gisenyi, 3000 in Gikongoro, 2000 at Ruhuha, 6000 in
Kirambo and 8000 in Biniga821. Cardinal Etchegaray from Vatican, Konrad Raiser, General
Secretary of WCC, Fons Margot, A. Sondag, Mgr F. Kuntner, respectively presidents
Commission Justice and Peace Belgium, France and Austria, Jo Becker for FOR New York,
Konrad Fubbert for MIR Germany, Hermut Eigemann and Kakule Molo for VEM Wuppertal
were among the 33 international ecumenical organisations which sent messages of solidarity
to the organisers on the day of the rally.
manifested to that radical reflection, the Ukuri Kubaka Igihugu. Notes from the present author who chaired the
Seminar.
818 The joint plan of action of the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, the Episcopal Church (Butare, Shyogwe,
Kigeme and Cyangugu dioceses) and the Baptist Church in Kivu, Zaire (CBK) was formulated by a group of three
persons nominated by the Churches: Bishop A. Birindabagabo of the Episcopal Church' dioceses, Revd. Kambale
Mangolopa of CBK and the present writer of EPR. It came about through a consultation held in Kigali September
1993 between those Churches and a German partner, the United Evangelical Mission in Wuppertal which wanted
to encourage its Francophone Church members to influence positively the ongoing social and political changes.
The plan was confirmed by the Church leaders together with the authorities of the VEM and the authors who met
in Ramatea/Botswana subsequent to the General Assembly of the VEM in the end of October 1993.
819 Documentation of the present author.
820 Duharanire amahoro. Declaration de la base du Mouvement. Kigali: Decembre, 1993, plus de 100 signataires.
821 The statistics were collected by Father Guy Theunis. See his communication of 10 January, 1994 to those who
sent to the organisers a message of solidarity. Significantly, the last two areas, Biniga and Kirambo were located in
the zone of fighting between RPF and governmental troop.
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From Gisenyi, a western participant enthusiastically wrote: "I saw peace descending from the
sky of Gisenyi". JP. Godding went on to say how, for the first time, in that stronghold of
Habyarimana, a very Catholic region, Protestant and Catholic Christians and clergy shared
the messages, liturgies, songs, biblical texts, sermons and kisses of peace. In Butare, the
second largest city, the message focused on the suffering of the population and on the
qualities of good rulers needed to end the impasse the country was facing.
Long extracts of the messages were read on the two and half hours broadcast on the National
radio with the costs paid by the organisers. The movement pursued its activities in weekly
meeting of prayers for peace, justice and reconciliation. They produced several messages
protesting against violence and massacres; the messages were read in the Churches in Sunday
services. They continued also to portray the characteristics of a good leader in 12 points
including competence, democratic character, honesty and example of good manager of family
and professional relations.
One of the most difficult questions the organisers had to resolve with regard to the 1 January
1994 rally was whether or not the Church leaders would be associated with the march.
Knowing their pro-regime tendency, the organisers debated the problem and decided that
realism was needed, because if they had to mobilise Christians in the parishes, the Church
leader's approval was necessary. Thus, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kigali Vincent
Nsengiyumva and the president of the Protestant Council, Michael Twagirayesu were invited
to deliver a 5 minutes speech each to terminate the 150 minutes programme live broadcast on
Radio Rwanda. Yet with these restrictions, some people saw the two leaders' presence as
politically embarrassing. In the end, the hope generated by the rally was gradually affected by
the continuing political impasse and then extinguished by the huge tragedy which started on
7th April 1994. Thus, the Year of Hope became the Year of lost Hope!
Conclusion: Prophetic Words, too Little too Late
This chapter has assessed the factors that marked the global context of the crisis. It then
considered the different stances and intervention taken by the Churches in political crisis.
Churches' mediation was necessary but it had to overcome a number of handicaps. This the
Churches failed to do.
Firstly not having developed their theological thinking with regard to violence and the
absence of justice and mercy, Church leaders were more vulnerable to political manipulation.
In the framework of the struggle for power within the two poles, the MRND/Habyarimana
camp and the RPF vis-a-vis whom other political parties had a thin margin of manoeuvre,
speculations and political manipulations were exploited as means of diversion. In fact, the
party leaders would accept some of the advice given by the Church leaders provided it
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promoted the interest of their sponsors and they would reject it if they perceived it as an
obstruction to their objectives.
There was also a problem with the way the meetings of the Church leaders and the political
party leaders were communicated to the general public. The Church leaders used laconic
declarations, in the form of the diplomatic communiques throughout the media. The accounts
were an enumeration of peremptory instructions for media effect which betrayed the absence
of ethical and spiritual guidance822. With regard to clarity, the messages were formulated in a
kind of 'jest and earnest' condemning eventually all the 'politicians' without defining those
responsible for the political impasse. Inzira y'Amahoro proved then to be a failure in bringing
a Christian perspective in the political mediation.
The absence of a clear vision and a defined perspective was manifested in the Churches' early
withdrawal after the beginning of the peace talks before any progress was made. There was
no further possibility of accompanying the two sides with moral and disinterested guidance;
nor any possibility of drawing out the moral and ethical implications of the different
protocols comprising the peace treaty823.
The Church mediators were incapable of challenging both sides, the regime and the rebellion
on the issues of violence and power struggle; they were powerless before the war initiated by
the refugees because they had demonstrated a dramatic absence of mercy and compassion for
thirty years. The Churches for example should have firmly asserted to both parties that even
in the case of an overwhelmingly military victory the sole guarantee for a lasting peace was
power sharing and good governance. Equally, the fact that the Churches not only abandoned
the refugees in the wilderness during the crises but some even used the governmental pictures
featuring the refugees as "a group, thirsty for power, domination and revenge" diminished
their credibility as a neutral moral force in the conflict.
Secondly, in considering Church mediation, this work distinguished two types of
ecclesiology. On the one hand, the Church of the lower strata made up of laity and some
progressive members of the clergy who were to take some initiatives at the grass-roots, in
particular the formulation of material for education on human rights, democracy and
reconciliation. This form of Church was fragile, vis-a-vis the structures of dictatorship. On
822
However, the Church leaders defended the necessity of reporting their meetings by the fact that the political
party leaders many of them were linked to violent groups, were the same who in private meetings would promise
to working for peace. Thus the reporting aimed to show to the public what has been attempted.
823 For example, the 'Committee of Contacts' elaborated the protocol for the April 7 1992 government of five
political parties but no mechanism was suggested to resolve an eventual blockage. Equally in the meeting of
November 2 1992 about the insecurity and the Arusha negotiations they recommended that the political authorities
avoid to speak in political party rallies; they proposed to have a group of wise persons (Comite des sages) made of
representatives of the categories constitutionally forbidden to participate in politics; they proposed to dismantle the
militia of the political paties, but again there was no procedure to ensure the application of these proposals. See
Bulletin de la Conference des Eveques Catholiques du Rwanda, no. pp.; 23; 28;3.
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the other hand, the Church of the higher strata, the hierarchies of Catholic and Protestant
bishops.
In fact, when the war broke out, the methodology adopted by the bishops failed to
communicate the signs of hope among the people of God. Its didactic nature did not invite
them to resist the sense of fatality and inevitability of the conflict that was being promoted by
the emerging reactionary forces. The messages came in a very tight package that did not
allow people to analyse or assimilate them through a participatory process. In addition, the
delivery valued the traditional patronising approach in which people hear long and confusing
homilies with heads bowed.
The reading of the messages in the Sunday services, according to this writer's experience,
was the testing moment: long extracts of texts written with imperative admonitions were read
during the mass after which people left, bored, for home. All the channels of communication
within the churches were not exploited. Different basic communities, youth and women's
associations, denominational schools, and theological seminars as well as the media were not
harnessed in the debating and collection of the feed-back.
Not only the pastoral letters and statements arrived to late to be of any real assistance in the
proceedings leading up to the crisis but they also resembled in most cases the type of text
dropped from heaven, through the bunkers of the bishops separated from the daily reality of
Rwandans. None of the 'clerical monarchs' came to incarnate the messages, to personalise and
to implement it.
The pastoral letters dealt with contemporary social questions in an authoritative fashion. The
bishops practised a teaching ecclesiology, by the transmission of the truth from top to
bottom. It might have been useful to refer to the Roman legal maxim adopted by the Canon
Law: "quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et appro bari debet" ("what concerns all must
be discussed and approved by all"). This means that there was a deep need of another kind of
ecclesiology: a Listening Church, one which would exercise authority in dialogue. For
example, the Church leaders could have released the drafts of the pastoral messages and
invited members of the faithful community (eventually the protagonists in the conflicts) to
comment on them. Thereafter, they would have had the opportunity to carefully screen the
responses and take into consideration those useful in the preparation of the next drafts to be
discussed. During the reception of such drafts, communities could have endorsed and
accompanied the process and at the same time, been given the chance to reflect and reach a
reasoned judgement on the basis of their own experience and opinion, not only of the
Catholic community, but of all the nation.
The assessment highlighted the ethical issue that lies behind the delivery of these messages.
It is out of question that the Church leaders' intention was appropriate and corresponded to
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their role as representatives of moral forces. What is questionable however, is the motivation
which may have been mixed. They used a dubious language to communicate to the
population a sense of solidarity with the regime. From the perspective of this thesis, it seems
that a different approach should have been to clearly define a model from a biblical ethos.
Christ, the model of mediation between God and humanity offers principles for our
intervention in any mediation. His presence alongside the poor and oppressed is a constant
reminder of the necessity for the clergy to accompany Christian and society in moments of
turmoil and of calm.
Lastly, Church mediation resulted mainly from internal and external pressure by Christians
and ecumenical organisations. However, the Church leaders were not ethically and
theologically equipped to act with reasonable freedom from political bias824. This led this
writer to the suggestion that the Church leaders' primary motives in accepting to initiate the
dialogue between the RPF and the Habyarimana's regime and between the latter and the
internal political forces, were to ensure a situation in which Habyarimana would remain in a
position of strength. In a sense, the Church leaders wanted to preserve the status quo in which
they had not identified with the 'vaches maigres'.
But how can we articulate a genuine mediation taking into consideration the reality of a
broken relationship between God and human beings? How can we heal a wounded and
suffering society? How can we re-establish ecclesial integrity after the breakdown of truth
telling in the Church? These will be discussed in our next and last chapter.
824 The Anglican archbishop, A. Nshamihigo had vehemently accused the chiarperson of the Committee to work
for the opposition and FPR, and to be hostile to the Head of the state. That created a malaise among the Roman
Catholic bishops and in September 1992 almost led to the disintegration of the group. Actuaaly, the Catholics have
always been critical towards the Protestants for exposing their divisions in public. From then on Mgr. T.
Nsengiyumva retreated in his Kabgayi diocese and became fewer enthusiast to attend the meetings.
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CHAPTER VII: THE HEALING OF THE CHURCH
AND THE NATION
Introduction.
This research has been concerned with looking at the root causes of the ethnic ideology in
Rwanda. It has been shown that an accumulation of factors contributed to the impact of the
crises. First, the unequal political system which prevailed in the "central core kingdom" had been
imposed indiscriminately on the rest of the country by the tripartite leadership that ruled the
country: the colonial authorities, the Catholic Missionaries and the Mwami. Second, the process
of ethnisation has developed through the formulation and implementation of discriminatory
policies in various domains. The population was continuously divided into superior and inferior
races. It was systematically classified into separate races or 'castes' in the framework of the
colonial rule (1900-1962). Third, the ethnisation of Rwandan social life culminated in the
creation of hostility between the Bahutu and Batutsi ending in the 1959-1962 revolution which
left society fractured.
During the post-independence period up to the 1990s, as far as the author is informed, the issue
of reconciliation was neither raised by Church leaders nor politicians. Thus, when the regime in
power (1973-1994) faced the pressure from both outside and inside; it prepared a campaign of
violence to oppose the aspirations of political change manifested by the population. When the
activities in the Churches resumed after the 1994 genocide and subsequent tragic events, a
number of questions emerged: will the Churches assess the crisis and draw a lesson? And what
will be the role of the laity? What relations will the Churches keep with the State? What role will
the Churches have in society in the future?
Firstly, in many regards and through many forums825, the Churches have been criticised both
from within and outside either for having abandoned its members and failed to proclaim a
prophetic word during the times of turmoil, or for being associated with the previous regime.
Moving faster than the hierarchy, some Christians and members of the Roman Catholic and
Protestant clergy started to criticise the Churches but in many cases, did not make their self-
criticism so as to discover new possibilities for a genuine reconciliation826.
825 These include notably the NPI, Christian organisations like ARTC, participants to the CPR meetings in Kigali,
1995 and 1996. See in particular, Dialogue, no 183. Brussels, May-June 1995, pp.85-88; Dialogue no 187. Brussels,
November- December 1995, pp.55-58; Dialogue no 192. Brussels, August-September 1996, pp. 109-110.
826 In Nyundo, Butare, Cyangugu dioceses, and in some Protestant Churches. In the Butare diocese, the Service for
Theological Animation (SAT) which started in 1990 and continued after the genocide has established itself as a pioneer
in initiating a new model of peoples' participation, in elaborating a new language of faith and in forming new Christian
leadership with the task of being the heralds of peace in their parishes, congregations and communes. Its services are
being immensely solicited by the local government authorities in the formation of the volunteers of peace in their
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Secondly, in that process, the laity played a key role in reflecting on a new form of evangelism,
needed. Meanwhile in some Churches the dispute over power and leadership restarted. The
security forces had to intervene to remind them of the necessity for order and discipline in
society827.
A question that has always been raised is this: why did the Rwandan Churches fail to stop the
genocide? What this thesis has highlighted is that Christianity and colonists appeared in Rwanda
as conquering powers and spread heroic exploits of self-assertion by producing distorted images
and narratives of the Rwandan society. Under the guise of 'christianising and civilising' the
Church encouraged a process which damaged some of the essential factors of relational harmony
(.Kiliziya yakuye kirazira: the Church has abolished the interdicts) and left them old fashioned.
Hence, some factors such as the mechanisms of resolving conflict and conciliation were
abolished without offering alternative structures. Hence, society was left with people who
belonged to a decaying traditional infrastructure without being offered strong spiritual and moral
instruments in the new one.
Despite this, the society is not without some hope. Thus, in the following paragraphs, a number
of proposals are made, for consideration by the wider Christian community to accompany the
efforts already being made in Rwanda today. Firstly, the Churches should initiate a process of
Confession and Repentance as a necessary step for the healing of society and the Churches. This
implies identifying the causes of the crisis. Identification relates to remembrance which is part of
our psycho-somatic, spiritual, historical and political life. It is also God's purpose that His people
remember so that they become teachers whose life is rooted in the past and the present so as to
prepare for the future.
If Rwandans do not remember, they will lose their history, and become rootless. At the same
time, they will undervalue the genocide and its victims, martyrs and heroes; they will not learn
from the lessons of history. It would be a mistake to pretend that a tragedy of the magnitude of
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda would be forgotten or its images be removed from memories by
simply ignoring its root causes. If the wounds are not healed, and the wrongdoers not
psychologically, spiritually or socially brought to acknowledge guilt and regret it, then, all the
conditions for the scars of the past conflict may easily be transmitted from one generation to
another. This has been a trend in Rwandan society. The violent revolution of 1959 was a
communes and districts. Ntezimana.L., Interview, Detmold, December 1996; See also Ntezimana's intervention in
Chimay, December 1997.
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response to the injustices of the colonial and monarchical era which were not dealt with in the
past. Equally, the wounds from the revolution were not healed, and recent tragedies have been a
consequence of that.
Remembrance, however is not merely looking back into myth, cataclysms and tragedies. It must
be linked to the present and the future. Remembering has value if it heals memories. That is to
provide the opportunity to tell the story of the tragedy through a genuine dialogue from the
perspectives of the victims and of the perpetrators of violence. In remembrance there is despair
which comes from the experience of woundedness, pain, bitterness, accusations, unforgiveness
and resentment. Such a resentment provokes hatred, despair and can exacerbate tensions for more
conflicts. But to make remembrance become part of the healing process, resources which help
people cope with their suffering and prevent any further crisis should be provided.
Henceforth, to heal the Church and the nation, this thesis suggests a five level process: firstly, a
social constraint combining retributive and restorative justice; secondly, a spiritual dimension
comprising confession, repentance and forgiveness as factors of reconciliation; thirdly, the
healing of memories; fourth, the education for generations capable of questioning and addressing
the issue of power; and fifth initiating a listening ecclesiology.
VII. 1. Churches, Guilt and Repentance: Some Precedents ?
During the twentieth century tragedies similar to what happened in Rwanda have occurred
elsewhere in the world. The most infamous are the 1915 genocide of 1,5 million Armenians by
the Turks and the holocaust of more than 6 million Jews by the Nazis. Other massacres on a
genocide scale occurred also in Burundi in 1972 where more than 200,000 Bahutu were killed by
the Micombero regime and most recently, thousands of Muslims and Croats in former
Yugoslavia. In the countries that 'hosted' these tragedies (except Turkey), the majority of the
population was Christian. In the heat of the war they either co-operated with the evil regime or
kept silence. In the end they had to face their painful history, and the problem of denial, shame
and guilt. The following examples, which may be of relevance to Rwanda, show how out of the
confusion and destruction created by the evil ideologies, a small fraction of the Churches
remained faithful to the Gospel and initiated peace actions which succeeded in raising hopes in
the situations of uncertainty.
VII. 1.1 The German Churches
After the second World War, when millions of human beings, in particular the Jews, were
exterminated in the name of Nazi ideology, the German Churches were faced with the issue of
827 In Kigali, the headquarters of the Pentecostal Church, the Temple was closed for more than three months because
of internal leadership disputes which arose out of an attempt to replace Revd Nsanzurwimo who had left the country in
1994.
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confession of guilt and repentance. According to Visser't Hooft,828 after the Second World War,
the major task was reconciliation between Churches whose nations had been fighting each other.
The estrangement between the nations was such that it would not be enough to admit in vague
terms that the world was guilty. It was crucial for the Churches that gave support and credence
to the National socialism ideology to explicitly repent.
From 1933 when Hitler was firmly entrenched in power, he began to implement his Nazi
programmes published in 1924 in Mein Kampf. German Protestantism split between the
confessing Church (opposed to Hitler) and the official Churches who compromised with the Nazi
state. In October 1945 after the war, a World Council of Churches delegation met with the EKD
Council. A special service was organised in the ruined city of Stuttgart in which some Church
leaders accepted their guilt in a short but poignant declaration. They affirmed that the Nazis
would not have done what they did if Christians had been 'true believers'. Pasteur Asmussen
declared before the delegation: "I sinned against you and against God as a member of my nation
because I did not show enough courage". In the end, a declaration of guilt was formulated by the
German Christian leaders. They said:
C'est avec une profonde douleur que nous declarons : par notre faute, une indicible souffrance s'est abattue
sur beaucoup de peuples et de pays. Ce dont nous avons souvent temoigne dans nos paroisses, nous
rexprimons aujourd'hui au nom de toute l'eglise. Bien qu'ayant lutte, durant de longues annees, au nom de
Jesus-Christ contre l'esprit qui avait trouve une expression effroyable dans le regime tyrannique du national-
socialisme, nous nous accusons de n'avoir pas rendu un temoignage plus courageux, de n'avoir pas prie plus
fidelement, de n'avoir pas eu une foi plus joyeuse et un amour plus brulant. II faut maintenant a nos Eglises
829
un commencement nouveau .
The declaration provoked controversies inside Germany. But the authors insisted that it was the
"first step which would lead Germany to find its place in the concert of nations"830. In the 1970s,
President Heinemann, the sole layperson among the authors of the Confession, declared to the
media that the repentance of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) had been a blessing to
the German nation because it urged it to ask for forgiveness from the nations that suffered under
its occupation. Heinemann's example was followed by his successors and the German
Chancellors831.
828 Visser't Hooft,W., Memoirs. London: SCM Press Philadelphia/ The Westminster Press, 1973.
829 Ibid. p. 192.
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Message of the Prime Minister of Lower- Saxony to the World Lutheran Federation Assembly in 1952. As sign of
repentance, immediate actions were launched. They included first, a National day of repentance held in November
1945. A special department was set up to judge war criminals. Since 1945, 5,445 cases were convicted, 7000 further
suspected while it was believed 6000 more lived under assumed names. Through a Treaty agreed in 1952, German
accepted to pay in form of goods worth three billion Dutch-Marks to the state of Israel and a compensation of US $
11,000 million to Jews who returned to Germany. See, Frost, B., Politics of Peace. London: Darton, Longman and
Todd, 1991, p. 27. See also ShriverJr, D., An Ethic for Enemies. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995,
pp.78ff.
831 Chancellor Adenouer of Germany met with President de Gaulle of France in 1963 and signed a Treaty which
normalised relations between them. Chancellors Willi Brandt, Helmut Kohl committed the German people to face
freely and truly their responsibility. President Richard von Weizsacker said to Germans before the Jewish survivors in
Bergen-Belsen (where 100.000 died) in a commemoration ceremony that their forefathers have left them a grave
legacy. "All of us, whether guilty or not, whether young or old, must accept the past". Shriver Jr., D., op.cit. p. 110.
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Both German Protestantism and the Ecumenical Movement benefited from the German
confession. In the words of Visser't Hooft : "It would have been impossible to create the
necessary spiritual conditions for the inauguration of the World Council of Churches at
Amsterdam in 1948 without the Stuttgart declaration"832.
VII. 2. Repentance and Reconciliation in Rwanda
In Rwanda, the process which led to the conflict and the 1994 genocide has been traced through
various responsibilities including the ethnologic, colonial and missionary meta-narratives as well
as, unquestionably Rwandan elites. The International community share a part of shame because
the UN had in Rwanda over 2500 UN Blue helmets troops super equipped during the tragic
events of 1994. In many cases they stood and watched as the innocent people were slaughtered.
The 1994 tragedy deepened the fracture of society and raised the issue of Reconciliation. Due to
the above responsibility, a precise question arises of knowing who reconciles with whom and
from what perspective, since various parties contributed to the crisis?
In Rwandan society reconciliation was a process in which a third party, namely a mediator,
would play a key role. The mediator must be a good character; his/her life must be marked with
abnegation and truth searching. She/he must be known by all as a living example of virtues,
patient and discrete when dealing with sensitive issues or people. She/he must be capable of
incarnating and interpreting the suffering of the victims, but at the same time be able to listen to
and interpret the motives of the guilty so as to accompany both parties in the re-establishment of
new and harmonious relationships.
This role as it appears, is the task of moral forces present in each society, including the Churches.
But in the case of the Rwanda, the Churches have been rather instrumental in the process of the
control of power. If then, the Churches want their role as spiritual and moral forces to be
832Visser't Hooft,W., op.cit. p. 194. See also Confession of culpability of the United Church of Christ in Japan
(Kyodan).
...During the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the United Church of Christ in Japan ( Kyodan) in 1966, the
participants felt it indispensable to denounce the crimes committed in their name when their government, in the name
of the necessity of the war, appealed to the union of all the religious associations and their co-operation in favour of the
war as national policy.
"The Church as 'light of the world and salt of the earth' shouldn't tie itself to the war. For the love of our nation, we
should rather have correctly judged the behaviour of our country in a careful consideration of our Christian
consciousness. Rather we have published a declaration in our country and abroad in which we approved and backed the
war. We prayed for the victory. When our country committed faults, we have, as Church sinned with him. We have
neglected our role to be 'watchmen/women'. At present, we confess this sin with deep pain in our hearts, and implore
our Lord, the countries of the world in particular in Asia, the brother and sisters members of different Churches, and
people of our nations to forgive us".
The Declaration was signed by Masahisa Suzuki, Moderator on 26 March 1967. in Unite Chretienne. Condamnes et
Reconcilies. no 77, Lyon, 1985. p. 68/69
243
rehabilitated so as to become a trustful mediator, they ought to confess their own guilt and
repent.
VII. 2.1. Call for Repentance in Rwanda
There has been a debate whether the Churches would pursue their activities as if nothing had
happened to Rwanda. For many, including the new government created after the genocide in July
1994 which claims to be different from the previous regime, Churches were part of the MRND
regime. If then they wanted to play any moral role, they ought to confess guilt and repent. Within
the Churches too many voices, from individuals and groups, call the Churches for Repentance.
The Butare Diocesan Commission for the re-launch of pastoral activities (CRAP) interprets the
Rwandan tragedy as being the product of the Christian 'rack and ruin', (la 'debandade
chretienne'). The degradation in moral values evident amongst and between Christians from all of
the Churches has affected the fabric of society. Both the hierarchy and the clergy have been
incapable of witnessing to what they were "celebrating and teaching" 833.
Father Muzungu says that the Church should abandon its discourse encapsulated in the
expression "we have done everything that is possible. The reality is appalling: the genocide, the
crimes against humanity, the ordeal of the populations and a national hatred propaganda in the
media"834. From the laity community, a vindictive 36 page memorandum was sent to the Pope in
March 1996 by 24 well known personalities charging the Catholic Church for having been not
only a vehicle of ethnic ideology, but also of negativism835.
Likewise, the Protestant Churches, in several meetings organised by the Protestant Council of
Rwanda (CPR) together with the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) 836, the participants
invited the Churches to "publicly confess their failure, actions and omissions during the
development of the ideology of the genocide". In one meeting, the participants declared:
the genocide constitutes a failure not only for the Church in Rwanda but for the universal Church. They must
acknowledge their share of responsibility in the genocide, repent, ask humbly for forgiveness and make
reparation. It must break with its routine show of stereotyped rites and symbols and undergo real and far-
reaching changes including asking the media, the ecumenical and international bodies to stop locking the
people of Rwanda into the Hutu-Tutsi boxes.837
833
Dialogue, no 187, Dec. 1995, pp 55-58.
834
Muzungu,B., Interview in Kigali. March 1997. See also his articles in Cahier, no 1 1995; "La therapie de la verite"
in La Lumiere no 12.
835 For them, Mbyirukira & Al., "Rwanda. Preoccupations sur l'attitude de l'eglise Catholique Face a l'Evolution
Socio-Politique du Pays Apres le Genocide", Kigali: Mars 1996. Collection of the author, pp. 33/34.
836 CPR : Conseil Protestant au Rwanda ; AACC: All Africa Conference of Churches ( AACC). More than a hundred
participants including Church leaders, youth and women organisations as well as leaders of ecumenical organisations.
Church leaders included the General Secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches, Revd Jose Chipenda, and the
Church leaders of the Protestant Churches.
837 A three days conference organised in Kigali (4 to 7 March 1997) by the same Protestant Council with some Roman
Catholic participants on the theme "Christianity Before, During and After the Genocide in Rwanda". CPR, "Les
Eglises Protestantes du Rwanda sortent du Silence". Recommandations du Seminaire de Kabusunzu, Kigali, 4 au 6
Mars 1997. In Batissons, no 9, Janvier- Fevrier 1997, p.2.
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These feelings of many Protestants have been summarised by Revd Hitimana as follows: "nous
sommes une generation des gens qui ont echoue. II nous faut des gens neufs avec une nouvelle
vision pour aider l'eglise a se transformer"838.
VII. 2.2. Repentance: An Unavoidable Mandate.
Though, the act of confessing and repenting is not new in Christian tradition, it has always raised
controversy in modern tragic history of some nations. When the 1945 Stuttgart Confession
mentioned before was published, it provoked huge controversy. People like J.Moltmann839, saw
in it an 'insult' which led him and many others to claim their German identity. For Moltmann,
Reconciliation was still remote, because, on the one hand, a person who admits his guilt and
complicity becomes vulnerable, defenceless and weighed down in such way they can no longer
determine their action; and on the other, the victims have a "better memory than the
wrongdoers". For that very reason, the Confession of guilt, according to Moltmann, has no
end840. Eberhard Bethge, a prominent theologian and a Church leader criticised the document for
the "tone of self-justification" which he would never apply if it does not mention the crimes
committed by the Allied forces. In addition, Bethge saw the Confession as having a depoliticising
character, 'unfortunately dangerous' because it was the same attitude which permitted the
"totalitarians to take power over every sector of society"841. It is also worth noticing that the
Confession was criticised for being notoriously general, notably for its failure to identify the
crimes of the Nazis era, and even not mentioning anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.
In specifying the details of the crimes and repenting for having failed to do anything possible to
prevent the genocide, the Rwandan authors of the Detmold Confession (presented below in
section VII.2.6) aimed to avoid the danger of generalisation and self-justification. But then, its
detailed identification was regarded as naive and endangering the "incriminated" group. As in the
German case, some believe that unless crimes committed in both camps were put on the balance,
838 Interview with Revd N. Hitimana in Butare, April 1997. Revd Hitimana was the first leader of the Presbyterian
Church of Rwanda, succeeding to missionaries from 1963 he run the Church up to 1977. He was interviewd as a
district president and vice-president of his Church as well as Chairman of the Protestant Council of Rwanda. See also
NPI: New Park Initiative: a group of Christian leaders who attempted successfully to arrange talks for reconciliation in
South Africa between the ANC and Inkhata. Ecumenical participants including Church leaders, members of clergy and
laypersons from Rwanda and outside said that the Church had a unique role in the reconstruction of Rwanda provided
it would confess and repent of its omissions and misconceptions of its mission. NPI. "Le Role de I' Eglise dans la
Reconstruction du Rwanda". Declaration of Ashburham. In Dialogue No 192. Aout-Septembre, 1996, pp 109-110.
839
lurgen Moltmann is a prominent Protestant Theologian. He was prisoner of war in Glasgow.See Shriver Jr, D.,
op.cit., p.85.
84(1 Ibid. p. 87.
841ShriverJr.,D., op.cit. pp. 87; 84-89. See also Tschuy, op.cit. pp. 18; 21.
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there would be no reason to confess and repent. Others see in the confession a 'dangerous legacy'
which will weigh on future generations.
The discussion around the Detmold Confession points to the reality that the road towards
reconciliation in Rwanda still has many obstacles. Schreiter's analysis may be used to suggest
obstacles which must be overcome to reach a genuine reconciliation in Rwanda842. The first
obstacle to avoid is to consider reconciliation as a hasty search for peace, that comes from either
the initiators of violence who have many wrong acts to cover up or from naive outsiders willing
to restart from an idealistic situation. Such an approach ignores the examination of the causes of
the suffering, and wants to deal with reconciliation by suppressing the memories and the
experiences of suffering of the victims.
A second trap to avoid is that of considering reconciliation as an alternative to liberation. In such
an approach, those engaged take reconciliation as a kind of appeasement that closes the eyes and
ears to the cries and the suffering of the people in search of harmony and unity. If, in Rwanda,
the causes and sources of violence are not named, examined and eliminated, there will be little
chance of reaching reconciliation. A genuine approach should have for originality to bring people
to a re-encounter through a genuine dialogue-transformation during which they would discover
the factors of the blindness and oppression being ideological, political and historical which led
them to conflict.
In fact, with few exceptions, there has been a reciprocal indifference to the suffering of large
sections of the population in both communities. The ruling class ignored the suffering of the
Bahutu before 1959; similarly, in the post-independence period, with few exceptions, the Bahutu
ruling class has become the new oppressors who ignored the suffering of the Batutsi. The authors
of the Detmold Confession wanted to overcome that difficulty by trying, first, to encounter the
suffering of the one another and second, by committing themselves in a project aiming to stop the
conflict before it becomes an intergenerational evil.
The theologians who published Road to Damascus suggested that Christians have been deaf to
the call of God and blind to his presence among the people843. Paragraphs 45 and 56 of that
document illustrate adequately the Rwandan context: the prophetic mission of the church is at
stake for not having been challenged by the situation of the poor and oppressed on the one hand,
and on the other, for having chosen the side of the privileged and the powerful.
842Schreiter,R., Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Order. MaryknolfN.Y: Orbis,1992, p.26.
843 Institute for Contextual Theology. Road to Damascus: Kairos and the conversion. Braamfontein, 1989.
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The last danger to avoid, is to manage reconciliation as a 'social science discipline' with a
mediator trying to recognise a minimum of dignity in each of the antagonists. Reconciliation is a
gift from God, a spiritual attitude which helps to re-unite those who were aliens, separated from
each other by conflict with the purpose of restoring broken harmony. This means that in our
search for reconciliation we must leave the door open to the unpredictable, the mystery of the
grace of God. To enter such an atmosphere, people concerned have to be efficiently exposed to
the word of God.
In Rwanda, some Christian communities including the Seventh Day Adventist Church perceive
Reconciliation from such a 'spiritual' dimension. Christian leaders at national level are exposed to
the message of the Bible in a series of conferences reflecting on the crisis, then requested to
bring it to the congregations to question their relationship with God.844 Rugerinyange, a survivor
of the genocide himself, thinks that the Church is holy and its teaching have persistently insisted
on love and holiness; thus, individuals not the Church, should repent.
However, if precautions were not taken, the approach of the Seventh Day Adventist Church can
slip into what this thesis has been arguing against, a pietist theology which 'depolitises' the life of
the Churches, and avoids questioning the dehumanising systems. The relevance of such a process
is best manifested in its potential as a spiritual model for encountering both God and the person
wronged.
VII. 2.3. Confessing and Repenting so as to Be the Church
As indicated in the above examples the route to reconciliation was opened only after the
Churches which had previously compromised with the political powers, confessed and repented.
Likewise, it is when the Catholic Church implicitly acknowledged its inadequate attitude during
the Jewish Holocaust, an attitude resulting from the so-called "Jewish culpability in the death of
Christ" that the relations between Israel and Vatican improved. Observers still notice that the
pastoral document on the Catholic Church's responsibility in the Jewish tragedy which was said
to be under preparation at the death of Pope Pius XI in 1939, was forgotten by his successor,
Pope Pius XII and only became available on 16 of March 1998845.
844
Rugerinyange, A., (President of Rwanda Mission Union) , Interview. Kigali, March 1997. For him, "the failure has
been apparent even among those who were believed to be firmly committed. That is why people are invited to bring
messages referring to Biblical teaching about the tragedy and then to debate them in groups. The messages are
intended to comfort those who stand in the middle, groaning because of the suffering of people of God, and the
extremists in both communities. We want to reach all our 270.000 members in one year's time because we know not
the time of the Lord's second coming". Rugerinyange,A., Interview. Kigali, March 1997.
845 The document entitled:"Souvenons-nous: Une Reflexion sur la Shoah" was published on Monday 16 March 1998
by the Pontifical Secretariat for Dialogue with non Christians which is headed by the Australian Cardinal, Cassidy.
Not only, the Catholic Church did not apologise, but it rejected the Catholic responsibility in the tragedy; it does not
specify why Pope Pius XII kept silence during the Holocaust. Around the world, leading figures among the Jewish
community manifested their general disappointment. Liberation Dairy newspaper of 18 March 1998.
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Meanwhile, Pope John Paul II had invited the Catholic Church to face the "state of guilt as an act
of loyalty and courage which reinforces our faith which helps to perceive today's temptations
and difficulties so as to be prepared to confront them"846. Responding to such an appeal, the
French Catholic hierarchy, recently made the most poignant, direct and clear confession and
repentance ever made by a Roman Catholic Church as far as this author is informed. They
confessed and repented as follows:
Aujourd'hui nous confessons que ce silence fut une faute. Nous reconnaissons aussi que l'eglise en France a
alors failli a sa mission d'educatrice des consciences et qu'ainsi elle porte avec le peuple Chretien la
responsabilite de n'avoir pas porte secours des les premiers instants quand la protestation et le protection
etaient possibles et necessaire. Cette defaillance de l'eglise de France et sa responsabilite envers le peuple juif
font partie de son histoire. Nous confessons cette faute. Nous implorons le pardon de Dieu et demandons au
peuple juif d'entendre cette parole de repentance847.
With regard to Rwanda, the Pope referred to the 1994 genocide as 'inter-ethnic killings' in his
homily in Uhuru Park in Kenya848. He later invited those, individual members of the Church who
committed crimes to be judged by the state justice. As far as the institution is concerned, the
Rwandan bishops have also implicitly admitted in their pastoral letter of Christmas 1994 that the
Church has been close to the political powers; but they failed to face up to their guilt.
For the Churches of Rwanda nothing can hide their legitimisation of the political powers both
colonial and republican and their silence before the abuse of Human Rights. Like the French
Church, the silence and collusion of the Rwandan Churches with violent regimes require
confession and repentance.
Reflecting on the absence of the Churches' stand in favour of human rights, the Camerounian
Theologian J-M.Ela raised appropriate questions regarding "how the Churches are to be the
Church of Christ in those countries where bloody tyrants celebrate countless murders,
exterminating the harmless, voiceless population Where human beings are delivered over to
unheard of suffering, despair, and slow death by fire, the Church should make the voice of the
846
Eglise de France., Le Repentir. Declaration de l'Eglise de France. Paris: Descellee de Brouwer, 1997, p.15.
Among the few Church hierarchies who had spontaneously manifested the need for the Catholic Church to repent
immediately after the World War, was Bishop Grober, Archbishop of Fribourg. He had been one of the rare voices who
denounced the Nazis crimes facing their anger. In the pastoral published on 8 May 1945, he wrote:
"My God, what ignominy have we accumulated during the last 13 years! What pain for me to have to talk of it in public
and as I try to divert from my thinking and sights, to not see the shame and dishonour of my own people! Helas! Now
the defeat has revealed everything, its not possible to hide them from the blinding light of the sun and the eyes of the
horrified world which condemn them. Isn't now our task to expiate the crimes committed and to pray for thousands of
those who have been assassinated". In Condamnes et Reconcilies, no 77. Lyon, 1985.
847 Ibid. p.29.
848 That unfortunate expression used in the Homily of Pope John Paul II at Uhuru Park, Nairobi/ Kenya on 19
September 1995 raised controversy between the Rwandan government and the Catholic Church. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs said that "the Rwandan Government of National Union would have wished a word of comfort from
the Pope and a condemnation of the crimes against humanity committed by the first 'African Nazis' instead of wrongly
referring to Hutu-Tutsi conflict which was rather the expression of the policy of a dictatorial fascist regime". The
Apostolic Nuncio in Rwanda declared that the 'Standard' Newspaper of Nairobi reported the homily in terms that had
not be used by the Pope, i.e. "Hutu" and "Tutsi".
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Gospel heard out of respect for human beings"849. Ela pioneers what he calls 'Conscientizing
evangelisation' which is to try to "share the destiny of the marginalised peasants" in bringing
"attention to the tragic situation of these people who were condemned long age to ignorance,
poverty and oppression"850. B. Rordorf follows the same line and set up an ethical agenda of a
human being in society. He defines being human as a "heritage of physical and psychological
characteristics that urges us to care for our existence, to give sense to humanity and to become
responsible for each other because in our encounter with each other we gain something of which
we are redeemable"851.
VII. 2.4. Protestant Responses to the Call for Repentance
The Churches and Christian organisations have responded differently to the call for repentance.
Within the institutional level, there are at least three tendencies. Some Church leaders, including
the Catholic hierarchy consider the call for repentance as a political agenda aiming to force them
to admit sins, even those they did not commit, so as to silence them. Others, especially, the new
leaders within the Protestant denominations, have manifested the desire to publicly confess and
repent the guilt of their predecessors. Another fraction believe that the Churches must repent but
found the governmental pressure unacceptable. On both the Catholic and Protestant sides, some
individuals and ecclesial communities have taken initiatives such as seminars to reflect on the
root causes of the tragedy and have taken a step forward to repent of their incapacity to stand for
the truth while others still remain silent.
VII. 2.4.1. AEE Seminars: Hanging Pains on the Cross
The most consistent body from a Protestant background has been the African Evangelical
Enterprise (AEE) which pioneered the organisation of seminars on repentance and forgiveness
from September 1994. The seminars have been conducted by a Welsh medical Doctor, Rhiannon
Lloyd who specialised in counselling852. Dr Lloyd has a simple methodology: participants,
Church people, ministers and elders meditate on repentance and forgiveness, exchange their
pains, faults and failings with each other in groups. Then to get relief and release, they hang their
pains on the cross with nails and hammer. The session is interspersed with the singing of hymns
centred on the theme of Christ destroying the walls of separation. Dr Lloyd has been spiritually
supported in her ministry by a world-wide intercessory prayer group. Later in 1997, she handed
849 Ela, J-M., Mv Faith as an African. Maryknoll, New York/London: Orbis Books/ Geoffrey Chapman, Translation
from French, 1985, p.8.
850 Ibid. p.9.
851
Rordorf,B., "Le Sens Humain de la Culpabilite". In Condamnes et Reconciles no 77, Lyon, 1977, p. 11.
852 From a Welsh background, Dr Lloyd said that she observed the Anglo-Welsh relations of oppression and frustration
and came to the conclusion that trauma heals when treated from the spiritual perspective. Lloyd, R., Witness in
Detmold. Dec. 1996.
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her work to a team of three nationals who, according to reports received, continued to perform
with the same energy.
AEE's seminars and conferences are organised in different cities and Churches; despite many
difficulties,853 the initiative has contributed valuably to the spiritual recovery of Christian
leaders. Assessing the first term seminars in 1997 held in Rwamagana, Kigali, Bugesera,
Kigeme, Butare, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Dr Rhiannon wrote:
The seminar for Church leaders in Bugesera last week was very difficult. Over half the people present had
recently returned from camps in Tanzania or Zaire. This is changing the dynamics. People are much more
suspicious of us and each other and it's hard work to build trust. There seemed to be a lot of underlying
hostility. However, during the workshop with the cross the atmosphere changed and many were deeply
touched by God. We realise we need more time to wrestle with the issues of forgiveness. We have decided to
extend the seminars by an extra day. We really need wisdom! How do we tackle this subject effectively?
Extending forgiveness in this situation is very emotional. We can't begin to imagine how difficult it must be
for someone to forgive the very person who killed their entire family and is now back in town854.
The passage underlines the fact that there is still mistrust among people. On the one hand, the
wounds remain fresh and visible. Insisting on forgiveness seems to be a precipitated process
designed to stop them from breathing. On the other hand, suspecting some organisations of
continuing to intoxicate the population with hatred, some authorities have shown a heavy
presence which could affect the ambience of the meetings.
Examining the varied feedback given and also how to reach a real therapy of society, Antoine
Rutayisire, the AEE leader said that there was progress but not as yet a true process of
repentance. Firstly, people remain in the Protestant stereotypes of repenting of minor sins. People
do not yet recognise the offence so as to express themselves and to accept the reality of the
therapy. Secondly, the judiciary system acts like the sword of Damocles which may hinder
repentance855. Would it be acceptable to unconditionally welcome the guilty who recognise their
offence so as eventually - as in the prodigal son case- to invite them later to change their
behaviour.
A second Protestant independent initiative comes from a group of Christians who launched a
daily campaign of evangelism among young people and the working class of the capital. From
12.00 to 14.00 (period of break in Rwandan administration), hundreds of people gather at the
Inkuru Nziza headquarters856 in the Kigali city-centre where they are exposed to messages from
fundamentalist evangelists, mainly expatriates of the born-again model 857.
Difficulties include: differences in their education level; insecurity in some regions; suspicions among the
population and the refugees who had returned from Zaire and Tanzania. Some authorities had also suspected that AEE
team had a hidden agenda.
854Lloyd,R. "Seminars on Repentance and Forgiveness" in progress. Internal Report, June 1997.
855Rutayisire, A.. Interview in Kigali, March 1997.
856A conservative mission from America which has a single parish in Kigali from early 1960s. See our chapter on
media.
857 On Thursday, the 27 March 1997 the rally was addressed by a German native, Wolfgang Heiner, who runs
"Partnership in Mission" organisation and has been interested in the East Africa Revival, in particular organising team
visits from Germany to Africa.
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The campaign has had an impact, in particular among young people; it appeased the fear of
uncertainty for many, but still cannot bring a real healing to society. As it is indicated below,
both repentance and forgiveness are possible if the victim are helped to tell their stories of
suffering and if the guilty are willing to identify their evil deed and ask for forgiveness.
The question arises, how can an outsider, not imbued in the local culture, hopes to have an
understanding of the situation, so as to bring Rwandans to adopt the changes needed for
repentance. The renewal of Rwanda, this writer suggests, can only emerge out of the
commitment of a well trained local leadership, who, as in the case study of South Africa,
transcend the ethnic divide towards mutual understanding and encounter.
VII. 2.4.2. Presbyterian Church : First Church to Repent
On the institutional level, the lead has been taken by the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda during
her annual General Synod in Kigali, 10 to 15 December 1996. The Synod confessed and repented
before God and all the Rwandan nation for the omissions and failure of the Church to oppose or
denounce the genocide and massacres either during their public preparation or during their
execution. The Synod called on Christians around the world to denounce and oppose murder of
any kind and to resist ethnicism:
Dear Rwandans and Christians, the time has come to proceed to a self-criticism because the Church of God is
ashamed of having been incapable of opposing or denouncing the preparation and the execution of the
genocide. As God's servant Nehemiah did (Neh 1.5-11), so we, the Synod, in the name of the Presbyterian
Church of Rwanda's members, repent and ask forgiveness before God and the nation because of the
weakness and the lack of courage shown when it was necessary. The Synod asks the people of Rwanda and
the world-wide Christian family to oppose any form of rejection of God's will for His creatures, to denounce
and resist strongly ethnicism, regionalism and religious divisions. For God there is no Jew, Greek, Hutu,
Tutsi nor Twa. We all are one in Christ858.
Though the Presbyterian Church is relatively small859 and the impact of its message is
proportionate to its influence, what matters is the significance and the precedent of this act,
firstly for the victims and secondly for the guilty and the nation as a whole. How best could the
repentance of the Church move the conscience of many? On the impact of the confession from
the ethical, political and evangelical point of views, the new president of the Presbyterian Church
858Batissons, no 10, Janvier 1997, p.2. The message in Kinyarwanda says in substance: "Banyarwanda,
Banyarwandakazi namwe mwese bayoboke b'lmana, igihe kirageze cyo kwinegura kubera ko Itorero ry'lmana
ryakozwe n'isoni bitewe n'amarorerwa yo gutsemba ikiremwa-muntu aricyo "SHUSHO Y'lMANA" yabaye mu gihugu
cyacu Itorero rikabigiramo intege nkeya ntiribashe kubuza cyangwa se kwamagana ku mugaragaro ibikorwa nk'ibyo....
Nkuko umugaragu w'lmana Nehemiya yabikoze mu gice cya 1:5-11 mu izina ry'abakristo bose b'ltorero
Peresibiteriyeni Sinode isabye Imana n'Abanyarwanda bose imbabazi. Kubera izo ntege nke, n'ubuhamya bwabuze
ibihe bwari bukenewe. Isabye abakristo bose bo mu Rwanda no ku isi yose kurwanya byimazeyo ubwicanyi uko bwaba
buri kose n'ikindi kintu cyose kinyuranye n'ubushake bw'ijambo ry'Imana. Synode iboneyeho kandi gusaba abakristo
n'Abanyarwanda bose kwamagana no kwirinda ibyaha by'irondakoko, irondakarere, n'amacakubiri ashingiye ku
madini . Ijambo ry'Imana ritwigisha ko mu bubaha Imana ari nta Muyuda nta Mugiriki, nta mugabo nta mugore, nta
Muhutu, nta Mututsi cyangwa se umutwa kuko twese turi umwe muri Kristo".
859 In comparison, it claims 200,000 members while, the Roman Catholic Church has almost four million out of the 7
1/2 million Rwandans (pre-genocide statistics).
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said that the Church must agree to repent of its involvement in the rooting of ethnic ideology860.
How can this de-ethnisation be facilitated, what are its principles? All these aspects will be
debated in further sections.
VII. 2.5. Catholic Responses to Call for Repentance
Different dynamics within the Catholic Church dioceses have generated signs of hope for an
eventual process of repentance. In the Butare diocese, the Service of Theological Animation
(SAT) mentioned above is widely involved in establishing the expression of faith in the daily
lives of Christians. According to L. Ntezimana, leader of the SAT, the core principles of the
training are twofold: 1. to initiate a new language of faith, that is to relate the content of
Christian faith to the daily reality of people; 2. to cement unity between different members of the
Christian community. The Service pursues its activities in training nucleus of peace called
AbakambaziMana861.
For Ntezimana, the Gospel (sermon, liturgy, sacraments, devotion) which is the engine, has
turned, but history (economics, politics, culture, society) which is the moving part never
followed. That is because there was no engaging clutch. In fact the living stones, the Church's
members lacked connections between themselves. The Church was made up of "crowds which
come into the Church on Sunday who are easily manipulated and some committed personalities
who are easily neutralised"862.
Yet, for some prominent members of the Catholic hierarchy, the call for repentance is perceived
as a political agenda aiming to silence them. The Church, they say, is being forced to confess and
repent the sins, even those they did not commit. If they do it, they would put them in a trap. They
will not have any more say about the evident human rights abuse in the new regime.
This position is reflected in the ambivalence which characterises the messages of the bishops
published after the 1994 tragedy and subsequent tragic events. These included the 1994
Christmas and New year pastoral letter, the pastoral priorities (1995), and other messages to the
government863. In that pastoral letter called "Love Your Neighbour", the bishops condemned the
massacres and appealed to repentance. They wrote: "people have been killed because of their
ethnic and regional origin or political opinion... Some people behaved like wild animals:
860 "Most importantly", Dr Karamaga said, "the Church must participate in the 'de-ethnisation' of society; it must no
longer reason in ethnic line but invite people to cross community boundaries". Karamaga, A., Interview. Kigali, March
1997.
861 Abakambazimana (ABKZ):literarly, those who implore God (Noyaux Generateurs de Paix), the Peace Volunteers in
the communes and parishes. In May 1997, 58 Peace Volunteers were sent by the Bishop of Butare to minister in the 18
parishes of the diocese. Ntezimana, L., Inteview at Detmold, December 1996; Interview at Butare, March 1997; see
also SAT. Rapport d'Activites (Juillet 1996-10 Mars 1997), p.4.
862 Ibid. p. 3-4.
863 I refer the reader to the two meetings of the Protestant Council held in 1995 and 1997 in which some Catholics
participated. During our inquiry none could confirm if any effort was made to explore the possibilities of pursuing co¬
operation on public issues.
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exposing proudly their atrocities, even refusing to stop the killings. Under the pretext of anger,
people took the freedom to kill"864. Then with their habitual imperative formula, the bishops
invited the criminal to repent:
Et vous qui avez commis des delits, Dieu vous invite au repentir. Considerez les mefaits du peche qui a
plonge les pays dans des cris de douleur; a travers le pays beaucoup de Rwandais en ont ete les victimes et
nous avons ete objet de reprobation a la face du monde865.
The bishops refer to individual crimes whose authors must personally repent but reject the idea
of confession and repentance in the name of the Catholic Church as an institution. At Christmas
1995 and New Year 1996 they pursued the same line of thinking. 'The country', they said, "has
been destroyed by sin", adding that "we all have sinned against God. We thus have to repent to
receive the sacrament of reconciliation"866. However, the bishops did not formulate any word of
repentance. They did not take any clear position on ethnic problems, the monopoly of power,
ignorance of the masses as well as what, according to them, some people have considered as
"alleged mistakes in evangelism" identified by some people, according to them as the "causes of
the genocide and massacres". They preferred to leave it "to those who have time and
competence" to analyse how much these factors had contributed to the genocide. The bishops,
instead, justified the secular collaboration between the missionaries and the authorities as having
been inspired by the founder of the order of the White Fathers as being in the best interests of the
population. As one can see, this was a nice general statement with "we all sinned", which does
not specify the particular institutional sin.
This attitude has led some observers to think that the Church is ignoring or minimising the
genocide. For some people the hierarchy is losing contact with reality in behaving as if the
tragedy did not happen. Father Mungwarareba said that there is a "muteness in the summit which
contrasts with life in the base"867.
Another fraction which includes people like Father Bh., believes that the Church has enough sins
to repent for but at the same time, finds the government's attitude, which seems to associate the
Churches with the former regime, as a threat to such a confession and repentance868. Like Bh.,
Father Rutumbu, though acknowledging that "the Catholic hierarchy was gangrened by the ethnic
virus which marked them more than their baptism, their priestly and religious life", 869 perceives a
political and ideological agenda behind the call for repentance. For him, the RPF regime is
864
Eglise Catholique, Conference des eveques., Message de Noel 1994 et de Nouvel An 1995. p.5.
865 Idem. Priorites Pastorales pour la Periode d'apres-guerre, Kigali: Pallotti-Presse. January 1995.
The Bishops committed themselves to recommence hosting the seminars on human rights and democracy which were
organised by NGOs and human rights organisations including OXFAM, ADL, Centre Iwacu, Ardes. See discussion on
the matter in chapter Five.
8fi6Dialogue No 189. February-April 1996, p.89-107.
867
Mungwarareba, M.. Interview in Detmold. December 1996.
868




forcing the Church to repent even for the crimes it did not commit, so that it finds the pretext to
silence it870.
This line of thinking follows the new Archbishop of Kigali, Mgr T.Ntihinyurwa's idea. "Some
politicians", he says, "want to nail what they consider as the lost sheep, on the feet of the wall".
In other words, the pressure bears a strategy to push them to confess guilt, thus compromising its
power to speak out. For the archbishop, "the Church acknowledges that the genocide happened,
but the counter-genocide also took place". For that very reason it is too early to make a
confession because that would not help all the parties to mourn their victims. Will the Church
then wait for a consensus before it confesses, this writer asked?
As a Christian I confess and pray for all the Christians. Concerning the confession, due to extremism in
different sides, one must be sure they were not being misinterpreted. Although I know things must go in that
direction, I note that a confession would not make sense if it does not help all the Rwandans. It is only when
all will understand that a Twa widow is as good as a Tutsi or a Hutu widow, then a confession will make
sense. If a confession was to be made it must start from the recognition of each other crimes. But today, when
a Tutsi confesses they are attacked for forgetting that their kin died. When it is a Hutu, they are accused of
being blind about people who are dying now around the country871.
However, amidst this controversy, in the Kabgayi diocese, after the genocide and massacres, the
Administrative Apostolic, Father Andre Sibomana (interim bishop until March 1996)872, in what
he called 'la Pastorale de dialogue', requested that Christians who wanted to live the Gospel,
renew their inscription in their parishes, have a personal encounter with the priest with regard to
the tragedy and re-affirm in their own words: what they were looking for in religion as well as
what must change in their life. Father Sibomana synthesised the 'declarations' in a pastoral letter
which was distributed in November 1994 under the title "Convertissez-vous et Croyez a la bonne
nouvelle"(Convert and believe in Good News). The message according to him, invited the
Christian community in the diocese to manifest their will to be true Christians873.
This encounter with the priest, though it avoids the imposition of a personal confession, is a
pedagogical process which, if appropriately managed, could lead to a self-examination and
87(1 Rutumbu finds that the hierarchy is denouncing the arbitrary imprisonment, the abuse of human rights, the rejection
of democracy and opposing the on-going rewriting of Rwandan history of which the Catholic Church holds important
documents in the archives of the Vatican and in the headquarters of the White Fathers. Rutumbu, J., Dialogue no 195
Janvier 1997, p. 71. Rutumbu is a Biblicist, formerly lecturer in the Superior Seminar in Nyakibanda.
871
Ntihinyuzwa,T. (Mgr), Interview in Kigali. March 1997. In a memorandum of January 12, 1995 to the Minister of
Justice, the bishops asked that the new regime apply the Arusha accord, put an end to arbitrary arrests, facilitates the
rsistitution to their owners the properties and estates occupied by the army and close partners of the new authorities,
and relieve the member of clergy under jails. Similarly, in his letter to the minister of Justice, the Apostolic Nuncio
demanded the government to stop the damaging campaign against the Church through the media, the unjust accusations
against the Church. For them the campaign aimed to hide the crimes committed against the Church such as the
assassinations of the bishops and several members of the clergy. If the preceding regime lost its credibility before the
international community, it was because of its abuse of human rights. Any other regime that adopts the same strategy
would also destroy itself added the bishops. Dialogue no 181. Mars 1995
872
Following the death of Bishop Thaddee Nsengiyumva, together with his colleagues, Bishop Vincent Nsengiyumva
and Joseph Ruzindana and several priests, early June 1994. Journalist, director of the most influential Newspaper,
Kinyamateka, activist of Human Rights who denounced energetically the abuse of human rights before and after the
genocide, Sibomana, 43, died on 7 March 1997 in Kigali.
873 Sibomana,A., op.cit. p. 187.
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confession. The Ruhango parish priest who exploited the appeal wrote: "II ne s'agit pas d'une
confession, il s'agit de debarrasser chacun de ce qu'il porte dans son coeur, du mal qu'il a pu
faire, de parler de reparation et de restitution". After the encounter with the priest, the Christians-
a first group of 5000 underwent the experience- participated in a celebration of Penance,
Reconciliation and Eucharist874.
VII. 2.6. An Ecumenical Response: The Detmold Confession
In Detmold, Germany, a group of 24 Christians from various denominational backgrounds
including Catholic Priests and Sisters, Protestant ministers and lay persons from Rwanda and
elsewhere met from 7 to 12 December 1996 to pray and to meditate on the crisis with some
Western Christians875. They came to the conclusion that Rwandan people would never be
reconciled with each other unless each party agreed to humbly ask for forgiveness from their
victims.
This conviction led to those present, from a Bahutu background, in the name of their group,
repenting of all the atrocities committed during the genocide. The participants of the Batutsi
background followed, on behalf of their group, repenting of the attitudes and deeds of the past
which led to the hatred and fear of the Bahutu. The Europeans present, on behalf of the 'Bazungu'
(Whites) repented for the discrimination and prejudices introduced among Rwandans and for
supplying arms and abandoning the Rwandan people during the massacres and genocide. All
three groups repented for marginalising the Batwa. The confession reads as follow:
1. We, Hutu Christians, present at Detmold, recognise that our group has oppressed the Tutsi in various ways
since 1959. We confess the massacres committed by the Hutu against the Tutsi group at different periods of
Rwandan history, culminating in the genocide of 1994. We are ashamed of the horrors and atrocities
committed by the Hutu towards the Tutsi: torturing, raping, slitting pregnant women open, hacking humans
to pieces, burying people alive, hunting people with dogs as if they were animals, killing in churches and
temples (previously recognised as places of refuge), massacring old people, children and the sick in hospital,
forcing people to kill their own relatives, burning people alive, denying burial and thousands of other ways of
cynically degrading and mockingly putting to death.
We carry the terrible weight of this unspeakable crime and we accept to bear the consequences without
resentment. We implore our Hutu brothers and sisters not to forget this terrible past when they judge the
present reality in Rwanda. We humbly ask forgiveness of God and our Tutsi brothers and sisters for all the
evil we have inflicted upon them. We commit ourselves to do whatever we can to restore our honour and
dignity and to regain the lost humanity in their eyes.
The Batutsi group declared themselves comforted by the demand of forgiveness made by their
Bahutu counterparts and likewise repented for the crimes of their group.
2) We, Tutsi Christians, present at Detmold, are happy and feel comforted by the confession and demand of
forgiveness made by our brothers and sisters. We likewise ask God and the Hutu to forgive the repression and
blind vengeance which members of our group have taken, surpassing all claims to legitimate self-defence.
"Inkoni ikubise mukeba uyirenza urugo" (justifying evil on the pretext that it affects a rival, ends up by
turning back on the person who justified it). We also ask God and our Hutu brothers and sisters forgiveness
874Vleugels,J., "Le pardon est-il possible apres le genocide? Reflexion pastorale". In Dialogue no 182, Avril 1995. pp.
36-54.
875 The initiative came from a Roman Catholic lay person, a Medical Doctor, Fulgence Rubayiza. A team of four, two
Roman Catholic priests, Fathers P.C. Nkusi and Patrice Nzeyimana, two laypersons, Dr Rubayiza and the present
writer co-signed the invitation to the meeting.
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for certain arrogant and contemptuous attitudes shown to them throughout our history in the name of a
ridiculous (sic) complex of ethnic superiority.
The Western Christians repented of their sense of "superiority" and the discrimination between
people by generalising and judging some as good and others as bad; they regretted among other
things that their countries condoned violence by delivering arms to all parties:
3) We, Western Christians present at Detmold regret that, feeling too sure of our superiority, we
discriminated between people by generalising and judging some as good and others as bad. We regret that
our countries have conduced violence by delivering arms to all parties. We regret our silence and our neglect
of the refugees of the years of the independence. We also regret our silence and our abandoning of the
Rwandan people during the genocide and massacres in 1994. We regret our silence and neglect when it was a
question of finding a viable solution to the return of the refugees after the genocide. We regret our failure to
listen and to share in the suffering experienced by our Rwandan friends. For all that harm, we ask God and
our Rwandan brothers and sisters to forgive us for not respecting them as they are and we want to commit
ourselves with Jesus to a path of listening, respect and solidarity.
Then altogether, they exhorted members of Rwandan society and the international community to
feel equally concerned by each other's misery.
We exhort them to work together to comfort and rehabilitate all those who have been wounded by the
Rwandan tragedy: widows, orphans, prisoners, refugees, both old and recent, homeless, and the marginalised
Batwa. May everyone find recognition and respect in Rwanda and be rooted in the midst of brothers, sisters
and friends. We thank the Father, who has given us his Spirit to break our "hearts of stone" and to free us
from the mistrust and the fear which separated us. He has remade us brothers and sisters committed to the
Way of His Son, who died and rose again to reconcile man to God and to one another876.
This confession has raised many inspiring remarks, many positive and some negative. A widow
who survived the genocide in which all the members of her family and her husband died phoned
this writer to say :"I couldn't believe that there are still Rwandans, Bahutu and Tutsi who could
meet and produce a message of such a high sincerity".877 A Rwandan Roman Catholic nun said
that the Confession was her "best Christmas gift".
A year later, the authors of the Confession met against in the Trappist Monastery of Chimay,
Belgium, 27 to 31 December. They acknowledged warmly several hundreds of the signatories
who ascribed to the Confession. The reactions included a letter from the Rwandan Government.
The Prime Minister, P-C. Rwigema said that the confession would "give the strength and courage
to Rwandans to respect each other and to live together in peace so far as we all accept and regret
our offences in the search for forgiveness so as to build up a new Rwanda which would no longer
know the abominable atrocities of 1994 ...It is encouraging that some expatriates participated and
showed their contrition because of the failure of the international community to assist in the
tragedy which affected Rwanda. They ought to bring to the attention of their states, public
authorities and the rest of the population that they, indeed have a big debt to pay towards Rwanda
and Rwandans"878.
876 Detmold Confession. In Rubayiza, F., Confession de Detmold. Signe d' Espoir pour le Rwanda. Detmold,
Romerweg, Decembre, 1996; see also Dialogue, no 195, January 1997.
877
E.M., Message from Norwich University in December 1996.
878
Rwigema,P-C., "Reeaction du Premier Ministre a la Confession de Detmold". In Dialogue no 199, Juillet- Aout
1997, pp. 97/8.
256
The participants reflected also on the accusation according to which the Confession takes a
whole group for being killers and the other the victims. For those who raise the issue the
confession seems to incriminate a whole group. People killed, not because they were Bahutu or
Tutsi, but because they were criminals, commented among others, Dr Karamaga.879 Henceforth,
the confession would both endanger the lives of innocent people caught into the group
incriminated and obstruct the state justice.
Some other criticisms saw the Bahutu repentant as being naive or underestimating the offences of
the Batutsi. A former missionary in Rwanda, C.M. Overdulve, regretted that the Confession was
unbalanced with "extremely moving and sincere details from the Bahutu not counterbalanced in
the Batutsi group". He also suggested that westerners should confess misdeeds including the
collusion between the missionaries and the colonisers; for the naive support provided by their
governments for the RPF attack. Westerners he said, might confess the fact that for a "long time,
missionaries of different Churches had underestimated the seriousness of the ethnic antagonism
which was embedded and never questioned; that they avoided involving themselves in the
political life of Rwanda arguing that politics was a dirty affair"880. A former member of the post-
genocide Rwanda Cabinet greeted the initiative warmly, regretting however that there was a
cover up of many injustices, and the grave oppression that led to the 1959 revolution. 'The
repentant', he pursued, "underestimated the systematic revenge conducted by the victorious army,
the RPF, on the defenceless population"881.
From the point of view of the Detmold participants, many among the critics reject the Confession
because their group or the group they have identified with crossed the Rubicon in acknowledging
the offence committed by members of their community. Some among both groups do not accept
that they have a responsibility in the tragedy which can be confessed and repented. As indicated
above, the South African experience shows that the perpetrators of violence can be found not
only among the dominant camp or the victorious but also those of the victims.
The authors never intended their confession to be used as a compromise or be negotiated
between two or several parties. Though the confession resulted from a reflection on the socio-
historical, political and moral crises that affected Rwanda, the participants have never pretended
to have assessed fully the extent of the developments which led to the tragic events of Rwanda882.
879
Karamaga, A., interview in Kigali, March 1997.
88(1
Overdulve, C., "Reflexion sur la Confession de Detmold". In Exchange Vol. 26.3., Leiden, September 1997,
pp.256-263.
881
Sendashonga.S., "Pour le Pardon et la Justice". Reaction a la Confession de Detmold. In Dialogue, no 197. Mars-
Avril 1997, pp. 44-50.
882 It must be remembered that even the historical Stuttgart Confession of the Churches of Germany mentioned above
which, as indicated above has been revered for its role in rehabilitating the Germans and their nation in the concert of
nations, never referred to the socio-historical analysis, nor mentioned the Jewish holocaust.
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Instead, the initiative envisions opening a process of repentance- identification which could
generate the gift of grace for forgiveness from the victim so as to move towards reconciliation.
VII.3. Agenda: Weeping with Hope for Rwanda
The practical dimensions of the issues raised in the previous discussions can be summarised in
one question: How and what should be done to re-establish a social harmony? The Detmold
Confession created a precedent when the participants committed themselves to share in the
burden of the crimes perpetrated by members of their respective groups. Such an 'organic
solidarity' raises a number of issues such as the mandate they had to do it as well as the
implications of such an identification.
VII. 3.1. Repentance, Forgiveness and Reconciliation
The magnitude of the tragedy goes beyond human understanding. If its root causes are not
identified, confessed and repented for, the nation will rest its future on bitterness and rancour.
The Bible shows that the history of human community began with murder when Abel, son of
Adam and Eve, was killed by his brother, Cain. On the other hand, it shows successful attempts
to stop intergenerational sins. Though, the law codes of the Old Testament mandate capital
punishment, God did not impose death upon the first murderer. However, God did not leave
Cain's crime unpunished. Cain was banished from living with human company "threatened,
isolated, excluded fugitive, abandoned, hunted on the edge of decay and death".883 That,
however, was not his fate because he married and had children.
The Bible tells the stories of brothers and sisters who suspected, envied, hated, fought or
eliminated each other for various motives like shortage of resources, or inheritance, blessings, or
according to Marx-Leninism, the domination of one class by another884. What is important in
these stories is the re-establishment of the harmony. Among these, Jacob and Esau, Joseph and
his brothers, all carry the notion of forgiveness as a social-political rule which is rare either in
Old Testament or in politics.
Both stories embody rivalry, domination, trickery and alienation. Jacob gets Isaac's blessing at
the detriment of his brother Esau. After a long period of separation the re-union of the two
brothers happened on the background of spiritual encounter with God; confession, repentance
and restorative justice885.
883 Dumas,A., Theologiens Politiques et Vie Spirituelle de l'Eglise. Paris: Chollet, 1977. p. 54.
884 Ibid. p.57.
885 "Now I am sending this message to my lord, that I may find favour in your eyes". "If I have found favour in your
eyes, accept this gift from me. For to see your face is like seeing the face of God, now that you have received me
favourably". See passages in Gn. chap. 22-30; 32.1-1; 32.5; 33.10.
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Joseph and Benjamin accepted naively the favourite status of their father, Jacob; when their half
brothers saw that, their hatred grew. This led to the plot to kill Joseph. But it was Reuben and
Judah who saved their brother, Joseph from being murdered. Nevertheless, they sold him. Later
Joseph reconciled with his brothers and invited the whole family to reunite in Egypt886. A new
nation has now begun even outside Canaan, after painful, judgmental truth, forbearance of
revenge, empathy and compassion and new solidarity between enemies. Before he died, Jacob
had asked his sons to "Say to Joseph, 'Forgive, I pray you, the transgression of your brothers and
their sin..."'887. The sins of the past generation can affect future generations. Therefore, those who
reacted negatively to the Detmold Confession may be wrong if they think that the iniquities of
the past can simply disappear; corporate sin obstructs the fullness of relationships between God
and the community and prevents the latter from becoming a true community of human beings,
truly united in a fraternal communion of love and sharing.
To stop the perpetuation of generational sin, there are at lest two options which may be
complementary. Firstly, teaching children, in families, schools, Churches, youth clubs and
organisations, in media how to respect and love those who do not belong to their biological and
sociological group or those whose views differ from theirs. Above all, effort must be made to
eradicate all the mechanisms of structural injustices, prejudices fed by myths and lies,
discrimination contained in law and social opportunities like job and education.
Secondly, for many different reasons it may be that the offenders are no longer there or are not
available to repent for their guilt, as in the case of the Rwandan genocidals. Therefore, it may be
suggested that the repentance-identification, has two basic foundations: spiritual and
sociological. On the one hand, Christians belong to the same body of Christ through baptism and
the blood of our Lord. They are many members of one body and when one member suffers all
members suffer (ICor. 12.26). As a spiritual community we are co-responsible for one another888.
886 Ibid. p. 53. See also, Shriver, op.cit. p. 27.
887 See Genesis 37:4; 37:26;Gn.44:33;Gn.45:l-5.15; Gn.50:17. In fact, Jocob is keen to repeat to his sons what God
said about the consequences of the intergenerational sins which have not been repented for. : "I, the Lord your God, am
a jealous God, punishing the children for the sin of the fathers to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me"
See Ex. 20.5.
888 See for example how the confession and repentance of Daniel, Nehemian and Jeremiah on behalf of their
communities helped to re-establish the relationship of Israel with God, and among Israelites of different generations
and tribes. Nehemiah confessed on behalf of the "sins we Israelites, including myself and my father's house,
(Nehemiah 1.6). Daniel also confessed and repented in the name of Israel" (Dan 9.4-20). In the same manner, Jeremiah
says: "Let us lie down in our shame, and let our disgrace cover us. We have sinned against the Lord our God, both we
and our fathers" (Jeremiah 3.25).
Daniel, Jeremiah and Nehemiah confessed in the name of the people because they believed the consequences of the
offence would have repercussions on them and on the whole nation. Their confessions always comprise two
dimensions: 'I' and 'my people'; they clearly state the sin committed and the iniquity resulting from the sin888.
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On the other hand, the Rwandan people express the idea of organic solidarity as members of one
body, one family, clan or the nation and the collective responsibility in the following tale:
A man was being tested for having stolen a bunch of bananas. The man said, it is not me but my legs. They
then called on the legs. The legs said, we have never cut the banana bunch, you better ask the hands. They
then said to the hands what do you say? The hands answered: we have never carried that banana. Then they
questioned the head. The head said, I had never walked in that land. Then the man was acquitted because of
the absence of proof for collective guilt88!).
This tale shows the dimension of a collective responsibility for any form of guilt that affects a
social group. It joins Paul's perspective of the unity of the spiritual and organic body. If the eye
does not recognise the relationship it has with the hand, the head and the foot, how can it
function? It is only when all the parts function in harmony and when the Church functions like an
organic body that a true community exists. And only such a community serves as the working
model for the world.
Therefore, the notion of repentance originates from both the biblical and the Rwandan cultural
ethos. For Christians, the abstaining from repentance resembles a denial of the identity of the
Church. Up until now the Roman Catholic Church has as its pillars apostolic succession through
Peter. A significant dimension of the life-story of Peter is his Repentance for denying Jesus.
Peter and Judas both sinned in denying Jesus. Their betrayals were of the same magnitude. But
the gaze of mercy and forgiveness met the gaze of recognition of guilt and sorrow which led
Peter to repentance.
Yet, the Rwandan Roman Catholic hierarchy both minimises the situation of suffering of its
members and then blames on someone else. In the case of the clerical hierarchy, they have been
far from the suffering of the victims, the Bahutu before independence, and the Batutsi after that
period. In many instances, the Churches function on the state model in which the monarchs rarely
confess guilt. Their history shows that they have not been always clean.
But if the God of the Scriptures, is known through His movements of repentance, change of mind
towards his people, a God of justice and love... why shouldn't the Church change its mind? If
the Church has for vocation to be the conscience of the people, through repentance and
forgiveness, it can reinstate justice and peace from guilt assimilated and rendered in aggression.
Repentance, suggests Alain Blancy is a "divine act. It is the only way which opens the possibility
to reconciliation and to renewal of the community...."890. This action can bring to an end the
infernal circle of anguish and aggression, mistrust and hatred, source of conflicts.
88S>
Muzungu, B., Interview. Kigali, March 1997.
8'J(I
Blancy, A., "Les Eglises peuvent-elle se repentir?". In Condamnes et Reconcilies, no 77, Lyon, Fevrier, 1977,p.44.
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However, as in the example of Jesus who carried out the sentence of our death on the cross,
confessing and repenting in the name of members for whom Christians and the Churches assume
a certain moral responsibility, does not prevent the criminals from taking responsibility for their
crimes. Instead, such a repentance fulfils three major functions: it liberates grace in alleviating
the anger and pain of the offended person; it helps eradicate and stop the automatic transmission
of the sin from generation to generation; it lastly allows the offending and the offended to re¬
establish communication.
Due to the influence of the Catholic Church on Rwandan society, it may be relevant to introduce
an aspect of discussion on reconciliation from a Catholic theologian. According to Mgr Bussini,
within the Roman Catholic Church, the dogmatic constitution, Lumen Gentium of Vatican II
considers reconciliation as a "theological order reality". The sacrament of reconciliation means
two things. Firstly, that the Church celebrates, receives forgiveness and acknowledges the love
that heals. The reconciled enters into a personal relationship with God, in prayer, fasting,
charity... Secondly, as light of the nations, the unification of humanity and socialisation of the
divided and broken world is fulfilled in Christ. The Church regards the Christ, both as a "sign
and a means of the intimate union with God and of the unity of human kind". In this gathering of
Jews and gentiles, we are engaged in Spirit to share the childhood relations that unite Christ with
the Father and we are associated to propagate the message of reconciliation. This union with
Christ passes through the celebration of the sacraments.891 Consequently, the Church becomes a
sign of an intimate union with God and human kind. Transformed and changed, it can then
radiate the visage of the risen and can call for conversion in faith. It becomes, for the divided and
broken world, the message for forgiveness and reconciliation and can collaborate to create a
'civilisation of Love'892.
VII. 3.2. Colonial Powers to Apologise
In December 1997 the Belgian Parliament (Two Chambers) published a more than 1000 page
report of an ad-hoc Commission inquiry into the 1994 tragic events in Rwanda. The commission
was created under the pressure of Belgian public opinion and some politicians including Senator
Destexhe to unveil the truth about the death of 10 Belgians893 of the UN troops who were
891
Mgr Bussini refers to what the Roman Catholic Church calls the 'fourth sacremant': the Penance. Bussini also
acknowledges what the Church calls the sacrements of 'initiation1: Baptism, Confirmation and the Eucharist. Bussini
(Mgr),F., "L'eglise catholique, Sacrement de la Reconciliation pour le monde". In Unite Chretienne- Condamnes et
reconcilies. No 77, Feb. 1985,p.27-29.
892
Ibid.p.30
893 Out of the 2500 UN blue helmets present in Rwanda in a so-called mission to supervise the implementation of the
Arusha Peace Agreement, Belgium had 470 men. See chapter five.
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lynched by the Rwandan Presidential Guard while attempting to escort the late Prime Minister,
Agathe Uwiringiyimana894.
Using the most accurate scholarship available, auditing several hundreds of oral and written
witnesses, the Commission analysed the socio-historical and political evolution of the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-independence Rwanda. They collected a lot of information on the
errors of colonialism and of its relations with the two republican regimes. The report outlines, in
particular, the hostility developed by the anti-peace groups of the Presidential camp, especially
through the RTLM, against the Belgian troops who were accused of being the right hand of the
RPF and the Batutsi. The Commissioners confirmed that like France, Belgium knew the exact
details about the preparation of the genocide. In particular, they knew about the abundant reports
sent to Brussels by Johan Swinnen, then Ambassador of Belgium in Kigali, as well as, from
January 1994, reports sent by Major- General Romeo Dallaire, the UN Peace Troops
Commander.
Hence a French native, R. Braumann, for a long time Chairman of the very well known medical
organisation, Medecins sans Frontieres, who like Destexhe, pioneered in France to have the truth
about the role of his country unveiled, commented that "France has adopted a cynical position,
supporting fully the genocidal regime, accepting that the Tutsi of the region be eliminated in the
name of the majority rule democracy"895.
Though the report evokes implicitly how Belgium contributed to the process which led to the
1994 genocide, it understandably focuses on the death of the Belgian blue helmets whose
families continue to accuse their government of incompetence in the handling of the crisis.
Hence it reduces the 1994 Rwandan tragedy to the death of its 10 nationals and pays little
attention to the million of victims who also suffered and died. Secondly, it omitted to invite
Belgium to apologise to Rwanda for its lack of historical responsibility in the processes that led
Rwanda to the tragedy.
Having sown the seed of hatred among Rwandans themselves on the one hand, and on the other,
between Belgian people and Rwandans; having sown injustices, ethnic and regional resentment
and then abandoned the victims of the 1950's and 1994 even exposing them to death,896 with the
publication of that Parliament Report, Belgium has a unique historical chance to apologise. It
must acknowledge some of the injustices so as to stop the transmission of generational sins
84.4 The Belgians were sent to escort the late Prime Minister who was attempting to reach Radio Rwanda early the 7
April 1994 to broadcast a message calling the population to remain calm.
84.5 RF1 programmes of 20 and 21 January 1998, 7.45.
896 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and his family were taken from their residence by the Belgian troops to a so-called
'safer place' which appeared to be the School of Technology of Kicukiro. There, they were abandoned by both the
Belgian and French troops on 11 April 1994. More than 4000 refugees were exterminated. Ngurinzira, F,(Mrs),
Interview in Brussels, July 1995.
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between Belgians and Rwandans. At the same time the report challenges France to follow the
example of Belgium and allow the truth to be unveiled about its supposed role897.
It must also be remembered that from 1945, Rwanda was a UN trusteeship confided to Belgium;
the UN cannot then simply ignore the consequences of the decolonisation in one of its trusteeship
nor avoid to fulfil its mandate of preventing and repressing the crime of genocide.898 Hence, both
the International community and the Great Powers which govern the World and the UN stand
accused by the Rwandan genocide899.
VII. 3.3. Justice, as a Factor of Reconciliation
After the genocide, some countries and international partners urged Rwanda to engage in
reconciliation as a precondition for international aid. Since then, many people have had different
opinions on how to rebuild Rwanda900. Some suggest that the quest for justice and for the
eradication of impunity is the priority. Others still refer to the Arusha Peace Agreement as
preconditions for a sustainable reconciliation. Both the United Nations and the Rwandan
government have put an emphasis on the pursuit of the criminals who planned and executed the
genocide in creating tribunals to deal with the issue.
Nevertheless, many observers express the views that without a physical and economical
reconstruction which could offer prospects for equal opportunities and without distributive
justice, reconciliation may still be remote. Likewise, some scholars had expressed the views that
the economic severity of the Versailles Treaty and the fact that the Allied politicians vowed that
"no German would have any visible reason to doubt that their country had been defeated", had
897 In early March 1998, the Commission of Defence of the French Parliament created an ad-hoc commission to inquiry
on France's responsibility in the crisis, from 1990 to 1994. Liberation of 4 March 1998.
898 The Convention on "Prevention and Repression of the Crime of Genocide" was adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1948. See Destexhe,A., Rwanda. Essai sur le Genocide. Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1994, p. 17.
899 In fact, it was only on 25 May 1994 two months after the genocide began and at a time it was almost consumed that
the UN General Secretary, Boutros Boutros Ghali referred to it as a genocide. Yet on 31 June 1994 he surprised the
world when he invited the heads of states present at the OAU summit to 'forget the past' on his ground that "there had
been genocide on one side and another". Meanwhile on 16 May 1994 the Security Council voted the resolution 918 to
redeploy 5500 blue helmets to replace the 2500 who had been withdrawn on 27 April 1994 after assisting indifferently
on the genocide massacre. It is believed that the UN was handicapped by both the position of France, sponsor of the
genocide regime, and the Clinton Administration which was keen to avoid the use of 'genocide' which should have
compelled them to intervene. See Le Vif l'Express. 10 June 1994; 17 July 1994. During his brief stop at Kigali Airport
on 26 March 1998 President Clinton acknowledged that "The international community, together with nations in Africa
must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We
should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these
crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power
to help you build a future without fear, and full of hope". "Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance
Workers and US and Rwanda Government Officials". Kigali, 1998. Clinton failed to apologise for this omission as well
as for the blockage put by his administration to prevent any UN Security Council action.
9m
E.M., Interview. Kigali, April 1995. According to our research the majority of survivors of the 1994 genocide share
the government position. People of good will, Bahutu and Batutsi have always lived and continue to live together.
Reconciliation says E.M is irrelevant since the perpetrators of violence "show no sign of regret for the genocide".
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contributed to the rise of Nazism901. Bad treaties can be seeds of wars and violence. As indicated
in chapters five and six, such an accusation was made against the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement.
The Agreement was continuously presented by its opponents as the revenge of the "defeated
monarchists over the Bahutu". The most hated clauses of the Agreement were, the sharing of
power between the two major communities, the demobilisation of the majority of the armed
forces which were not needed in the period of peace and the trial of the bureaucrats of the
administration and armies who would have been involved in human rights abuse. This thesis has
expressed a conviction that regardless of some imperfections inherent in every human creativity,
the Agreement presented the potential for being the minimum requirement for preventing the
continuing escalation of the conflict.
In the case of the Holocaust, the Nuremberg Tribunal adopted the principle of death and life
sentence for top Nazi criminals taken as individual agents. However, as many Germans had
simply literally followed the orders of their dictator, the Fiihrer Prinzip, the judges had to turn
down many other candidates for justice' who were too numerous for courtrooms or jails, or even
because some were indispensable to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a devastated
society902. With Hitler dead, there was a problem of knowing who should be held 'morally and
legally' responsible for the 'guilt' of Nazism.
In the case of Rwanda, the slowness of the International Community, and the UN tribunal led the
903
Rwandan government to initiate its own legal procedure to judge the thousands of people who
are assumed to have participated in the genocide and massacres. The Rwandan authorities
believe that there can be no reconciliation without the judgement of those who were involved in
the genocide. The President of Rwanda, Pasteur Bizimungu has expressed it as follows:
Mais il ne pourra y avoir de Reconciliation et a fortiori de reconstruction sans Justice. Ce serait reconduire
l'impunite et banaliser la mort. La mort dans laquelle certains ont cru trouver une solution finale a leur soif
de pouvoir. Mais avec eux, des milliers de Rwandais ont de gre ou de force trempe leurs mains dans le sang
de leurs compatriotes. Redonner un prix a la vie c'est mesurer les responsabilites individuelles et les
sanctionner. C'est aussi le prix a payer pour que les Rwandais puissent a nouveau vivre ensemble. Pour
qu'ils puissent pleurer leurs victimes sans desir de vengeance. Pour que les coupables reglent leurs dettes a la
societe et que leurs fils n'aient plus de compte a subir904.
Like Bizimungu, many Rwandans believe that due to the extent of the atrocities which have been
committed, calling for reconciliation without punishment would be an illusion. The Rwandan
9111 Shriver Jr,D., op.cit. p. 12.
902 Ibid. p.81.
9(13 Created by the UN Security Council in resolution 955 in November 1994 established an international tribunal to
judge those responsible for the genocide and other crimes committed between 1 January and the 31 December 1994.
The Tribunal (IPT) was installed in Arusha, Tanzania.
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Parliament then voted a law on the genocide in 1996. According to MP Kageruka, a Roman
Catholic leader of a charismatic prayer group, this law aims to break the impunity and facilitate
reconciliation. But it requires positive actions so as to eradicate the evil in society905.
The law groups the suspects into different categories: the authors, executioners and accomplices
of the genocide and massacres906. However, observers have noticed that the appliance of the
organic law on genocide may pose a dilemma to Rwandan justice. Many people have been driven
to participate in the militia and the armed groups which executed the genocide. However, many
performed individual atrocities.
How then to distinguish the limits between politics and moral threat? If on one hand, the
genocide rightly cries for justice, on the other, a much reduced legal system with large number of
prisoners, risks sacrificing innocents who languish in jails, while many true criminals escape
justice as they must be assumed innocent before trail That serves the ends of the genocidals907.
Equally, though it has been assumed that the genocide was planned by the regime of
Habyarimana, it is not clear, in the absence of an inquiry, who will be held legally and morally
responsible for the genocide. In fact, it is not clear if President Habyarimana whose death
inaugurated the genocide, died as victim or sacrifice.
In a society where impunity has been erected as the means of government, memories cannot heal
until Justice is done. According to Prof. Bernstein who participated in the activities of the
Nuremberg Tribunal on the Nazis criminals, the condemnation of the latter has been a healing act
for the Jewish people. Wherever such a condemnation didn't take place as in the genocide of the
904 Declaration of the Rwanda Government. International Conference "Rwanda in its Regional Context: Human rights,
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation". La Haye, 16-17 September 1994. Rwanda was represented by President Pasteur
Bizimungu and many other members of his Cabinet.
905Kageruka,I., Interview. Detmold, 11/12/1996.
91)6 Republic of Rwanda: Journal Official, Law no 8/96 of October 30/1996 nO 17 of 1/9/1996.
on the pursuit of the crimes of genocide or the crimes against Humanity from October 1, 1990.
The law classifies the suspects in four categories:
first category: a) the organisers, initiators, supervisors of the genocide and crime against humanity; b) those who acted
in the position of authority nationally or locally, being members of political parties, army , religious confessions or
militia; c) the executioners who committed atrocities; d) those who committed sexual tortures.
The second category include the co-authors or accomplices of homicide or grave acts that led to death. The third
category include people who committed grave criminal acts. The fourth category, the persons who committed offence
against properties.
The persons of the first category incur the death penalty; those in the second category the life sentence. Following a
mutual agreement for restitution and reparation, the suspects in the last category can receive remittance of sanction.
The law has also installed the procedure for confessing. When it happens the penalties are reduced.
907 In October 1997, with more than 120,000 arrests in prisons with few magistrates available, some observers have
questioned the capacity of the Rwanda judiciary system to handle adequately such a large number of cases. For C.
Ntampaka, a Rwandan professor of law, the so-called first list of 1946 names of suspects published by the Prosecutor
of the High Court poses problems of reliability. It presents insufficient and confusing information on the identities and
the charges against the suspects. Instead of being an instrument of truth and reconciliation, the law can maintain
suspicion and mistrust among people. Ntampaka,C., Ntampaka, C., "La Justice Rwandaise a 1'Epreuve du Droit". In
Dialogue, no 195, Bruxelles. Janvier. 1997, pp. 17-26
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1,5 millions of Armenians by the Turks in 1915, the genocide of 1 million Serbs by the Croats
during the second war, the massacres of Bahutu in Burundi in 1972, the wounds could not
heal908. A wound has to be exposed, opened, cleansed, balmed and given time to heal.
In ancient Greece, Solon, a legal expert and pioneer of democracy, was opposed to impunity. He
said that "transgression of justice is a disturbance of social organism... A state thus punished is
affected by party feuds and civil wars... If the guilty man escapes punishment, his innocent
children and his descendants suffer in his stead"909. Solon' efforts aimed to prevent inter-
generational thirst for revenge. For a just revenge leads to a just counter-revenge and this leads to
civil war. For democracy to triumph, society must develop a language of dialogue as the central
medium in political exchange rather than raw power .
Likewise, Father Muzungu, one of the theologians of Inculturation in Africa, perceives the aim of
legal justice as an indispensable complement to psychological pressure indispensable to bringing
the criminals to acknowledge their guilt. "Human Justice, conscience and moral laws", he says,
"compel the guilty to accept their crime for eventual reparation with a view to preventing the
circle of revenge. Unfortunately", he adds, "in Rwanda the elite have a false perception that
accepting their sin diminishes them; there is a pretext of pride".
In such a case of denial, punishment reduces the psychological resistance to the acceptance of
sin; it increases the chances for the guilty to acknowledge that they need to be healed. In
punishment there are two aspects. Firstly, the revenge which is anti-evangelical as life belongs to
God alone. Secondly, the individual is prevented from becoming a professional criminal.
However, forgiveness does not depend on the will of the guilty alone. God who died for us was
not mistaken. Reception of forgiveness is blocked by an unwillingness to repent. The option of
forgiveness remains open though the process becomes much harder9I0.
For Forrester, "justice is not vindictive, unrelenting or mechanical, nor a machine-like, balanced
retribution, the lex talionis of the blindfold, impersonal figure of Justitia, with scales and sword
in hand. Nor is it a cheap grace which veils the gravity of the offence and sin. At the heart of
908
Vleugels, J., "Le pardon est -il possible apres le Genocide? Une Approche Pastorale". In Dilogue no 182. Ap. 1995,
pp. 36-54,
After the defeat many regimes: Idi Amin, Habyarimana, Mobutu, Mengistu, Siad Barre, Lisouba and even the
Angolese rebel Savimbi, many armies have dissolved and many arms are out of control of a central governement. The
Rwandan crisis as part of a sub-regional context can only resolve for a sustainable peace if really contextualised. On
the other hand, some among the new administrations seem not be ready to sort out the dense mixture of good and evil
that has suffused the enmity of the conflicts. People have continued to undertake more actions which set new
geometrical record in politics of destruction: the massacres of refugees, the attacks of the genocidal militia to finish off
their agenda; the attack against the freedom of speech; the attack against the private properties. In many cases, that
constitutes a threat to the normality.
909 ShriverJr , D., op.cit. p. 13.
910 Muzungu, B., Interview, Kigali, March 1997.
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justice we find mercy, forgiveness and love more than fairness and equity".... However, it is clear
for Forrester that "mercy and forgiveness do not ignore or cover up the offence, and are not
incompatible with penalty and with repentance" though it would be to simplistic to suggest that
these two have no bearing upon criminal offence911.
Martin Luther King, Jr linked the necessity for forgiveness to the fact that most human beings
live and act in blindness. Reflecting on the Lord's prayer phrase on the cross: "Father, forgive
them for they know not what they do", and by extrapolation the process that roots racial attitudes
and heartlessness in the masses, King showed that the Lord's prayer implies also human
intellectual and spiritual blindness. For him innocent but ignorant people can be subtly subjected
to a dangerous manipulation of different ideologies by the elite like those who arrested, put on
trial and condemned Jesus. Likewise, in Rwanda the masses have been manipulated and pushed
to commit acts of great inhumanity912. But the most exciting side ofM. L. King's story is his firm
conviction that equal rights for all are the best foundation of a lasting peace.
VII. 3.4. Investing in Peace and Educating Questioning Generations.
Having assessed the aspects of guilt, repentance, forgiveness and justice, questions remain as
how these factors can be transformed into a process which creates a lasting peace. Both Rwanda
government and civil society are persuaded that punishment is not the only option. They both
recognise the need for education for peace and reconciliation. In a recent intervention, the
Rwandan Director General of Culture and Arts, Jean Mukimbiri, set up five guidelines for
Reconciliation and peaceful co-existence: 1. Education on Reconciliation and peaceful co¬
existence; 2. Struggle against discrimination and promotion of rights; 3. Consolidation of the
democratic process in the lights of culture and history of each country/ region; 4. Inter-cultural
dialogue between national groups and, 5. Resolving conflicts through dialogue913.
This agrees with the NGOs and the views of human rights activists. For C. Ntampaka, to be a real
instrument of peace the Churches have to invest in Education for peace with the clergy becoming
good models of what they teach instead of being the tools for division. They ought to promote
human rights from the very beginning; teach young people that rights are vindicated not given.
Finally the Churches must maintain humanitarian actions in favour of the poor and at the same
time set up initiatives which build up the fabric of society like rehabilitating heroes914. This
911 Forrester, D., Christian Justice and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 237/8.
912
KingJr, M.L., La Force d'Aimer. Translation by . From The force of Love. Casterman, 1964.
913
Mukimbiri, J., Orientations presentees a la Conference sur la Reconciliation et la co-existence Pacifique, Kigali,
28 Mars 1997.
914 Ntampaka. C.. Interview in Brussls. July 1996.
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insistence on the necessity to invest in education for peace reminds the Churches that irrespective
of the existence of the foundations of human rights in both the Bible and in the Christian
tradition9'5 and in the history of the United Nations91 , they have failed to integrate the
dimension of human rights in their teachings.
However, the most valuable investment, in the view of this thesis, is primarily educating a
questioning generation capable of standing for their rights and those of the community. The
ongoing experiences of the grass-roots dealing with the rehabilitation of Christian activities as
assessed above, help individuals and communities to enter into a spiritual dialogue with
themselves and one another and to eventually acknowledge the profundity of the evil.
Ntezimana is right to highlight the fact that 'control of power' was one of the four degrading
forces spread by the Akazu -group and the Interahamwe and which precipitated the country into
moral decadence917. The other degrading forces were 'possession' or the control of resources at
any price, 'valoir' or the violent expression of self-esteem combined with vanity, and the control
of 'knowledge'. These functioned through the perpetration of violence, intimidation and
suppression of individual liberties.
Yet, a question needs to be asked so as to identify why the Church establishment has been
incapable of addressing the issue of power and violence. What is clear is that the Roman Catholic
Church has an ecclesial mandate from its magisterium to assume its social and ethical
responsibility. According to professor Subilia, Vatican II ecclesiology introduced the concept of
the Church as, 'people of God'918. It reaffirmed that the church has a 'civilising task', designed to
prepare society to receive the Gospel. Corollary, it developed the idea of 'bureaucratisation' of
915The document 'Gaudum et spes' no 29 of Vatican II strongly integrated the human rights dimension into the teaching
of the Church.
916The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) has then become the first generation of rights. The second
generation of Rights is considered to be the social and economic rights. The third generation comprises the ecology
and development.
According to John De Gruchy, Christianity has given the matrix to democracy. The Bible too defines different
theologies appropriate to crises: The rebellion-passion of Job; the prophetic judgement and suffering of Jeremiah; the
theology of renewed of Ezekiel, the theology of anticipation of the coming of Deuteo-Isiaih, the theologies of
reconstruction of Nehemiah and Ezra and the theology of dream of Zachariah and Joel. These are the basis for both
Catholics and Protestants to oppose unjust policies. But the attitude of the Churches has varied from context to context.
After the holocaust, the German Protestant Churches made the 1945 Stuttgart declaration of guilt whilst in Cuba, the
Church could never recover from its collaboration with the Baptista regime until its 1986 declaration. See De Gruchy,
J.. Christianity and Democracy, London/N.Y. Cambridge University Press, 1995.
917
Ntezimana,L. "De Charybde en Scylla". In Dialogue no 178. Bruxelles, Octobre.1994, & Ntezimana, L. "La
desinsertion" in Dialogue no 182. Bruxelles, April 1995. See also our analysis in chapter IV on the process of
mystification of power and the ruler.
918 Vatican II Constitution, Lumen Gentium integrates chapter II on the people of God, chapter III on the "hierarchical
constitution of the Church" and chapter IV on the laity.
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society in which the laity holds a position in the public structures while continuing to execute the
orders of the ecclesial hierarchy919.
Why, since then few initiatives have been taken to conceive the Church from below? The
monarchical organisation keeps the reins of command and prevent the dynamic Rwandan
Christians creativity. Father Muzungu put it in this way: "The Church is not a democracy. The
Pope can bring an incompetent person from anywhere and appoint them in any position".
Muzungu's interview surely raises the question of how power is exercised within the Churches
themselves.
"The world-wide Catholic Church", comments P.Deschamps, "is a dynamic macro-system
comprising a mazzo-system of Churches, themselves enclosed in a micro-system of Episcopal
dioceses. It is a rigid hierarchical system where each superior institution is politically responsible
for the inferior institutions. Rwandan ecclesial hierarchies, Catholic and Protestant hierarchies",
Deschamps goes on, "should cease to maintain a stubborn silence justifying the past and
legitimating the present, but rather agree to repent for the offences committed by its members
during the genocide. Instead of hiding behind an old-fashioned religious discourse, it is time to
assess on each level the individual and collective guilt, to interact with the people of God, and
with them to examine what has happened"920.
Among the Protestants, apart from the EPR confession, in May 1996, the general Assembly of
the CPR acknowledged that its members failed to become a model of unity in society; that they
failed to bring through evangelism, truth, unity and love. To this half self-questioning, it must be
added that, as in the Roman Catholic Church, the decision-making machinery in Rwandan
Protestantism has become a centralising system in the hands of the 'legal representatives', the
bishops and the ministers with little regard for or accountability to the congregations.
The notion of power in the Church, as said earlier, does not correspond to the biblical ethos. It
has developed with considerable influence from the political and cultural environment ignoring
the charisma of the community. It is the conviction of this thesis that rehabilitating the biblical
ethos in the life of Christians passes through rediscovering the role of the community as a
creative source of power. That requires the assertion of the confessional and sacramental
character of the community in forgiveness and reconciliation. Such a teaching was a core
919
Subilia.V. "The Ecclesiology of Vatican II". In The Reformed and Presbyterian World. Geneva: WRA, Vo XXVIII,
no 5, March 1965, pp. 200-210.
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Deschamps, P., " Eglise, Qu' as-tu Fait Pendant le Genocide"? In Dialogue no 198. Fevrier-Mars 1996, pp. 85-88,
particularly, p.86.
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principle of the primitive Church; it was reaffirmed by the reformers and the Vatican II
Council921.
VII. 3.5. Mediating Among the Three Communities
This work has been concerned with showing that the Rwandan crises developed into
accumulation of factors meaning that before the consequences and effects of a previous tragedy
are dealt with, another tragedy arrives. As stated previously, reconciliation comes at the end of a
process starting with the identification of the root causes and a confession, repentance,
forgiveness and healing of memories.
In that context, Ntezimana assumes that the root causes of the conflict were established between
the Bahutu and the Batutsi by the three factors: fear, arrogance, and the politics of the 'belly'. In
his book 'Imburagihana'922 (the one who lacked an adviser/ prosecutor), A.Nduwayezu discusses
the conflict between the Bahutu and the Batutsi through what he called the trial of Sebahutu (the
sons of Bahutu) and Sebatutsi (the son of Batutsi). The trial, had three witnesses Mutwa,
Muzungu (the White) and Mateka (History). In the trial primarily concerned with the affair
between the two brothers, but which turns its attention also to the White, Nduwayezu identifies
the offences, injustices, prejudices, imputable to each of the three defendants 923.
The pronouncement of the judgement inculpates the two (three) defendants and invites the rivals
to reconcile. A detailed ecumenical ceremony is then organised in the framework of the tradition
of each Religion (the traditional religion, Christianity: Catholics; Protestants, Pentecostals,
Adventists, and Islam), present in the land. Then Rwanda will be ruled with democratic
principles; everyone's right will be respected and all the heroes of Sebahutu and Sebatutsi
rehabilitated924. For Nduwayezu, the Banyarwanda became Imburagihana because those who
would have done it, the Church and the colonial ruler were part of the problem.
921 Kung, H., The Church. London: Burns & Ootes, 1968, pp 128; 336. See also Ela, J-M., op.cit. p.55ff. On
priesthoold role of Christian community see also, 1 Pet.2.9-10; Gal.6.16; Gal 3.29; Eph4.1-5.
922 Nduwayezu, A.. Imburagihana, Kigali: Editions Barama, 1991.
923Ibid. p. 138. In particular to have killed among those who remained with him in the country in the reprisal against
the outside' inyenzi attacks; he must respond to the charges about the 1973 violence that left several hundred dead and
sent others in exile at a time the external attacks had ceased and why he had opposed the return of the Sebatutsi
refugees, excluded them from schools, politics and senior positions in public administration after 1959
924The author mentions, in particular, the heads of the state of Rwanda, Rwabugiri, Rutarindwa, Musinga, Mutara,
Mbonyumutwa and Kayibanda. He noted that he left out Habyarimana whose regime was not yet about to end and
which would be judged by history and the Banyarwanda. Nduwayeze, A.,Op. cit. p. 192/3.
In fact, Rwabugiri died during a military expedition in Kivu region. It was assumed that he died under the plot of his
political rivals. His son and successor, Rutarindwa was assassinated in the Rucunshu putsch, in 1896. His half-brother
and successor, Musinga died in Moba/Zaire in 1943 where he had been exiled by the Belgians in 1931. His son and
successor, Mutara III Rudahigwa died, assassinated in Bujumbura in 1959. The 1959 revolution brought in power, a
Hutu president, Kayibanda. The later died in 1975 assassinated by the regime of his successor, Habyarimana.
Habyarimana himself was killed in a plane crush shot down in early April 1994.
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Beyond the generous but restricted interpretation of Ntezimana, lies, as shown earlier, the
external interferences. These worsened the situation and the need for the truth becomes even
more evident. For Father N.pc., the noble notion of Reconciliation must be handled with some
preambles, honesty in reflection; removing injustices past and present; respecting human rights.
Father N.pc. put it as follows:
Je suis Tutsi, je ne l'ai pas voulu. Ne refugie, je ne l'ai pas voulu. Mon pere n'a pas ete chasse par les Hutu,
mais par le Roi. J'ai ete au Katanga. Ma mere, veuve a 25 ans, avec 3 enfants. En 1961 nous avons pu
retourner au Rwanda. J'ai connu l'exclusion. Originaire du Centre du Rwanda, j'ai du aller au seminaire a
l'Est. En 1963, j'ai vu la mort en face. En 1973, j'ai encore vu la mort en face. En 1994, je ne peux pas
expliquer comment j'ai survecu, a Ruhango, puis a Kabgayi. En 1994/5, j'ai vu les gens mourir, tues par les
Tutsi. Les Hutu m'ont dit les horreurs qu'ils ont vecus. II y a des Hutu qui meurent parce qu'ils sont Hutu. Je
925
voudrais qu'il y ait l'honnetete dans le reportage des faits .
Clearly, to resolve the Rwandan conflict one has to review the different national and external
responsibilities. This will bring the various parties in the conflict to a position of humility and
modesty. This passage shows clearly that, there is no landmark in guilt; there are not necessarily
innocents in one camp and guilty in the other.
With regard to Nduwayezu it is best to first place his invitation to reconciliation and position in
context. Writing in the course of 1991 with an obvious tendency to defend the regime of which,
as head of the Office of Intelligence, under direct control of Habyarimana, Nduwayezu926,
deliberately omitted the analysis of the mechanisms, the structures of the MRND party, its
bureaucrats and the machinery which spread violence. However, here was an attempt from within
the system, to identify and name some of the root causes of the conflict and propose a way
forward towards the re-establishment of harmony.
The 1994 genocide arrived because of the violent groups who were opposed to the Arusha Peace
Agreement which would have provided the basis for power sharing. In fact, the discussions
above showed that society has been estranged from its institutions, the army, the security forces,
the administration. These have become the machinery of destruction of human beings. More
devastating, many people were led to kill their fellows neighbours. As Dr E. Rwabuhihi observed
in reaction to the Detmold Confession, we do not become Christians so as to continue reasoning
into sectarianism.
However, in a real world in which we live, many people have come to behave in Bahutu-Batutsi
binary opposition. It no longer helps to hide the divisions; it rather helps to show the divine
presence in each human being and the Spirit of God who breaks down the walls of separation. As
mediator, the Churches must help to find out a new formula which guarantees the inclusion of
925 Father Npc. Interview. December 1996.
926Former head of Intelligence in the Habyarimana regime.
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social, cultural, political, religious group's opinion. The process should re-establish mutual
confidence; it should guarantee that the losers in political and military power terms would not be
excluded, dominated and over- whelmed by the winners; it should offer the chance of respect of
integrity of life and human rights. Taking into account the feelings of the losers is to make
yesterday's enemy a friend, a partner in the making of a destiny of the nation.
Dumas identifies three models of the re-encounter to heal the family fracture. Firstly, after the
social decay due to the tragedy that followed the murder of Abel by Cain , he suggests that it has
been valued a re-encounter of social and political style aiming at the reconstitution of
brotherhood and equality. Secondly, in the case of Jacob and Esau, it was a prudent diplomatic
approach proposed by Jacob to Esau in which the two communities would remain prudently
distant from one another (Gn. 33). These two models remain a fragile enterprise. And thirdly, a
'total reintegration model' where the guilty, like in the case of the brothers of Joseph, become the
witnesses of a new revolution made not for eliminating nor excluding the Other but for re¬
establishing in force and duties and enjoying brotherhood and national co-operation with those
whom they were alienated by their fault.927
This writer follows Dumas' last model, that of total integration because unlike the other models,
it inspires a rebuilding of the broken brotherhood between the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. When
the faults of a previous generation have been imposed upon children or political communities,
then every generation both inherits and repeats them. The stones of the past, writes Shriver,
weigh down the present; the burden of history is one of the chains of office, and every set of
leaders adds something to that weight.
In contemporary history of relations between the Banyarwanda, despite all the external
influences underlined in this work as well as the universality of guilt, as the most horrific
tragedy, the genocide was committed against the Batutsi. It seems reasonably correct to suggest
that the Bahutu community pursues a straightforward effort to confess and repent so as to re¬
establish communication with their counterparts Batutsi. However, this author is aware of , on
the one hand a possible political manipulation, and on the other, the naivete of such a process if it
was not backed by the political authorities. In this regard, the message of Richard.F.von
Weizsacker, former President of Germany to his fellow Germans with regard to the legacy of the
Nazis applies well in Rwandan case for both the population and the rulers:
every German", he said, "would witness what Jewish fellow citizens had to suffer, from cold indifference
through veiled intolerance to open hatred... Who could remain innocent after the burning of the Synagogue,
the looting, the stigmatising with the Jewish star, the withdrawal of rights, the unceasing violations of human
927 Dumas, A., op.cit. p. 69.
272
worth?...The imagination of men is insufficient to encompass the means and the scale of the annihilation. But
in reality the crime itself was compounded by the attempts of all too many people- in my generation as well,
we who were young and who had no part in the planning and execution of the events- not to take note of
what was happening". "No feeling person expects (young Germans now) to wear a hair shirt merely because
they are Germans. Yet their forefathers have bequeathed them a heavy legacy", and "all of us, whether guilty
or not, whether old or young, must accept the past928.
Von Weizsacker's message like Mandela's and Tutu's, shows that Political and moral figures can
help nations to remember, repent and forgive. A re-encounter between the three Rwandan
communities is unlikely to happen if the moral forces are unable to create a doorway to it. When
A. Sadat, President of Egypt visited Israel in 1977 and was taken to Yad Vasem, the Museum
dedicated to the memory of the 6 million Jewish victims of Holocaust, he said that he had always
thought it was merely an exaggerated propaganda. "I saw with my eyes", he said, "how Israelis,
and Jews the world over, must feel. They are victims not of war alone but also of politics and
hatred"929. When a public figure starts telling how their mind has been changed by the suffering
of the victims, that begin to teach their constituencies to change.
VII. 3.6. Rehabilitating Relational harmony
The inhumanity which characterised the recent tragedies affected the fundamental virtues which,
according to various sources, cemented social and cultural harmony. In working for
reconstruction, it seems to this writer that the essential of the spectrum of Rwandan fundamental
virtues must be revisited to detect their weakness which facilitated their ideological
manipulation. Bimenyimana enumerates some of these virtues such as: a. reverence and
obedience to parents and to authorities (kubaha no kumvira ababyeyi n'abategetsi) who are
viewed as depositories of wisdom; b. to be wise (gushyira mu gaciro) for discernment; c. to work
hard (gukunda gukora); d. solidarity (gufatikanya); e. cordiality- hospitality (urugwiro-
ubupfura) so to live in harmony930.
These virtues should be viewed critically so as to filter out whatever negative significance they
may reflect in the Rwandan culture. For example, kubaha abategetsi (to obey the authorities)
enhanced the culture of irivuze umwami ukoma yombi (whatever the monarch says you applaud)
and became the doorway through which the extremists entered to manipulate the population. The
cultivation of a genuine theological thinking, as discussed above, should lead the Rwandan
people to question the orders from any source of power whether authorities or neighbours before
executing them blindly.
Another aspect of Rwandan culture is concerned with resolving conflict. Both African and
Rwandan cultures offer different formulas which must be explored. One of the African ways of
928 Shriver, op.cit. p. 110.
929 Ibid. p.71.
9311
Bimenyimana, J., La Rwandisation de l'Enseignement Secondaire. These, Rome: Universite Pontificale, 1992,
p. 103.
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resolving conflicts is the palaver (a form of conciliation by the community) 931. This model
which had its setting in Rwandan society - the 'Gacaca'- has emerged in recent African politics in
the form of the 'National Conference'. Eboussi Boulanga suggests that the National Conference
organised for the first time in Benin, is not only a forum for dialogue but a therapy for the
African populations wounded by the violence of the state regimes which perpetrated repression,
tortures, and denial of rights932.
In addition to the 'Gacaca', or the mediation of lineages or communities, there existed a magico-
religious process called Inzira ya gicurasi n'igihitasi (the path of May and pass-underground)933;
both processes compelled families, lineages and society to resolve the conflicts at a very early
stage. They would compel both the elites and the masses to sit together and listen to one another
with the assistance of a mediator.
If such a process, which from the perspective of the present work, links with a Listening
Ecclesiology was adopted by moral forces, including the Churches, and promoted as a form of
dialogue and communication in society, then the cultural based 'Gacaca' could help society to
liberate itself from the slavery of a rigid monologue of the state bureaucracy.
If the Churches decide to assume a role in ending violence and revenge using among other
means, Gacaca, then they must have a vision of reinforcing the vital force. This vision from the
perspective of this thesis, must be Koinonia, the way people can live together, having things in
common, sharing, listening to one another and participating in a common reality. According to K.
Muttiah, Koinonia is wholeness; it includes prayer, worship, fellowship, healing, repentance and
thanksgiving934. Where Koinonia is practised there are expressed the fundamental images of the
Body of Christ, the people of God, the temple.
931 The National Conference is a forum which emerged from the grass-roots in Africa at the end of 1980s. The
organisers intended a bringing together of the different social, political, religious forces to reflect on how to initiate a
new model of managing our societies. It has been organised for the first time in Benin, in 1990, then in Togo, Gabon,
Niger, Congo; R.D. Congo. It facilitated the transfer of power from the military rules to the democratically elected
bodies. Even though in many cases, the dictators have managed to cling on power, or to retake power by arms, from a
historical and psychological perspectives, the impact on the population of such an undertaking cannot be
underestimated.
932
Boulanga, E., Les Conferences Nationales en Afrique Noire. Une Affaire a Suivre. Paris: Karthala, 1993. According
to Boulanga, against all the predictions of obscurantism, stagnation, counter-development or an 'opium' of people in
the service of Western powers, some of the African Churches, have been a force for renewal and mobilisation of
conscience, through prayers, celebrations, Christian initiatives for dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation.
933 This rite comprised the mourning period after national catastrophes; at the same time was specifically designed to
question the attitude of the monarch and their entourage during the tragedy. These processes have been evoked in
Chapter six in the Presbyterian Document Ukuri Kubaka Igihugu mentioned earlier.
934Similarly, Carlos Valle argues that the notion of Koinonia is crucial for the life in unity of a Christian community.
First, community: one body which is different from uniformity or conformity but mutual responsibility in one human
family for the realisation of basic human rights needs. Second, Diversity, not a stratification nor the avoidance of the
problems but the respect of pluralism, otherness, a tolerant dialogue and the redistribution of power to favour a better
communication between the components of the society. Third, participation and fraternity. See Valle, C.,
'Communication and Mission' in Rehabilitating Communication and Mission. London: WACC, 1996,
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VII. 3.7. Healing of Memories: The 'Acting- out'
The memory created, traded and propagated has made the Banyarwanda, Bahutu, Batutsi and
Batwa), irreconcilable enemies. However, memory is not automatic; it is acquired through
education, propaganda, and policies that may perpetuate diverse forms of injustices, exclusions,
frustrations, humiliations. This means also that there is a possibility of creating good memory in
a genuine socialising process. Such a process starts with healing wounded memories.
Telling the story of the suffering and the violence is a crucial step in the healing of the memories
of the victims and society. J. Kagabo, a Rwandan native exiled in France from 1973 returned in
October 1994, December 1994 and again March 1995. He toured the bloodshed country and was
astonished to see how little was being done to help the survivors tell their experiences of
suffering. He concluded that unless the Rwandans: Bahutu and Batutsi, innocent and guilty are
helped to tell their story and exorcise all the demons of evil, the tragedy could repeat935 itself
again.
The French Philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, evokes wounded memories on the national level
consisting of the suffering from a lot of vivid memories of humiliations, shame or far deeper
ignominies. How does this 'acting - out' bring healing? Ricoeur suggests that the psychoanalytical
cure after the trauma provides what he calls 'experiencing space' (Tespace d'experience')936. This
is a kind of container, the safe place for apprehending the inheritance, the sediments of the past
that constitute the fears, the prospects, the projects and anticipation. For Ricoeur, the confession
expresses the emotions, the fears and distress; it discloses and pushes them out so as to deliver
the victim. Throughout the confession, the consciousness of the guilt is brought to the light of the
speech; "the Penitent is linked to the spoken word of their experience of absurdity, of suffering
and anguish"937.
For Ricoeur such a critical use of memories aims at telling the story, not only from the victim's
point of view, but from the enemy's. Such a work opens the way to deliverance; to mercy,
forgiveness and healing instead of recycling the stories in bitterness and hatred and resentment.
Father Masinzo member of the 'Detmold Confession' Group, a survivor of the 1994 genocide,
witnessed how he initiated an experience of this kind in the Karama parish, in the Catholic
diocese of Butare:
J'ai vecu en cachette durant le genocide. J'ai une soeur ainee rescapee. Je pensais que si je me remettais je
chercherai un pays lointain ou je m'exilerai. Quand j'etais convalescent, deux vieilles dames sont venues me
rendre visite. Une d'elle, en me voyant tout amaigri alors que d'habitude je suis Grand et costaud a eu pitie.
Elle a tire de son pagne 1,000 Francs, elle me les a donnes et m'a dit qu'elle voulait me revoir en paroisse.
J'avais refu des missionnaires a Bujumbura suffisamment d'argent, mais je ne pouvais pas refuser ce don.
935
Kagabo, J., "Apres le Genocide- Notes de Voyage". In Les Temps Modernes. 1995. Special Rwanda & Burundi
1994-1995. 50e Annee, Juillet- Aout 1995, no 583, pp.102-125.
936Ricoeur "le Pardon Peut-il Guerir". In Dialogue no 190, Avril-Mai 1996. pp 3-9. Texte paru dans la Revue 'Esprit'
Mars-Avril 1995, pp 77-82.
937 Ricoeur,P., Finitude et Culpabilite. Lvre 11: La Symbolique du Mai, Paris, Aubier, 1960, pp. 14/5.
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Apres un sejour de un mois en Belgique, je suis rentre en paroisse. La j'ai ecoute les gens, aussi les non-
rescapees. Ce fut ma conversion.
En Avril 1995 lors des evenements tragiques qui ont suivi la destruction du camp de Kibeho, j'ai vu les gens
retenues aux barrieres, cette-fois-ci, c'etaient des Hutu. J'ai vu qu'ils avaient les meme visages peureux que
les Tutsi aux barrieres en 1994: la souffrance est la meme pour tous. Des enfants jetaient des pierres ou meme
frappaient des 'abagabo' (hommes adultes). J'ai dit a ceux qui voulaient tuer pour se venger: 'vous avez
perdu des membres de vos families, vous allez perdre le ciel aussi'. J'ai du courir les collines pour la justice.
A Karama, j'ai travaille avec les veuves et les orphelins. J'ai rassemble toutes les veuves, et en plus les
femmes qui ont leur mari en prison. Je les mettais ensemble a l'eglise. La je leur disais: "ecoutez-moi peandat
5 minutes...". Puis je leur disais: " comme vous m'avez ecoute, maintenant vous allez ecoutez l'une d'entre-
vous". A tour de role, elles parlaient de leur vie. Nous apprenions ainsi a nous ecouter, a respecter la
souffrance de l'autre. Ensuite nous entamions un dialogue. Apres seulement, nous posions la question que
feriez-vous? Elles se constituaient en equipes de vie (sur base locale). Ce qui est etonnant, c'est que leur
premier besoin, c'est: qu'est-ce que Dieu peut oser nous dire? "Est-ce qu'il a encore quelque chose a nous
dire?" Une Soeur qui a fait la specialisation biblique nous aidait a lire ensemble la Bible. Le second besoin:
"les coeurs des veuves sont plus escarpes que les montagnes du nord": des gens veulent abuser, profiter
d'elles... Elles parlent aussi de leurs traumatisme. Un psychologue nous aidait. Ce n'est qu'ensuite qu'elles
parlent de leurs problemes materiels938.
In this powerful witness, the two old women represent a large fraction of Rwandans who were
powerless before the tragic events. Father Masinzo said how he could read the suffering on their
very hearts. Unlike him, some among the survivors have been affected by the loss of their
relatives to such extent they cannot read the dilemma affecting many among the 'opposite
community'.
Now, Masinzo and people of the same conviction, must undertake a heavy struggle in healing
society. He broke the chains of mistrust affecting both communities and started healing trauma
among both the survivors and the incriminated community. The process initiated by Masinzo -
who since then was named in the SAT and moved to the diocese in Butare before he left to
pursue his studies in Rome needs to be reinforced and expanded. It presents a crucial similarity
with the study of Carlos Mesters based on the suffering communities in North- East Brazil.
Mesters's book is a kind of dialogue between the victims of the arbitrary repression conducted by
the military-bourgeoisie, the four songs of Isaiah chapters 42 to 53 and the central actor, the
suffering servant. Mesters invites the 'suffering servant' not to fall for the logic of violence and
revenge by imitation of the perpetrators of violence939.
VII. 3.8. Stopping the Cumulative Impact of Violence
The suffering and wounds cannot heal in a context of continuous repetition of violence, the circle
of violence which has concerned Solon. The following story recounted by Antoine Rutayisire
indicates how the impunity evoked before can create a system of rooted violence.
Our father, was butchered in broad daylight, before our very eyes, and left for dead in front of our house. He
later was taken by the chief of our commune with many other Batutsi and some suspected Bahutu accused of
supporting the " enemy" (Inyenzi: cockroaches) and we were told they had been shot. We never saw his
body, we were never able to bury it...This kept us in a state of suspense for many years, hoping that may be
he had managed to escape... When I finally came to accept my father's death I turned my anger on all the
938
Masinzo,J., Witness at Detmold. December 1996. Notes of the present author. See also Eliat-Eliat,B., Rencontre de
Detmold ( Minutes de la Rencontre), p. 10.
939 Mesters, C., La Mission du Peuple qui Souffle. Kinshasa/ Kisangani: Editions St Paul, 1988. See also section
VII.6.8.
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people I had seen beating my father and looting our possessions. Every time I had a problem I always
remembered the massacre scene and blamed the people... I grew to hate even their children and I remember I
used to persecute one of them who was with me in secondary school. He was far younger and did not even
know what his father had done to mine. He could not understand why I hated him and I never took pains to
explain.. Then during the massacres of 1972-1973 we had to undergo a series of humiliating escapes,
spending sleepless nights in hiding, uncertain ( sic) of the future94"...
Then Antoine goes on to tell how his hope to become a renowned University professor was
destroyed in 1983. That year he was recruited to lecture at the National University in Rwanda,
but the minister of Higher Education deselected him on the ground of ethnic balance policy.
Rutayisire then abandoned his ambition of an academic career.
Commenting on the Detmold Confession from another angle, Sendashonga describes the context
of the Bahutu suffering as follows:
Parler de 1959 comme point de depart de l'oppression des Tutsi par les Hutu, sans parler des injustices
sociales d'avant cette annee -la ( et qui frappaient surtout les Hutu) revient a nier d'emblee ou a minimiser la
realite de ces injustices reduites a " certaines attitudes arrogantes et meprisantes affichees contre eux au cours
de notre histoire au nom d'un ridicule complexe de superiorite ethnique". Cela revient aussi a nier la
legitimite des aspirations au changement qui se sont faits jour au cours de la decennie 1950 et a nier la
responsabilite des tenants du pouvoir a l'epoque ( pouvoir traditionnel et pouvoir colonial) dans la myopie
dont ils ont fait preuve en ne preparant pas les institutions et les esprits en vue d'une evolution pacifique vers
une societe d'egalite et de fraternite. Pour les tenants du pouvoir traditionnel, cette myopie a ete
particulierement nocive, dans la mesure ou c'est elle qui a contribue a introduire la violence dans ce
processus de changement qui aurait du etre pacifique. 941
In Rutayisire's example, memories do not heal because of successive violence. In Sendashonga's,
fear of being subjected again to past violence and the different forms of injustices, rejection and
marginalisation may provoke a cycle of violence.
During this research, this writer came across a form of psychological repression and assimilation
of frustration that can end in a later explosion of violence. These were some people whose
relatives had been killed during the massacres and even genocide but who said that they were not
'allowed' to mourn their victims. In fact, during the genocide, people were not only killed but
were also refused the right to die as human beings and to be given a grave. Many were left in the
open air, thrown into rivers or put in common graves. The Catholic archbishop has put it as
bluntly as this: "there will be no reconciliation if all groups are not allowed to mourn their
victims" 942. However, despite the archbishop's statement, some among the Catholic hierarchy
did not manifest much enthusiasm for the exhumation of the remains of the victims wherever
possible to allow a dignified burial.
In contrast, the Presbyterian Church has been engaged in helping to organise the funerals and
mourning for some of the victims of the genocide. Unlike the views of some people opposing
such a gesture, it must be remembered that digging up bones for good reason is biblical: the
9411
Rutayisire, A., Faith under Fire. Testimonies of Christian Bravery, Herts: African Evangelistical Enterprise, 1996,
p. 105.
94lSendashonga, S., "Pour le Pardon et la Justice". Reaction a la Confession de Detmold. In Dialogue, no 197.
Bruxelles, Mars-Avril, 1997, p. 45/6.
942
Ntihinyurwa, (Mgr), op.cit. Kigali, March 1997.
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Hebrews dug up the bones of Joseph and took them from Egypt to Canaan for burial there943.
Funeral and mourning offer the possibility to express the pain and to exorcise a possible
explosion in violence which would otherwise continue to accumulate.
Hence, a liturgy of mourning and purification becomes a solid act of reconciliation that would re¬
establish dignity to human life and reinstate the creation to its primary 'divine' role. Such a
liturgy might involve the purification of different elements such as water, vegetation, air and
individuals. Such a liturgy must compel people to accept cohesion and unity nurtured by the
sacraments taken from the perspective of the cultural Rwandan notion of Igihango944. From now
on, receiving the blood and body of Christ would cease to be a formality: it will commit the
recipients to a reciprocal solidarity with those for whom Christ died; all the victims of arbitrary
measures and diverse forms of injustice945.
VII. 3.9. Interpreting Suffering
Suffering and death have become so commonplace in Rwanda that a deep reflection is needed to
equip Christians morally and spiritually to learn how to sustain life945 as well as to discover their
theological significance. Subsequent issues to consider here range from such questions as why
innocents die; why human beings easily become vectors of hatred and death. What factors have
helped some people to become involved in violence while others become heroes or martyrs? And
in reference to the preceding section, to reflect on what can be the 'anti-crises' values, both from
the biblical perspective and the positive side of the Rwandan culture?
Then the Churches must prepare to face fundamental questions regarding suffering and death.
People ask: where was God during our suffering? Why did the tragedy affect X not Y? There
then must be some presuppositions from both the victims' perspective and from the perpetrators
of the violence.
First, from the victim's point of view, it could be said that:
- God was there but did not want to intervene in the Rwandan conflict;
943 See Genesis 50.25; Exodus 13.19; Hebrews 1.22.
944
Igihango, a blood pact between two persons of different lineages or clans who would commit themselves to mutual
fidelity till death.
In the post-apartheid era, the South Africa Council of Churches has proposed a rite of Reconciliation on the same
model. The Council had invited the Churches to celebrate ceremonies of Reconciliation in which people were invited
to repent either for having taken arms to defend Apartheid or having taken arms to fight for freedom thus killing
innocent people caught in the crossfire, or necklacing the suspected informers.
945 SACC. Rite of Reconciliation. Johannesburg: 1996. The document suggests among other things that the communal
confession and rite of cleansing use fire, oil, shrines of peace. Optionally there can be a libation rite. Then the
participants would be invited to call upon both the spirit of ancestors and the spirit of those who died before their time
as innocent victims of human blindness, those who died unknowingly defending a cruel political order to intercede on
behalf of the nation. Alternatively, a cleansing rite can use a goat, water, bile, gall and so forth.
The sermons would emphasise: alienation from God and one another; God, author of reconciliation; the theology of the
cross underlining sacrificial love, retribution and reparation justice; the incarnation; God, vulnerable as dependant on
humanity. The lesson to draw up would be the encounter that leads us to the prophets in the age of reconstruction and
development. Lastly, it will be shown that reconciliation with God is impossible without reconciliation with each other.
94<sSee the Detmold Confesssion.
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- God was not there, He has too much to do elsewhere;
- or most likely, God was there and suffered with the victims.
From the point of view of the perpetrators of violence, two categories of feelings emerged often:
God, didn't mind or God allowed it to happen.
But then, the same questions will be extended to whoever stands for reconstruction and
rehabilitation. Where were you? What was your position during our suffering? Have-you
participated in our suffering, in the struggle for our liberation; have you, been neutral or siding
with the violent?
From the perspective of this research, it is clear that many in Rwanda became apathetic or
indifferent as in the case of the Jewish holocaust recalled by President Weizsacker above. Hence,
what is important for the future, is whether people remain unrepentant like Cain and Judas or if
they would, like Peter break down in tears and shame. The position before and during the
suffering is crucial for anyone: individuals or group who want to work for reconciliation.
Hans Jonas a German Philosopher from a Jewish origin discusses the Conception of God after
Auschwitz. He suggests four images of God : 1. the Suffering God (image given by Hosea), God
who suffers from the creation of the human being; 2. a God in becoming (God is not immutable
but is sensitive to what is happening in the world); 3. a God who is concerned (He is not
detached from the very reality but is implicated; He is not a magician but has left the autonomy
to the world); 4.a God who is poor and fragile).
Hans Jonas thinks that God did not intervene in Auschwitz not because he did not want it but
because he could do nothing. From creation, God deprived Himself of His invulnerability, thus
allowed the world to be; He gave autonomy to His creation. Since then, God has nothing to offer
but is dependant vis-a-vis His creatures, human beings created in the image of God become
responsible for the destiny of the world and beyond, of God Himself. For H. Jonas its now up to
human beings to enjoy being created and to give to God no reason to regret having created the
world947.
This Jewish perspective points out the crucial issue of the use and misuse of the autonomy which
God gave to human beings. The relevance of the message for the Rwandan context is a challenge
to understand that God suffered with the suffering victims of the tragedy. To collectively help
people recover, Job's theology of passion and revolt may be an aid to understanding the suffering
of innocents though this remains God's mystery. The meditation on Job's theology will help to
penetrate the enigma of evil, suffering and death. It shows that God was some how mysteriously
but really present in the midst of the tragedy, accompanying the victims. Hans Jonas's message
also invites Rwandans to assess how they managed the autonomy entrusted in them by God and
1,47
Hans, J., Le Concept de Dieu apres Auschwitz. Une voie Juive. Paris: Petite bibliotheque Payot, 1994.
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to foresee their key responsibility in the destiny of their nation and neighbours as part of God's
creation.
VII. 4. A Listening Ecclesiology
The failure of the moral forces to fully understand or to interpret accurately the reality of the
Rwandan crises shows that, it may be feasible for the Churches to live in midst of the poor but to
exist for the rich. In fact, the Biblical ethos suggests that the identity of a Christian community is
living in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. The best model here is the servant-hood
described in the Second Isaiah, also Jesus's life and contemporary martyrs, including Martin
Luther King Jr and Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King Jr pioneered human rights
and dignity of the 20th century. They showed that the rejection of a reign of terror always carries
a cost. In choosing to oppose evil regimes instead of being the vectors of sin in the world, or
curbing ourselves before absolute power and living ideologies, we must choose the route of
martyrdom.
The question is how to be truly Christian without renouncing our belonging to family, clan,
cultural or political identity. Ethnicity is a gift from God. But it ceases to be a glory when it is
made an absolute ideological tool of oppression, exclusion and used to deny the rights of others.
In fact, the "citizenship in the Kingdom of God is the only absolute, non-negotiable identity for
the Christians". When a person becomes a member of the people of God through Christ, they
receive a new identity which supercedes every ethnic identity though does not efface or
invalidate its cultural manifestation.
Volf suggests that Christians should take a critical distance vis-a-vis their identity, that is a
latitude to observe one's camp, without emotion, or partiality948. Distance can transcend the
community boundaries and fears which block the possibility of listening, interacting and being
challenged by others' experiences, others' ways of doing, organising and understanding things.
Before the 'Hutu power ideology' of MRND/CDR and the Interahamwe system, Nazism
attempted to re-establish a primitive unity in a homogeneous tribal and racial community. They
wanted to establish a cultural, religious and economic basis in which an omnipresent
monolithical state would control and be capable of suppressing individual liberties in the
negation of differences. R. Niebhur suggests that democracy emerged as an effort, first to
preserve the unity and the uniformity of tensions between classes, and second, to allow those
classes in friction with liberty to express themselves without necessarily breaking the unity of the
community949. This applies to all cultures including Rwandan but, needs, I suggest some
948
Volf, M., "Theological Perspectives on Cultural identity and Conflict". In Ecumenical Review, No 47.VoL.2. April
1995. pp. 195-205.
949
Niebuhr,R., The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. A theological Vindication for Democracy and a
critique of its traditional defenders. London: Nisbet, 1945.
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mechanisms of reinforcement including a listening ecclesiology as a characteristic of the
Churches.
VII.5. Weeping with Hope
Telling the stories of the fracture of Rwandan society as this thesis has tried to do must be edified
by the fact that the ruin has not been total. One thing which all those involved in reconstruction
of Rwanda must remember, is that the Bible story shows how God can transform crises into
opportunities and blessings. In the history of revelation: Flood, Sodom and Ghomorrah, Exodus,
God has used only a small group of faithful human beings to renew his Creation.950
It is also important to remember that crises are always followed by a new beginning provided that
there is even one remaining to stand in the gap and to worship the true God (Noah), to confess
and repent (Jacob and Esau), to forgive (Joseph and his brothers) and do justice and
righteousness (Micah 6.8; Rom 14.17). In the midst of despair, tensions, it is my conviction that
that 'small remnant', individuals and groups, exists known and unknown.
Many people, regardless of the threats of the killers, remained united during the Rwandan
tragedy; many died, others survived. Even among non- Christian circles some people have shown
their inclination to sacrifice their lives for peace and human dignity. In the period before, during
and after the genocide, there have been individuals and groups who have together continued to
witness to the love of God in refusing to adhere to the genocide project.
Reflecting on the Church of the future, Jose Chipenda, suggested that crises are always followed
by a new beginning. Chipenda invites the Churches now freed from colonialism and ideological
divides to discern the signs of hope and set up programmes that emphasise Justice, Peace,
Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Koinonia which binds us into a partnership and mutual
951
commitment .
Those include not only Christians but also Muslims and even Government officials, army men
and so forth952. These are signs of hope which could resuscitate the soul of the Rwandan nation.
950 The idea of a 'small rest' has been developed by the Zairian ethicist Ka Mana. See Ka Mana. Foi Chretienne. Crise
Africaine et Reconstruction de l'Afriaue. Sens et Enieux des Theologiens Africaines Contemporaines. Nairobi/ Lome/
Yaounde: CETA-HAHO-CLE, 1992.
95lChipenda,J., "The Church of the Future". In Waruta, D., African Church in the 21st Century, Challenges and
promises. Nairobi:AACC/ African Challenges Series, 1995, pp. 19-36.
952 Kunath Wolfgang reported in Stuttgart Zeitung. of 14/12/1994 that many Muslims have been arrested and killed
trying to save lives. A Hutu Muslim in Butare has saved almost 100 Tutsi in hiding them under the wood in his lorry
and in conveying them towards Burundi. In Nyamirambo, Kigali, the Imam said, "now it is time for the true believer to
live his faith as written in the Koran in saving lives that are in danger".
A Similar experience verified by the present author happened in Cyangugu city. Muslims blocked their home area
called, 'La cite' where it was believed more than 50 people were hiding and requested their members, including those
who belonged to the Interahamwe militia to protect them. This may be a sign of hope, a basis for the dialogue Islam-
Christianity.
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Their example will speak for the whole nation if they persist in cross-cutting political and
ideological boundaries. If we do not remember and pay tribute to them, they will have died in
• 953
vain .
There are many stories of groups and individual bravery. In Kigeme, the family of Bishop
Birindabagabo stayed in the diocese where his colleague N. Kayumba made every effort to
protect him after abandoning attempts of evacuating the family through separate routes in
secret954. Equally in Kigeme, M. Kayitaba, a very well known former Secondary school Head-
teacher, was hidden by a widow. At the very worse period of the massacres, Kayitaba proposed
leaving his hiding place in order to die alone instead of risking both their lives. The widow
replied: "Michael, what sort of Christian witness would that be? What would I say to you if I had
to meet you in Heaven? No if you die I will die with you"955. Kayitaba is now very active in
reconciliation with his organisation, MUSECOOR. Many other groups of survivors are working
hard to lay down the conditions of repentance and reconciliation956.
Equally, in a T.V. documentary film of the Irish journalist, F. Keane, the new Prefet of Butare who had just succeeded
J.B. Habyarimana (no relations with President Habyariama) dismissed and Killed by the Interim Government, is shown
conveying two hundred children in a lorry towards Burundi. After that, he was, according to the film dismissed and
replaced by an army officer.
953 Antoine Rutayisire has recently collected and published 13 short stories about "Testimonies of Christian bravery"
Rutayisire.A., op.cit.
954
Meeting and talks with Kayumba and Birindabagabo, Kigeme, late April 1994.
955Kavitaba. M.. Interview, Detmold. December, 1996; and witness during the Conference on " Role of the Churches
in Conflict Prevention, Human Rights and Peace Keeping", Kigali, October 1997.
956 In Ruhanga parish, Bahutu and Batutsi refugees refused to separate. They were attacked, bombarded. Almost a
1000 people, including the parish priest and his wife died within the Church. In Kacyiru, Revd F. Bashaka, the leader
of a Baptist Church succeeded in dismissing the attempt made by Interahamwe militia to separate refugees. When a
commando of the RPF arrived to rescue the Batutsi, they all gave the response Revd Bashaka had repeated to the
Interahamwe: here are no Bahutu no Batutsi but Christians. All the 150 people were taken to Hospital Faycal where
they joined other refugees under the protection of the RPF.
In Gakinjiro, Kigali, the Church in the headquarters of the Pentecostal Church, Revd Jacques Kayihura resisted with
almost 700 refugees, Hutu and Tutsi from April to the capture of Kigali, 4 July 1994. Two people were reported to
have died among them a driver who was captured supplying the refugees with wood. Sadly, in the aftermath of the
tragedy, that Church recorded disgraceful scenes of a struggle for power and leadership. The police eventually had to
intervene and the temple was closed for more than three months.
To White Fathers, Henry Brancharld and Otto Meyer, in the Nyamirambo parish (Kigali) remained with the refugees.
They were wounded but continued to brave the most threatening attacks of the Interahamwe. With God's help, they
had some refugees rescued by the RPF.
A tribute goes to a Catholic layperson mentioned ealier in this work, Dr Laurien Ntezimana who stood firm in Butare at
the risk of his life; it goes to an expatriate layperson, Marc Vaiter. A French HIV patient, Vaiter arrived in Kigali in
March 1993 to start a centre for assistance to the HIV-AIDS patients. M. Vaiter rejected the offer from the French
troops to evacuate and endured the hardship of the militia till the end of the war in the capital.
A more controversial figure, Father W. Munyeshaka saved the lives of many. Very familiar within the circles of the
MRND, this young priest may have tried to use some strategic tools of the militia (gun, anti-bullet dress) which
became his downfall. He was one of the rare people who remained in a sensitive parish with thousand of refugees
caught in the crossfire of the two armies. If some people in Church defend him against the curse and accusations of
others, it is because he has represented different images: he portrays a contrast to the cowardice of many among the
clergy but also represents the weakness of the clergy which the Church wants to keep secret (he has been accused for
attempting to abuse some refugees, i.e. abusing females).
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It would be hazardous to suggest that all survivors are inclined to work for peace and
reconciliation. Many want no more than revenge. What matters here is to acknowledge that the
survivors can be either the resources for Reconstruction or factors of destruction. Thus the
Churches ought to play a crucial role in providing a container for all the angers, frustrations and
sufferings so as to make good out of evil.
It is when a container is provided that a Christian community can set up a model that breaks the
barriers of hatred to allow reconciliation and reconstruction to happen. As in the case of
Germany mentioned in section VII. 1.1, South Africa post-Apartheid society offers an example of
the healing of the nation and the Church, in particular through the activities of its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In South Africa, the struggle for liberation reached a high
point in the liberation of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 (after 27 years of imprisonment)
followed by democratic elections in April 1994. These elections were won by the ANC. Mandela
became the first Black President of multi-racial South Africa. He pursued his work of reconciling
the South Africans, in particular with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) 957.
Chaired by Desmond Tutu, the Commission seeks to reveal the truth about the atrocities
committed by all the actors from all sides. The Commission has the authority to offer amnesty to
the perpetrators of violence in return for confessions made before the deadline of May 1997958.
The person seeking for amnesty for gross violation of human rights must apply to the
commission within a deadline time. The applicant must provide the details on the circumstances
of the offence including whether the offence was executed as an order or personal motivation. In
the context, amnesty is offered on the basis of full disclosure and public confession before the
public hearings of the TRC. According to him, the "majority of victims and their relatives want
little more than this basic knowledge" so that people know how society arrived at such a
degrading and dehumanising state.
What South Africa society wants to have is a disclosure of a complete picture of the causes,
nature and extent of gross violations of human rights that allows society to hear and understand
the atrocities organised by the apartheid regime. Inspired by the German Philosopher Karl Jasper,
957 Villa-Vicencio , C., "Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) A different kind of justice. The South Africa
Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (1996). See also Sojourners. Vol. 25 No 4 July-August 1996. pp. 10-11.
Documentation from Prof. Forrester's collection.
9 The ANC as a party has acknowledged its mistakes while the NP refuses to confess.
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Villa-Vicencio suggests that the TRC gives importance to the distinction between the criminal,
political, moral and metaphysical aspects of justice.
The dominant model of retributive justice offers no alternative to punishment. It demands an
eye for eye, blood for blood. From the TRC perspective it is devoid of justice. TRC offers
amnesty and a political restorative model as an alternative to forms of criminal justice. Finally, it
offers ethical, cultural and theological principles as source of true justice.
This means: 1. that the community is involved in finding new ways of dealing with criminals in
accepting communal responsibility instead of leaving the matter between the victim and the
perpetrator; 2. makes the perpetrator contribute to society rather than become a burden; 3. the
political and personal apology which of course results from a personal and spiritual condition
that transform the individuals (thus pedagogical work of the moral forces).
Likewise, the Churches in Rwanda are faced with the enormous task of persuading the
governement to create a moral culture that enables society to overcome the legacy of years of
violence. Telling the stories is a form of therapy. But it needs more, a programme of reparation.
Epilogue
This work has explored the pilgrimage of the Rwandan narrative. It recounted how the
breakdown of the relational harmony has allowed some people to inflict much suffering and
death on their fellow countrymen. It has highlighted the unequivocal role of the Churches in
planting and maintaining the ideology of supremacy together with other major actors, the
colonial rulers and the local elites, the Batutsi before the independence and the Bahutu after that
period. It has also debated the role of the leadership in the post-independence period marked by
ethno-politics. It became inevitable to underline the responsibility of the ethno-historical
scholarship in the formation and fixing of prejudices and stereotypes which generated the
'histoire ressentiment' in the mentalities of Rwandans. It showed that this process created a lot of
enmity, hatred and violence propagated by sectarian groups in some media sections culminating
in the 1994 genocide.
That said, the contribution of the Churches of Rwanda in the promotion of the social and
economic activities has been outstanding. This is not however the aim of this work which,
instead has focused on the issue of the absence of spiritual and moral guidance to society. An
evaluation of the experiences that are happening at the grass-roots in the post-genocide era
indicates that, despite their spontaneity and enthusiasm, they have not yet reached the peak. They
have not yet broken through the fortress mentality of the ecclesial elite to enable them to become
prophets of their time.
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The chances of success for a process of healing to reach a holistic reconciliation starts
necessarily with a genuine gesture from the Church hierarchy to accept their guilt and that of the
nation, to confess and repent as did the German, South African and the Japanese Churches,
Christian groups in Ireland and hopefully some Rwandans who made the 'Confession of Detmold'
and the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda. To contribute to the search for a solution this thesis
proposes a 'Repentance-Identification' as the first step the Churches should take in approaching
the issue of confession and repentance. Once their conscience is cleansed, then they will feel
freer to elaborate a framework for repentance, forgiveness and reconciliation for society.
This research suggests that the Gospel crosses ethnic boundaries and creates a new identity. It
then envisions both a model of Koinonia structure sustained by a listening ecclesiology for the
Church to help society end its tragic past. Koinonia, as a way people live together, share in
worship and fellowship, must perpetually refresh itself in a transforming spiritual renewal
enhanced by acts of repentance, truth - searching and telling which constitute the basis for a
genuine reconciliation.
As a result, people will lean to curb their ethnic belonging under the banner of their Christian
identity; they will learn to commit themselves to being the gift of life for their neighbours,
sharing their humanity infused by the values of the Gospel which offer the chance for Rwandans
to work for the kingdom of God, a kingdom of Justice, Peace and Joy.
To pursue, enhance and carry out such a project, the world-wide Christian community must assist
the Rwandan Churches to be equipped for the training of outstanding leadership, clergy, men and
women whose mind-sets are liberated from the chains of ethnicism. These must be free-thinkers,
open- minded, guided by the biblical ethos of love, justice and justice so as to build up a dignified
moral and sustainable society. This involves what Karamaga calls" detribalisation de la mentalite",
which means to acknowledge in each human being, the body and blood of Christ who makes us
brothers/sisters. Out of such a process would certainly emerge a new generation of human beings
converted to share humanity and 'Rwandanity' instead of valuing the Bahutu or Batutsi identity
which has proved up to now to be fragile in resisting against ideological propaganda.
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Glossary of the Kinyarwanda Terms
Abacurabwenge (lit.creators of knowledge): Specialists of the genealogies and biographies as "legal
foundation of the reigning dynasty".
Abahuzamugambi ( lit.those who have the same goal): Militia of the extremist party CDR, ally of the
MRND.
Abaka: (lit.those who shine). Name given to those who converted during the 1930s Protestant Revival. See
also Abarokore: the saved.
Abakambazimana (lit. those who praise Gose): volunteers of peace formed by the Butare Catholic Service
of Theological Animation.
Abantu b'Imana (lit. people of God). Name chosen by adherents of religious movements who split from
the major Christian denominations in 1980s and who were severely repressed by the regime.
Abasizi: poets.
Abatekereza (lit.those who reason): memorialists who kept the official or family genealogies.
Abatware: chiefs
Abiru: influential ritual councilors of the court. They kept the esoteric code of the monarchy.
Akazu (lit.small house): the clique surrounding the monarch, then after the independence, a clique close to
the president who ruled over legal official institutions.
Amasasu: a violent group formed in the army to oppose the peace process.
Amoko: a generic term designing both the clan or ethnic group
Babanda (Banda); Bagesera (Gesera); Bahindiro (Hindiro); Basinga (Singa), Bega, Banyiginya,
Benengwe : ancient clans of Rwanda.
Bafulero, Banyamurenge, Bembe: three ethnic groups in the Province of South Kivu (R.D.Congo).
Banyarwanda (Bahutu, Batutsi, Batwa): respective "ethnic" groups of Rwanda. See also Gahutu, Gatutsi,
Gatwa: sons of Kanyarwanda, mythical ancestor of the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa
Barenge: population known in the Rwandan tradition as inhabiting the land before the present-day
occupants.
Buberuka, Budaha, Bufumbira, Bugoyi, Buha, Buhoma, Bukonya, Bukoba, Bukunzi, Bumbogo,
Bunyabungo, Bunyoro, Bushiru, Busozo,Bwanamwali, Bwimba, Gisaka, Mubali,Bugesera: ancient
autonomous kingship of Rwanda
Butare, Cyangugu, Byumba, Gikongoro, Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kigali, Kibungo, Kibuye, Ruhengeri:
administrative divisions called Prefectures.
Cyimumugizi, Kiragutse,Mpatsibihugu: the substitutes of Karinga, the emblem-drum of Karinga.
Gacaca: Traditional form of lineages and clan's mediation of the conflict
Humiriza Nkuyobore: close your eyes so that I lead you: name given to the totalitarian policy of the
MRND regime
"Hutu Pawa": name of the extremists groups who, under the MRND and CDR political parties elaborated
and executed the 1994 genocide and massacres.
Ibimanuka: those who descended from sky. According to the myth of ibimanuka, the Banyiginya reinging
dynasty
Ibyitso: Accomplices. Name given to members of the Batutsi community or those favorable to the power
sharing with the RPF.
Igihango: blood brotherhood
Ikiguri-Nunga: the "zero network"or the nucleus of the violent groups of the Habyarimana regime
Ikinani (lit.the invincible). Nickname Habyarimana gave himself during an extraordinary Congress of the
MRND on April, 29, 1991
Imana: God
Imbaga (masses): name of a independent newspaper belonging to the rural co-operative movement.
Imvaho ( news): A governemental newspaper
Inkotanyi: fighter in Kinyarwanda. Name of a traditional militia adopted by the militants and the army of
the RPF.
Inkuru Niziza: good news. Name of a small american christian community of Protestant tendency based in
Kigali from 1960s.
Interahamwe: those who attack together. Militia of the MRND
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Inyabutatu Nyarwanda: the Rwandan tripartite (Bahutu, Batutsi, Batwa)
Inyarubuga: name of a traditional militia
Inyenzi: cockroaches. Name of the 1960s rebellion made of the 1959 refugees.
Inzirabwoba (lit. those who never have fear): name of a traditional militia adopted by the Habyarimana
regime for his army.
Kamarampaka: Referendum. Reference to the 25 September referendum in which the Banyarwanda
rejected the monarchy.
Kangura (lit. make awake): Newspaper of the extremists groups initiated in 1990
Karinga: the emblem-drum of the Banyiginya-Bahindiro reigning dynasty.
Kinyamateka: the Roman Catholic newspaper
Kinyarwanda: language of Rwanda.
Kivu Lake: a natural border between Rwanda and R.D.Congo
Mariamu: a prophetess of Banyamurenge background who started teaching in 1970s in Abela village,
south-east of Congo.
Mbonyumutwa; Kayibanda: respectively presidents of Rwanda, January to September 1961; October
1961 to July 1973
Munyoro, Muhima : clans of Uganda
Mwami: King in Rwanda, Burundi and east of R.D.Congo
Nduga or Nduga elargi: name given to the regions of Rwanda other than Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and the part
of Byumba other than Buganza and Mutara.
Rubanda nyamwinshi (the vast majority): designation of the Bahutu by the "Hutu extremist groups".
Rukiga: The opposite of Nduga. Part of the country comprising Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Byumba.
Ubuhake: contrat of clientship in the pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda
Uburetwa: forced labour
Ubuse: relationship of jokery existing between members of different clans; ritual of purification of a land or
the space for the installation of a house and its inauguration.
Ukuri kubaka igihugu: the truth that build up the country
Umuganda: Activities of mutual aid and solidarity in Rwanda, Umuganda manual activities were made
constitutionally compelling by the MRND Regime in 1974 for at least one day per week for each Rwandan.
Umukristo mu Mjyambere (the Christian in development): Name of an ecumenical group initiated in
1990s by Father Blancharch to reflect on the political changes. See in Bibliography the list of various
publications in Kinyarwanda.
Umunyamuryango wa TRAFIPRO: Newspaper of the TRAFIPRO trade company
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